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ABSTRACT			Through	a	reading	of	the	heroic,	female	bodies	available	in	Tamora	Pierce’s	Tortall	books	(1983–2011)	and	Marissa	Meyer’s	Lunar	Chronicles	(2012–2015),	this	thesis	demonstrates	how	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	contests	the	dominant,	hegemonic	narratives	of	female	adolescence.	Owing	to	the	system	of	binary	oppositions	structuring	this	space,	the	adolescent	girl	is	offered—through	the	heavily	stylised	and	always-edited	images	of	popular	and	media	culture—a	very	narrow	and	limited	means	of	becoming	self,	one	insisting	on	a	discourse	of	self-through-appearance	at	the	expense	of	the	body’s	fleshiness.	Demonstrating	a	creationary	or	world-building	mind-set,	this	vein	of	speculative	fiction	offers	a	sub	or	counter-cultural	space	in	which	alternative	frameworks	of	living	and	being	an	adolescent	female	body	are	possible.	Through	the	sometimes-fantastical	transformations	of	the	body	in	Pierce	and	Meyer’s	fantasy,	this	thesis	engages	liminality,	focusing	on	the	adolescent	(between	child/adult),	the	body	(between	self/other),	and	young	adult	literature	(YAL)	(between	children’s/adult	literature).	Drawing	from	a	variety	of	fields:	YAL	and	feminist	theory,	studies	of	myth	and	folklore	as	well	as	popular	culture	and	cultural	anthropology,	this	thesis	speaks	to	and	from	the	places	between	oppositions,	and	does	so	in	order	to	refuse	the	individuality	and	isolation	required	by	hegemonic	models,	while	also	offering	a	re-mapping	of	the	body’s	curves	and	contours,	one	that	takes	“lumps,”	“bumps,”	and	“scars”	into	account.	To	counter	the	dominant	framework	of	adolescence,	this	thesis	concludes	by	offering,	through	a	metaphor	of	“the	Pack,”	a	model	of	interdependency	and	relation.	Formed	by	repetition	and	connection,	this	model	frustrates	the	economy	of	opposition,	while	also	taking	into	account	the	body’s	raised	and	irregular	surfaces	and	demonstrating	how	individuals	may	be	“scored	into	uniqueness”	through	relationality.					 	
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INTRODUCTION	EXCESSES	OF	EXPECTATION:	FEMALE	ADOLESCENCE,	1980–PRESENT		The	journey	of	adolescence	and	the	hero’s	journey	are	essentially	the	same:	both	privilege	a	white,	youthful,	able-bodied,	male	figure	and	both	aim,	through	a	linear	framework,	to	maintain	heteronormative	values	and	ideals,	while	also	reinforcing	patriarchy.	The	adolescent	becomes	a	stable,	heterosexual	adult;	the	hero	wins	the	princess’s	hand	in	marriage.	In	other	words,	these	two	journeys	chart	the	same	hegemonic	story,	in	particular	manifestations.	The	hero	is	the	adolescent;	the	adolescent	is	the	hero.	Moreover,	their	shared	fantasy	of	achieving	a	stable,	secure,	and,	by	default,	heterosexual	(adult)	identity	is	only	ever	that,	a	fantasy.	It	is	the	ideal,	and	ideals	are	not	expressions	of	things	as	they	are	but,	rather,	conceptions	of	things	as	they	are	desired	to	be—by,	in	this	case,	hegemonic,	patriarchal	discourse.	Furthermore,	within	both	these	frames,	the	body	marks	the	adolescent/hero	as	adolescent/hero.	The	adolescent	is	adolescent	because	of	pubertal	bodily	changes,	and	the	hero	is	hero	because	of	his	bodily	strength	and	potency,	characteristics	also	associated	with	the	ideal	adolescent	body.	Yet,	this	ideal—expressed	by	both	discourses—also	refuses	the	body.		Dependent	on	an	infrastructure	of	binary	oppositions	(mind/body,	male/female,	linear/cycle),	the	ideal	refuses	bodily	fleshiness	and	materiality,	in	favour	of	a	discursive	construction	of	ability,	stability,	wholeness,	and	singularity.	These	oppositions	are	not	equal	in	weight;	one	side	of	the	oppositional	pair	is	superior	to	the	other,1	and	this	superiority	depends	on	a	clearly	defined	blank	space	between	the	pairs.	Paradigmatically,	the	body	is	refused	because	it	is	not	mind,	the	superior	position.	This	refusal	of	the	body	is	key	because	it	is	through	the	adolescent	girl’s	alignment	with	the	body	(fleshiness	and	materiality)	that	she	is	not	only	excluded	from	the	paradigm	“hero,”	but	also	trapped	within	a	developmental	scheme	that	requires	the	
                                                1	Derrida	(1981)	suggests,	this	opposition	is	not	“the	peaceful	coexistence	of	a	
vis-à-vis,	but	rather	[…]	a	violent	hierarchy”	(41).	
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suppression	of	her	body,	a	body	that	is	shape-changing	into	“woman”	thus	offering	a	heightened	fleshiness.2			It	is,	however,	my	contention	that	mythopoeic	Young	Adult	(YA)	fantasy	literature,	a	literature	particularly	concerned	with	hailing	and	interpellating	an	adolescent	audience	(Althusser	1971),	is	challenging	these	dominant,	hegemonic	discourses	of	the	body	and	of	its	appearance,	and	while	such	challenging	occurs	in	many	ways	and	in	many	books,	this	thesis	explores	the	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	of	Tamora	Pierce	and	Marissa	Meyer.3	Pierce’s	Tortall	Universe	and	Meyer’s	Lunar	Chronicles	offer	bodies	of	instability,	directly	countering	the	images	of	stability	and	perfection	dominating	hegemonic	discourse.	The	cross-dressing,	“glamoured,”4	menstruating,	shape-shifting	and	cybernetic	bodies	available	in	these	texts	offer	alternatives	to	both	the	hegemonic	discourses	of	the	mythic	tradition	(ideal	heroic	form)	as	well	as	the	visuality	of	popular	and	media	culture,	a	space	influenced	by	the	discourses	of	myth	and	also	the	one	most	directly	affecting	contemporary	adolescent	girls.		Within	this	frame,	girlhood—particularly	its	liminal	adolescent	years—is	fraught	with	great	anxiety,	increasingly	in	terms	of	appearance	(Brumberg	1998;	Dyhouse	2013).	Since	the	Spice	Girls’	popularizing	of	“Girl	Power”	in	the	early	1990s,	this	focus	on	appearance	has	been	negotiated	through	a	neoliberal	
                                                2	I	see	a	subtle	difference	between	female	adolescent	and	adolescent	girl.	While	it	is	a	difficult	distinction	to	make	and	maintain,	I	associate	the	first	with	the	physical	changes—the	bodily	transformations—that	demarcate	a	period	between	childhood	and	adulthood	and	the	second	with	the	discursively	constructed	creature,	thus	it	is	a	difference	along	the	lines	of	sex	and	gender.	Yet,	herein	lies	the	problem:	not	only	are	those	physical	(i.e.	biological,	natural)	changes	capricious,	but	their	meanings	(our	conceptions	of	them)	are	just	as	culturally	constructed	as	this	idea	of	“adolescent	girl”	that	I	attempt	to	isolate	through	the	division.	3	I	focus	specifically	on	Pierce’s	Song	of	the	Lioness	(1983–1988),	Immortals	(1992–1996)	and	Protector	of	the	Small	(1999–2002)	quartets	as	well	as,	to	a	lesser	extent,	her	Daughter	of	the	Lioness	duology	(2003–2004)	and	Beka	Cooper	trilogy	(2006–2011),	as	all	are	also	set	within	the	Tortall	realm.	Meyer’s	work	comprises	The	Lunar	Chronicles	(2012–2015).		4	This	refers	to	the	Lunar	glamour,	an	ability	possessed	by	certain	characters	in	Marissa	Meyer’s	The	Lunar	Chronicles.	
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narrative	of	choice:	the	adolescent	girl	may	choose	to	be	whomever	she	wishes.5	Yet,	while	such	narratives	appear	to	offer	agency,	the	sheer	homogeneity	of	the	appearance	produced—and	that	appearance	is,	itself,	so	singularly	relied	upon—suggests	a	narrowing,	rather	than	an	increasing,	of	options	available	to	the	adolescent	girl.	Furthermore,	these	narratives	posit	the	female	adolescent’s	developing	body	as	both	her	source	of	power	and	as	something	she	must	(self-)	control	(Bartky	1988;	Gill	2007).	Thus,	despite	gaining	access	to	an	unprecedented	amount	of	choice,	the	adolescent	girl	remains	both	trapped	within	a	body	and	constrained	by	surveillance	and	discipline	so	pervasive	that	she	“freely”	chooses	to	enact	their	mechanisms	of	control	(bikini	waxes	and	breast	augmentation,	hair	dye	and	teeth	whitening)	upon	herself,	that	is	to	say,	upon	her	body.		Popular	and	media	culture	is	a	discursive	space	emanating	from	the	West,	particularly	the	United	States	and	its	culture	of	celebrity.	Yet,	it	is	also	the	digital	and	visual	space	of	social	media—Facebook	and	Twitter,	YouTube	and	Vine,	Snapchat	and	Instagram—where	adolescent	girls	are	increasingly	“living”	more	and	more	of	their	lives.	This	is,	in	other	words,	the	media	and	image	saturated	world	within	which	the	adolescent	girl	has	existed	since	the	profusion	of	Internet	technologies	in	the	mid–2000s,	a	saturation	that	has	only	increased	as	technologies	have	developed	(Senft	2008;	Rettberg	2014).	Through	the	images	of	this	space	as	they	are	made	available	by	popular	and	social	media	(the	celebrity	and	the	selfie),	the	adolescent	girl	is	continually	presented	with	images	of	the	ideal	body—images	that	not	only	model	and	define	the	ideal	self	but	that,	at	times,	replace	it.6	These	images	of	perfection	continuously	bombard	
                                                
5	In	terms	of	texts	examining	Girl	Power,	see:	Harris	(2004),	Currie,	Kelly	and	Pomerantz	(2009),	and	Hains	(2012).	While	neoliberal	narratives	of	choice	(among	other	issues)	are	explored	by:	Gill	(2007),	Gill	and	Scharff	(2011),	Stuart	and	Donaghue	(2011).	Gonick,	Renold,	Ringrose	and	Weems	(2009)	unites	the	two	narratives,	demonstrating	how	both	produce	the	“girl”	through	a	complex	web	of	neoliberal	policies	and	practices.	6	Rosalind	Gill’s	recent	work	has	turned	to	consider,	what	she	terms,	a	“psychic”	emphasis	on	what	were	“body”	projects,	that	is	to	say,	these	projects	have	shifted	to	a	focus	on	one’s	“state	of	mind.”		While	Gill	reads	this	as	a	shift	in	focus	“from	bodily	regulation	to	psychic	regulation”	(Gill	and	Elias	2014,	179,	my	emphasis),	I	see	it	as	an	intensification	in	the	relationship	between	the	body	
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her:	in	the	pages	of	her	favourite	magazines,	on	the	many	screens	she	views,	and,	even,	in	the	stories	she	reads.	Encompassing	both	the	image	(as	in	photograph)	as	well	as	the	more	illusive	self-image	(conceptions	of	oneself,	both	presented	and	perceived	and	reliant	on	the	first	notion	of	image),	this	insistence	on	image	elides	the	shape-changes	that	occur	when	one	is	becoming	“woman.”	The	often	messy	transition—growing	breasts,	first	periods	and	spotty	faces—is	elided,	in	favour	of	the	perfect	image,	an	image	that	conceals	its	own	constructedness.	In	other	words,	the	dominance	of	the	visual	within	this	discursive	space	posits	a	representational	economy	that	equates	her	self	with	her	body,	and	it	assumes	the	“fit”	and	able	body	as	its	ideal.7	Moreover	through	digital	technologies,	this	ideal	has	the	potential	to	influence	multiple	geographically	isolated	and	culturally	unique	spaces	(Jenkins	2006),	eroding	another	kind	of	difference.	In	this	sense,	this	thesis	is	placeless,	or,	rather,	it	is	of	the	cultural	space	that	now	exists	because	of,	and	through,	digital	technologies.	If	a	locating	must	occur,	it	hovers	somewhere	over	the	Atlantic	in	terms	of	its	scope	and	focus,	as	I	see	dominant,	hegemonic	discourses	of	female	adolescence	emanating	from	the	Western	powerhouses	of	the	United	States	and	Great	Britain.	It	is	this	discursive	space	that	this	introduction	reads	and	that	the	remainder	of	this	thesis	contests	through	the	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	of	Tamora	Pierce	and	Marissa	Meyer.		In	order	to	do	this,	I	bring	together	distinct	histories	and	discourses,	focusing	on	where,	and	how,	they	overlap	in	concern	with	the	adolescent	girl,	the	body—or	both.	The	histories	I	engage	are	complex	and	lengthy,	and	a	full	and	complete	reading	of	each	is	outside	of	the	scope	of	this	thesis.	Rather,	I	am	interested	in	the	faultiness	and	fractures	where	those	issues	of	being	adolescent,	female	and	embodied	come	into	sharper	focus,	treating	texts—
                                                                                                                                     and	self—in	contemporary	culture	the	body	is	one’s	self,	especially	one’s	female	self—that	speaks	to	the	insidious	and	pervasive	nature	of	these	hegemonic	images	of	perfection.	7	Hyde	([1998]	2008)	suggests	“the	organized	body	is	a	sign	that	we	are	organized	psychologically	and	that	we	understand	and	accept	the	organization	of	the	world	around	us”	(169).	This,	as	paradigm,	is	fundamental	to	the	hegemonic	economy	of	self-through-appearance	with	which	I	am	here	concerned.		
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novels,	images,	tweets,	television	programmes	and	films—as	cultural	artefacts	speaking	to	the	perceived	shape	of	female	adolescence	at	a	given	time.	Pierce	and	Meyer’s	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	texts	serve	as	an	anchor	because	of	their	engagement	with	the	adolescent	female	and	because	of	how	that	engagement	offers	images	of	the	body	that	do	not	construe	it	as	a	thing	that	the	adolescent	girl	must	be	beholden	to	or	limited	by—specifically	through	narrations	of	cross-dressing,	the	Lunar	“glamour,”8	menstruation,	shape-shifting,	and	being	cyborg.	These	books	allow	for	the	acceptability	of	a	changing	adolescent	female	body,	rather	than	the	fixed,	“perfect”	one	required	by	popular	and	media	culture.		While	I	focus	on	Pierce	and	Meyer,	they	are	not	the	only	authors	working	within	this	vein	of	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy.	They	are	also	not	the	only	female	authors	engaging	this	reconfiguring	of	the	heroic	body	in	terms	of	the	female.	Mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	is	a	thriving	vein	of	speculative	fiction,	one	that	has	existed	since	the	early	1980s,	when	Pierce,	but	also	Robin	McKinley,	began	writing.	Of	this	early	work,	The	Blue	Sword	(McKinley	1982)	and	its	prequel	The	
Hero	and	the	Crown	(McKinley	1984)	are	excellent	examples.	More	recent	offerings	include,	but	are	not	limited	to,	the	series,	The	Books	of	Pellinor	(Croggon	2004–2008),9	Graceling	Realm	(Cashore	2009–2012),	Throne	of	Glass	(Maas	2012–on-going),	Seraphina	(Hartman	2013–2015),	and	The	Queen	of	the	Tearling	(Johansen	2014–on-going).	While	many	of	these	works	construct	a	pseudo-medieval	world,	there	are	examples—of	which	The	Lunar	Chronicles	is	one—that	consider	non-Western	locations:	the	duology	comprising	Eon	(Goodman	2008)	and	Eona	(Goodman	2011),	the	Grisha	trilogy	(Bardugo	2012–2014),	and	Rebel	of	the	Sands	(Hamilton	2015)	are	excellent	examples.	In	the	readings	that	follow,	the	body	is	both	an	essential	marker	of	a	sexed	and	gendered	self	as	well	as	immaterial	to	either	position.	It	is	a	source	of	truth	as	well	as	a	site	of	misprision.	It	is	privileged	in	conceptions	of	the	self,	and	it	is	discounted	in	favour	of	discursive	productions.	The	body	is,	in	other	words,	difficult,	if	not	impossible,	to	define—at	least	in	terms	of	binaries.	This	is	
                                                8	This	is	“the	illusion	of	themselves”	that	gifted	Lunars	“project	into	the	minds	of	others,	(Meyer	2012,	172).	9	The	Books	of	Pellinor	were	first	published	in	Australia	beginning	in	2002.	In	references,	I	give	the	UK	titles	and	publication	dates.		
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because	the	body	is	“a	boundary	crosser”	(Hyde	[1998]	2008,	7).	It	is	present,	at	every	turn,	delineating	a	line	between,	for	example,	outside/inside,	self/other,	man/woman,	and	human/animal,	but	it	does	not	just	mark	the	line	between.	The	body	also	is	the	line,	and	as	such	it	has	properties	of	both	binary	sides.	In	other	words,	the	body	is	the	paradigmatic	limen,	and	liminality—the	space	between	binary	pairs—pervades	this	thesis	because	liminality,	as	an	organising	and	defining	principle,	unlocks	potential	and	possibility.	For	the	adolescent	girl,	bodily	potentiality	is	crucial	because	the	body	is	the	very	thing	by	which	she	is	othered.	Finally,	I	focus	on	multiple	examples	of	bodily	instability	and	change,	not	at	the	exclusion	of	other	possible	examples	but	to	avoid	the	truth-claims	that	would	accompany	a	reading	of	a	single	image	of	embodiment—for	example,	menarche	or	birth,	those	particularly	female	examples.	Through	looking	at	multiple	instances	in	which	the	body	is	unstable,	changeable,	deceptive	or	not	entirely	human,	I	seek	to	avoid	simply	replacing	one	dominant	hegemonic	narrative	of	self	with	a	different	dominant	narrative	of	self.	Rather,	I	aim	to	offer	models	for	conceiving	of	the	embodied,	adolescent	self	in	relation	to	and	interdependent	with	other	embodied	selves.	Imperatively,	I,	and	these	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy,	texts	do	not	engage	such	possibilities	casually:	popular	and	media	culture’s	preoccupation	with	the	singular,	stable,	fit,	and	whole	body	is	underscored	by	a	profound	fear	of	losing	the	self.	It	is	one	evidenced	by	the	obsession	with	appearance,	but	its	roots	are	much	deeper,	stretching	for	the	purposes	of	this	thesis	to	the	very	mythology	underpinning	Western	ontological	positions.	Owing	to	this,	these	texts	do	acknowledge	the	complex	relationship	between	body	and	self,	including	potential	loss	of	self,	but	they	engage	the	issue	in	order	to	demonstrate	the	prospects	that	open	up	when	the	body	is	conceived	of	as	visually	unreliable	(Garber	1992;	Flanagan	2008),	animal	(Haraway	2008;	Walsh	2013),	more-than-one	(Battersby	1998),	and	mechanical	(Haraway	1991;	Flanagan	2011	and	2014).			
FROM	GIRL	POWER	TO	A	POSTFEMINIST	SENSIBILITY			
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Pierce	and	Meyer	not	only	offer	a	particularly	sustained	engagement	with	issues	of	the	body,	but	they	also	offer	a	provocative	timeline.	Spanning	just	over	three	decades	(1983	to	present),	Pierce	and	Meyer’s	texts	parallel	the	narrative	arcs—excesses	of	expectation,	Girl	Power	and	increasing	emphasis	on	appearance—that	have	coalesced	into	their	current	forms	within	the	discursive	space	of	popular	and	media	culture.10		In	other	words,	whilst	I	read	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	as	offering	alternatives	to	mainstream	narratives	of	living	and	being	an	adolescent	female	body,	it	is	impossible	to	disentangle	these	texts	from	the	wider	discursive	space	within	which	they	sit.	In	this	way,	this	thesis	sits	alongside	the	social	history	work	of,	for	example,	Joan	Jacob’s	Brumberg	(1998),	in	The	Body	Project:	An	Intimate	History	of	American	Girls	and	Carol	Dyhouse	(2013),	in	Girl	Trouble:	Panic	and	Progress	in	the	History	of	Young	Women.	These	projects	read,	across	the	last	century,	the	(hi)story	of	living	and	being	an	adolescent	female—and	body—in	the	contexts	of	the	United	States	and	Great	Britain.		Coinciding	with	the	birth	of	“adolescence”	as	a	distinct	period	between	childhood	and	adulthood	(Hall	1904),	Brumberg	and	Dyhouse’s	social	histories	of	girlhood	begin	around	the	turn	of	the	century	and	both	posit	the	mid-twentieth	century	as	marking	a	particular	turn	to	the	body,	although	with	slightly	different	emphasis—commercialism	and	social	discourses,	respectively.	For	example,	Brumberg	(1998)	argues	that	the	1950s	seem	to	have	been	the	decade	of	the	breast,	at	least	in	terms	of	mass-produced	bras	and	the	standardization	of	cup	sizes—both	of	which	had	the	effect	of	increasing	adolescent	self-consciousness,	when	one	did	not	“measure	up”	(110).	Dyhouse	(2013),	on	the	other	hand,	focuses	on	the	“moral	panics”	surrounding	the	adolescent	girl	and	her	body	(225):	she	is	too	girly,	too	laddish,	too	sexy,	and	too	bossy.	While	the	characteristics	of	these	excesses	are	interesting—the	polarity	of	too	laddish	and	too	sexy,	for	example—the	point	is	how	each	is	conceived	as,	ever	increasingly,	playing	out	on	the	body.	For	example,	through	phenomenological	arguments,	the	above	characteristics	(girly,	laddish,	sexy	and	
                                                10	Pierce’s	Tortall	Universe	comprises	seventeen	novels	and	several	short	stories	and	Meyer’s	universe	currently	comprises	5	novels,	with	a	2-book	graphic	novel	duology	set	for	release	in	2017,	see	Cavna	(2016).	
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bossy)	become	phenomenons	of	the	body	as	they	structure	how	the	body	is	lived,	that	is,	while	girly	requires	one	set	of	actions	and	laddish	other,	both	are	available	for	reading	on	the	body.		While	the	mid-twentieth	century	may	have	begun	this	shift,	the	twenty-first	century	has	seen	such	a	proliferation	in	commercialism,	along	with	deregulation	and	privatization,11	that	a	neoliberal	choice	biography	is	now	also	in	place.	Rosalind	Gill	(2007)	defines	this	choice	biography	as,12		the	contemporary	injunction	to	render	one’s	life	knowable	and	meaningful	through	a	narrative	of	free	choice	and	autonomy,	however	constrained	one	actually	might	be.	(154)		As	the	body	is	the	site	upon	which	“choices”	are	made	and	made	manifest,	the	choice	biography	not	only	increases	concerns	with	and	of	the	body,	but	does	so	in	such	a	way	that	excesses	of	expectation	are	now	inflicted	freely	and	willingly	by	the	girl	herself,	as	she	“chooses”.	Moreover,	this	choice	biography	defines	the	discursive	shape	of	adolescence:	the	appearance	of	limitless	choice	alongside	an	overwhelming	presence	of	social	and	media	culture	that	subtly,	and	not	so	subtly,	defines	the	“right”	choice.	This	particular	arc	of	the	neoliberal	self	begins	in	the	early	1990s	(slightly	later	than	the	1983	publication	of	Pierce’s	first	Tortall	book),	and	it	is	most	recognisable	in	terms	of	the	Spice	Girls	popularising	of	Girl	Power.	However,	while	Girl	Power—particularly	the	Spice	Girls’	brand	of	“strength	and	courage	and	a	Wonderbra”	(Spiers	1997)—is	perhaps	the	dominant,	popular	narrative	emanating	from	this	period,	it	exists	directly	in	contention	with,	and	perhaps	because	of,	what	Rebecca	Hains	(2012)	terms	“the	girl	crisis”	(1).	A	coalescing	of	various	academic,	political,	commercial,	and	popular	discourses,	the	“girl	crisis”	saw	the	girl	as	a	figure	of	concern.	Even	the	Riot	Grrrls,	the	first	proponents	of	Girl	Power	were—for	their	eschewing	of	conventional	markers	of	femininity	and	commerciality—pathologised	as	girls	in	crisis,	because	of	their	
                                                11	Broadly,	both	describe	the	lessening	of	(obvious)	government	intervention	in	the	daily	lives	of	individuals;	privatization	speaks	to	the	particular	manifestation	of	deregulation	in	the	United	Kingdom,	under,	especially,	the	Thatcher	government.		12	See,	also,	Rose	(1996)	and	Walkerdine,	Lucey	and	Melody	(2001).		
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non-mainstream	endeavours	at	self	fashioning,	they	were	(perceived	as)	girls	in	crisis.		 In	its	role	as	a	governmental	paper,	Shortchanging	Girls,	Shortchanging	
America	(Montiegel	1991)	established	the	tone	of	this	“new”	discourse:	not	only	are	girls	at	risk—from	popular	culture’s	“marginalizing	women	and	stereotyping	their	roles”	as	well	as	school’s	“unintention[al]	[…]	collu[sion]”	in	this	positioning	(7)—but	they	are	also	the	key	to	America’s	success	and	thus	doubly	worth	care	and	concern.13	Yet,	this	particular	narrative	is	not	new.	The	accounts	of	adolescent	girls,	and	of	girlhood	itself,	offered	by	both	Brumberg	(1998)	and	Dyhouse	(2013),	show	that	such	cultural	concern,	anxiety,	and	expectation	have	always	already	surrounded	this	liminal	figure.14		The	1990s	simply	saw	these	concerns	become	more	visible	than	ever	before,	a	visibility	secured	by	the	abundance	of		“girls	studies”	texts	published	by	the	popular	press,	in	the	years	following	Shortchanging	Girls,	Shortchanging	America	(Montiegal	1991).	From	Schoolgirls:	Young	Women,	Self	Esteem,	and	the	
Confidence	Gap	(Orenstein	1994)	to	Failing	at	Fairness:	How	Our	Schools	Cheat	
Girls	(Sadker	and	Sadker	1994),	the	“girl”—as	ripe	for	saving—was	a	hot	commodity,	a	point	best	made	by	the	phenomenally	successful	Reviving	Ophelia:	
Saving	the	Selves	of	Adolescent	Girls	(Pipher	1994).	Tapping	into	the	fears	of	parents,	Pipher’s	text	both	defines	and	establishes	the	“girl	poisoning	culture”	in	which	the	adolescent	girl	of	the	1990s	existed	(267).	The	frightening	element:	how	little	the	story	has	changed	in	the	intervening	years.		Despite	appearing	to	have	access	to	more	choice	and	opportunity	than	ever	before,	the	twenty-first	century	“girl”	is	still	fragile	and	weaker	than	the	“boy,”	else	Always’	(2014)	#LikeAGirl	campaign	would	not	need	to	exist.	Designed	to	call	attention	to	and	to	end	the	stereotypical	positing	of	running,	throwing,	or	fighting	“like	a	girl”	as	somehow	less	than	a	boy’s	undertaking	of	those	actions,	this	campaign—in	simply	existing—acknowledges	that	girls	are	
                                                13	For	examples	in	a	similar	vein,	including	one	earlier	contender	for	first,	see:	Gilligan	(1982)	(re-released	1993)	and	Brown	and	Gilligan	(1992).	14	Regarding	the	cultural	concern,	see	also,	Lesko	(1996),	(2001)	and	(2012),	McRobbie	(2000b),	Giroux	(2003),	and	Gonick	(2006).	
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still	perceived	as	weaker	and	less	athletic	than	boys.15	If	teenaged	girls	and	young	women,	the	persons	adolescent	girls	are	becoming,	were	not	still	at	the	mercy	of	over-sexualisation,	there	would	have	been	no	nude	photo	scandal	in	2014.16	Expressing	sexuality	through	the	personal	sharing	of	sexually	explicit	images	would	just	be	sexuality;	it	would	not	be	deviant.	It	would	not	be	scandal	(see,	also,	McKinney	2014;	Valenti	2014;	Duck	2015).	If	body	image	were	still	not	an	issue,	Lammily®	would	not	have	secured,	through	crowd-sourcing	and	in	less	than	24-hours,	101%	of	its	needed	funding	to	create	a	doll	(also	called	Lammily)	based	on	average,	typical	body	sizes—not	Barbie’s	measurements	(Lamm	2014).17		Goldieblox	would	not	be,	very	successfully,	turning	STEM	subjects	(science,	technology,	engineering	and	maths)	into	toys—problematically	pink	in	colour—specifically	marketed	at	girls,	if	girls	were	not	still	excluded	from	those	subjects.18		
                                                15	In	1980,	Iris	Marion	Young	effectively	made	this	advertisement’s	argument	in	“Throwing	like	a	Girl:	A	Phenomenology	of	Feminine	Body	Comportment	Motility	and	Spatiality.”	Moreover,	Young	developed	the	line	of	enquiry	in	2005	with	On	Female	Body	Experience:	“Throwing	Like	a	Girl”	and	Other	Essays.	The	point	is	two-fold:	the	issue	of	“throwing	like	a	girl”	is	not	new	and	contemporary	culture	has	seen	a	conflation	of	previously	“academic”	issues	discussed	in	a	popular	vernacular,	a	crossroads	at	which	this	thesis	arguably	sits.		16	Commonly	known	as	“celebgate”	or	“the	fappening,”	this	scandal	was	the	result	of	the	social	media	site	4Chan’s	hack	of	Apple’s	iCloud	and	the	subsequent	sharing	of	some	five-hundred	private	images	of	celebrities,	including	Jennifer	Lawrence,	Kate	Upton,	Cara	Delevingne,	and	many	others.	The	images	stolen	and	disseminated	were	predominantly	of	women	and	frequently	included	sexually	explicit	or	nude	photographs.		
17 In	2016,	Barbie®	countered,	or	attempted	to,	its	own	ideal	through	“the	expansion	of	its	Fashionistas®	line	with	the	addition	of	three	new	body	types—tall,	curvy	and	petite—and	a	variety	of	skin	tones,	hair	styles	and	outfits”	(Mazzocco	2016).	For	discussions	of	this	addition,	see,	for	example,	Abrams	(2016)	and	Colon	(2016). 18	Regarding	what	has	come	to	be	called	the	“pinkification”	of	culture	and	toys	see,	Bates	(2014),	Cochrane	(2014),	and	Orenstein	(2011).	Prior	to	the	late	eighties,	children’s	toys	were	varied	in	colour	and	not	overtly	marketed	to	one	gender	or	the	other.	However,	the	Regan	administration’s	deregulation—the	lessening	of	government	influence	in	relation	to	children’s	television	and	advertising,	in	this	case—led	to	the	clear	dividing	lines,	pink	for	girls	and	blue	for	boys,	that	exist	today.	For	a	detailed	explanation	of	the	larger	economic	policy	of	which	deregulation	was	a	part	and	of	deregulation	itself,	see	Niskanen	
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Reaching	a	zenith	in	the	early	2000s	with	a	proliferation	of	Internet	technologies,	this	narrative	of	“Girl	Power”	in	tension	with	“Girl	Saving”	is	now	also	characterised	by	a	neoliberal	fashioning	of	the	self.	It	is	a	fashioning	that	each	of	the	above	examples	plays	into:	the	consumerism	embedded	in	the	Dove,	Lammily,	and	Goldieblox	narratives	speaks	to	the	power	of	choice	through	purchase,	while	the	nude	photo	scandal	represents	the	shaming	that	occurs	with	the	wrong	choices.	This	is	the	choice	biography,	the	primary	mechanism	of	neoliberal	self	fashioning	that	dominates	contemporary	popular	and	media	culture.	The	choices	an	individual	makes	determine	her	self	and	because	she	has	“freely”	chosen—to	grow	her	hair	long,	a	certain	style	of	clothing,	or	to	not	be	involved	in	those	STEM	subjects—she	gains	agency.	It	is	through	choice	that	the	neoliberal	self	is	constructed.	The	question	is:	just	how	free	and	open	is	that	choice?	Thus,	while	neoliberalism	has	been	criticised	as	a	“catchall”	and	as	devoid	of	any	real	meaning,19	Rosalind	Gill	and	Christina	Scharff	(2011)	note	in	the	“Introduction”	to	New	Femininities:	Postfeminism,	Neoliberalism,	and	
Subjectivity	that	the	term	is	still	relevant,	particularly	to	women.			It	is	women	who	are	called	on	to	self-manage,	to	self-discipline.	To	a	much	greater	extent	than	men,	women	are	required	to	work	on	and	transform	the	self,	to	regulate	every	aspect	of	their	conduct,	and	to	present	all	their	actions	as	freely	chosen.20	(7)		This	work	often	takes	the	form	of	transformations	enacted	upon	one’s	appearance,	an	issue	that	I	discuss	in	detail	through	the	makeover	paradigm,	both	in	this	chapter	as	well	as	in	readings	of	Cinder(ella).	The	illusion	of	choice	offered	by	this	mechanism	is	of	primary	concern	in	this	introduction	whereas	Chapter	Two’s	look	at	Cinder,	from	Marissa	Meyer’s	Lunar	Chronicles,	begins	to	complicate	the	paradigm,	though	also	serving	as	a	useful	demonstration	of	how	embedded	even	the	most	counter	or	sub-cultural	text	is	within	its	wider	
                                                                                                                                     (1988).	Digitally,	The	Library	of	Economics	and	Liberty	offers	a	concise	explanation;	see	Niskanen	(2002).	19	See,	for	example,	Rowlands	and	Rawolle	(2013)	and	Hilgers	(2013).		20	Bartky	(1988)	makes	a	similar	argument.		
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discursive	space;	Cinder’s	narrative	may	contest	the	paradigm,	but	it	still	engages	it.	Finally,	these	neoliberal	narratives	of	choice	are	also	a	marker	of	the	postfeminist	sensibility	that	Gill	argues	characterises	contemporary	media	culture.	Gill	describes	this	sensibility	as,		the	notion	that	femininity	is	a	bodily	property;	the	shift	from	objectification	to	subjectification;	the	emphasis	upon	self-surveillance,	monitoring	and	discipline;	a	focus	upon	individualism,	choice	and	empowerment;	the	dominance	of	a	makeover	paradigm;	a	resurgence	in	ideas	of	natural	sexual	difference;	a	marked	sexualization	of	culture;	and	an	emphasis	upon	consumerism	and	the	commodification	of	difference.	(2007,	149)		The	female	adolescent’s	existence—particularly	her	existence	as	a	body—touches,	in	varying	degrees,	each	of	these	features.	Aside	from	describing	a	postfeminist	sensibility,	Gill’s	description	also	works	as	a	framework	for	self-becoming	within	contemporary	popular	and	media	culture.	In	terms	of	the	adolescent	girl,	it	is	a	framework	that,	despite	appearing	to	offer	“choice	and	empowerment,”	is	limiting:	how	much	choice	is	she	really	afforded,	when	the	wrong	choices	pathologise	her	as	a	girl	in	crisis,	as	a	girl	needing	saving?	What	sacrifices	come	with	such	an	insistence—at	the	expense	of	community—on	the	individual?	How	“individual”	is	individual,	when	every	other	girl	is	aiming	for	the	same—young,	thin	and	fit—individual?	Are	there	not	ways	of	being	female	and	feminine	that	do	not	refuse	the	body’s	fleshiness	and	its	potential	for	change?	It	is	these	questions,	as	well	as	others,	that	this	thesis	explores,	while	also	exploring	the	alternatives	made	possible	by	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy.			
NEOLIBERAL	CHOICE	BIOGRAPHIES:	#GIRLSCAN	#SHINESTRONG,	WITH	
COVERGIRL	AND	PANTENE			“Yeah,	girls	can,”	according	to	a	recent	Internet	campaign	launched	by	CoverGirl	(2014),	while	Pantene	(2013)	suggests,	girls,	and	women,	should	“Be	Strong	and	Shine.”	Featuring	celebrities,	models,	and	musicians,	like:	Ellen	DeGeneres,	P!nk,	Katy	Perry,	and	Sofia	Vergara,	the	CoverGirl	ad	overtly	attacks	the	gender	stereotypes	that	suggest	“girls	can’t”—“rock,”	“be	strong,”	“dance	like	crazy,”	
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“rap,”	or	“own	businesses”	(2014,	n.p.)	while	Pantene’s	ad	focuses	on	the	conflicting	“Labels	Against	Women”	(2013,	n.p.)	With	a	cover	of	Gary	Jules’	“Mad	World”	as	background,	gendered	comparisons—he	is	a	“boss;”	she	is	“bossy”	or	he	is	“neat;”	she	is	“vain”—draw	attention	to	the	binary	construction	of	men	and	women	(Ibid.).	Further	still,	the	CoverGirl	campaign	makes	a	valiant	attempt	at	widening	these	gender	stereotypes,	including	race	and	sexual	orientation	as	latent	messages	within	its	video.	Appearing	as	copy,	Pantene’s	final	message—“Don’t	let	labels	hold	you	back”—complements	the	sentiment	nicely	(2013,	n.p.).	However,	both	adverts	are	troublesome:	yes,	#GirlsCan	#ShineStrong—with	CoverGirl	and	Pantene,	or	so	the	message	reads.	These	advertisements,	cloaked	as	campaigns,	offer	success	through	the	purchase	of	products.	More,	as	these	are	both	companies	that	deal	in	hair	and	beauty	products,	they	slip	in	the	notion	that	physical	appearance—maintaining	a	certain	appearance,	with	their	products—is	key	to	this	success	(Duberman	2014).	In	this	way,	the	body	becomes	the	girl’s	and	woman’s	source	of	(em)power(ment),	as	well	as	something	she	must	control	(Gill	2007,	149;	Wolf	1991).		Crucially,	these	advertisement	also	speak	to	Judith	Butler’s	(1997)	concern	with	the	re-citing	of	hate	speech	that	occurs	in	the	processes	of	censorship,	as	in	order	to	censor	speech,	the	speech	must	be	rearticulated	and	recirculated,	albeit	as	that	which	is	to	be	censored.	Butler	suggests,	“the	censor	is	compelled	to	repeat	the	speech	that	the	censor	would	prohibit.	No	matter	how	vehement	the	opposition	to	speech	is,	its	recirculation	inevitably	reproduces	trauma	as	well”	(37).	This	is	exactly	that	which	is	occurring	in	these	“body	positive”	campaigns.	Issues	of	consumerism	aside,	these	“empower-ads”	(Delamere	2015)	do	not	straightforwardly	counter	the	stereotypical	images	of	being	a	girl	or	woman.	In	its	superficial	engagement	with	the	hero	journey,	the	Song	of	the	Lioness	quartet	(Pierce	1983–1988)	reflects	this	problem,	though	the	subsequent	Tortall	books	as	well	as	The	Lunar	Chronicles	(Meyer	2012–2015)	make	progress	towards	ameliorating	it,	as	I	discuss	in	Chapter	Two.		Within	the	discursive	space	of	contemporary	popular	and	media	culture,	the	body	that	is	the	adolescent	girl’s	source	of	power	is	vastly	different	from	the	adolescent	female’s	flesh,	blood,	and	material	body,	especially	in	terms	of	the	
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bodily	changes	marking	it	as	adolescent.	The	body	that	is	her	source	of	agency,	and	thus	self,	is	a	discursively	produced	body,	one	comprised	of	all	those	things	that	beauty	culture	tells	her	it	must	be:	spray	tans	and	SPANX®,	nose	jobs	and	gym	visits.	Moreover,	this	body	is	ideally	represented	by	an	image,	not	by	the	body	itself,	a	phenomenon	epitomised	by	the	images	of	media	(the	celebrity)	and	social	media	(the	selfie).	These	images	work	as	mirrors	telling	girls	and	women	how	to	be	bodies	and	selves.	This	body	also	requires	a	certain	amount	of	“body	obsession”	on	the	part	of	women	existing	within	this	discursive	space,	a	position	that	prevents	girls	and	women	from	ever	fully	enjoying,	or	having	access	to,	the	body’s	potential.	This	is	the	“beauty	work”	made	explicit	in	The	
Beauty	Myth:	How	Images	of	Beauty	are	Used	Against	Women	(Wolf	1991,	15).	For	Wolf,			The	beauty	myth	tells	a	story:	The	quality	called	‘beauty’	objectively	and	universally	exists.	Women	must	want	to	embody	it	and	men	must	want	to	possess	women	who	embody	it.	(12)			“Beauty”	becomes	a	currency	for	exchange:	if	you	have	it,	you	have	power	and	agency;	if	you	do	not,	you	work	to	get	it.	In	this	way,	Wolf	argues	that	the	beauty	myth	is	always	actually	“prescribing	behavior	and	not	appearance”	(14).	Thus,	the	myth	is	also	about	control,	about	the	control	of	women	by	patriarchy,	since	hegemonic,	patriarchal	discourse’s	ever-changing	ideal	always	indicates	new	work	for	women	within	the	discursive	space	(13).	Furthermore,	with	what	it	means	to	be	woman	existing	on	the	body	(Gill	2007),	these	beauty	practices	are	also	practices	of	the	self,	and	thus,	the	risk	with	failing	is	great:	if	you	fail	not	only	are	you	not	beauty(ful),	you	are	also	not	feminine.	You	are	not	woman.		This	is	the	makeover	paradigm;	or,	the	notion	that	individuals,	primarily	woman,	see	their	bodies	(and	selves)	not	only	as	amenable	to,	but	also	in	need	of,	improvement	(see,	also,	Gill	2007).	It	is	a	view	of	the	world,	and	of	being	self	within	the	world,	that	depends	on	an	increased	concern	with	appearance,	often	focusing	quite	intensely	on	young	girls.	It	is	a	concern	that	has	seen	both	the	locating	of	femininity	on	the	body—being	woman	depends	upon	the	body	appearing	female	and	feminine—as	well	as	a	peculiar	conflation	of	self	(identity)	with	image	(body).	For	example,	The	Hunger	Games’	Katniss	
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Everdeen	is	the	“girl	on	fire”	because,	as	her	dress	magically	alights,	she	appears	as	such	(Collins	2008–2010),	an	appearing	made	explicit	in	the	books’	film	adaptations	(Ross	2012	and	Lawrence	2013;	2014;	2015).	Yet,	this	is	a	precarious	sort	of	femininity—one	that	depends	not	only	on	correct	purchases	and	successful	makeover	endeavours	but	also	one	that	renders	sexuality	as	sexy,	a	superficial	performance	of	being	sexed.	In	other	words,	what	it	means	to	be	a	woman	or	girl	is	secured	through	the	performance	of	a	sexed	body	(Orenstein	2011).	Yet,	what	does	such	a	rendering	mean	for	one’s	sense	of	self,	especially	when	the	results	of	such	transforming	offer	both	a	“heightened	fantasy	femininity”	(Cochrane	2014)	that	is	impossible	to	ever	achieve	and	an	“economy	of	sameness”	(Weber	2005)	that	produces	overwhelming	homogeneity?			
PLEASING	ONE’S	SELF(IE):	ILLUSIONS	OF	CHOICE			The	selfie:	large	eyes,	defined	cheekbones,	styled	and	stylish	hair	contained,	most	frequently,	within	the	square	frame	of	an	Instagram	photo.21	From	the	Pope	to	celebrities	(Alexander	2013),	ordinary	girls	and	world	leaders,	everyone	is	snapping—and	posting—selfies,	Ellen	DeGeneres	even	managed	to	crash	Twitter	with	a	celebrity	filled	selfie,	taken	during	the	2014	Oscars	(Gerick	2014).22	Barak	Obama,	David	Cameron	and	Helle	Thorning-Schmidt’s	selfie—taken	at	Nelson	Mandela’s	memorial	service—caused	such	political	fallout	that	news	of	the	selfie	superseded	news	of	the	service	itself	(Selby	2013;	Anthony	2013),	and	selfie	sticks	have	even	been	banned	from	sporting	and	music	events	as	well	as	museums	and	theme	parks	the	world	over.	In	short,	the	selfie	is	now	the	ubiquitous	image	of	the	ideal	self,	styled	and	contained.		
                                                21	On	the	7th	of	April	2014,	Instagram	listed	more	than	96	million	photographs	tagged	with	#selfie,	by	the	24th	of	July	2015,	the	tag	found	300	million.	Selfies	are	also	shared	on	other	social	media	sites,	like,	Twitter,	Facebook		and	Tumblr.		22	Katie	Warfield	(2014a)	suggests	that	this	two-pronged	description—an	image	of	one’s	self	that	is	taken	with	the	intent	of	being	shared,	most	typically,	through	social	media—is	the	definition	of	a	selfie.		
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	 There	are	two	key	discourses	surrounding	the	selfie,	one	positive	and	the	other	negative.	First,	taking	and	posting	selfies	is	an	empowering	act	of	self-creation	and	one	that	affords	girls	a	space	in	which	to	not	only	bond	through	the	sharing	of	images	of	themselves	but	to	also	support	and	encourage	one	another	through	positively	engaging	one	another’s	photos.	As	an	exemplar	of	neoliberal	narratives	of	choice,	the	selfie	is	empowering	because	the	adolescent	girl	herself	“chooses”	not	just	to	participate	in	the	trend	but	also	which	image	of	herself	will	be	posted.	Thus,	the	posting	of	a	selfie	suggests,	at	the	most	basic,	an	instance	of	personal	pride	(Simmons	2013).	It	is	within	this	frame	that	Katie	Warfield’s	current	work	on	selfies	is	situated	(see,	2014a	and	2014b).	For	Warfield,	selfies	allow	girls	the	opportunity	to	challenge	dominant	scopic	regimes	by	being	in	control	of	their	image;23	while	I	do	not	agree	with	Warfield’s	argument,	she	does	offer	a	sustained	criticism	of	the	negative	discourse	of	selfies.		This,	the	other	discourse	surrounding	the	selfie,	suggests	that	taking	and	posting	selfies	is	harmful	to	girls	(Ryan	2013).24	More	widely,	selfies	limit	the	possibilities	of	being	an	adolescent	girl,	as	opposed	to	expanding	them,	and	it	is	within	this	discourse	of	selfies	that	my	own	reading	sits;	I	believe	selfies	can	only	ever	offer	the	illusion	of	agency	and	control	because	of	their	overwhelming	homogeneity	and	the	sheer	weight	of	that	homogeneity	across	cultural	spheres.	The	majority	of	selfies	feature	an	excruciatingly	repeated	image:	young,	fit	girl	with	long	flowing	hair	and	sultry	(pouty)	expression.	It	is	in	this	taking	into	account	the	image—the	one	produced	and	posted—that	I	feel	Warfield’s	argument	is	lacking,	for	this	image	is	more	a	reflection	of	the	requirements	of	
                                                23	In	some	ways,	this	argument	speaks	to	Kathleen	Sweeney’s	(2008)	call	for	“media	literacy,”	as	Sweeney	calls	for	a	media	literacy	that	is	achieved	through	placing	cameras—video	cameras,	not	the	highly	specific	front-facing	cameras	of	mobile	phones	that	are	used	for	takings	selfies—in	girl’s	hands.	In	doing	so,	Sweeney	suggests	girls	will	be	able	to	see	how	images	are	framed	and	otherwise	manipulated,	thus	breaking	the	illusion	of	perfection.		24	Newspaper	(including	digital	editions)	and	magazine	articles	clearly	demonstrate—while	also,	perhaps,	creating	and	certainly	perpetuating—this	divide.	Rachel	Simmons’	(2013)	“Selfies	are	Good	for	Girls”	represents,	quite	succinctly,	the	positive	side	(selfies	are	empowering	acts	of	agency),	while	Erin	Ryan’s	(2013)	“Selfies	Aren’t	Empowering.	They	are	a	Cry	for	Help”	expresses	the	views	of	the	negative	angle	(selfies	are	narcissistic).		
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beauty	culture	than	any	positive	stand	towards	female	self-empowerment	(see,	also,	Ryan	2013).	The	selfie	that	is	“liked”—the	selfie	that	inspires	positive	comments—is	the	selfie	that	meets	(or	exceeds)	the	standards	of	beauty	culture.		In	this	way,	the	selfie	is	not	about	individual	(re)presentation.	The	taking	and	posting	of	a	selfie	is	not	a	choice;	it	is	an	illusion	of	a	choice.	The	illusion	that	one	has	unconstrained	freedom	to	choose,25	as	while	the	options	may	be	limitless,	the	“right”	choices	are	not.	Moreover,	the	selfie	is	really	about	being	chosen—for	getting	your	choice	right—than	it	is	about	choosing	for	yourself.	Thus,	the	selfie	offers	not	choice,	but	the	illusion	of	choice,	and	it	is	an	illusion	of	choice	that	extends	to	many	of	the	other	choices	“available”	to	adolescent	girls.	The	selfie	also	makes	evident	a	fetishizing	of	the	fit,	able	adolescent	female	body.	Thus,	not	only	has	the	ideal	appearance	coalesced	around	a	very	particular	image,	but	as	we	continue	to	get	older	sooner	and	stay	younger	longer,	the	ideal	is	also	becoming	more	and	more	pervasive,	stretching	to	include	younger	and	older	women	within	its	scope.	In	order	to	(only	ever	temporarily)	placate	this	desire	and	to	remain	an	active	subject	with	popular	and	media	culture,	the	adolescent	girl	must	continually	choose	to	reinvent	herself,	aiming	for	the	ever-changing,	highly	specified	ideal.	There	is	always	work	to	be	done,	and	the	pressure	to	meet	these	exacting	standards,	coupled	with	those	narratives	of	choice,	has	led	to	a	culture	of	perfectionism:	the	adolescent	girl	must	choose	to	do	it	all	perfectly,	whilst	also	looking	perfect.	Finally,	neoliberal	practices	of	the	self	depend	on	the	visibility	of	the	results	of	one’s	choices	because	the	“right”	choices	are	necessary	in	order	for	the	self	to	be	produced	as	active	and	empowered.	With	femininity	(what	it	means	to	be	woman)	existing	on	the	body,	girls	and	women	are	required	within	the	frame	of	the	neoliberal	choice	biography	to	construct	themselves	as	girls	and	women	by	appearing	appropriately	feminine,	by	appearing,	most	pervasively,	“sexy.”	The	selfie	is	the	now	dominant	means	of	proving	one’s	choices.	If,	as	Gill	(2007)	argues,	the	body	is	in	postfeminist	media	culture	the	
                                                25	Hilgers	(2013)	suggests	neoliberalism	has	been	brought	about	by	a	“‘regulated	deregulation’”	(75).	This	notion	goes	some	way	towards	explaining	the	limits	on	free	choice.		
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“window	to	the	individual’s	interior	life,”	the	selfie	is	the	securing	of	that	interior	life,	that	identity,	writ	large	(150).	In	so	being	other	possible	ways	of	knowing	the	body—touch,	for	example—are	excluded	(Grosz	1994),26	and	it	is	this	insistence	that	places	ever	more	weight	on	one’s	appearance	(Bordo	1993).	Yet,	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy—as	is	evident	in	both	Tamora	Pierce’s	and	Marissa	Meyer’s	work—foregrounds	other	such	ways	of	knowing,	an	issue	developed	throughout	but	one	I	especially	turn	to	in	the	Conclusions.			*	*	*		While	I	posit	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	as	a	counter	or	subcultural	space	to	popular	and	media	culture,	the	relationship	between	the	two	is	not	binary.	Rather,	the	two	discourses—hegemonic	fantasies	of	being	a	girl	and	fantastical	narrations	of	being	a	girl—are	interwoven	and	overlapping.	In	short,	where	popular	and	media	culture	offers	illusions	of	choice,	impossible	ideals	and	silences,	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy—because	it	is	fantasy—offers	bodies	that	express	multiplicity	and	difference,	thereby	offering	frameworks	for	living	and	being	a	body	that	challenge	the	dominant,	hegemonic	fantasy	of	adolescence.	This	reconfiguring	of	the	body	is	essential.	Because	the	body	is	that	by	which	she	is	excluded,	the	body	must	be	mapped	differently	in	order	for	inclusion—of	difference,	change,	and	multiplicity—to	occur.	Thus,	this	thesis	maps	these	frameworks,	speaking	from	the	silenced	position	within,	and	between,	the	binary	oppositions—popular	and	media	culture/mythopoeic	YA	fantasy,	male/female,	mind/body,	human/animal,	human/machine,	abled/disabled—underpinning	this	discursive	construction.	I	do	so	in	order	to	ask:	what	happens	to	the	self,	and	to	its	relationship	with	other	selves,	when	it	is	conceived	of	as	both	embodied	and	non-binary?	
                                                26	It	is	also	peculiarly	anti-Aristotelian.	Peculiar,	as	it	was	Aristotle	(and	Plato)	who	established	the	hierarchical	dualisms	ordering	discourse	that,	in	turn,	have	given	rise	to	the	binary	oppositions	that	are	so	problematic	today:	male/female;	mind/body;	adult/child.	It	is	anti	in	as	much	as	Aristotle	called	for	rational	argument	as	essential	proof	as	opposed	to	the	visual.		
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Thus,	where	Chapters	One	and	Two	establish	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	(the	wider	field	of	YA	and	the	genre	of	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy),	Chapters	Three	and	Four	as	well	as,	to	some	extent,	the	Conclusions	offer	close	textual	analysis	of	instances	of	cross-dressing,	“glamouring,”	menstruation	(including	pregnancy),	shape-shifting	and	being	cyborg	in	Tamora	Pierce’s	Tortall	Books	and	Marissa	Meyers	Lunar	Chronicles.	I	structure	the	thesis	in	this	way	because,	while	I	read	my	specific	examples	as	operating	in	a	counter	or	subcultural	space,	they	can	not	only	not	be	separated	from	the	space(s)	within	which	they	sit,	but	the	relationship	is	also	far	more	complex	than	simple	antithesis.		Chapter	Three,	“Appearances	May	Be	Deceiving”	explores	the	appearance	of	the	body	and	what	happens	to	the	self,	to	identifying	as	a	self,	when	the	body’s	appearance	is	not	only	changeable	but	may	also	not	correspond	to	the	self	that	it	is	meant	to	represent.	Through	four	case	studies	concerning	specific	instances	in	which	the	body	is	not	what	it	appears	to	be	or	in	which	it	actively	conceals	an	interiority,	alongside	narrations	that	explicitly	show	bodily	instability,	this	chapter	asks:	what	are	the	consequences	for	subjectivity	if	the	“represented	self”	is	not	the	same	as	the	“self	represented”?		Chapter	Four	“Speaking	the	Unspeakable	and	Breaking	Cultures	of	Silence”	focuses	on	woman’s	exclusion	from	the	Symbolic,	that	is	to	say	representation.	It	is	interested	in	how	narrations	of	bodily	instability	engage	with	and	overcome	this	exclusion.	This	chapter	takes	it	shape	from	the	monomyth	(Campbell),	the	pattern	of	(male)	identity	formation	that	directly	influences	the	shape	of	adolescent	development	in	popular	and	media	culture.	In	taking	this	shape	for	the	chapter’s	structure,	I	am	able	to	demonstrate	how	adolescent	girls	are	bodily	excluded	from	signification,	while	also	exploring	what	it	would	take	in	order	for	them	not	to	be	excluded.	Thus,	Chapter	Four	asks:	what	happens	to,	and	for,	representation	when	the	female	body	is	taken	as	norm?	When	we	all	speak	the	unspeakable?		“Conclusions:	Alternative	Ways	of	Being	and	Perceiving	a	Body,”	offers	conclusions,	in	as	much	as	it	offers	potential	alternatives	both	to	the	journey	of	adolescence—the	becoming	adult	that	is	the	goal	of	this	liminal	period—as	well	as	to	conceiving	the	adolescent	female	body	and	self.	It	is	a	self-reflexive	final	chapter,	one	that	returns	to	the	issues	raised	throughout	this	thesis.	It	is	also	a	
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chapter	of	possibilities,	in	that,	a	focus	on	two	kinds	of	relation	(repetition	and	connection)	available	in	Pierce’s	Song	of	the	Lioness	and	Immortals	quartets	as	well	as	Meyer’s	Lunar	Chronicles,	it	offers	a	model	self—exemplified	by	a	metaphorical	notion	of	“the	Pack”—that	is	based	in	an	economy	of	relation,	as	opposed	to	hegemonic	opposition.	
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CHAPTER	ONE		YOUNG	ADULT	LITERATURE:	THE	LITERATURE	AND	ITS	ADOLESCENT			Issues	of	“coming	of	age”	and	of	“maturing”	pervade	YAL	and	not	just	in	terms	of	story	lines:	both	the	criticism	and	the	literature	have	been	“coming	of	age”	for,	at	least,	the	last	quarter	century	(see,	also,	Gallo	1992;	Monseau	and	Salvner	1992;	Hunt	1996;	Moore	1997).27	Recently,	both	may	have	even	come	of	age	(see,	also,	Monseau	and	Salvner	2000;	Wilder	and	Teasley	2000;	Soter	and	Conners	2009;	Brown	2011;	Garcia	2013;	Hill	2014).	However,	whether	YAL	or	YAL	criticism	has,	or	has	not,	reached	some	point	of	maturation	is	not	my	concern;	rather,	I	am	concerned	with	how—because	of	its	liminality	(it	is	“in-between	children/adult	literature)—YAL	is	problematically	perceived	as	perpetually	needing	to	become.	As	neither	children’s	literature	nor	(adult)	literature,	YAL	is	perceived	as	difficult,	if	not	impossible,	to	define—many	avoid	doing	so	by	including	it	under	the	umbrella	of	children’s	literature	because	children’s	literature	is	stable,	secure,	and	known.	In	other	words,	the	structural	reliance	on	binary	oppositions—in	this	case	between	child/adult	and	children’s	literature/literature—makes	young	adult	literature	and	the	young	adult	it	hails	structural	anomalies,	and	the	refusal	to	recognise	and	to	theorise	this	liminality	is	restrictive	as	it	is	why	both	the	body	of	literature	and	the	critical	engagement	of	that	literature	are	so	preoccupied	with	becoming,	at	the	expense	of	being.			Yet,	in	Constructing	Adolescence	in	Fantastic	Realism,	Alison	Waller	(2009)	calls	for	“a	separate	critical	methodology”	of	YAL	(14),	and	she	calls	for	this	methodology	“in	order	to	theorise	young	adult	literature’s	very	in-
                                                27	Trites	(1996b	and	2000)	makes	a	distinction	between	YA	novels	and,	what	she	calls	the	wider,	adolescent	literature.	The	first	concerns	books	for	adolescents,	specifically	those	marketed	as	being	“for	adolescents.”	These	would	be	the	texts	to	which	she	turns	in	order	to	establish,	through	a	Foucauldian	reading	of	power,	the	characteristics	of	YA	novels.	The	latter,	for	Trites,	is	a	more	general	field	of	literature	that	might	concern	adolescents	without	specifically	being	for	them,	see,	also,	Small	(1992)	and	Olson	(1993).		
 31	
betweenness	or	liminality”	(14).28	In	making	such	an	appeal,	Waller	offers	a	twofold	suggestion.	First,	it	is	time	to	move	beyond	the	defending	of	YAL’s	status	as	a	field	and	towards	a	more	theoretical	and	critical	engagement	with	the	literature.	Second,	this	critical	focus	should	take	into	account	the	liminality	marking	both	the	field	and	the	adolescent	it	hails	(see,	also,	Day,	Green-Barteet,	and	Montz	2014;	Flanagan	2014).	This	thesis	answers	Waller’s	call	by	recognising	and	engaging	the	liminality	of	YAL	and	of	young	adults	themselves	as	crucial.	The	young	adult	person,	or	book,	is	neither	one	(child/’s	book)	nor	the	other	(adult/’s	book).	The	young	adult	is,	rather,	between	the	two,	touching	both	sides	of	the	oppositional	pair.	Thus,	liminality	is	key,	and	in	order	to	begin	this	theorising	of	liminality	as	well	as	a	concomitant	bodily	instability,	this	chapter	explores	the	young	adult—both	in	terms	of	the	generic	label	and	the	adolescent	addressed	by	that	label—aspect	of	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy.29	This	chapter	is,	thus,	a	two-part	reading:	the	literature	and	the	adolescent	hailed	by	the	literature.	Thus,	while	I	demonstrate	across	the	chapter,	the	ways	in	which	this	thesis	engages	and	develops	the	existing	field,	I	begin	by	establishing	the	adolescent	and	the	shape	of	adolescence.	I	begin	here,	rather	than	with	the	literature,	because	without	the	adolescent,	the	literature	could	not	have	come	
                                                28	Importantly,	Waller	is	not	alone	in	this	call	for	a	critical	engagement	of	YAL.	I	mention	her	specifically	because	of	the	nature—to	engage	the	liminality—of	her	plea.	However,	this	sort	of	appeal	has	been	occurring	since	the	mid-1990s.	The	1996	spring	issue	of	the	Children’s	Literature	Association	Quarterly	was	dedicated	to	YAL	and	theory	(Trites	1996a).	From	that	issue,	see	especially,	Hunt	(1996)	and	Trites	(1996b).	For	more	recent	works	requesting	a	theoretical	engagement	of	this	literature,	see,	for	example,	Alsup	(2010a)	and	Coats	(2011).	Hunt	(2014)	suggests	that	critical	engagement	is	still	a	“growing	body,”	while	also	calling	for	that	growth	to	continue.		29	In	addressing	issues	of	distinctiveness	and	worth,	I	am	well	aware	that	I	am	engaging,	by	re-citing,	the	very	problems	I	do	not	wish	to	engage.	In	this	vein,	a	particular	merit	of,	for	example,	Flanagan	(2014)	is	how	rather	than	placing	itself	within	these	debates,	the	text	simply	gets	on	with	the	task	of	addressing	the	issues	of	posthumanism	in	YAL.	However,	I	engage	this	situating	for	two	reasons:	first,	because	of	the	nature	of	this	project,	in	that,	a	thesis	requires	a	certain	amount	of	situating	itself	within	the	wider	field,	but	also,	and	more	importantly,	because	of	liminality.	These	issues	of	distinctiveness	and	worth	stem	from	a	refusal	to	acknowledge	and	thus	to	theorize—because	of	the	pervasiveness	of	binaries—liminality.		
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into	existence	as	well	as	because	of	how	the	“motive	forces”	of	adolescence	are	the	same	forces	of	both	YA	literature	and	YA	criticism.30	Critically,	this	is	not	to	divide	the	two	into	oppositional	categories.	It	is	not	to	posit	the	adolescent	as	more	“real”	or	“true”	than	the	literature	(or	vice	versa);	rather,	the	chapter	demonstrates	just	how	interwoven	the	two	are.	I	start	with	the	adolescent	and	adolescence	because	the	liminality	of	both	the	creature	and	the	period	provides	a	lens	through	which	to	read	both	the	literature	and	the	criticism	of	the	literature.		
	
THE	ADOLESCENT:	BIOLOGICALLY	DETERMINED				In	order	to	explore	just	who	the	adolescent	girl	is,	it	is	useful,	if	not	also	conventional,	to	start	with	the	categories	of	child	and	adult.	The	discursive	relationship,	that	is	to	say	the	hegemonic	fantasy,	between	the	two—the	“adult”	as	sexuality,	experience	and	corruption	and	the	“child”	as	asexuality,	innocence	and	purity—is	obvious	and	certain,	in	as	much	as	binaries	offer	the	appearance	of	such.	It	is	a	distinction	that	happens	within	discourse	(language),	but	it	is	one	that	has	a	very	real	impact	on,	at	least	the	perception	of,	the	bodies	behind,	and	within,	the	construction.	Setting	up	Peter	Pan	as	the	ideal	child	of	this	formation—he	cannot	be	touched;	he	is	eternal	child—Jacqueline	Rose	(1984)	argues	that	this	binary	opposition	involves	the	disembodiment	of	the	child	within	discourse	so	that	adult	“normal”	heterosexuality	and	its	stability	may	be	secured.	Adolescence	disrupts	the	fantasy.		The	very	notion	of	adolescence	as	a	discrete	period	between	childhood	and	adulthood—if,	by	nature,	it	can	be	discrete—hinges	on	a	heighted	instance	of	biological	determinism:	the	adolescent	is	adolescent	because	of	the	changes	occurring	to	his/her	body.	In	fact,	G.	Stanley	Hall’s	(1904)	landmark,	two-volume	study	Adolescence:	Its	Psychology	and	its	Relations	to	Physiology,	
Anthropology,	Sociology,	Sex,	Crime,	Religion	and	Education—that	effectively	
                                                30	As	Chapter	Two	discusses,	Rank	([1909]	1959)	makes	this	link	between	the	“motive	forces”	of	adolescence	(as	part	of	the	family	drama)	and	the	hero	journey	(67).		
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brought	the	category	into	existence—heralded	puberty	as	its	initial	maker.31	However,	this	anchoring	of	adolescence—a	discursive	category—within	biological	frameworks	that	are	posited	as	“true”	or	“real”	is	questionable	as	bodily	transformations	are	unreliable.	With	notions	like	“late-bloomer,”	the	beginning	is	fraught	(see,	also,	Roberts	2015),	and	as	it	lacks	a	biological	marker,	adolescence’s	ending	is	even	more	uncertain	(see,	also,	Furedi	2003	and	Wallis	2013).	Still,	refusing	any	other	changes	(psychological	or	social)	that	may	occur	during	this	period,	the	bodily	changes	of	puberty	serve	as	the	defining	marker	of	adolescence,	for	both	males	and	females.	Thus,	the	conventional	understanding	of	adolescence	is	a	discursive	rendering	of	biology-as-truth	in	order	to	secure	that	which	disrupts	the	ordering	of	binary	oppositions;	the	adolescent	does	not	fit	within	either	the	adult	or	child	categories,	so	the	biological	changes	of	puberty	are	offered	as	an	uneasy	explanation	for	the	instability	and	liminality	marking	the	adolescent	as	adolescent.	Waller	(2009)	argues	“biological	determinism	[…]	helps	to	tie	teenagers	to	their	bodies,	gender	roles	and	sexualities	in	conventional	ways”	(32).	In	other	words,	pubertal	changes	mark	the	body	not	just	as	feminine,	that	is	to	say	woman,	but	also	as	heterosexually	feminine.32	Thus,	this	is	not	just	a	rendering	of	biology-as-truth.	It	is	a	rendering	of	biology-as-truth	of	how	the	shape-change	into	an	adult	woman	should	occur	in	order	to	bring	this	hegemonic	fantasy	into	being.	In	one	sense,	this	foreshadows	how	YAL	is	concerned	with	
                                                31	See,	more	recently,	Spacks	(1981),	Russell	(1988),	Neubauer	(1992),	Baxter	(2008).	Coleman	(2010),	alongside	earlier	editions,	offers	a	particularly	nuanced	and	exhaustive	study	of	the	shape	of	adolescence.		Finally,	this	developmental	theory—heavily	influenced	by	cognitive	development	that	is	structured	by	biological	stages—also	underscores	the	work	of	Jean	Piaget,	see,	especially,	Piaget	and	Inhelder	(1958);	Piaget	(1962);	Piaget	and	Inhelder	(1969).	Elkind	(1981)	gives	a	succinct	reading	of	the	shifts	in	Piaget’s	conceptualizing	adolescent	development.		32	While	LGBTQ	issues	are	not	within	the	scope	of	this	thesis,	there	is	a	strong	vein	of	YAL	offering	alternatives	to	this	narrative	of	(en)forced	heterosexuality.	In	terms	of	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy,	Malinda	Lo’s	fiction	is	an	excellent	example,	see:	Ash	(2009a)	and	Huntress	(2011),	especially.	Furthermore,	TeamEpicRead’s	(2013)	“25	Must-Read	YA	Books	Featuring	Gay	Protagonists”	is	a	useful	introduction	into	the	LGBTQ	genre,	as	it	is	termed.			
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adolescence.	As	a	literature,	it	exists	to	assist	the	adolescent	outside	of	the	text,	by	means	of	the	adolescent	inside	the	text,	into	the	appropriate	single,	stable	(adult)	identity,	an	identity	that	includes	heterosexuality.		Here,	my	concern	is	with	the	body	and	with	how	the	transition	from	child	to	adult	is	secured	in	the	body,	thus	associating	adolescence	with	an	overwhelming	biological	determinism,	one	particularly	affecting	female	adolescence	because	the	adolescent	girl	is	becoming	woman.33	In	Volatile	
Bodies:	Towards	a	Corporeal	Feminism,	Elizabeth	Grosz	(1994)	notes,	“women	are	somehow	more	biological,	more	corporeal,	and	more	natural	than	men”	(14,	emphasis	original).	The	female	body	is	perceived	as	not	just	biological,	corporeal	and	natural	but	as	“more”	of	each	of	these	things,	a	more	that	is	always	threatening	to	escape	the	binary’s	control.	The	adolescent	girl—who	is	already	“more	biological”	because	of	the	pubertal	changes	marking	her	as	adolescent—is	becoming	“more	biological”	because	she	is	becoming-woman.		This	“biological-ness”	of	the	female	body	is	an	argument	central	to	The	
Second	Sex	by	Simone	de	Beauvoir	([1949]	1997).	Concerned	with	unpicking	the	myth	of	woman—the	“eternal	feminine”—Beauvoir	elucidates	the	myth,	or	fantasy,	of	biology-as-truth,	and	its	relation	to	the	production	of	the	girl-child	as	a	gendered	body	that	is	becoming-woman.	She	describes	how	at	the	time	of	puberty,	the	female	body,	within	this	myth,	announces	itself	as	female	through	the	development	of	breasts,	the	widening	of	hips,	growth	of	body	hair,	and	menarche.	Here,	the	adolescent	female	body	becomes	gendered	as	feminine	through	the	physical	changes	of	puberty.	In	other	words,	prior	to	these	biological	changes,	the	female-child’s	body	is	asexual	because	it	is	unmarked	by	the	feminine	contours	that	would	code	it	as	woman	and	sexual,	a	notion	my	reading	of	Alanna’s	cross-dressing	in	Pierce’s	Song	of	the	Lioness	quartet	(1983–1988)	develops—and	complicates—throughout	the	following	chapters.	Here,	the	adolescent	female	becomes	embodied	in	a	way	that	her	male	counterparts	escape,	and	this	excessive	embodiment	is	that	by	which	the	adolescent	girl	is	excluded	from	dominant,	hegemonic	models	of	self.		
                                                33	See,	for	example,	Kipkie	1999;	Avshalom,	Lynam,	Moffit	and	Silva	1993;	Ge,	Conger	and	Elder	1995.	
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Biological	determinism	does	not	just	define	adolescence	it	also	narrates	the	shape	of	the	period	of	adolescence:	a	liner	progression	out	of	childhood	and	into	adulthood,	thanks	to	biological	processes	driving	the	action	forward.	This	view	is	at	the	centre	of	conventional	understandings	of	adolescence,	and	it	is	one	that	excludes	social	(discursive)	processes	or,	at	best,	relegates	them	to	a	peripheral	position	(see,	also,	Feldman	and	Elliot	1990	and	2010;	Katchadourian	1990;	Fausto-Sterling	1985).	In	this	vein,	adolescence	is	underpinned	by	what	Wood	(1984)	calls	an	“ideology	of	emergence”	(73),	a	notion	that	Hilton	and	Nikolejava	(2012)	also	assert	in	relation	to	the	literature.	Calling	attention	to	the	problem	of	biological	essentialism,	Wood	(1984)	suggests,		 sexuality	is	[…]	left	to	essentialism	(i.e.	that	the	essence	of	masculinity	or	femininity	is	biologically	pre-given)	without	a	consideration	of	how	what	emerges	is	due	to	culture	rather	than	biology.	(73)		Adolescence,	and	the	sexual	maturity	that	the	period	is	seen	to	produce,	is	posited	as	natural	and	naturally	occurring	through	a	“paradigm	of	biological	causation,”	which	Lesko	(1996)	further	describes	as	a	linear,	unicausal	model”	(151).	This	linear	biological	model—and	the	naturalness	of	adolescence—is	exactly	that	which	Lesko	(1996)	contests.	For	Lesko	(1996),	and	myself,	the	problem	with	the	conventional	and	typical	construction	of	adolescence	is	that	in	being	“universal,	timeless	and	massified”	the	specificity	of	adolescence	in	particular	cultural	spaces,	and	the	difference	in	the	ways	in	which	development	occurs,	is	elided	(152).	At	their	most	basic,	“normal”	developmental	models	posit	a	white	male	as	the	ideal	subject	of	this	process	and	the	process	itself	is	linear,	determined	by	the	biological	changes	of	puberty.	In	so	being,	the	female	adolescent	is	excluded—because	“the	fluctuations	of	women’s	systems,”	that	is	the	unpredictability	of	her	reproductive	system,	renders	her	“naturally	abnormal”	(151).	She	is	abnormal	because	of	the	“naturalness”	(i.e.	uncontrollability)	of	her	body.	Thus,	for	Lesko,			it	is	not	enough	to	study	the	cultural	or	social	aspects	of	adolescents,	allowing	the	biological	processes	to	stand	as	real	truths	outside	of	social	
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processes.	We	must	examine	the	ontological	assertions	regarding	adolescence	and	the	biological	research	that	establishes	them	as	natural	an	inevitable.	(144)		This	is	key:	there	cannot	be	a	binary	opposition	between	biology-perceived-as-truth	and	“cultural	or	social	aspects”	(the	discursive)	of	adolescents	because	they	work	together	to	construct	the	period.34		Moreover,	Robyn	McCallum	(1999)	suggests	that	“the	dominant	liberal	humanist	ethic”	underscoring	this	space	“privileges	concepts	such	as	the	uniqueness	of	the	individual	and	the	essentiality	of	self,	as	opposed	to	concepts	of	the	self	as	fragmented	or	plural,”	as	well	as,	I	suggest,	concepts	of	the	self	as	related	to,	and	interdependent	with,	other	selves	(6).	This	insistence	on	individuality	is	achieved	by	a	linear	progression	from	child	to	adult,	a	process	that	limits	the	options	available	to	adolescent	girls.	As	Allison	Waller	(2009)	suggests,	through	a	use	of	Kristeva’s	(1986)	notion	of	“woman’s	time,”				female	development	is	situated	as	an	alternative,	an	other,	in	the	general	framework	of	development;	girls,	it	is	suggested,	can	only	go	so	far	on	this	progressive	route	before	they	slip	back	into	matrilineal	patterns	of	‘woman’s	time.’	(35)			The	dominant	model	of	becoming-self	(the	pattern	of	adolescent	development)	within	Western	rationality	is	a	model	that	privileges	the	male	subject	position,	at	the	expense	of,	not	necessarily	a	female	subject	position,	but	one	that	takes	both	males	and	females	into	account.	In	other	words,	I	do	not	wish	to	replace	the	dominant	male-centred,	binary	model	with	an	alternative	female	one;	rather,	I	seek	a	model	that	is	not	founded	in	binary	oppositions	and	that	is	available	to	both	adolescent	girls	as	well	as	boys,	as	there	are,	theoretically,	infinite	positions	along	the	spectrum	between	the	two,	if	only	the	binary	is	refused.	For	this	reason,	I	believe	a	new	map	is	in	order;	a	map	that	offers	not	only	economies	of	relation	but	also	one	that	takes	the	body,	its	contours	and	fleshy	materiality,	into	account.		
                                                34	In	her	folkloric	approach	to	the	“vernacular”	discourses	of	menstruation,	Victoria	Louise	Newton	(2016)	takes	a	similar	stance,	hovering	between	a	purist	social	constructionism	and	a	biological	determinism	in	her	understanding	of	the	everyday	discourses	of	menstruation.	
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In	popular	and	media	culture,	as	representative	of	hegemonic	discourse,	there	is	an	erasure	of	the	body	that	not	only	affects	the	“natural”	female	body	but	that	also	extends	to	any	body	that	is	perceived	as	excessive,	deviant	or	different.	This	is	in	the	controversy	surrounding	Bruce	Jenner’s	transformation	into	Caitlyn	(see,	for	example,	Moyer	2015),	as	it	also	in	Renée	Zellweger’s	“new	face,”	one	achieved	through	plastic	surgery	(see,	for	example,	Hess	2014).	While	celebrities	may	make	headlines	for	their	deviations,	it	is	also	in	the	shamed	and	ridiculed	photo	of	an	overweight	girl,	just	as	much	as	it	is	behind	the	editing	or	filtering	of	a	selfie.	This	shame	silences	the	body’s	pimple,	slightly	off-centre	jawline	or	any	other	of	the	dozens	of	possible	perceptual	imperfections,	in	hopes	of	drawing	ever	nearer	to	the	impossible	ideal.	Moreover,	the	instances	of	shaming	and	self-policing,	of	specific	concern	in	Chapter	Four,	seek	to	produce	not	only	a	heavily	stylised	image	but	also	one	of	homogeneity—a	sameness	that	silences	the	fleshy.		Thus,	while	I	discuss	the	hegemonic	YAL	that	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	contests	throughout,	a	few	examples	of	the	literature	perpetuating	dominant	images	of	female	adolescence	includes	but	is	again	not	limited	to:	the	Gallagher	Girls	(Carter	2006–2013)	and	Heist	Society	series	(Carter	2010–2013),	the	Rebel	Belle	series	(Hawkins	2014–2016),	as	well	as	Zoe	Sugg’s	Girl	Online	(2014)	and	the	many	books	by	Sarah	Dessen,	most	recently,	Saint	Anything	(2015).	While	these	books	may	appear	to	offer	active	and	empowered	girls,	they	also	repeat	the	ideal	image	of	popular	and	media	culture—thin,	attractive,	white	and,	often,	middle	class—thus	contributing	to	the	silence	with	which	I	am	concerned.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	the	cross-dressing,	shape-shifting,	menstruating,	“glamoured”	and	cyborg	bodies—bodies	of	difference—in	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	are	significant.	For,	these	bodies	are	the	bodies	that	dominant	discourses	of	adolescence	would	see	erased,	a	point	evidenced	by	the	bodies	available	in	hegemonic	YAL,	a	point	that	is	fundamental	to	my	argument	that	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy,	as	a	sub-	or	counter-cultural	literature,	offers	alternative	frameworks	for	living	and	being	an	adolescent	female	body.		For	now,	the	biological	(the	fleshy	and	the	physical)	frequents	conceptions	of	adolescence	generally	and	female	adolescence	particularly,	a	construction	that	relies	heavily	on	readings	of	biology-as-truth.	Yet,	as	
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discursive	constructions	privilege	a	superficial,	edited	image	of	the	body-cum-self,	there	is	also	a	tension	between	the	fleshy	body,	marked	by	the	bodily	changes	of	puberty	(the	“real”),	and	the	ideal	body,	exemplified	by	the	digital	image	(the	symbolic).	This	tension	produces	a	silence	in	relation	to	the	body,	and	it	is	one	that	happens	in	two	ways:	between	oppositions,	because	the	adolescent	girl	is	neither	child	nor	adult,	and	within	oppositions,	because	the	adolescent	girl	is	becoming-woman;	she	is	physically	shape-changing	into	woman,	and	“woman”	is	the	other	of	the	paradigmatic	man/woman	binary.			
Liminality:	Silenced	Between	Oppositions		The	first	manifestation	of	this	silencing	occurs	because	the	female	adolescent	exists	between	the	child/adult	binary	opposition.	It	occurs	because	the	adolescent	is	liminal,	neither	child	nor	adult,	and	in	so	being	a	kind	of	structural	impossibility	surrounds	the	figure.	First	employed	by	French	anthropologist	Arnold	van	Gennep	([1909]	1906)	in	Les	Rites	de	Passage,	liminality	describes	the	state	of	being	in-between.	Specifically,	and	in	Gennep’s	focus,	it	is	the	threshold	moment	during	the	ritual	process	of	transference,	the	moment	that	sees	the	initiate,	in	my	case	the	adolescent,	as	existing	between	states;	she	is	neither	one	(the	child)	nor	the	other	(adult).		While	Gennep	is	concerned	with	ritual	processes	in	general,	Victor	Turner’s	([1964]	1972)	“Betwixt	and	Between:	The	Liminal	Period	in	Rites	de	
Passage”	specifically	focuses	on	liminality	and	on	the	ritual	transference	of	an	individual,	neophyte	in	his	terminology,	from	one	state—the	“relatively	fixed	or	stable	condition”	between	which	the	liminal	person	exists—to	another	(235).	In	this	sense,	liminality	describes	the	moment	of	utter	possibility	or	utter	destruction	(see,	also,	Hyde	[1998]	2008),	and,	here,	it	lends	an	uncertainty	to	the	category	of	adolescent.	In	popular	and	media	culture,	it	renders	the	adolescent	girl	doubly	invisible—because	she	is	woman	(outside)	and	adolescent	(between).	Moreover,	this	ritual	process	of	transference	is	key	on	two	levels:	YAL	itself	is	an	example	of	ritual	transference	in	as	much	as	it	often	narrates	the	transference	of	child	to	adult,	and	the	mythopoeic	aspect	of	my	key	texts	brings	an	additional	level	of	ritual	transference	in	as	much	as	mythopoeic	
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fantasy	texts	are,	by	and	large,	hero	narratives.		Here,	however,	I	am	concerned	with	the	adolescent	as	a	figure,	or	embodiment,	of	this	liminality,	and	with	all	the	silence	that	so	being	engenders	within	hegemonic	discourses.	Turner	([1967]	1979)	suggests,	“the	subject	of	passage	ritual	is,	in	the	liminal	period,	structurally,	if	not	physically,	‘invisible’”	(235).	In	the	initiation	rights	with	which	Turner	is	concerned,	a	period	of	seclusion	typically	ensues,	and	while	adolescents	in	the	twenty-first	century	hardly	disappear	altogether	from	view,	they	do	increasingly	“disappear”	from	the	family	home	as	part	of	the	ritual	process	in	contemporary	culture.	They	join	clubs	and	organisations,	they	gain	freedom	to	go	out	with	friends,	and	in	so	doing,	they	begin	disappearing	from	their	structured	place	as	child	typically	within	a	family	unit.	In	this	way,	Angela	McRobbie’s	(2000a,	especially)	work	on	youth	cultures,	perhaps,	gives	Turner’s	ritual	disappearance	modern	shape—in	the	form	of	youth	clubs	and	(other)	subcultural	spaces	into	which	young	adult	and	teens	disappear.		Finally,	as	I	am	concerned	with	this	“structural”	invisibility,	or	absence,	of	the	liminal	figure,	I	do	not	employ	Heather	Anastasiu’s	(2011)	consideration	of	liminality	in	relation	to	the	popularity	of	Stephenie	Meyer’s	Twilight	Saga	(2005–2008).	Despite	a	concern	with	the	reflections	of	adolescent	transference	in	patternings	of	the	hero’s	journey—an	issue	I	discuss	in	the	following	chapter—Anastasiu’s	psychoanalytic	reading	of	the	liminal	period	does	not	take	into	account	the	embodying	of	liminality	that	marks	adolescence	as	adolescence.	In	other	words,	Anastasiu’s	consideration	of	liminality	does	not	take	into	account	the	silence;	it	does	not	take	into	account	the	absence	of	a	discourse	around	bodily	change	and	instability	within	the	West’s	image	saturated	culture.	Incidentally,	Anastasiu’s	focus	on	the	Twilight	Saga	is	also	outside	of	my	scope,	as	that	series	is	another	example	of	hegemonic	YAL.		Hegemonic	patriarchal	discourse	requires	oppositions	and	their	stability	in	order	for	its	norms	and	ideals	to	be	maintained:	youth	cannot	be	preferred,	if	age—its	opposite—is	not	derided;	thin	cannot	be	admired,	if	fat	is	not	condemned;	fit	can	not	be	required,	if	bodily	difference	is	not	abnormal.	It	is	a	system	based	in	competition.	The	adolescent,	however,	disrupts	binary	pairs	(child/adult,	innocence/experience,	instability/stability).	In	a	specific	look	at	
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the	child/adult	binary	and	its	success,	Waller	(2009)	comments,				gaps	between	the	two	states	[child	and	adult]	are	more	problematic.	The	teenager	resides	in	the	indefinable	space	between	innocence	and	experience,	or	asexuality	and	sexuality,	forcing	definition	that	relies	on	transitory	and	unstable	signifiers.	(30)			This	is	Turner’s	([1967]	1979)	“structurally	[…]	‘invisible’”	(235).	Binary	oppositions	are	the	structure	of	discourse,	and	adolescents,	discursively	and	bodily,	exist	in	the	space	between,	in	the	“indefinable,”	according	to	Waller.	It	is	also	why	conventional	conceptions	of	adolescence	latch	onto	the	bodily	changes	of	puberty—onto	that	which	is	“transitory	and	unstable”—for	definition.	Adolescents	do	not	have	a	place	within	a	binary	pair,	so	their	definition	is	that	which	excludes	them.		Lesko	(1996)	also	identifies	this	“structural	invisibility.”	For	her,	it	is	the	“coming	of	age”	discourse	marking	adolescence	that	silences	adolescents,	by	forcing	linear	development	on	them	(148).	Lesko	also	notes,			 The	creation	of	normal	adolescents	occurred	along	the	same	lines	as	did	the	demarcation	of	wayward	girls	[…]	juvenile	delinquency	[…]	and	White	trash.		(141)			This	is	a	binary	constructing	of	adolescence:	normal	adolescence	is	thus	because	it	is	not	wayward,	delinquent	or	(white)	trash.	This	normalising	silences	the	adolescent,	forcing	her	into	binary	categories	of	existence—because	she	is	otherwise	liminal.	In	short,	it	is	the	language	used	to	fill	the	space	between	oppositions	(child/adult)	that	Lesko	finds	problematic.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	I	aim,	specifically	in	Chapter	Four,	to	speak	from	the	silenced	positions	within	and	between	oppositions.		The	narrations	of	bodily	instability	with	which	I	am	concerned	are	narrations	that	speak	from	both	the	silenced	position	within—because	they	are	narrations	of	woman	and	body—and	between—because	they	are	narrations	of	uncertainty,	change	and	liminality.	Speaking	from	the	space	between	oppositions	is	not	the	only	way	of	undoing	the	binaries	governing	Western	rationality	(see,	also,	Braidotti	1994;	Deleuze	and	Guattari	1987;	Renold	and	Ringrose	2008);	although	it	is,	I	feel,	particularly	relevant	to	female	
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adolescence.	Narrations	of	bodily	instability	operate	in—and	as—blank	spaces:	“inter-dict[s],”	or	a	functioning	between	the	states,	according	to	Irigaray	([1974]	1985),	and	this	bodily	liminality	is	pertinent	to	the	female	adolescent	who	is,	herself,	liminal.	Each	bodily	instability	that	I	read	explores	a	particular	kind	of	liminality:	narratives	of	cross-dressing	navigate	the	blank	space	between	the	binary	opposition	male/female,	shape-shifting	between	human/animal,	bleeding	between	woman/child,	and	being	cyborg	between	human/machine.	Finally,	there	is	also	a	navigation	of	the	opposition	between	surface	and	depth	underscoring,	and	linking,	each	of	these	liminalities.			
Woman:	Silenced	Within	Oppositions		While	adolescence	experiences	a	kind	of	silence	because	it	is	between	the	oppositional	pair	comprising	childhood	and	adulthood	and	adolescents	because	they	are	neither	child	nor	adult,	the	adolescent	girl	experiences	a	further	silence—or	is	entering	into	one—because	she	is	becoming-woman.	In	other	words,	this	manifestation	of	silencing	occurs	within	the	binary	pair	man/woman	because	through	the	bodily	changes	of	puberty	the	adolescent	girl	is	becoming-woman;	she	is	shape-changing	into	woman.	Implicit	within	this	system	is	a	privileging	of	the	white	male	subject	who	has	historically	been	associated	with	the	mind,	and	not	the	body.	N.	Katherine	Hayles	(1999)	suggests,			 Identified	with	the	rational	mind,	the	liberal	subject	possessed	a	body	but	was	not	usually	represented	as	being	a	body.	Only	because	the	body	is	not	identified	with	the	self	is	it	possible	to	claim	for	the	liberal	subject	its	notorious	universality,	a	claim	that	depends	on	erasing	markers	of	bodily	difference,	including	sex,	race,	and	ethnicity.	(4-5)		Through	the	lens	of	posthumanism,	Hayles	offers	a	critique	of	the	liberal	humanist	model	of	self	that	is	the	dominant	hegemonic	model	of	contemporary	Western	culture.	Here,	the	male	body	is	essentially	blank,	despite	the	very	visible	marker	of	its	maleness,	and	this	male	body	is	the	default	body	of	self—a	body	that	is	possessed	by	the	self	but	not	a	part	of	it.	As	is	also	the	case	for	the	raced	or	ethnic	body	(that	is	not	white),	this	model	refuses	the	female	body	
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because	of	its	difference	from	this	norm,	the	visible	demarcation	with	breasts	and	an	absence,	or	lack,	with	the	womb.		Owing	to	this	deviation,	woman	is	“represented	as	being	a	body,”	a	manoeuvre	that	excludes	her	from	liberal	humanistic	models	of	self,	an	argument	that	Christine	Battersby	(1998)	makes	when	she	suggests	that	Western	tradition	constructs	the	male	body	as	a	“thing	capable	of	being	transcended”	(19).	The	male	subject-position—the	normal	subject	position—is	autonomous;	it	is	not	entrapped	within	a	body.	The	female	subject-position	is,	however,	“linked	to	a	fleshy	continuity”	(10)	and	that	“flesh	is	[…]	monstrous—with	a	materiality	which	is	more	fully	immanent”	(19).	Woman	is	flesh	and	this	fleshiness—that	is	monstrous—permeates	her	very	self.	This	monstrosity	stems	from	a	“profound	somatophobia,”	a	fear	of	the	body,	which	has	marked	Western	philosophy	since	its	inception,	as	Elizabeth	Grosz	(1994,	5)	argues	in	relation	to	her	concern	with	the	silencing	of	woman.	Briefly,	both	Grosz	(1994)	and	Battersby	(1998)	play	a	continued	role	through	this	thesis,	as	both	are	concerned	with	woman’s	exclusion—through	her	body—from	representation.	In	short,	Grosz	offers	a	conceptualizing	of	the	excessive	corporeality	of	woman	through	a	reading	of	Western	philosophy,	and	Battersby	does	much	the	same,	though	she	focuses	on	pregnancy	as	a	particular	manifestation	of	this	excessive	corporeality.	Effectively,	the	pregnant	body	(Battersby)	is	the	body	at	its	most	biological,	corporeal	and	natural	(Grosz),	thus	uniting	Grosz	and	Battersby’s	arguments.	In	this	way,	the	excessive	corporeality	and	fleshiness	of	woman	is	at	the	core	of	my	reading,	with	the	adolescent	(and	also	the	pregnant	woman)	serving	as	a	heightened	example.					At	the	core	of	these	readings,	the	corporeality	of	this	body	is	the	issue.	The	mind—equally,	self,	soul,	I—is	positioned	as	resolute,	unchanging,	eternal;	whereas,	the	body	is	fallible,	prone	to	decay,	death.	In	the	Phaedrus	(360	B.C.E.),	Plato	describes	the	body	as	a	“living	tomb,”	a	thing	in	which	the	soul	is	imprisoned	(Plato	1982;	n.p.).35	This	aligning	of	self	with	the	mind—not	as	physical,	fleshy	organ	but	as	representation	of	self,	soul,	or	“I”—	has	only	
                                                35	The	translation	of	Plato’s	Phaedrus	by	Alexander	Nehamas	and	Paul	Woodruff	sees	this	sentiment	as	“not	buried	in	this	thing	we	are	carrying	around	now,	which	we	call	a	body,	locked	in	it	like	an	oyster	in	its	shell”	(Plato	1995,	39).		
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deepened	through	the	Cartesianism	still	underscoring	Western	philosophy	today,	at	least	in	terms	of	the	narratives	of	liberal	humanism	dominating	that	space,	a	humanism	that	is	reflected	in	YAL.	Not	only	does	humanism	place	the	human	in	a	position	of	superiority	to	animals,	the	land,	machines,	effectively	anything	not	“human,”	but	it	also	positions	man-as-mind,	leaving	woman	trapped	within	her	body—that	unruly	and	uncontrollable	thing.	It	is	through	this	embodiment	she	becomes	his	‘Other’.36	In	this	way,	the	othering	of	the	female	body	is	about	control,	about	controlling	that	which	is	construed	as	excessive	and	thus	threatening	to	the	stability	of	the	binary	oppositions	underpinning	this	discourse.	It	is	a	positioning	that	hinges	upon	the	sexed	nature	of	the	body,	in	that,	the	male’s	sexual	member	is	visible,	thus	known,	whereas	the	female’s	is	invisible	and	thus	unknowable	(Freud	[1993]	1973).37		Yet,	despite	this	invisibility,	the	female	body	makes	visible	the	corporeality	of	the	flesh.	It	grows	breasts,	bleeds,	produces	more	bodies,	and	it	is	this	perceived	excessive	fleshiness	that	causes	her	othering,	as	fleshiness	complicates	the	stability	required	of	binary	oppositions.	It	is	not	an	untenable	positioning,	as	Gill	(2007)	suggests	femininity,	that	is	what	it	means	to	be	a	woman,	is	now	aligned	not	just	with	the	body	but	with	its	surface:	appearing	appropriately	woman	means	one	is	woman.38	It	is	this	very	appearing	that	popular	and	media	culture	seeks	to	control	and	contain—especially	in	terms	of	those	bodies,	adolescent	and	pregnant	ones,	for	example,	that	make	being	woman	and	body	particularly	obvious.	The	obviousness	threatens	the	superiority-through-visibility	of	the	phallic,	as	it	depends	upon	the	opposition	of	woman’s	invisible	and	unknowable	sex	for	its	dominance,	an	issue	that	Chapter	Three	directly	engages.			Finally,	the	discursive	construction	of	men	and	women	has,	since	the	Renaissance,	positioned	woman	outside	of	hegemonic	discourse	(Flanagan	
                                                36	McNay	(1998)	gives	a	thorough	schematisation	of	this,	what	she	terms	poststructuralist,	argument	and	its	displacement	of	the	other	in	order	to	secure	subjectivity,	also	positing	the	mind/body	dualism	as	the	“central”	dualism	(12–13).		37	This	known/unknown	dichotomy	is	Irigaray’s	([1974]	1985)	grievance	in	
Speculum	of	the	other	Woman.	38	There	is	a	conflation	of	female	and	feminine	occurring	within	this	space.	
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2014),	and	it	has	done	so	through	her	body.	Moreover,	it	is	an	exclusion	from	the	Symbolic	Order,	the	register	of	meaning	and	subjectivity.	As	Irigaray	([1984]	1993)	terms	it	in	her	critiques	of	Lacan,	this	is	an	exclusion	from	discourse,	from	meaning,	and	it	leaves	woman	in	a	state	of	déréliction	(67).	In	short,	woman	is	excluded	from	the	Symbolic,	the	order	of	Western	philosophy,	discourse	and	meaning,	and	it	is	a	bodily	exclusion.	This	is	the	Symbolic	Order,	the	space	in	which	the	hegemonic	fantasy	of	self-through-appearance	exists	in	popular	and	media	culture.	Moreover,	woman	not	only	lacks	access	to	(masculine)	discourse,	but	she	also	lacks	“access	to	the	signifying	economy”	of	her	femaleness	([1974]	1985,	71),	in	that,	discourse	includes	no	space	for	“red	blood”	and	birth—because,	as	evidence	of	the	body’s	propensity	to	change	and	also	to	fail—such	things	threaten	the	stability	of	the	binary	oppositions	underpinning	hegemonic,	masculine	discourse.	Thus,	in	the	exclusion	from	the	Symbolic	Order	and	in	the	lack	of	access	to	a	signifying	economy,	woman	is	doubly		“outsider,	the	epitome	of	being	subject	to	[…]	[masculine]	norms”	(ibid.).	There	is	no	discourse	for	fleshy,	female	subjectivity,	and	this	absence	is	discourse	is	reflected	in	both	YAL	as	well	as	in	the	critical	engagement	of	it.			
YAL:	A	FIELD	OF	LITERATURE	NEEDING	A	BODY	OF	CRITICISM			While	there	is	a	general	consensus	that	the	critical	theory	of	YAL	is	a	“growing	body”	(Hill	2014	ix),	there	is	also	overwhelming	agreement	that	a	“body	of	criticism”	is	still	needed	(15)—the	parallels	between	this	“growing	body	of	criticism”	and	the	“growing	body”	of	the	adolescent	are	striking.	Conventionally	subsumed	by	children’s	literature	not	only	because	it	is	larger,	older,	and	more	established	but,	crucially,	because	children’s	literature	is	also	securely	positioned	as	part	of	a	binary	pair,	there	is	a	lack	of	critical	engagement	of	YAL	(see,	also,	Trites	1996b;	Hunt	1996;	Alsup	2010a;	Coats	2011;	Hill	2014).	Thus,	this	thesis	seeks	to	contribute	to	the	developing	body	of	YAL	criticism	by	discussing	developing	bodies.	This	section	is	concerned	with	YAL’s	inclusion	under	the	umbrella	term	“children’s	literature,”	as	well	as	with	why	such	inclusion	is	impossible,	while	it	also	considers	the	kinds	of	engagement	of	
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YAL—“book	selection,”	“teaching”	and	critical	theory,	of	which	the	first	two	are	the	most	prevalent—that	do	occur	(Hill	2014,	xiv).			Citing	Hunt	(1996),	Hill	(2014)	argues,	“in	terms	of	theoretical	criticism,	the	field	of	YA	literature	has	not	yet	separated	itself	from	children’s	literature”	(15),	adding	the	caveat	“new	fields	take	time	to	develop	serious	criticism”	(ibid.).	While	I	disagree	with	this	continual	need	to	justify	the	state	of	YAL	criticism,	it	was	not	until	Disturbing	the	Universe:	Power	and	Repression	in	
Young	Adult	Literature	by	Roberta	Seelinger	Trites	(2000)	that	both	a	sustained	defining	of	the	field	and	a	categorical	call	for	its	difference	from	children’s	literature	occurred.	Moreover,	Trites	has	been	instrumental	in	the	development	of	the	field	(see,	also,	2001	and	2007).	Thus,	while	Hunt	(1996),	and	more	widely	the	“special	issue”	of	the	Children’s	Literature	Association	Quarterly	(Trites	1996a)	in	which	the	article	exists,	marks	a	pivotal	point	in	the	critical	engagement	of	YAL,	it	was	not	until	the	new	millennium	that	a	sustained,	coherent	body	of	YAL	criticism	began	to	develop.	In	terms	of	both	the	criticism	of	YAL	that	does	exist	as	well	as	the	tendency	to	place	YAL	under	the	umbrella	term	children’s	literature,	Hunt’s	article	is	a	particularly	useful	place	to	start,	not	just	because	it	is	included	in	that	“special	edition”	of	the	Children’s	Literature	Association	Quarterly	but	also	because	of	the	way	in	which	it	addresses	“why”	there	is	a	lack	of	critical	engagement.39	For	which	Hunt	gives	three	reasons,	young	adult	books	tend	to	“date”	quickly	(5),	“the	theory	that	accompanies	[them]	is	more	likely	to	focus	on	social	issues	than	on	literary	theory”	(6),	and	finally,	the	“persistent	connection	between	YA	literature	courses	and	high	school	certification	[as	in	teacher	training]”	(8).	While	the	final	reason	comes	to	bear	below,	there	is,	within	the	first	two,	a	shared	issue	of	temporality	at	play,	one	that	speaks	to	the	linear	way	in	which	adolescents	are	meant	to	progress	out	of	adolescence,	a	
                                                39	In	her	introduction	to	the	edition,	Trites	(1996b)	suggests	that	it	came	about	because	of	how	“[a]t	the	1995	Children’s	Literature	Association	conference	[…]	the	paucity	of	theoretically	orientated	literary	criticism	analyzing	adolescent	literature”	was	noted.	Given	that	many	critics	shared	the	concern,	the	edition	sought	to	fill	a	gap	(2).		
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notion	that	Mary	Hilton	and	Maria	Nikolajeva	(2012)	pick	up	in	their	focus	on	the	endgame	of	adolescence.			For	Hilton	and	Nikolajeva,	the	adolescent	must	“emerge”	from	adolescence	as	an	adult,	that	is	to	say,	possessing	a	unified,	single,	stable	and	heterosexual	identity,	according	to	dominant	hegemonic	paradigms.	This	discourse	of	emergence	is	prohibitive,	especially	as	Hilton	and	Nikolajeva	go	as	far	as	suggesting	“adolescence”	itself	“implies	a	transition	from	deviation	to	norm”	(13).	This	is	the	structural	anomaly	of	adolescence,	and	it	is	one	that	concomitantly	encompasses	young	adult	literature.	Moreover,	this	“deviation”	sees	YAL	placed	under	the	umbrella	term	children’s	literature,	as	it	“easier”	to	rationalise	the	literature	within	binary	frameworks	if	it	is	simply	an	aspect	of	children’s	literature.	In	other	words,	this	chapter	reads	a	structure	of	binary	oppositions	existing	within	Western	culture,	a	structure	that	supersedes	specific	binary	pairs	in	a	favour	of	a	paradigmatic	use	of	binary	oppositions	to	structure,	organise	and	rationalise	the	world.	It	is	this	structure	of	binary	thinking	that	this	thesis	refuses	through	engaging	YAL’s	liminality	generally	and	the	female	body	and	its	“instability”	specifically.		This	particular	iteration	of	YAL	as	deviation	is	exemplified	by	the	journals,	in	two	ways.	First,	by	how	both	the	children’s	literature	journals,	as	well	as	several	key	children’s	literature	book	series,	have	included	YAL	within	their	scope:	especially,	when,	in	terms	of	the	journals,	that	inclusion	occurs	through	a	“special	edition”	(see,	for	example,	Trites	1996a	and	Christenbury	1997).	In	being	made	“special,”	these	editions	acknowledged	YAL	as	a	field	of	literature	and	of	criticism,	but	in	doing	so	in	this	way,	they	also	named	it	a	deviant	aspect	of	children’s	literature.	There	is	a	similar	issue	occurring	with	the	publication	of	monographs	that	engage	YAL	(see,	also,	Waller	2009;	Day,	Green-Barteet,	Montz	2014;	Flanagan	2014).	While	on	the	surface	(cover)	these	books	appear	to	concern	YAL,	appearance	immediately	gives	way	to	a	situating	within,	what	becomes,	the	wider	field	children’s	literature.	For	example,	
Technology	and	Identity	in	Young	Adult	Fiction	(Flanagan	2014)	makes	immediately	explicit	a	concern	with	“Young	Adult	Fiction.”	However,	on	the	first	page—prior	even	to	the	title	page—the	paratextual	material	situates	the	text	within	Critical	Approaches	to	Children’s	Literature	(i,	formatting	original).	“The	
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Series	Editor’s	Forward”	(Waller	2009)	performs	much	the	same	function.	In	publishing	these	key	works	on	YAL	within	children’s	literature	series,	the	publishers	effectively	turn	them	into	“steam-valves,”	at	once	giving	the	individual	text	approval	and	validity	as	distinct	from	children’s	literature,	whilst	also	ensuring	that,	as	a	whole,	they	operate	within	the	accepted	framework	(of	binary	oppositions).40	However,	the	inclusion	of	YAL	under	the	umbrella	of	children’s	literature	is	problematic	because	there	is	an	elision	of	bodies	that	occurs	with	the	conflation.	The	child	and	the	adolescent	are	markedly	different:	a	fundamental	bodily	instability	that	is	absence	from	conceptions	of	childhood	marks	adolescence	generally	and	female	adolescence—through	breast	growth,	the	growth	of	pubic	and	underarm	hair,	the	widening	hips	and	menarche—particularly.	Children’s	literature	cannot	take	into	account	this	instability	as	being-child	elides	the	fundamental	bodily	instability	of	adolescence.	This	is	an	issue	I	have	with	Adventures	into	Otherness:	Child	Metamorphs	in	Late	
Twentieth-Century	Children's	Literature	(Lassén-Seger	2006)	as	well	as	
Werewolves,	Wings,	and	Other	Weird	Transformations:	Fantastic	Metamorphosis	
in	Children’s	and	Young	Adult	Fantasy	Literature	(Chappell	2007),	both	of	which	should	speak	quite	strongly	to	this	thesis.	Instead,	their	scope	for	reading	instability	is	limited	by	their	refusal	to	acknowledge	YAL	as	separate	and	distinct	from	children’s	literature.	While	focusing	on	children’s	literature	and	including	YAL	within	that	field	is	also	a	problem	in	Coats	(2007),	Bradford,	McCallum,	Mallan,	Stephens	
                                                40	William	Bascom	(1954)	first	identified	this	practice	as	one	of	his	“Four	Functions	of	Folklore.”	Bascom	suggests,			 folklore	fulfills	the	important	but	often	overlooked	function	of	maintaining	conformity	to	the	accepted	patterns	of	behavior	[…]	More	than	simply	serving	to	validate	or	justify	institutions,	beliefs	and	attitudes,	some	forms	of	folklore	are	important	as	means	of	applying	social	pressure	and	exercising	social	control.	(346)		Through	a	“steam-valve”	function,	folklore	gives	space	to	issues	unacceptable	within	a	particular	culture,	allowing	them	to	be	explored	within	an	acceptable,	that	is,	controllable	way.	The	trickster	figure	often	fulfills	this	steam-valve	function,	in	his	role	as	a	disrupter	of	borders	and	boundaries.		
 48	
(2008),	Reynolds	(2007),	Wilkie-Stibbs	(2002),	and	Jacques	(2015),	I	draw	out	Lassén-Seger	and	Chappell	because	of	their	engagement	with	shape-shifting—metamorphosis	in	their	terminology—as	that	concern	relates	closely	to	this	thesis.	However,	these	texts	cannot	give	credence	to	the	(bodily)	instability	of	the	adolescent	and	of	adolescent	literature	because	of	their	association	with	children’s	literature.	Moreover,	neither	text	can	take	into	account	the	liminality	of	adolescence,	of	which	this	bodily	instability	is	one	example.	This	very	tension—between	the	required	appearance	of	bodily	stability	in	popular	and	media	culture	and	the	adolescent	girl’s	fundamentally	unstable	body—is	the	focus	of	my	argument.	YAL	criticised	under	the	umbrella	term	or,	even,	in	conjunction	with	children’s	literature,	cannot	take	into	account	the	peculiar	relationship	between	adolescence	and	the	body.		“Book	selection,”	“teaching,”	and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	critical	theory	mark	the	field	of	YAL	studies	today	(Hill	2014,	xiv),	and	while	these	areas	offer	unique	perspectives	on	the	field,	there	is	often	a	slippage	between	the	distinct	areas.	For	example,	“book	selection”	and	“teaching”	frequently	overlap	and	engage	one	another,	as	once	trained	to	teach—the	goal	of	“teaching”	focused	criticism—teachers	and	librarians	are	often	the	front	lines	of	recommending	“best	books,”	the	primary	role	of	book	selection	research.	This	ambiguity	within	the	field	of	study	reflects	the	ambiguities	that	also	pervade	the	category	young	adult	(the	adolescent)	and	YAL	(the	literature);	there	is	often	a	slippage	between	the	adolescent,	the	literature,	and	the	criticism,	as	all	three	are	intimately	bound	up	in	one	another.	In	other	words,	the	search	for	identity	associated	with	adolescence	is	reflected	in	both	the	literature	and	the	criticism,	both	in	its	concern	and	its	preoccupation	with	its	own	identity	as	criticism.	Moreover,	this	thesis	is	not	specifically	intended	to	recommend	“best	books”	but	in	engaging	alternative,	positive	images	of	living	and	being	an	adolescent	female	body,	I	implicitly	suggest	that	the	books	under	discussion	are	indeed	“good	books.”	This	ambiguity	and	slippage	is	a	manifestation	of	liminality.	Thus,	it	is	through	this	liminality	that	I	examine	the	field	of	YAL	engagement.		Returning	to	the	journals,	there	is	an	absence	of	publications	dedicated	to	the	critical	engagement	of	the	literature,	as	the	YAL	specific	journals	that	do	exist—The	ALAN	Review,	SIGNAL	Journal,	The	Young	Adult	Library	Services	and	
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the	Journal	of	Research	on	Libraries	and	Young	Adults—focus	most	predominantly	on	book	selection	and	the	teaching	of	young	adult	literature.	The	
ALAN	Review,	for	example,	features	“clip	and	file,”	a	section	wholly	dedicated	to	reviewing	new	YAL	in	most	of	its	issues.	This	is	not	to	say	that	these	journals	do	not	include	critical	theory;	it	is,	rather,	to	demonstrate	how	their	primary	aims	align	more	with	book	selection	and	education	than	with	critical	theory.	Of	the	two,	education	stands	as	the	most	dominant	strand,	with	book	selection	participating	in	its	goals.	In	the	West,	at	least,	this	is	because	the	adolescent	is	presumed	to	be	in,	and	in	need	of,	education.	Owing	to	this,	it	is	impossible	to	extricate	YAL	from	discourses	of	education.	On	this	front,	Young	Adult	
Literature	and	Adolescent	Identity	Across	Cultures	and	Classrooms,	edited	by	Janet	Alsup	(2010b),	is	one	recent	and	popular	example	of	this	vein	of	criticism.		This	is	also	largely	the	work	of,	in	the	United	States,	the	Young	Adult	Library	Services	Association	(YALSA)	and	the	Assembly	on	Literature	for	Adolescents	of	the	NCTE	(National	Council	of	Teachers	of	English).	For	examples	of	works	in	this	vein,	see:	Bucher	and	Hinton	(2013);	Cole	(2008);	Herz	and	Gallo	(2005).	While	it	is	not	a	field	that	I	am	currently	interested	in	or	largely	concerned	with,	it,	while	increasing	the	visibility	of	YAL	(especially	in	calling	for	YAL’s	use	within	classrooms)	is	a	strand	of	engagement	that	most	often	remains	in	the	“best	books”	vein	of	criticism,	in	that,	it	is	concerned	with	what	books	are	best	suited	for	particular	purposes	and	particular	stages.		This	“best	books”	front	is	heavily	bound	up	in	the	awarding	of	prizes—awards	that	typically	go	to	realistic	YA	fiction,	as	I	discuss	below.		While	most	critics	note	the	lack	of	YAL	criticism	and	several	have	explored	why	it	might	be	so	lacking,	I	want	to	question	Hunt’s	(1996)	belief	that	the	“issue-driven”	nature	of	YAL	causes	a	difficulty	in	terms	of	the	theorizing	of	YAL.	I	agree	that	criticism	of	YAL	often	focuses	on	“issues.”	YAL	is	an	“issues-based”	literature,	thus	an	issues-driven	criticism	of	the	literature	logically	follows,	but	I	do	not	see	this	as	detrimental	to	theorizing.	Rather,	I	see	it	as	contributing	to	the	robust	and	growing	body	of	criticism	in	highly	relevant	and	specific	ways.	YAL	is	an	incredibly	topical	literature,	and	in	contemporary	popular	and	media	culture	this	has	led,	within	the	literature,	to	an	increased	turn	to	dystopias	and	to	the	posthuman,	but	this	turn	has	not	been	at	the	
 50	
expense	of	a	theoretical	engagement	of	YAL,	as	Basu,	Broad,	and	Hintz	(2013);	Flanagan	(2014);	Day,	Green-Barteet,	and	Montz	(2014)	make	clear.	Through	their	look	at	the	“issues”	related	to	posthumanism	and	dystopias,	they	engage	topics	of	the	day,	but	as	they	do	so	through	the	lenses	of,	for	example,	feminism,	postfeminism,	semiotics,	post-structuralism	and	postmodernism,	there	is	no	lack	of	literary	theory.	However,	they	also	engage,	for	example,	mythology,	girlhood	studies,	cultural	studies,	science	fiction	studies,	and	herein	lies,	I	feel,	the	difficulty:	a	critical	theory	of	YAL	does	necessarily	look	like	a	critical	theory	of	children’s	or	(adult)	literature	because	YAL	is	different	from	those	literatures,	while,	simultaneously,	being	like	both	of	them.	YAL’s	liminality	means	that	it	demonstrates	aspects	of	children’s	literature	and	(adult)	literature	as	well	as	features	that	are	distinct	from	these	fields,	and	this	liminality	must	be	addressed.		The	refusal	to	recognise	YAL’s	liminality,	and	the	consequential	absence	of	theorising,	is	at	the	heart	of	this	perceived	lack	of	YAL	theoretical	criticism,	and	it	is	endemic	to	Karen	Coats	(2011)	call	for	not	just	“a	more	robust	critical	conversation”	but	one	that	“treats	YA	lit	as	a	destination,	rather	that	as	an	in-between	phenomenon”	(317;	see,	also,	Hunt	1996;	Ostry	2004;	Alsup	2010a;	2010b;	Hill	2014).	YAL	is	an	in-between	phenomenon,	but	this	in-betweenness	does	not	preclude	treating	YAL	as	a	field	in	and	of	itself,	though	it	does	require	the	refusal	of	binary	oppositions.	In	short,	YAL	criticism	is	still	a	growing	body.41	However,	rather	than	focusing	so	much	on	YAL	as	a	“destination,”	a	theorizing	of	YAL	that	takes	into	liminality,	and	the	concomitant	relation	between	areas	of	concern,	is	required.	Crucially,	this	is	not	at	the	expense	of	uniqueness.	Rather,	it	is	possible	to	conceive	this	liminality	and	relation	as	the	very	thing	that	makes	YAL	unique.42			
                                                41	Of	possible	interest,	Kaplan	(2007),	Cappella	(2010),	and	Hill	(2014)	offer	descriptions	of	the	kinds	of	critical	research	taking	place.		42	Battersby	(1998)	makes	a	similar	argument	in	her	concern	with	a	feminist	metaphysics	that	takes	into	account	“fluidity”	and	the	body.			 [w]e	need	a	metaphysics	of	fluidity	and	mobile	relationships;	not	a	metaphysics	of	fixity,	or	even	of	flexibility.	However,	that	metaphysics	
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Mirrors	Abound:	YAL	as	an	Ideological	Framework		From	the	problematic,	problem	novels	of	the	1960s	to	the	romances	of	the	1980s	and	current	trends	for	dystopias,	vampires	and	other	paranormal	creatures—alongside	gritty	truth	and	striking	realism—the	YA	novel	not	only	serves	as	cultural	marker,	an	indication	of	the	perceived	shape	of	adolescence	at	any	particular	time	(Hunt	1996),	but	it	is	also	perceived	as	playing	a	critical	role	in	the	individual	adolescent’s	transition	into	an	adult.	In	fact,	Michael	Cart	(2008),	speaking	for	the	YALSA,	suggests:	YAL	is	“often	described	as	‘developmental’	[…]	recogniz[ing]	that	young	adults	are	beings	in	evolution,	in	search	of	self	and	identity;	beings	who	are	constantly	growing	and	changing”	(n.p.).43	This	notion	of	change	is	key:	lacking	clearly	defined	or	easily	definable	parameters,	the	most	common	defining	marker	of	adolescence	is	change	itself	(see,	also,	Baxter	2008;	Hilton	and	Nikolajeva	2012),	and	it	is	this	change,	in	the	form	of	identity	formation,	that	YAL	prevailingly	grapples	with	(see,	also,	Hunt	1986).			 Thus,	YAL	paradigmatically	concerns	narratives	of	“coming	of	age,”	and	while	there	is	divergence	on	how	this	engagement	occurs,	the	addressing	of	transition,	or	the	issues	(drugs,	dating,	sex,	friendship)	potentially	encountered	within	such	transition,	is	the	generally	agreed	upon	marker	of	YAL	(see,	also,	Trites	2000;	2007;	Hill	2014).	Koss	and	Teale	(2009)	suggest,		although	YA	novels	do	still	focus	on	social	issues,	there	has	been	a	shift	from	the	big	event/coming-of-age	stories	to	a	more	general	focus	on	teens	struggling	to	find	themselves	and	dealing	with	typical	teenage	life.	(567)		
                                                                                                                                     must	also	be	able	to	explain	how	a	subject	might	be	scored	by	relationality	into	uniqueness.	(7)		This	is	YAL.	It	is	unique	precisely	because	of	its	particular	relationship	to	children’s	and	(adult)	literature.	I	address	Battersby’s	work	in	more	detail	throughout.		43	Since	1991,	the	YALSA	has	understood	this	individual	to	be	someone	between	the	ages	of	12	and	18,	a	broad	range	that	certainly	includes	many	kinds	of	changes.	
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	This	reflects	the	ever-increasing	focus	of	YAL	on	the	“issues”	facing	adolescents.	From	sexual	identities	to	friendship	and	dealing	with	loss	or	mental	illness	to	being	“normal,”	YAL	is	a	mercurial	field	of	literature,	ever-evolving	because	of	its	relationship	to	and	with	adolescents.44			Within	this,	there	is	an	underlying	assumption	that	this	literature	performs,	or	at	least	has	the	potential	to	perform,	a	particular	function	in	the	life	of	“real”	adolescents.	As	Cart	(2008)	states,		to	see	oneself	in	the	pages	of	a	young	adult	book	is	to	receive	the	reassurance	that	one	is	not	alone	after	all,	not	other,	not	alien	but,	instead,	a	viable	part	of	a	larger	community	of	beings	who	share	a	common	humanity.	(n.p.)		In	this	way,	the	text	serves	as	a	mirror	for	the	adolescent	(see,	also,	Tatum	2009;	Bodart	2006;	Dail	and	Leonard	2011;	DasGupta	2011).	It	offers	a	way	of	being	in	this	world.	Even	the	most	obviously	“for-pleasure”	novel	is	expected	to	address	in	some	way	the	adolescent’s	needs—be	they	“real”	or	imagined.	In	relation	to	the	development	of	YAL—through	the	lens	of	Francis	Pascal’s	Sweet	Valley	High	series	(1983–2003)—Amy	Pattee	(2010)	extends	this	reading	by	suggesting	that	early	YAL	novels	“adhered	to	a	recognizable	formula	that	perpetuated	dominant	ideologies”	(11).	In	one	sense,	Pattee’s	claim	concerns	the	lack	of	variation	in	early	YAL,	especially	in	terms	of	the	mass-produced,	often	ghost-written,	series.	These	series—Sweet	Valley	High	(1983–2003),	Nancy	Drew	(1930–2003),	the	Hardy	Boys	(1927–2005)—	depend	on	a	repetition	of	conflict	and	resolution	for	their	structure,	often	with	a	“hook,”	a	small	unresolved	subplot	or	the	promise	of	a	new	mystery,	to	keep	readers	reading.45	Moreover,	with	the	conflict	serving	as	anything	deemed	
                                                44	This	preoccupation	with	“normal”	is	peculiar,	not	least	owing	to	the	fact	that	two	of	the	ten	books	nominated	for	the	2016	YA	Book	Prize	concern	being	“normal”	(“Shortlisted	Books”	2016).	See,	in	particular,	Am	I	Normal	Yet	(Bourne	2015)	and	The	Art	of	Being	Normal	(Williamson	2016).		
45	While	outside	of	the	scope	of	this	thesis,	it	is	worth	noting	that	both	the	Nancy	Drew	series	as	well	as	the	Hardy	Boys	series	are	still	in	print,	as	“reboot”	series.	For	discussions	of	Nancy	Drew	see:	Dyer	and	Romalov	(1995)	and	Rehak	(2006).	For	discussions	of	the	Hardy	Boys,	see,	Connelly	(2008)	and	Greenwald	
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counter	to	dominant	ideologies	and	the	resolution	always	showing	the	wayward	adolescent	figure	brought	back	in	line	with	those	ideologies,	these	stories	perpetuate	conservative	ideals	whilst	also	entrenching	certain	beliefs	about	the	shape	of	adolescence,	a	notion	that	I	develop	throughout	this	chapter.		In	this	vein,	one	argument	I	make	is	that	the	adolescent	is	a	“hailed”	creature,	in	the	Althusserian	sense.	Althusser	(1971)	suggests,	“all	ideology	hails	or	interpellates	concrete	individuals	as	concrete	subjects”	(163,	emphasis	original).	Ideology,	or	this	hail,	transforms	individuals	into	subjects	(Althusser	uses	recruits).	This	is	particularly	relevant	to	YAL,	which,	like	children’s	literature,	addresses	a	specific	subject.	In	this	address,	YAL	(as	ideology)	names	its	intended	audience	“young	adult,”	and	it	interpellates	that	“young	adult”	as	such.	In	other	words,	through	the	interpellative	aspect	of	this	hail,	the	individual	addressed	(the	adolescent	in	the	case	of	YAL)	becomes	the	subject	of	the	address.	Her	identity	is	(in)formed	by	the	hail.	While	I	contend	that	children’s	literature	and	YAL	are	different,	they	do	share	overlapping	concerns,	owing	to	YAL’s	liminality.	Both	children’s	literature	and	YAL	rest	on	the	premise	of	engaging	a	specific	audience,	and	both	name	their	intended	audience.	In	a	field	of	children’s	literature	criticism	concerning	this	issue,	The	Case	of	Peter	Pan	and	the	Impossibility	of	Children’s	Literature	(Rose	1984)	is	the	seminal	text	(see,	also,	Tucker	1981;	Wall	1991;	Lesnik-Oberstein	2004).	It	is	also	the	work	undertaken	by	the	Graduate	Centre	for	International	Research	in	Childhood:	Literature,	Culture,	Media	(CIRCL),	headed	by	Karín	Lesnik-Oberstein	at	Reading	University.	However,	as	Rose,	Lesnik-Oberstein	and	CIRCL	as	well	as	Peter	Hunt,	John	Stephens,	and	Perry	Nodelman—all	stalwarts	of	children’s	literature—ignore	the	adolescent	in	their	work,	this	chapter	shows	my	work,	where	pertinent,	both	in	relation	to,	and	diverging	from,	children’s	literature	critics	and	criticism.		Briefly,	my	divergence	concerns	a	difference	in	perception	of	the	“concrete	individual”	that	Althusser	discusses	(1971,	163).	For	me,	Rose	and	CIRCL	lose	the	concreteness—the	fleshy	and	physical—in	their	analysis,	in	
                                                                                                                                     (2004),	Greenwald	also	considers	the	Stratemeyer	Syndicate,	as	does	Billman	(1986)	and	Johnson	(1982)	and	(1993).	Heiferman	and	Kismaric	(1998)	unites	both	Nancy	Drew	and	the	Hardy	Boys.	
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favour	of	a	wholly	discursively	produced	child.	While	such	a	claim	might	be	possible	in	terms	of	the	child—though,	I	think	not—the	adolescent	is	a	particularly	embodied	creature,	and,	as	I	discuss	in	detail	below,	the	body	must	be	taken	into	account.	For	my	argument,	YAL	creates	and	validates	the	very	group	that	it	is	constructed	as	being	for,	yet,	without	physical,	material	adolescent	beings,	the	field	could	not	exist.	There	is	a	complex	relationship	between	the	fleshy,	physical	adolescent	and	discursive	conceptions	of	that	creature	just	as	there	is	a	complex	relationship	between	the	fleshy,	physical	adolescent	and	YAL,	a	particular	narrative	of	adolescence.	It	is	this	relationship	that	the	remainder	of	this	chapter	explores.	For	now,	YAL	is	a	literature	that	is	particularly	bound	up	in	creating	the	very	subject	it	purports	to	address;	it	establishes	its	own	ideal	adolescent,	and	in	so	doing,	it	serves	as	an	“Ideological	State	Apparatus”—or	an	ideology—and	it	provides	a	discursively	and	culturally	specific	image	of	adolescence	(Althusser	1971).	As	Joanna	Croft	(1994)	suggests,	in	her	PhD	thesis	
Adolescence	and	Writing:	Locating	the	Borderline,	“the	adolescent	subject	is	interpellated	as	the	addressee	(and	source)	of	a	unique	form	of	narrative”	(12).	While	Croft	is	specifically	referring	to	the	adolescent	diaries	with	which	she	is	concerned,	the	same	kind	of	relationship	holds	true	in	relation	to	adolescence	as	a	discursively	produced	state	of	being	and	YAL	as	a	discourse	participating	in	that	constructing.	Essentially,	adolescence	and	YAL	exist	because	of,	and	through,	each	other,	and	in	this	way,	YAL	serves	as	an	ideological	framework	that	hails	adolescents	outside	the	text	through	narratives	concerning	adolescents	within	the	text.	Within	this	frame	of	interpellation,	realism	is	most	often	praised	as	the	genre	best	suited	to	this	interpellative	task—because	it	more	readily	represents	the	world	in	which	the	adolescent	exists	and	is	therefore	“better”	able	to	assist	them	in	the	developmental	tasks	of	the	stage.	It	is,	in	many	ways,	a	truth	claim:	if	literature,	or	an	image,	mimetically	reproduces	the	reality	with	which	it	is	concerned,	it	is	somehow	more	truthful,	more	accurate.	Yet,	I	often	find	realistic	YAL	ineffective,	especially	when	it	aims,	in	sometimes	quite	a	didactic	manner,	to	address	an	adolescent’s	needs.	Still,	in	popular	and	media	culture,	mimetic	representation	(realistic	literature)	dominates	conceptions	of	what	is	best	for	
 55	
adolescents.	It	is	a	fact	made	evident	by	the	overwhelming	success	of	realistic	YAL	at	winning	awards—this	is	also	the	“book	selection”	front	of	the	tripartite	engagement	of	YAL.		Administered	by	the	YALSA,	the	Michael	L.	Printz,	Margaret	A.	Edwards	and	William	C.	Morris	awards	are	three	of	the	most	prominent	specifically	in	terms	of	YAL.	The	Printz	is	the	weightiest.	Recognising	the	“best	book	written	for	teens,	based	entirely	on	its	literary	merit,”	the	Printz	has,	with	little	deviation,	gone	to	realistic	YAL	(“The	Michael	L.	Printz	Award	for	Excellence	in	Young	Adult	Literature”	2016).	The	deviation:	a	paranormal	romance,	
Midwinterblood	(Sedgwick	2011),	won	in	2014,	and	Bone	Gap	(Ruby	2015),	which	employs	magical	realism	(a	style	that	is	fantastical	in	scope,	though,	as	the	name	suggests,	grounded	in	realism),	won	in	2016.	While	these	two	texts	push	the	boundaries	of	realism,	they	are	more	mainstream	than	sub	or	counter-cultural.	With	the	Edwards	Award,	fantasy	and	fantasy	authors,	have	faired	better:	Tamora	Pierce	(2013),	Susan	Cooper	(2012),	Sir	Terry	Pratchett	(2011),	Orson	Scott	Card	(2008),	Ursula	K.	Le	Quin	(2005),	Anne	McCaffrey	(1999)	and	Madeleine	L’Engle	(1998)—all	fantasy	authors—have	each	won,	in	the	noted	year.	The	Edwards	award	recognises	a	lifetime	contribution	to	YAL,	suggesting	that	fantasy	requires	a	body	of	work	before	it	is	worth	recognition?			
Fantasy	and	Realism:	How	Very	Different	Are	They?		In	Fantasy	and	Mimesis,	Kathryn	Hume	(1984)	argues	that	since	“Plato	and	Aristotle”	most	“western	critical	theory	[…]	ha[s]	assumed	mimetic	representation	to	be	the	essential	relationship	between	text	and	the	real	world”	(5).	Mimetic	representation	is	about	appealing	to	reality,	to	the	“truth”	associated	with	the	“real,”	and	in	so	being	realistic	literature,	literature	that	is	mimetic	in	its	approach	to	reality,	is	posited	as	more	valuable	and	as	“better”	at,	in	terms	of	YAL,	assisting	the	adolescent	through	the	perilous	period	of	transition.	This	being	“better”	is	about	the	assumed	one-to-one	relation—as	a	method	of	binary	systems—between	the	“real”	and	that	which	is	mimetically	represented.	Given	this,	fantasy	and	reality	are	posited	as	existing	on	opposing	ends	of	a	spectrum,	as	constituting	a	binary	opposition.	However,	this	section	
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asks:	how	very	different	are	realistic	and	fantasy	literatures,	as	both	are	(re)presentations	of	this	thing,	consensually	agreed	to	be,	“reality.”		The	very	concept	of	realistic	literature,	or	of	discussing	the	“real”	in	literature,	“constitutes,”	as	Sue	Walsh	(2013)	suggests,			a	claim	as	to	the	nature	of	reality,	which	involves	an	assumption	about	its	pre-	or	extra-discursive	existence	that	can	then	be	re-presented	in	language	with	greater	or	lesser	accuracy.	(4)			The	real	is	posited	as	prior	to,	or	outside	of,	language.	Yet,	at	the	same	time,	realistic	literature	rests	on	the	premise	that	this	real	can	be	“re-presented	in	language”	(ibid.).	As	fantasy,	my	key	texts—and	the	cross-dressing,	Lunar	“glamours,”	bleeding,	shape-shifting,	and	being	cyborg	contained	therein—make	no	claims	of	being	real	or	of	offering	“real”	examples	of	the	adolescent	female	body.	They	do	not	claim	to	mimetically	reproduce	any	given	reality;	rather,	they	create	realities,	and	this	interruption	in	the	one-to-one	relationship	associated	with	realism	and	with	mimetic	representation	is	crucial	for	this	fracture	allows	for	alternative	images	of	living	and	being	a	girl.		Owing	to	the	prioritising	of	mimetic	representation	and	of	realistic	literature,	there	is	no	critical	theory	of	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy.	In	this	way,	I	also	pick	up	precisely	where	Hilton	and	Nikolajeva	(2012)	stop.		Moving	beyond	the	argument	and	scope	of	this	book	to	the	historical	novel,	fantasy,	dystopia,	and	horror	for	teenagers,	each	in	its	own	ways	offers	excellent	possibilities	for	creating	situations	in	which	young	people’s	dilemmas	can	be	represented	and	tested.	(15)		Chapter	Two	delineates	these,	among	other,	possibilities.	In	short,	there	is	criticism	on	YAL.	There	is	criticism	on	myth,	and	even	on	mythic	fantasy	literatures,	but	there	is	no	criticism	on	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy—a	mythic,	fantasy	literature	that	is	YAL.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	Chapter	One	and	Chapter	Two	work	together	to	establish	this	thesis’s	field	of	concern.		Finally,	Walsh’s	suggestion	also	indicates	the	binary	opposition	between	discourse	(language)	and	the	pre-	or	extra-discursive	(often	posited	as	the	“real”),	a	tricky	opposition	that	is	under	scrutiny	in	Chapter	Four’s	concern	with	discourse	and	representation.	Briefly,	it	is	an	opposition	that,	in	Lacanian	terms,	
 57	
encompasses	a	tension	between	the	registers	of	the	Real	(woman,	body,	pre-discourse)	and	the	Symbolic	(man,	mind,	discourse)	(Lacan	2001).	Mimetic	representation	attempts	to	overcome	this	tension	by	reproducing	the	real,	an	issue	central	to	why	I	find	realistic	YAL	questionable.	Mimetic	representation—offered	by	realistic	YAL	and,	as	I	discuss	in	Chapter	Three,	by	the	selfie—appears	to	offer	a	stable	and	secure	means	of	representation	because	it	looks	like	the	thing	it	is	meant	to	represent—the	real	or	the	self,	in	my	above	examples.	Thus,	in	the	twenty-first	century,	realistic	fiction	is	extoled	as	a	vein	of	writing	particularly	relevant	to	adolescents	and	to	the	“challenging”	issues	of	transition,	from	child	to	adult,	that	they	face,	because	it	is	held	to	be	the	most	like	the	reality	faced	by	adolescents,	except	when	it	becomes	overwhelmingly	didactic.		This	didacticism	is	one	of	the	faults	of	“problem	novels,”	a	genre	of	YAL	that,	while	offering	readers	the	“gritty	realism”	that	formulaic	series	(Sweet	Valley	High	and	Nancy	Drew)	lacked,	quickly	became	farcical	in	its	dedication	to	the	“problems”	potentially	faced	by	adolescents:	drugs,	alcohol,	(unplanned)	pregnancy,	or	abuse.46	Thus,	while	The	Outsiders	(Hinton	1967),	The	Pigman	(Zindel	1968)	and	The	Chocolate	War	(Cormier	1974)	stand	as	both	stalwarts	of	YAL	and	as	paragons	of	the	problem	novel,	the	genre	itself	is	hugely	controversial,	as	Go	Ask	Alice	(Anonymous	1971)	makes	explicit.	Written	in	a	diary	format	in	order	to	heighten	its	appeal	to	the	real,	Go	Ask	Alice	is	unerringly	
about	drugs	and	the	havoc	they	wreak.	“Showing”	the	diarist’s	downward	spiral	into	drugs	(after	an	unwitting	experience	of	LSD),	Go	Ask	Alice	not	only	unites	Croft’s	(1994)	reading	of	adolescent	diaries	with	YAL,	but	it	also	reflects	the	notion	that	Western	adolescence	is	perceived	as	a	period	in	which	individuals—especially	girls—are	“at	risk.”	Moreover,	on	a	visit	to	the	United	States	in	September	of	2015,	I	discovered	that	Go	Ask	Alice	is,	at	time	of	writing,	enjoying	a	renewed	period	of	popularity,	with	the	brooding	black	cover	of	the	2006	re-release	populating	many	bookstore	shelves.	The	question	is:	what	does	the	
                                                46	For	a	history	of	the	problem	novel,	see,	Cart	(2010a),	and	for	a	more	positive	analysis	see	Strum	and	Michel	(2009).	
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continued	popularity	of	such	an	iconic,	yet	contentious,	text	say	about	the	perceived	shape	of	adolescence,	and	the	adolescent,	in	2016?			While	being	an	issues-based	literature	is	not	in	itself	problematic,	the	insistence	on	realism	at	the	expense	of	other	ways	of	viewing	the	world	is	limiting.	It	also	establishes	a	binary	opposition—an	opposition	that	I	now	want	to	unpick,	as	doing	so	both	makes	a	space	for	fantasy	literature	while	also	offering	a	framework	for	how	this	thesis	approaches	such	oppositions	more	generally.	In	this	vein,	C.W.	Sullivan	(1992)	explores	this	binary	positioning	of	realism/fantasy,	noting	that	the	“real	and	the	not-real	(or	fantastic)	have	been	mutually	exclusive	terms”	since	the	seventeenth	century	and	the	advent	of	science	(98).	On	opposing	sides	of	this	thing	called	reality,	there	seem	to	exist	two	positions:	mimetic	representation	(real)	and	fantasy	(not-real).	Or,	as	Hume	(1984)	further	notes,	“literature	is	the	product	of	two	impulses.	These	are	mimesis,	felt	as	the	desire	to	imitate	[…]	and	fantasy,	the	desire	to	change	givens	and	alter	reality”	(20).	Crucially,	reality	is	included	both	between,	and	within,	the	two	positions—one	repeats	a	given	reality	while	the	other	potentially	alters	it.	While	reality	and	mimetically	representing	that	reality	have	been	the	predominant	strain	of	literature	for	a	great	portion	of	Western	history,	there	are,	according	to	this	argument,	two	ways	of	(re)presenting	reality	within	the	text:	reality	(mimetic	representation)	and	fantasy	(fantastic	departure).	Furthermore,	these	two	kinds	of	literature,	rather	than	existing	separately,	seem	to	reside	on	opposing	ends	of	a	spectrum,	with	any	given	text	sitting,	usually,	closer	to	one	than	the	other.	Thus,	I	read	the	relation	between	realistic	and	fantasy	literatures	as	one	of	continuum	and	not	opposition,	a	point	Dawan	Coombs	(2013)	makes	through	a	debate	concerning	the	perceived	mutually	exclusive	nature	of	nonfiction	and	fiction	in	the	classroom	when	she	calls	for	the	same	relationship	between	those	genres	as	I	am	calling	for	between	realism	and	fantasy.	Moreover,	she	does	so	in	terms	of	YAL.	Coombs	insists	“instead	of	placing	fiction	and	nonfiction	in	curricular	competition,”	as	educational	standards	do,	“symbiotic	relationships	allow	the	reading	of	one	form	to	support	and	complement	the	reading	of	the	other”	(7).	Speaking	to	liminality,	this	symbiotic	relationship	between	that	which	is	traditionally	perceived	as	binarily	opposed	is	crucial	to	this	thesis.	It	
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also	demonstrates	the	benefits	of	liminality	in	terms	of	education:	engaging	the	symbiotic	relationships	between	oppositional	literatures	allows	for	an	enriched	and	more	nuanced	understanding	(support	and	complement).		Finally,	nonfiction	literature	is	a	rising	star	with	YAL	(see,	also,	Cart	2010b),	and	it	exemplifies	the	elevating	of	realistic	literature	that	I	have	been	describing,	as	it	is	about	“provid[ing]	the	facts”	it	is	the	most	mimetic	in	appeal	(182).	Nonfiction	literature	sits	firmly	at	the	realistic	end	of	the	spectrum,	even	more	“real”	that	realistic	fiction.	Yet,	even	with	this	nonfiction	literature,	there	is	a	space	between	the	thing	represented	and	its	representation,	as	Cart	(2010b)	suggests,	“when	handled	expertly,	the	result	[of	nonfiction]	is	a	compelling	narrative	that	offers	the	power	of	story	without	sacrificing	any	of	the	authenticity	of	fact”	(183).	Handled	expertly	is	the	issue:	to	be	handled,	expertly	or	not,	indicates	shaping;	it	indicates	a	particular	view.	As	Alexander	(1968)	claims	“The	most	uncompromisingly	[…]	naturalistic	novel	is	still	a	manipulation	of	reality,”	and	non-fiction	is	not	immune	to	this	manipulation	(382;	see,	also,	Yep	1978	and	White	2010).	Realism	is	a	perspective;	it	just	happens	to	align	with	the	dominant.	Fantasy	is	also	a	perspective;	it	just	happens	to	depart	from	the	dominant.	They	are	both,	however,	perspectives.	In	other	words	and	as	Hume	(1984)	contends,	“fantasy	is	any	departure	from	consensus	reality”	(21).	Consensus	indicates	the	role	of	perspective	in	our	conception	of	reality,	an	idea	that	Yep	(1978)	further	develops,	stating:	“we	must	distinguish	between	our	sense	of	reality	and	reality	itself;	for	our	sense	of	reality	is	by	necessity	a	simplification	of	the	complex	world	about	us”	(n.p.),	Yep	indicates	the	constructedness	of	reality.	He	draws	attention	to	the	role	of	perspective.	Thus,	“reality,”	as	it	is	generally	meant,	is	more	aptly	our	“social	consensus	about	our	world”	(n.p.).	The	reality	that	we	daily	experience	and	hold	to	be	true	is	our—consensually	agreed	as	“real”—reality.47	If	this	is	case,	exactly	how	different	are	fantasy	and	reality?			 *	*	*	
                                                47	For	a	discussion	of	“consensus	culture,”	see,	Jenkins	(2006,	236).	For	a	further	discussion	of	“consensus	reality”	see,	Hume	(1984,	xi	and	21).			
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	YAL	is	a	field	of	literature	marked	by	a	concern	with	identity	formation—with	the	adolescents	it	hails	achieving	a	secure,	stable	adult-identity,	and	it	is	a	concern	that	has	permeated	the	criticism	since	even	before	the	crystallisation	of	focus	offered	by	Trites	(2000)	(see,	for	example	Hunt	1986).	However,	a	focus	on	identity	formation	is	limiting,	primarily	because	identify	formation	remains	tied	to	hegemonic	goals	and	values.	Embodied	subjectivities,	however,	offer	a	means	of	conceiving	of	the	self	not	only	in	relation	to	the	body	but	also	in	relation	to	others,	and	in	this	frame,	YAL	criticism	concerning	the	posthuman	is	a	particularly	verdant	field,	one	also	relevant	to	this	thesis	owing	to	Cinder’s	cybernetic	body	in	The	Lunar	Chronicles	(Meyer	2012–2015).		In	this	frame,	Victoria	Flanagan’s	Technology	and	Identity	in	Young	Adult	
Fiction:	The	Posthuman	Subject	(2014)	alongside	“Girls	Parts:	The	Female	Body,	Subjectivity	and	Technology	in	Posthuman	Young	Adult	Fiction”	(2011)	are	preeminent.	Focusing	in	the	article	on	three	YA	texts—Uglies	by	Scott	Westerfield	(2005),	The	Adoration	of	Jenna	Fox	by	Mary	E.	Pearson	(2008)	and	the	short	story	“Anda's	Game”	by	Cory	Doctorow	(2008)—Flanagan	(2011)	argues	that	futuristic	YA	fantasy	“rejects	the	idea	of	mind/body	separation,	highlighting	the	integral	role	of	the	body	in	constructing	subjectivity”	(42).	Vitally,	it	performs	this	rejection	by	disrupting	the	relationship	between	mind	and	body,	offering	in	its	place	“mutation,	variation	and	becoming,”	as	Myra	Seaman	(2007,	247)	argues.	This	is	particularly	imperative	for	adolescent	girls,	who	are,	within	the	hegemonic	discursive	fantasy,	constructed	as	both	more	corporeal	than	their	boy	counterparts	and	who	are	yet,	simultaneously,	told	to	disavow	that	corporeality	through	the	silencing	of	the	body	and	its	processes.	Furthermore,	Flanagan	(2011)	stresses,			coming	to	terms	with	a	body	that	may	not	fit	within	[…]	[established]	perimeters	is	often	a	vital	aspect	of	maturation	within	representations	of	adolescent	femininity	in	young	adult	(YA)	fiction.	(40)			While	this	is,	or	should	be,	a	vital	aspect	of	all	YAL,	it	is	a	task	that	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy,	alongside	Flanagan’s	futuristic	fantasy,	undertakes	exceedingly	well.	The	cross-dressing,	“glamoured,”	menstruating,	shape-shifting,	and	cybernetic	
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bodies	available	within	these	literatures	are	bodies	that	not	only	refuse	to	stay	within	established	parameters,	but	they	explicitly	demonstrate	the	body	as	comprised	of	multiplicity	and	change.	In	so	being,	they	allow	for	an	exploration	of	an	embodied	subjectivity	that	does	not	insist	upon	the	body’s	silencing.	Such	a	conceiving	of	subjectivity	is	imperative	to	female	adolescence	because	of	the	biological	determinism	that	conflates	her	with	her	body.	The	adolescent	female	cannot	be	separated	from	the	body(ily	processes)	marking	her	as	adolescent,	no	matter	how	much	the	discursive	rendering	of	Western	popular	and	media	culture	wishes	to	see	it	suppressed	and	contained	within	a	tiny	frame.	Thus,	an	embodied	subjectivity—one	taking	into	account	multiplicity,	difference	and	change—is	imperative	if	she	is	to	achieve	agency.	In	other	words,	poststructuralism	and	posthumanism	have	opened	an	interrogation	into	the	myth	of	the	stable	and	unified	identity,	and	this	thesis	utilizes	that	position,	especially	emphasis	on	“mutation,	variation	and	becoming”	(Seaman	2007,	247).		 Thus,	Trites	argues	that	YAL	is	not	simply	concerned	with	identity	formation,	but	it	is	marked—and	for	Trites	defined—by	narrations	of	the	adolescent	coming	to	terms	with	discourses	of	power,	in	a	Foucauldian	sense.	This	literature	is	about,	as	Trites	(2000)	argues	in	Disturbing	the	Universe:	
Power	and	Repression	in	Adolescent	Literature,	how	“adolescent	protagonists	[…]	strive	to	understand	their	own	power	by	struggling	with	the	various	institutions	in	their	lives”	(8).48	Thus,	for	Trites,	it	is	not	simply	that	YAL	is	marked	by	identity	formation;	it	is,	rather,	that	narrations	of	identity	formation	take	place	in	relation	to	social	discourses	of	power.		While	her	reading	is	sometimes	dated—YAL	is	a	quickly	evolving	field	of	literature	and	a	lot	has	changed	in	fifteen	years—her	claim	that	YAL	is	defined	by	“how	social	power	is	deployed	during	the	course	of	the	narrative”	is	pivotal	(2,	my	emphasis).		In	one	respect,	it	is	so	because	of	the	ramifications	such	a	claim	has	for	conceiving	the	body.	Trites’	argument	is	a	Foucualdian	reading	of	power,	and	as	such	it	has	a	particular	relevance—despite	Foucault’s	omission	of	a	nuanced,	in	
                                                48	June	Pulliman	(2014)	uses	Trites’	definition	of	adolescent	literature	in	her	reading	of	monstrous	bodies	in	YA	horror.			
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terms	of	sexual	difference,	discourse	of	power	(see,	also,	Braidotti	1991)—to	adolescent	females.	Power	is,	for	Foucault,	played	out	on	the	body,	albeit	a	body	that	is	by	default	male.	Still,	this	body	is,	as	Lois	McNay	(1998)	argues	in	
Foucault	and	Feminism:	Power,	Gender	and	the	Self,	“the	point	where	power	relations	are	manifest	in	their	most	concrete	form”	(16).	Thus	while	Foucault	may	not	have	taken	into	account	a	female	body—in	relation	to	how	discourses	of	power	are	manifest	on	that	body—his	omission	does	not	preclude	others	from	doing	so,	arguably	McNay’s	purpose.	This	is	key	for	my	reading:	if	the	female	adolescent	is,	as	I	have	argued,	particularly	embodied;	if	YAL	is	a	field	of	literature	particularly	marked	by	discourses	of	power,	and	if	discourses	of	power	are	focused	on	the	body,	then	an	embodied	subjectivity	is	essential	to	YAL	that	concerns	and	hails	adolescent	girls.	In	short,	I	suggest	it	is	not	identity	formation	that	marks—at	least—this	vein	of	YAL	but	subjectivity.		For	this	reason,	McCallum	(1999)	is	useful,	given	her	focus	on	subjectivity.49	For	McCallum,	subjectivity	is	the		sense	of	personal	identity	an	individual	has	of	her/his	self	as	distinct	from	other	selves,	as	occupying	a	position	within	society	and	in	relation	to	their	selves,	and	as	being	capable	of	deliberate	thought	and	action.	(3)			Thus,	it	is	a	term	encompassing	identity	formation	while	also	bringing	the	social	position	of	the	individual—and	such	a	positioning’s	impact	on	identity—to	bear	on	that	process.	McCallum	further	argues	that	subjectivity,	as	a	notion,	is	intrinsic	to	YAL	because	YAL	and	subjectivity	are	concerned	with	the	same	things:	“relationships	between	the	self	and	others”	(3)	and	“explorations	of	relationships	between	individuals	and	the	world,	society	or	the	past”	(3).	Thus	subjectivity	offers	not	just	the	opportunity	to	explore	the	self’s	relation	to	social	discourses,	but	as	social	discourses	are	discourses	of	power	and	power	is	intrinsically	concerned	with	the	body,	it	also	allows	for	an	inclusion	of	the	body	within	the	conceptualizing	of	the	self.	
                                                49	McCallum	does	problematically	conflate	children’s	and	young	adult	literature,	to	such	an	extent	that	Hill	(2014)	considers	it	a	study	of	children’s	literature,	not	YAL.			
 63	
If	the	adolescent	girl	is	to	be	conceived	as	a	self	not	beholden	to	or	limited	by	her	body,	then	engaging	the	body	and	its	presentation	within	YAL	is	essential.	Moreover,	and	as	Flanagan	(2011;	2014)	argues,	it	is	essential	to	engage	bodies	that	do	not	align	with	the	ideal	body	of	popular	and	media	culture	because	bodies	of	difference	offer	alternatives	to	that	hegemonic	fantasy	of	perfection.	Thus,	I	also	diverge	from	Lassén-Seger’s	(2006)	because	I	am	specifically	concerned	with	the	potential	of	the	logically	created	Secondary	World	for	making	bodily	instability	acceptable,	if	not	also	normal.	Lassén-Seger	is	concerned	with	how	“the	real	[…]	clash[es]	with	the	fantastic	[metamorphosis]”	in	realistic	fiction	(7).	I	am	not	interested	in	clashes,	rather,	I	am	interested	in	the	possibility	inherent	within	this	space.	I	am	interested	how	positive	engagements	of	the	body	allow	for	the	fleshy,	physical	body—that	changes	and	that	is	lumpy	and	bumpy—to	be	reconceptualised	as	normal	and	as	part	of	one’s	self,	not	as	something	to	be	beholden	to	or	limited	by.		I	explore	these	bodies	as	they	are	made	available	within	the	discursive	space	of	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	because	of	the	prospects	of	this	literature,	as	Pierce	(1993)	discusses,		Fantasy,	along	with	science	fiction,	is	a	literature	of	possibilities.	It	opens	the	door	to	the	realm	of	‘What	If,’	challenging	readers	to	see	beyond	the	concrete	universe	and	to	envision	other	ways	of	living	and	alternative	mindsets.	Everything	in	speculative	universes,	and	by	association	the	real	world,	is	mutable.	Intelligent	readers	will	come	to	relate	the	questions	raised	in	these	books	to	their	own	lives.	(50,	emphasis	original)		 	 	In	its	fantastical	departure	from	“consensus	reality”	(Hume	1984,	21),	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	is	a	literature	of	potential,	and	it	is	the	potential	of	alternative	frameworks	for	living	and	being	a	body	with	which	I	am	interested.	In	other	words,	these	texts	tread	a	shared	territory	with	popular	and	media	culture	as	both	are	concerned	with	the	adolescent	female	body,	but	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy—because	of	the	potentiality	of	fantasy—maps	the	shapes	and	contours	of	that	body	differently.			 	
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CHAPTER	TWO		MYTHOPOEIC	YA	FANTASY:	FROM	KNIGHTS	IN	SHINING	ARMOUR	TO	A	CYBORGIAN	CINDERELLA		While	there	is	wealth	of	YA	fantasy	literature	available	to	adolescents	today,	I	am	interested	in	a	very	specific	vein	of	this	genre,	one	that	I	term	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy.	It	is	a	Tolkienian	inspired	vein	of	fantasy,	with	“high	fantasy”	as	its	closest	kin	(Sullivan	1992;	Alexander	1971).	In	other	words,	it	is	not	just	“speculative	fiction,”	the	amorphous	category	into	which	Cart	(2010a)	places	fantasy,	science	fiction,	dystopias	and	the	“paranormal,”	because	they	all	have	fantastical	elements	(101–104).	Yes,	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	is	a	part	of	this	wider	genre,	but	it	is	also	a	genre	in	its	own	right.	It	is	a	vein	of	fantasy,	more	clearly	than	any	other,	demonstrating	a	tie	to	traditional	mythic	narratives,	including	myths,	legends,	and	folktales.	In	short,	the	stories	shared	by	cultural	groups	that	not	only	establish	the	world	and	its	order	but	that	also	chart	expected	behaviours,	a	function	that	myths	perform	on	a	religious	or	sacred	scale	(possibly	including	multiple	geographic	groups)	(Eliade	1959),	and	one	that	legends	and	folktales	fulfil	on	a	more	local	level,	expressing	the	fears	and	concerns—while	also	demonstrating	appropriate	responses—of	a	particular	group	(Malinowski	1926;	Bascom	1954).	Participating	in	this	kind	of	cultural	process,	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy—that	is	also	written	by	women	and	for	adolescent	girls—offers	a	particular	space	in	which	hegemonic	discourses	of	perfection	may	be	disrupted	and	in	which	new	kinds	of	behaviours	may	be	charted.	In	one	sense,	this	chapter	is	about	establishing	a	difference	between	popular	YAL	that	merely	recapitulates	the	discourses	of	popular	and	media	culture	and	a	vein	of	YA	fantasy,	represented	by	Pierce’s	Tortall	books	and	Meyer’s	Lunar	Chronicles,	that,	though	always	in	relation	to	those	discourses,	offers	alternative	images	of	living	and	being	an	adolescent	female	body.		In	other	words,	while	the	apocalyptically	popular	The	Twilight	Saga	(Meyer	2005–2008)	and	The	Hunger	Games	(Collins	2008–2010)	are	also	examples	of	speculative	fiction,	they	operate	in	their	own	specific	genres	within	the	wider	field.	They	are	also	hegemonic	in	nature.	Thus,	while	they	too	engage	the	body,	
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they	overwhelmingly	offer	“pop	culture”	bodies	that	recapitulate	the	discourses	of	that	space:	Bella	and	Katniss,	respectively,	meet—sometimes	exceed—hegemonic	ideals	of	feminine	appearance;	they	do	not	contest	those	ideals.	Pierce	and	Meyer’s	texts	engage	the	body	because	they	exist	within	a	discursive	space	that	is	excessively	preoccupied	with	the	body,	but	they	engage	that	body	differently	because	they	are	outside	of	the	mainstream,	in	terms	of	both	popular	and	media	culture	as	well	as	popular	fantasy.	In	other	words,	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	is,	as	much	as	anything,	about	offering	an	alternative	discursive	space—the	Secondary	World—in	which	bodily	instability	becomes	not	just	possible	but	also	empowering.		This	chapter	is	framed	by	a	reading	of	Cinderella:	the	fairytale	figure,	the	Disney	Princess,	and	Cinder	(Meyer’s	cyborgian	Cinderella).50	Cinder(ella)	speaks	to	all	the	narrative	threads	with	which	I	am	interested.	It	speaks	to	myth,	as	fairytale	is	a	part	of	the	mythic	tradition;	popular	and	media	culture,	as	Disney’s	Cinderella	articulates	a	feminine	identity	that	is	of	contemporary	hegemonic	discourse;	and,	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy,	as	Cinder	is	a	female	hero,	despite—and	because	of—her	fragmented	body.	Moreover,	Cinder’s	engagement	with	narratives	of	self	unites	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	and	popular	and	media	culture	particularly	well,	in	that,	while	cyborgs	do	not	yet	exist,	the	relationship	between	girls	and	technology	is	ever-increasing,	to	such	an	extent	that	Warfield	(2014b)	describes	adolescent	girls	as	“hyper-mediated”	or	“plugged	in”	(n.p).	Underpinning	this	reading	is	the	notion,	offered	by	Linda	Parsons	(2004)	that	fairy	tales	provide	children	(readers	or	viewers)	with	“positions	to	occupy”	(136).	In	other	words,	fairy	tales,	and	their	vestiges,	offer	frameworks	for	gendered	behaviour,	and	while	it	is	impossible	to	account	for	every	“taking	up”	of	such	positions,	it	is	possible	to	read	the	positions	on	offer	and	to	explore	their	implications	on,	and	for,	the	particular	cultural	and	
                                                50	Fittingly,	the	state	of	“being	cyborg”	is	linguistically	difficult	to	articulate.	I	use	“cyborgian”	to	describe	the	state	of	being	cyborg.	Taking	guidance	from	Meyer	(2012),	I	also	use	“cybernetic,”	in	relation	to	the	cyborgian	creature.		Though	this	is	employed	to	describe	the	makeup	of	“being	cyborg,”	or	“cyborgian”—one’s	“cybernetic	makeup”	(81),	as	it	were.			
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discursive	spaces	within	which	they	sit.51	Thus,	using	the	characters	Cinderella	and	Cinder	as	examples,	I	am	concerned	with	the	feminine	identities	offered	by	these	iterations	of	the	“Cinderella”	figure,	the	fairy	tale	heroine	who	links	these	two	very	different	incarnations.	It	is	through	these	varying	articulations	of	the	Cinderella	figure	that	I	frame	a	transition	from	Cinderella	(a	hegemonic	feminine	identity)	to	Cinder	(a	shero).52		Finally,	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	is	a	fantasy	literature	for	adolescents	(though	read	more	widely)	that	employs	a	mythopoeic	mind-set	and	demonstrates	mythopoeic	features,	such	as	world	building,	female	heroes,	and	magic.	It	is	a	genre	of	writing	that	existed	long	before	Tolkien’s	creation	of	Middle-Earth	although	it	experienced	a	sort	of	cohesion	with	that	world.	Thus,	this	chapter	is	concerned	with	establishing	just	what	this	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	encompasses	in	terms	of	the	mind-set	it	employs,	the	worlds	it	creates,	and	the	heroes	it	features.	It	also	considers	the	tension	between	where	this	fantasy	began—with,	for	example,	traditional	myth	and	Tolkien—and	where	it	is	today—through	the	work	of	Pierce	and	Meyer,	for	instance—and	it	does	so	in	order	to	establish	the	discursive	space	encompassing	not	only	Pierce’s	and	Meyer’s	fantasy	but	to	also	further	establish	a	framework	for	my	reading	of	that	fantasy.		
THE	HERO	 	I	mean	to	shew	that	‘Hero-worship	never	
ceases,’	that	it	is	at	bottom	the	main		or	only	kind	of	worship.		(Carlyle	[1840]	2013,	n.p.,	emphasis	original)		
                                                51	It	is	worth	noting	that	Parsons	borrows	“positions	to	occupy”	from	Walkerdine	(1984),	and	while	it	is	Parsons’	use	with	which	I	am	most	interested,	Walkderdine	is	concerned	with	the	psychoanalytical	implications	of	such	positions	in	terms	of	the	young	girl’s	insertion	into	romantic	heterosexuality,	which	is	also	relevant.		52	The	term	“sheroes”	arises	from	the	name	given	to	female	heroes	on	a	discussion	board	Pierce	co-founded	with	children’s	and	YA	author	Meg	Cabot	in	2003,	as	I	am	concerned	with	Pierce’s	fantasy	the	use	of	her	term,	sheroes,	for	female	heroes	seems	appropriate	(“About	Us”	2016).	
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Defined	by	famous	(white)	men	as	being	about	famous	(white)	men,	the	hero	journey	is	his-story,	and	it	is	a	prolific	one.	It	is	the	story	of	world-creating,	of	world-shaping,	and	of	control.	Furthermore,	it	narrates	the	interface.	It	narrates	the	boundary	between	what	is	known	and	what	has	not	yet	been	discovered	(or	claimed).	In	this	way,	the	hero	story	is	also	concerned	with	liminality,	with	narrating	the	blank	spaces	and	with	transforming	chaos	into	cosmos,	a	task	it	undertakes	through	the	figure	of	the	hero:	Gilgamesh,	Odysseus,	Beowulf,	Sir	Gawain	and	his	Green	Knight,	Aragorn	son	of	Arathorn,	Luke	Skywalker.	Through	this	hero,	the	same	story	is	repeatedly	told:	the	story	of	his	domination	over	some	evil	foe	in	order	to	win	her	hand	in	marriage,	and	it	is	with	this	hero	and	his	journey—because	the	two	cannot	be	torn	asunder—that	my	reading	of	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	begins.	This	first	section	is,	in	many	ways,	a	continuation—through	the	specific	lens	of	the	hero	paradigm—of	the	silencing	I	read	above	in	relation	to	the	adolescent	girl	and	her	body.	In	other	words,	by	exploring	how	hegemonic	discourse	is	but	mythic	ideals	in	modern	shapes,	the	following	section	demonstrates	the	pervasiveness	of	this	silencing.		 Thus,	“hero	pattern”	research,	a	comparing	of	heroes	and	journeys	across	stories	in	order	to	ascertain	the	core	features	of	both,	is	the	most	useful	lens	for	my	current	purpose	of	establishing	just	who,	or	what,	the	hero	is,	in	order	to	consider	how	the	shero	is	different	(Dundes	1990,	43).	One	of	the	earliest	works	in	this	vein	of	hero	studies	is	Otto	Rank’s	([1909]	1959)	The	Myth	
of	the	Birth	of	the	Hero.	First	published	in	German	in	1909	(translated	to	English	in	1914),	Rank’s	pattern	is	concerned	with	“myth	formation	and	its	tendency”	(85),	as	it	arises,	he	argues,	within	the	“family	drama”—Rank	relies	quite	heavily	on	the	work	of	Freud	in	his	understanding	of	the	hero.		For	Rank,	it	is	the	child’s	desire	(need)	to	move	on	from	the	authority	of	the	parents	that	in	turn	“oblige[s]	the	hero	to	sever	his	family	relations”	(66).	In	other	words,	through	the	lens	of	psychoanalysis,	Rank	shows	how	myth	articulates	“identical	motive	forces	[to	those	of	the	family	drama],	only	in	delicately	shaded	manifestations”	(ibid.).	Myth	is	the	private	family	drama,	the	child	severing	ties	from	his	parental	home	in	order	to	establish	his	own,	made	manifest	across	cultures	and	throughout	history.	Myth’s	hero	story	is	also	the	story	of	adolescence	(see,	also,	Hourhian	1997;	Proukou	2005).		
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While	Rank’s	reading	of	the	hero	is	useful	for	its	relating	the	hero	pattern	to	the	family	drama	and	thus,	for	my	purposes,	to	the	ritual	transference	that	is	adolescence,	the	American	mythologist	Joseph	Campbell,	and,	especially,	his	
Hero	with	a	Thousand	Faces	([1949]	1973),	is	now	most	synonymous	with	hero	studies.	Campbell	([1949]	1973)	brings	together	the	motifs	appearing	in	“mythological	hero	stories”	from	around	the	world.	Through	“the	Orient	[…]	the	Greeks	[…]	and	in	the	[…]	legends	of	the	Bible”	(35),	Campbell	compares	mythic	stories	in	order	to	focus	on	the	hero	and	his	function,	a	function	that	he	believes	to	be	largely	psychological	(see,	also,	1968).	Campbell’s	most	well-known	contribution	to	this	field	of	hero	studies	is	the	monomyth—the	basic	pattern	of	separation-initiation-return—that	provides	the	framework	for	hero	stories,	while	also	paralleling	the	linear,	hegemonic	thrust	of	adolescent	development	(see,	also,	Lesko	1996;	Proukou	2005).	In	more	detail,	Campbell	([1949]	1973)	suggests,		[t]he	hero	ventures	forth	from	the	world	of	common	day	into	a	region	of	supernatural	wonder:	fabulous	forces	are	there	encountered	and	a	decisive	victory	is	won:	the	hero	comes	back	from	this	mysterious	adventure	with	the	power	to	bestow	boons	on	his	fellow	man.	(35)			This	journey,	typically	undertaken	by	the	young	man	in	peak	health	and	form,	makes	the	hero.	Thus,	while	the	hero	dominates	conceptions	of	myth—Northfrop	Frye	(1957)	even	has	the	figure	defining	literature	at	large—it	is	his	journey,	the	hero’s	actions,	that	always	take	precedence	within	these	constructions,	and	it	is	this	insistence	on	the	hero’s	journey	that	is	both	troublesome	and	potentially	useful.53		The	unyielding	repetition	of	the	pattern—a	pattern	that	insists	upon	his	dominance—is	problematic,	and	it	is	an	issue	that	children’s	literature	specialist	Margery	Hourihan	(1997)	takes	up	at	length	in	Deconstructing	the	
Hero:	Literary	Theory	and	Children's	Literature.	For	Hourihan,	myth	is	always	about	(his)	superiority	and	(his)	success.	With	this	essential	thread	of	
                                                53	Demonstrating	a	diverse	interest	in	heroes,	Valdimir	Propp	(1958)	offers	a	hero	pattern	through	the	language	of	folktales,	also	worth	noting	that	his	text	was	first	published	in	Russian	in	1928.		
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domination,	these	stories	provide	order	and	are,	more	or	less,	about	the	naturalisation	of	(his)	power;	the	establishing	of	hegemonic	discourse,	in	my	argument.	It	is	understood,	though	often	unstated,	that	superiority,	success	and	power	are	his	to	gain—not	hers	or,	even,	theirs.	Furthermore,	in	requiring	the	hero	to	be	male	and	in	pitting	him	against	monsters,	the	journey	is,	as	Hourihan	argues,	constructed	around	a	“conceptual	centre”	of	binary	oppositions	(for	example,	man/monster,	male/female,	good/evil,	active/passive	and	us/them)	that	speak	to	the	maintenance	of	the	status	quo	and	that	demonstrates	the	expansive	nature	of	the	structure	of	binary	oppositions	underpinning	contemporary	Western	culture’s	understanding	the	world.	(15).	Thus,	and	as	Rank	illustrates,	the	hero’s	journey	is	essentially	about	the	perpetuation	of	patriarchy	(status	quo)	through	the	slaying	of	monsters	and	through	marriage.	Yet,	who	is	the	hero,	the	figure	of	this	journey?		The	figure	of	the	hero	is	a	topic	to	which	Hourihan	(1997)	devotes	an	entire	chapter.	Within	this,	she	discusses	seven	aspects	of	the	hero:	“race”	(58),	“class	and	mastery”	(62),	“gender”	(68),	“age”	(72),	“relationships”	(76),	“rationality”	(88),	and	“action	and	violence”	(96).	As	the	last	three	are	more	concerned	with	his	journey,	it	is	on	the	first	four	that	I	focus.	For	Hourihan,	these	are,	and	I	agree,	the	defining	characteristics	of	the	hero.	Although,	I	suggest	one	more:	bodily	stability.	Bodily	stability	is	a	characteristic	that	not	only	underscores	each	of	Hourihan’s	characteristics,	including	those	more	focused	on	his	journey,	but	it	is	also	an	assumption	that	underscores	all	conceptions	of	the	conventional	hero,	despite	a	lack	of	acknowledgement.		Beginning	by	arguing	that	the	“hero	is	white”	(58),	Hourihan	suggests	not	that	the	hero	is	always,	or	is	traditionally,	white,	but,	rather,	that	he	is	fundamentally	white.		This	whiteness	establishes—in	terms	of	race—not	only	the	hero’s	“normal”	body	colour,	but	it	also	offers	a	kind	of	stability,	at	least	in	terms	of	appearance:	the	hero’s	skin	colour	does	not	change.	He	always	appears	white,	thus,	he	is	white.54	Class	and	mastery	directly	engage	this	whiteness,	by	
                                                54	Ursula	Le	Guin	specifically,	and	frequently,	cites	race	as	one	of	the	issues	she	directly	engages	in	her	work:	Ged,	the	hero	of	The	Wizard	of	Earthsea	(1968),	is	dark-skinned,	despite	a	white	washing	of	him	on	book	covers	(see,	also,	Le	Guin	
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also	insisting	that	(because	of	his	skin	colour)	the	hero	exists	in	an	elevated	position.	This	characteristic	stems	from	the	“god-touched”	aspect	of	mythic	patterns,55	and	it	places	him—even	before	the	journey	begins—in	a	position	of	some	authority.	As	Hourihan	suggests,	this	characteristic	speaks	to	the	hierarchies	that	are	embedded	within	the	hero	story,	and	as	“hierarchies	are	images	of	order,”	the	hero	embodies	order,	another	kind	of	stability	(65).	With	gender,	while	Hourihan	suggests,	“heroes	are	traditionally	male	and	the	hero	myth	inscribes	male	dominance	and	the	primacy	of	male	enterprises”	(68).	I	contend	that	in	terms	of	both	the	archetypal	hero	as	well	as	the	paradigm	of	
being-hero,	the	hero	is	male—just	as	much	as	he	is	white.	Age	is	Hourihan’s	final	marker	that	specifically	focuses	on	the	heroic	figure,	and	it	is	a	point	particularly	relevant	to	both	my	reading	of	the	adolescent	female	(body)	as	well	as	YAL.		While	the	hero	is	generally	considered	to	be	youthful,	Hourihan	argues,	“the	archetypal	hero	is	not	merely	young,	he	is	essentially	adolescent”	(74),	overtly	linking	this	reading	of	the	hero	to	my	reading	of	adolescence	and	YAL	in	the	previous	chapter.	The	hero	journey	is	ideally	suited	to	YAL,	a	point	that	Katherine	Proukou	(2005)	makes.	Linking	the	pattern	represented	in	the	ritual	transference	of	adolescence	(child–adolescent–adult)	with	that	of	myth	(separation–initiation–return)	and	specifically	referencing	Campbell’s	patterning	in	the	process,	Proukou	suggests	that	the	two	are	largely	interchangeable.	For	example,			because	everyone	can	identify	with	the	transformational	‘call’	of	adolescence	and	its	demands,	it	is	a	universal	link	to	its	mythological	association	with	the	hero's	call,	its	tests	and	wisdom-based	rewards,	as	well	as	to	psychological	associations	with	transformations	of	knowing.	(63)		
                                                                                                                                     1993).	This	white	washing	of	book	covers	also	frequents	YAL	(see,	for	example,	Schutte	2012).	55	Rank	([1909]	1914)	first	suggested	that	the	hero	is	“child	of	distinguished	parents”	(65)	and	it	was	with	Lord	Raglan’s	(1936)	expansion	of	Rank’s	project	(taking	the	“hero”	markers	from	twelve	to	twenty-two)	that	“hero	reputed	to	be	the	son	of	a	god”	entered	the	pattern	at	number	five.	For	a	copy	of	Lord	Raglan’s		“The	Hero	Pattern,”	see,	also,	Raglan	(1934).		
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While	I	agree	with	Proukou’s	argument	that	there	is	a	particular	correlation	between	adolescence	and	the	hero	journey,	I	am	hesitant	to	accept	the	universal	nature	of	the	claim.	For	one,	such	universalising	elides	the	difference	between	male	and	female	adolescence,	not	to	forget	that	adolescence	is	a	discursive	construction,	and,	as	such,	it	is	rendered	within	particular	discursive,	that	is	historical	and	cultural,	spaces	(see,	also,	Lesko	1996).	I	am	concerned,	as	is	Proukou,	with	a	Western	construction	in	which	my	reading	of	myth	is	embedded,	but	I	am	not	concerned	with	that	construction	in	order	to	refuse	other	possible	manifestations.	I	am	concerned	with	the	West	because	of	the	dominant	nature,	thanks	to	globalization	and	Internet	technologies,	of	its	paradigms,	as	well	as	because	Pierce	and	Meyer	are	situated	within	a	Western	tradition,56	though	this	does	not	foreclose	the	possibility	of	non-Western	engagements	of	this	topic.	Rather,	I	open	a	space	through	which	such	could	be	studied.	Finally,	this	“youthfulness,”	or	adolescence,	also	speaks	to	the	ideal	body	of	the	West’s	popular	and	media	culture:	the	ideal	body	of	that	space	is	also	adolescent,	that	is	to	say,	youthful—not	to	mention,	male.		While	bodily	stability	underscores	each	of	Hourihan’s	markers	of	the	heroic	figure,	it	is	a	characteristic	that	she	does	not	explicitly	engage—as	is	the	case	for	most	critics.	The	closest	is	her	argument	that	“the	hero’s	masculinity	is	his	assertion	of	control	over	himself,	his	environment,	his	world”	(69),	a	reading	that	echoes	the	hegemonic	expectations	of	the	adolescent	girl	in	popular	and	media	culture.	This	stability	is	pervasive,	and	I	believe	that	bodily	stability	is	not	only	a	characteristic	of	the	hero	but	that	it	is	also,	at	once,	the	most	required	while	also	the	least	discussed—because	of	its	ubiquity.	The	hero	is	bodily	wholeness,	and	this,	coupled	with	how	all	other	characteristics	describe	that	wholeness,	means	it	need	not	be	discussed.	Yet,	it	is	the	very	absence	of	discussion	that	perpetuates	both	the	conceptual	centre	of	binary	oppositions	(that	refuse	the	adolescent	girl)	as	well	as	the	limiting	dependence	on	bodily	wholeness	and	stability,	as	a	symptom	of	that	conceptual	centre.	Within	this	frame,	the	adolescent	girl	cannot	be	hero,	despite	adolescence’s	tie	to	the	hero	
                                                56	For	a	non-Western	view	on	the	Eurocentric	character	of	myth	and	fantasy,	see,	Deepa	(2009)	and	Dharmadhikari	(2009),	which	is	an	article	developed	from	the	original	blog	post.		
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journey.	The	adolescent	girl	cannot	be	hero	because	she	is	perceived	as	a	shape-shifting	creature,	in	a	way	that	her	male	counterparts	are	not.		This	dependence	on	bodily	stability	is	made	particularly	evident	by	the	few	instances	of	bodily	instability	that	do	appear	in	traditional	hero	narratives.	For	when	bodily	instability	does	appear,	it	does	so	either	to	question	the	hero’s	very	being-hero	or	to	signal	his	death.	In	terms	of	the	first,	Catherine	Batt		(1994)	argues	that	heroic	injury	is	“part	of	a	general	strategy	that	uses	the	body	as	the	focus	for	issues	of	integrity,”	in	relation	to	Sir	Thomas	Malory’s	knights	(270).	For	example,	Batt	specifically	argues	that	in	Malory’s	“Tale	of	Sir	Gareth	of	Orkney,”	an	injury	to	the	thigh	represents	“sexual	activity	[that]	constitutes	a	moral	transgression”	on	the	part	of	Sir	Gareth	(270).	Bodily	instability	signals	that	the	hero	is	no	longer	acting	heroically.	Thus,	he	is	not,	in	that	moment	of	action,	hero.	Furthermore	and	through	synecdoche,	bodily	instability	comes	to	represent	not-hero.	Bodily	instability	ensures	that	the	hero	is	bodily	stability.	Within	traditional	literature,	injury	also	signifies	the	hero’s	end.	Beowulf,	the	heroic	deliverer	of	King	Hrothgar’s	halls	from	the	terror	of	the	monstrous	Grendel,	is	never	injured	in	his	battles	with	that	foe.	He	is	never	injured—until,	in	old	age	and	in	meeting	the	dragon—it	is	his	time	to	die.														 Beowulf	was	foiled		of	a	glorious	victory.	The	glittering	sword,		infallible	before	that	day,		failed	when	he	unsheathed	it,	as	it	never	should	have.		For	the	Son	of	Ecgtheow,	it	was	no	easy	thing		to	have	to	give	ground	like	that	and	go		unwillingly	to	inhabit	another	home		in	a	place	beyond;	so	every	man	must	yield		the	leasehold	of	his	days.	(Donoghue	2002,	65,	lines	2583–2591)		The	failing	of	his	sword—that	is	to	say	his	strength,	his	body—precipitates	death,	the	ending	of	the	hero(’s	journey).	The	failing	body	is	another	kind	of	bodily	instability	with	which	the	hero’s	journey	is	concerned,	yet	because	it	runs	counter	to	the	hero-paradigm,	it	is	largely	ignored	when	discussing	the	hero.	The	hero	is	(bodily)	wholeness,	and	I	contend,	that	it	is	in	this	insistence	on	bodily	wholeness—an	insistence	that	is	so	pervasive	its	implications	are	often	
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elided—that	woman	is	excluded	from	being	a	hero.	She	is	excluded	because,	as	I	have	argued,	she	is	body,	instability,	and	change.			 Woman	is	not	the	hero,	and	in	so	being,	she	is	Other—no	space	is	afforded	to	her,	apart	from	in	opposition	to	him.	This	is	the	requirement	of	that	“conceptual	centre”	of	binary	oppositions	(Hourihan	1997,	15).	In	order	for	the	hero	to	be	heroic,	he	must	be	superior.	As	Hourihan	(1997)	suggests,			 Hero	stories	inscribe	the	male/female	dualism,	asserting	the	male	as	the	norm,	as	what	it	means	to	be	human,	and	defining	the	female	as	other—deviant,	different,	dangerous.	The	essence	of	the	hero’s	masculinity	is	his	assertion	of	control	over	himself,	his	environment	and	his	world.	(68–69)		The	way	in	which	this	assertion	echoes	the	arguments,	in	terms	of	Western	philosophy,	of	Grosz	(1994)	and	Battersby	(1998)	is	striking.	Across	these	two	discourses—that	do,	admittedly,	suffer	from	a	wealth	of	white,	male	perspectives—the	Othering	of	woman	is	particularly	similar.	Here,	she	is	“deviant,	different,	dangerous”	and	above	she	is	both	“more	biological,	more	corporeal,	and	more	natural”	(Grosz	1994,	154,	emphasis	original)	and	trapped	in	a	“flesh	[that]	is	[…]	monstrous—with	a	materiality	which	is	more	fully	immanent”	(Battersby	1998,	19).	Within	both,	the	body	is	key.	The	body	is	the	source	of,	and	reason	for,	her	exclusion	because,	as	Hourihan	suggests,	“the	essence	of	the	hero’s	masculinity	is	his	control,”	and	the	body	is	the	primary	site	of	control;	it	is	that	which	must	be	controlled	first,	before	the	land,	monsters,	or	others	can	be	tamed.	For	if	the	hero	does	not	control	his	own	body,	how	can	he	control	anything	else?	Yet,	the	body,	particularly	the	female	body,	frequently	refuses	such	control,	and	it	is	this	body	that	refuses	her	a	place	within	the	hero	story.	Hourihan	(1997)	goes	as	far	as	arguing:	“women	are,	essentially,	not	‘characters’	at	all	but	symbols	of	events	in	the	hero’s	psyche”	(156).	Woman	exists	only	in	relation	to	him:	his	bride,	the	mother	of	his	children,	the	crone	or	goddess	who	aids	him	on	his	quest	or	the	witch	who	hinders	him,	and	through	being	placed	in	such	roles,	woman	is	contained.	She	becomes	part	of	that	which	is	controlled	by	the	hero,	and	it	is	not	just	in	mythic	narratives	that	such	containing	occurs.	For,	the	illusions	of	choice	that	appear	to	offer	female	
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adolescents	the	chance	to	be	subject	and	author	of	their	own	story	are	constituent	to	the	positioning	of	woman	as	motif	in	myth,	and	it	is	a	positioning	that	occurs	because	of	a	perceived	instability	of	body	that	is,	and	has	been	historically,	associated	with	woman.	In	terms	of	more	traditional	hero	studies,	the	dominance	of	the	male	hero	is	an	issue	that	some	feminist	theorists	seek	to	solve	through	a	(re)turn	to	the	goddess	figure,	as	is	arguably	the	issue	at	stake	for	in	The	Feminist	
Companion	to	Mythology	(Larrington	1992).	Here,	the	hero-paradigm,	as	I	have	argued	it,	is	posited	as	not	enough,	so	a	turn	to	the	goddess	works	to	balance	the	pool	of	mythic	figures.	Yet,	for	all	the	good	work	it	does—seeking	to	address	issues	of	plurality	and	Eurocentricism,	issues	that	arguably	plague	the	male-dominated	field	of	criticism—the	turn	to	goddess	articulates	a	disavowal	of	the	male	hero	and	his	journey,	a	disavowal	that	frequents	many	feminist	responses	to	myth.	This	disavowal	most	often	comes	in	the	form	of	a	re-envisioning	of	the	hero	narrative,	through,	for	example,	myths	of	the	goddess.		Critics	also	use	goddess	myths	in	order	to	conceive	a	new	model	of	the	hero,	a	task	that	Nadya	Aisenberg	(1994)	takes	up	in	Ordinary	Heroines:	
Transforming	the	Male	Myth.	Beginning	with	the	claim	that	a	contemporary	heroine	is	needed,	Aisenberg	envisions	a	heroine	who	is	“deeply	committed	to	a	more	humane	society	[…]	forward-looking	[…]	a	responsive	leader	[…]	an	ordinary	woman	endeavouring,	nevertheless,	to	tackle	extraordinary	problems”	(13).	Yet,	this	call	essentially	inverts	the	thread	of	dominance	running	through	the	traditional	pattern:	replacing	heroic	conquering	with	humanity,	the	traditional	striking	out	on	his	own	with	a	responsiveness,	and	an	ordinary	woman	who	is	not	god-touched,	as	so	many	male	heroes	are.	However	empowering	Aisenberg’s	contemporary	heroine	might	be,	the	pattern	still	remains	subjected	to	the	binary	oppositions	of	the	traditional	hero	story	because	it	is	the	inversion	of	his	story.	The	binary	oppositions	must	be	addressed,	narratives—such	as	bodily	instability,	the	inclusion	of	difference,	touch,	relation—must	be	offered	as	that	which	disrupts	the	binary	through	being	in-between	the	binary	pairs.			Given	her	concern	with	the	hero	story’s	“conceptual	centre”	of	“binary	oppositions,”	Hourihan		(1997)	also	addresses	this	concern	with	reversal	(15).	
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For	her,	such	stories—and	she	gives,	as	examples,	Babette	Cole’s	Prince	Cinders	(1987)	and	Princess	Smarty	Pants	(1986),	among	others—merely	recapitulate,	through	inversion,	dominant	norms.	Hourihan	suggests	that	these	revisions	often		“ridicule	[…]	the	gender	stereotypes”	that	they	seek	to	undermine	(206),	and	in	doing	so,	they	fail.	For	example,	Hourihan	suggests	that	Cole’s	stories	“lampoon	the	stereotypes	of	large	hairy	masculinity	and	the	swashbuckling	hero	who	overcomes	all	difficulties”	(205),	and	in	so	doing	they	remain	tied	to	the	very	norms	they	seek	to	redress.	Moreover,	and	of	particular	relevance	to	my	concerns,	Hourihan	posits	these	revisions	as	“ultimately	nihilistic	for	they	offer	no	alternative,	positive	models	of	behavior	for	either	males	or	females”	(205).	It	is	for	this	reason	that	I	am	interested	in	heroic	bodies	that	change,	break,	bleed	and	are	not	always	entirely	human.	For,	these	bodies	not	only	engage	binary	oppositions	by	speaking	from	the	spaces	between	oppositions,	but	they	also	offer	alternative	frameworks	for,	in	Hourihan’s	terms,	“positive	model[ing].”	In	offering	such	bodies,	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	deviates	not	only	from	traditional	myth,	as	that	literature	depends	upon	the	stability	of	the	male	hero’s	form	but	also	from	Western	philosophy.	Through	narratives	of	cross-dressing,	Lunar	“glamours,”	menstruation,	shape-shifting,	and	being	cyborg,	Pierce	and	Meyer’s	texts	produce	the	female	body	as	a	site	of	change.	This	not	only	affords	a	chance	for	the	traditional	hero	to	be	looked	at	anew,	but	it	also	questions	the	representational	economy	dominating	the	West’s	popular	and	media	culture.	In	other	words,	through	negotiations	of	pluralities,	these	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	texts	open	spaces	in	which	female	heroes	break	boundaries	and	blur	borders,	and	in	which	they	challenge	the	necessity	of	the	male	hero	and	all	that	he	represents	through	a	questioning	of	bodily	stability.	Moreover,	it	is	a	questioning	that	affects	the	insistence	on	appearance	dominating	the	West,	as	that	narrative	is	underscored	by	this	mythic	view.	In	many	respects	it	returns	to	that	“possibility”	of	fantasy	that	Pierce	(1993,	50)	offered,	in	that,	I	believe	possibility	is	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy’s	conceptual	centre,	not	traditional	myth’s	binary	oppositions.	Rather	than	binary	oppositions,	this	fantasy	offers	multiplicity,	difference	and	instability,	and,	in	so	doing,	it	makes	a	space	for	sheroes	who	are	not	trapped	in,	or	limited	by,	their	bodies.		
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DISNEY’S	CINDERELLA:	A	FEMININE	IDENTITY		While	Cinderella	is	for	many	little	girls	synonymous	with	the	“Disney	Princess,”	there	are	countless	versions—and	revisions—of	the	Cinderella	motif;	the	transformation	(or	makeover)	from	pauper	to	princess	that	is	the	heart	of	this	story.	However,	this	becoming-princess	is	also,	quite	simply,	a	narrative	of	growing	up,	and	as	such	it	offers	a	feminine	identity.	In	the	case	of	Disney’s	Cinderella,	it	is	an	identity	of	“Princess,”	a	mass-market,	consumer-orientated	version	of	femininity	that	demurely	plays	along	the	edges	of	hyper-sexualisation.	Thus,	while	Cinderella	is	not	the	first	Disney	princess	(Snow	White	claimed	that	title	in	1937),	nor	is	she,	at	least	in	terms	of	merchandise	sales,	currently	Disney’s	favourite	princess	(Elsa,	of	Frozen,	dethroned	her	in	2013,	despite	not,	at	least	at	the	time	of	writing,	being	an	official	Princess),	Cinderella	is	the	iconic	Disney	princess—the	Princess	of	Princesses,	in	many	respects.57	In	popular	and	media	culture,	Cinderella,	as	a	part	of	the	Disney	Princess	franchise,	is	one	of	the	first	feminine	identities	that	young	girls	are	offered.		Yet,	Disney’s	Cinderella	is	underscored	by	the	fairytale	figure.	Falling	under	the	Aarne-Thompson	tale	type	510a,58	“stories	of	persecuted	heroines”	(Ashliman	1998),	Cinderella,	as	she	is	known	in	contemporary	Western	culture,	is	widely	considered	a	favourite,	and	she	also	appears	as	Aschenputtel	in	Germany,	Katie	Woodencloak	in	Norway	and,	more	often	than	not,	simply	as	daughter	or	girl.	There	is	something	quite	endearing,	and	enduring,	in	Cinderella’s	rise	from	those	ashes	in	order	to	marry	that	prince,	and	while	she	exists	in	countless	versions,	the	two	most	well-known	(in	the	West)	are	those	of	Charles	Perrault	and	the	Grimm	brothers;	yet,	two	more	different	stories	are	difficult	to	imagine.	Perrault’s	([1697]	1966)	ends	with	a	moral,	extolling	girls	to	beauty	within	and	without,	and	the	Grimms’	([1812]	1997)	with	the	wicked	step-sisters	getting	their	eyes	pecked	out,	“And	thus,	for	their	wickedness	and	falsehood,	they	were	punished	with	blindness	all	their	days”	(128).	However,	
                                                57	To	be	an	“official”	Disney	Princess	is	to	have	been	inducted	into	the	court.		58	Unless	specifically	noted,	Disney’s	Cinderella—character	or	film—refers	to	the	1950s	animated	film.	See,	Geronimi	(1950).		
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while	the	shape	of	their	endings	differ,	there	is	a	similar	core	message:	the	feminine	identity	rewarded	within	both	versions	is	Cinderella’s	“beauty	within	and	without,”	not	the	step-sister’s	“wickedness	and	falsehood”—these	things	bring	“punishment.”		This	grounding	in	fairytale	is	important,	for	it	is	upon	the	fairytale	that	Walt	Disney	constructed	his	Cinderella.	In	fact,	the	film’s	opening	credits	claim	that	its	Cinderella	is	“From	the	Original	Classic	by	Charles	Perrault.”	Crediting	Perrault	in	this	way	not	only	establishes	a	direct	lineage	between	the	film	and	the	fairy	tale,	but	it	also	(re)establishes	Perrault’s	story	as	a	classic,	perhaps	aiming,	even	before	it	begins,	to	bestow	the	same	“classic”	status	on	this	new	incarnation.	As	Linda	Parsons	(2004)	argues,	it	is	also	quite	telling	that	the	Disney	film	links	itself	to	Perrault’s	version	of	the	tale	rather	than	the	Grimms’.	For	Parsons,	“the	Grimm	version	is	based	on	female	empowerment	enabling	its	reclamation	by	women,	while	the	Perrault	version	embodies	a	patriarchal	point	of	view”	(143).	While	this	makes	the	Perrault	version	unsuitable	for	the	feminist	revisions	with	which	she	is	concerned,	the	connection	illustrates	precisely	the	kind	of	feminine	identity	offered	by	Disney’s	Cinderella.	Thus,	it	is	this	positioning—emanating	from	a	patriarchal	point	of	view,	or	the	“powdered	sugar”	nature	of	the	heroine,	as	Erika	Jarvis	(2015)	describes	Disney’s	recent	Cinderella	(in	Branagh	2015)—that	describes	the	feminine	identity	available	through	Cinderella,	extending	to	include	Disney’s	2015	Cinderella	as	well	as	to	dominant	narratives	of	Cinderella.		Furthermore,	it	is	a	link	to	fairy	tale	that	the	Disney	film	is	overly	determined	to	make:	first,	through	that	opening	credit,	and	second,	through	the	love	story	it	enacts.	This	love	story	is	the	plot	of	fairy	tales,	as	the	Grand	Duke	suggests	when	he,	at	the	ball		(and	more	than	halfway	into	the	film,	when	viewers	might	have	forgotten),	re-establishes	the	connection	to	fairy	tale	by	suggesting	that	the	love	story	imagined	by	the	king	for	his	son	is	“a	pretty	plot	for	fairy	tales.”	Little	does	the	Grand	Duke	realise	that	Prince	Charming	and	Cinderella	are	engaging	in	this	“pretty	plot”	right	before	the	king’s,	and	the	viewers’,	eyes.	In	this	way,	Disney’s	Cinderella	self-consciously	constructs	itself	as	emulating	Perrault’s	fairy	tale,	and	it	is	this	re-telling	that	has	ramifications	for	the	feminine	identity	the	film	offers	through	the	figure	of	Cinderella:	an	
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identity	underscored	by	Cinderella’s	appearance,	her	work/duties,	and	a	notion	of	dreaming	(see,	also,	Lundberg	2013).		In	terms	of	the	character’s	appearance	and	general	occupation,	fairy	tales	in	their	traditional	sense	are	not	about	innovation:	Cinderella	is	not	a	cyborg	(not	conventionally,	at	least)	(Meyer	2012),	Rapunzel	is	not	a	computer	hacker	(Meyer	2014a),	and	Snow	White	is	not	disfigured	(Meyer	2015c).	It	is	a	point	Bruno	Bettelheim	(1976)	makes—in	his	still	influential,	if	not	also	passé,	
The	Uses	of	Enchantment:	The	Meaning	and	Importance	of	Fairy	Tales—when	he	suggests,	“all	[fairy	tale]	characters	are	typical	rather	than	unique”	(8).	For	Bettelheim	this	is	largely	the	point	of	such	tales.	The	characters	are	“typical”	so	that	children,	within	his	argument,	may	see	themselves	within	the	tale.	In	other	words,	the	fairytale	hails	the	child	through	the	ordinary	characters	who	may	be	like	the	child;	this	is	why	Cinderella	must	be	pauper	before	she	is	princess,	and	it	is	why	Disney’s	Cinderella	is	a	thoroughly	domestic	creature.59	As	Naomi	Wood	(1996)	argues,	Cinderella	is,			the	ideal	housewife:	she’s	beautiful	(in	a	softly	curved,	Miss	America,	girl-next-door	kind	of	way	[…]);	innocently	sexy	(one	of	our	first	views	of	her	is	her	rear	end	charmingly	presented	under	the	bedcovers);	a	loving	caregiver	(she	tends	animals	in	lieu	of	children).	(35)			It	is	telling	that	the	predominant	aspects	of	Cinderella’s	“ideal”	nature	have	to	do	with	her	appearance:	“beautiful”	and	“innocently	sexy.”	Yes,	she	is	an	“ideal	housewife,”	but	“ideal	housewife”	is	modified	by	the	appearance.	Cinderella	is	an	“ideal	housewife”	precisely	because	she	is	“beautiful,”	“innocently	sexy,”	as	well	as	a	“loving	caregiver.”	The	caregiving	is	important,	but	the	appearance	is	more	so.	It	is	a	particularly	domestic,	feminine-self-through-appearance	that	Cinderella	embodies,	and	it	is	one	that	her	animal	friends,	as	foils	for	Cinderella,	demonstrate	throughout	the	film,	particularly	in	terms	of	clothing.		
                                                59	It	is	also	in	the	names	of	the	characters,	as	made	evident	by	the	two	films:	while	Lady	Tremaine,	for	example,	is	named	in	the	1950	animated	film,	where	she	runs	less	risk	of	becoming	a	“real”	person,	in	the	2015	live-action	remake,	she	is	merely	Stepmother,	her	function.	Names,	in	fairy	tales	and	live-action	remakes,	have	a	strong	tendency	to	match	a	character’s	role	or	function—Prince	Charming,	Grand	Duke,	Coachman.		
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The	mouse,	Gus,	for	example,	does	not	get	a	dress	because	he	is	a	he—and	“that	does	make	a	difference,”	as	Cinderella	intones.60	In	this	space,	dresses	contribute	to	one’s	feminine	identity,	an	identity	that	presupposes	femaleness	as	Gus—because	he	is	a	boy	mouse—cannot	wear	a	dress,	marking	him	as	not	female.	At	the	other	end	of	the	spectrum,	Cinderella’s	ball	gown	marks	her	as	appropriately	feminine	(and	thus	female),	in	that,	not	only	is	she	female	and	thus	able	to	wear	dresses	(a	certain	basic	level	of	femaleness/femininity),	but	she	is	also	able	to	wear	ball	gowns,	a	very	specific	kind	of	dress	marking	a	very	specific	(heightened	and	ideal)	femininity.	In	other	words,	dresses,	as	they	are	articulated	within	Disney’s	Cinderella	narrative,	establish	a	hierarchical	rendering	of	femininity:	while	most	dresses	(the	one	Gus	cannot	wear	and	the	“rags”	Cinderella	wears	for	working)	simply	mark	someone	as	female	or	not,	Cinderella’s	ball	gown	represents	the	epitome	of	femininity.	The	ball	gown	transforms	her	into	an	“eligible	maiden,”	yet	underscoring	this	physical	appearance	is	a	narrative	of	feminine	work	(chores)	that	must	also	be	accomplished	before	Cinderella	may	go	to	the	ball.			This	reading	hinges	on	the	purpose	of	the	ball:	“arranging	the	conditions”	for	a	“boy	to	meet	a	girl,”	conditions	that	imply	a	reading	of	class,	in	that,	while	as	the	daughter	of	a	nobleman	Cinderella	is	intrinsically	an	“eligible	maiden,”	her	social	positioning	at	the	time	of	the	ball	makes	her	ineligible.	In	other	words,	while	the	king’s	missive	may	insist	that	“every	eligible	maiden”	attend,	it	takes	Lady	Tremaine	to	clarify	the	eligible:	Cinderella’s	chores	must	be	completed	(appropriate	feminine	work)	and	she	(like	all	other	girls)	must	find	something	“suitable”	to	wear	(appropriate	appearance).	Placed	into	a	position	of	inferiority,	in	terms	of	class,	by	Lady	Tremaine,	the	hard	work	that	Cinderella	must	do	is	how	the	pauper	becomes	princess.	I	believe	this	work	also	metaphorically	relates	to	the	beauty-work	that	women	must	undertake	in	order	to	appease	the	“beauty	myth,”	or	standard	of	feminine	appearance	dominating	their	discursive	situation	(Woolf	1991,	6).	In	other	words,	the	chores	Cinderella	
                                                60	Gus	is	also	quite	rotund;	as	such,	he	does	not	meet	expectations	of	female	(or	feminine)	appearance	on	two	levels:	he	is	male	and	he	is	overweight.	Many	thanks	to	Catherine	Charlwood	for	reminding	me	of	this	second	connection.				
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must	complete	metaphorically	represent	“beauty	work,”	plausible	as	part	of	Cinderella’s	“work”	is	finding	something	“suitable”	to	wear.	In	this	sense,	Disney’s	Cinderella	is	a	narrative	that	recapitulates	the	binary	opposition	between	men	and	women	residing	at	the	heart	of	fairy	tales,	and	in	the	case	of	Cinderella	and	Parson’s	“romance	ideology”	(2005,	135),	it	is	an	opposition	that	sees	woman	as	a	Bride-to-Be-Had.	She	is,	after	all,	the	“maid	predestined	to	be	his	bride,”	according	to	the	Grand	Duke’s	“pretty	plot”	that	is,	in	fact,	the	plot	of	the	film.	In	other	words,	Cinderella	charts	not	just	the	successful	transference	of	the	girl	from	her	parental	home	to	that	of	her	husband	but	also	the	successful	transformation	of	child	into	woman.61	Cinderella’s	narrative	is	the	hegemonic	hero	story	for	females.		Significantly,	the	fairytale	does	this	while	having	Cinderella—who	in	the	animated	Disney	version	is	depicted	as	having	strawberry	blond	hair,	piercingly	blue	eyes,	and	a	tiny	waist—maintain	an	always	beautiful	appearance,	even	if	it	requires	the	assistance	of	animals	and	Fairy	Godmother.	However,	this	beauty,	as	a	symbolic	indicator	of	a	girls’	worthiness	(for	marriage)	is	not	limited	to	the	Disney	narrative.	It	also	serves	an	important	function	within	traditional	European	fairy	tales,	as	Maria	Tatar’s	commentary	for	“Ashfeathers,”	one	of	the	recently-recovered	tales	collected	by	Franz	Xaver	Von	Schönwerth	(2015)	and	another	version	of	the	510a	story,	suggests.62	Here,	Tatar	notes,	“[Ashfeather’s	suitor]	does	not	seem	to	need	her	consent.	He	falls	in	love,	woos	her,	and	whisks	her	off	to	his	castle,	without	a	word	from	her.	Consent	is	coded	through	the	display	of	beauty	she	puts	on	in	church	[which,	in	this	version,	she	attends	instead	of	a	ball]”	(Schönwerth	2015,	222).	In	other	words,	Cinderella/Ashfeather’s	beauty—coded	through	cleanliness	and	fine	clothes	(in	contrast	to	her	normally	ash/cinder-covered	appearance	and	rags)—supersedes	the	necessity	of	words.	In	this	way,	beauty	clearly	speaks	across	“Cinderella”	narratives,	tales	included	within	the	Aarne-Thompson	510a	classification.	
                                                61	This	is	the	charter	function—that	is,	the	establishing	of	a	pattern	of	behaviour—of	myth.	See,	for	example,	Malinowski	(1926).	62	Many	thanks	to	Dr	Amy	Davis	for	suggesting	this	link.		
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Wood	(1996)	further	argues	that	Cinderella,	perhaps	more	than	any	other	Disney	film,	is	bound	up	in	Walt	Disney’s	creating	of	the	American	fairy	tale—a	particular	version	of	the	American	dream,	and,	I	believe,	of	Western	femininity.	Moreover,	it	is	a	dream	underscored	by	hard-work	and	heteronormative	values	(admittedly	not	without	complications	and	tensions,	as	is	the	case	with	fairy	tales	in	general).	In	the	case	of	Cinderella,	she,	despite	the	difficulties	of	her	situation,	maintains	not	only	a	positive	attitude	but	also	one	dependent	on	the	belief	that,	as	the	song	suggests,	“No	matter	how	your	heart	is	grieving/	If	you	keep	on	believing/	The	dream	that	you	wish	will	come	true.”	It	is	this	dreaming	that	plays	not	only	an	integral	role	in	how	Cinderella	constructs	a	particular	version	of	femininity,	but	it	also	speaks	to	how	the	dream	of	marriage	also	contributes	to	successful	femininity.	While	Cinderella’s	dream	is	not	explicitly	shared	(doing	so,	as	she	tells	the	mice,	would	make	it	not	come	true),	the	dream—to	find	true	love	through	a	traditional,	heteronormative	marriage,	and	to	escape	her	present	situation—is	very	much	implied	by	the	way	she	gazes	at	the	castle	in	the	distance.	Through	marriage,	the	prince—the	hero—will	save	her.		Cinderella’s	dream	as	“appropriately”	feminine,	according	to	traditional	ideas/ideals	of	femininity,	is	a	reading	demonstrable	on,	at	least,	two	levels.	First,	as	Wood	(1996)	suggests,	it	is	a	dream	“shaped	by	the	values	of	self-control	and	devotion	to	duty,	as	defined	by	a	patriarchal	order”	(26).	Cinderella’s	dreaming	is	both	contrasted	with,	and	underscored	by,	the	household	jobs	she	dutifully	completes:	the	work	is	for	the	present,	the	dreams	for	the	future.	Furthermore,	and	as	the	happily-ever-after	ending	indicates,	her	dream	is	allowed	because	it	is	the	dream	of	patriarchy:	the	dream	of	heterosexual	coupling	that	produces—within	the	sanctity	of	marriage—children,	for	the	sake	of	perpetuating	patriarchy	(the	king’s	constant	desire	for	grandchildren	makes	this	explicit).	Thus,	through	the	medium	of	fairy	tale,	Disney’s	Cinderella	is	about	a	certain	kind	of	cultural	work,	and	in	so	being,	it	offers,	as	Wood	(1996)	argues,	“a	normative	standard	of	American-style”	or	values,	values	that	are	embodied	by	Cinderella	(as	well	as	the	wider	Princess	community)	(25).	In	short,	Cinderella’s	dream	is	the	dream	of	all	women,	or	so	it	should	be.		
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Disney’s	1950	animated	feature	offers	a	self-conscious	relationship	with	fairy	tale,	as	well	as	with	the	binary,	patriarchal	interactions	between	men	and	women	embedded	within	those	narratives.	This	relationship—not	only	to	fairy	tale	but	also	to	a	particular	version,	Charles	Perrault’s,	of	the	Cinderella	tale—contrives	a	narrow	feminine	identity,	a	hyper-femininity	that	is	only	available	on	the	body.	The	question	is:	Are	there	alternatives?	Yes,	the	“sheroes”	of	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	model	ways	of	being	female	that	not	only	counter	superficial	femininity	but	that	do	so	through	bodies	that	are	disguised,	different,	multiple,	injured	and	not	entirely	human.	Pierce’s	Alanna	of	Trebond	and	Olau	(Alanna/Alan),	Veralidaine	Sarrasri	(Daine),	Keladry	of	Mindelan	(Kel)	and	Alianne	of	Pirate’s	Swoop	(Aly)	are	such	female	heroes,	as	is	Meyer’s	Linh	Cinder	(Cinder).		
FROM	HEROES	TO	SHEROES		Much	of	today’s	fantasy	and	not	just	that	for	young	adults	owes	a	great	debt	to	J.R.R	Tolkien	though	not	as	much	to	C.S.	Lewis,	despite	Lewis’s	indelible	mark	on	children’s	literature	and	Tolkien	and	Lewis’s	mutual	influence	on	the	Oxford	English	curriculum,	a	topic	that	Cecire	(2011	and	2013)	discusses	at	length.	In	terms	of	world-building—a	cornerstone	of	the	mythopoeic	mind-set—Tolkien’s	Middle	Earth	is	unparalleled,63	and	it	has	become	the	standard	by	which	fantasy	authors	measure	their	work	(Haber	2011),	and	by	which	their	work	is	measured—whether	in	contention,	as	is	the	His	Dark	Materials	trilogy	(Pullman	1995–2000),	or	in	some	kind	of	accord,	as	is	the	Inheritance	Cycle	(Paolini	2002–2011).	Thus,	this	section	demonstrates	why	Tolkien	plays	a	more	integral	role	to	this	genre	than	does	Lewis,	while	also	tracing	a	narrative	arch	from	Tolkien	and	Lewis’s	heroes	and	women	to	Pierce	and	Meyer’s	sheroes—heroes	who	are	women.	This	section	also	begins	mapping	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy,	a	term	I	draw	from	Tolkien’s	use	of	the	notion	in	his	poem	“Mythopoeia”	(1988).	Addressing	the	act	of	myth-making,	this	poem	suggests	that	through	art	man	takes	on	the	role	of		“Sub-creator”	(98),	particularly	in	the	constructing	of	a	Secondary	
                                                63	See:	The	Hobbit	(1937)	and	The	Lord	of	the	Rings	(1954–1955).	
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World	(see,	also,	Tolkien	[1947]	1997).	Dedicating	the	poem	“To	one	[C.S.	Lewis]	
who	said	that	myths	were	lies	and	therefore	worthless,	even	though	'breathed	
through	silver'	(97,	emphasis	original),	Tolkien	offers	a	crucial	first	illustration	as	to	why	Lewis’s	fantasy	is	not	of	concern	to	this	thesis:	myths—and	by	extension	a	mythopoeic	mind-set—are	“lies”	and	“worthless”	to	Lewis.	Entrenched	within	the	structure	of	binary	oppositions,	here,	manifest	as	“boys	are	better	than	girls;	light-coloured	people	are	better	than	dark-coloured	people”	(Pullman	1998)	and,	crucially,	allegory	(truth)	is	better	than	myth	(lies),	Lewis’s	fantasy—specifically	The	Chronicles	of	Narnia	(1950–1956),	Lewis’s	most	renown	contribution	to	children’s	literature	and	to	fantasy—lacks	the	creationary	impetus	that	is	the	predominant	characteristic	of	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy,	relying	instead	on	allegory,	a	mode	of	writing	Lewis	believed	particularly	pertinent	to	writing	for	children.	In	an	essay	on	the	topic,	he	states		a	fairy	tale	addressed	to	children,	was	exactly	what	I	must	write—or	burst.	Partly,	I	think,	that	this	form	permits,	or	compels	you	to	leave	out	things	I	wanted	to	leave	out.	(1982,	65)		While	I	am	not	overly	concerned	with	authorial	intention,	this	statement	of	motivation	is	insightful,	especially	in	how	it	links	children’s	literature	and	fairy	tale	as	forms	that	allow	Lewis	to	“leave	out	things.”	Essentially,	the	two	forms	unite	as	the	perfect	vehicle	for	Lewis’s	allegory,	namely	that	women,	and	girls-becoming-women,	are	representative	of	sin	and	threats	to	his	idyllic	England.		Illustratively,	the	series’	primary	antagonist	is	“one	of	the	Jinn”	and	a	descendant	of	Lilith	(1950,	81),	and	the	White	Witch’s	magical	powers—the	ability	to	turn	beings	into	stone	and	to	cast	an	endless	winter,	with	no	Christmas—condemn	her	still.	As	Cecire	(2011)	suggests,	the	White	Witch	“is	sin,	evil	and	otherness	personified”	(101,	emphasis	original)—because	she	is	a	woman.	However,	it	is	not	just	the	female	villain	who	suffers	within	The	Chronicles	of	Narnia,	the	sisters—Susan	and	Lucy—fare	little	better,	despite	their	status	as	protagonists.	As	a	little	girl,	Lucy	just	about	manages	within	Lewis’s	allegory,	but	Susan,	as	she	transforms	into	a	young	woman—and	as	her	sexuality	can	no	longer	be	avoided—is	damned	more	perniciously	than	the	White	Witch.	Interested	in	“nothing	nowadays	except	nylons	and	lipstick	and	
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invitations,”	Susan	is	“no	longer	a	friend	of	Narnia”	by	the	series’	final	instalment,	because	she	was	“always	a	jolly	sight	too	keen	on	being	grown-up”	(1956,	161).	The	“lipstick,”	“nylons,”	“invitations,”	and	“being	grown-up”	are	about	becoming-woman	and	sexual,	and	for	her	interest	in	these	things,	Susan	is	banned	from	Narnia,	from	Lewis’s	figuring	of	Heaven.			Admittedly,	Tolkien’s	fantasy	does	not	escape	this	difficulty	with	women,	though	his	portrayal	of	female	characters	speaks	to	a	more	generalised	dissatisfaction	with	the	hero	story.	A	result	of	the	disillusionment	felt	after	World	War	II,	Tolkien’s	Lord	of	the	Rings	suggests	there	are	no	more	“great	deeds”	to	be	performed	by	“great	men.”	Man	was	no	longer	able	to	meet	the	standards	of	the	traditional,	often	god-touched,	hero,	so	Tolkien	inverted	the	figure,	turning	to	the	hobbits,	or	“half-lings,”	to	populate	his	hero’s	journey.	Literally	half	a	man,	Tolkien’s	hobbits	appear	the	most	un-heroic,	yet	they	perform	the	most	heroic	deeds	within	the	tale,	and	it	is	within	this	frame	that	Tolkien’s	women	sit:	simultaneously	granted	power—because	they	are	not	men—they	are	also	divested	of	it,	because	they	are	not	heroes	in	the	traditional	sense.	It	is,	for	example,	precisely	because	Eowyn	is	not	a	man	that	she	could	kill	Anagmar.	As	Neville	(2005)	suggests,			[Eowyn’s]	marginal	position	is	essential—and	not	simply	because	of	the	demands	of	the	prophecy	within	the	plot	of	the	text.	If	she	were	not	marginalised	and	assumed	to	be	powerless,	her	action	would	not	resonate	with	the	central	story	of	Frodo	and	Sam.	(109)		Tolkien’s	women	are	powerless—with	a	purpose,	for	in	being	powerless	(or	assumed	as	such),	they	too	commit	great	deeds.	However,	trapped	within	the	theme	of	the	unlikely	hero,	Eowyn’s	great	deed	does	not	equal	her	to	the	male	hero.	She	must	remain	marginal—or	the	plot	falls	to	pieces.		 Thus	while	both	Tolkien	and	Lewis’s	portrayal	of	women	is	lacking,	Tolkien’s	fantasy—because	of	its	mythopoeic	nature—stands	as	the	cornerstone	of	the	vein	of	fantasy	literature	with	which	I	am	concerned.	The	importance	of	Tolkien,	despite	the	problems	of	even	his	fantasy,	cannot	be	overstated.	Meditations	on	Middle-Earth:	New	Writings	on	the	Worlds	of	J.R.R.	
Tolkien	(Haber	2001)	sees	some	of	fantasy’s	biggest	names—Terry	Pratchett,	Diane	Duane,	Robin	Hobb,	Ursula	K.	Le	Guin,	and	Orson	Scott	Card—musing,	
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sycophantically	at	times,	on	the	“Tolkien	effect,”	children’s	and	YA	fantasy	author	Esther	Friesner	even	refers	to	Tolkien	as	a	“gateway	drug”	(2001,	56).	During	a	2011	ComicCon	panel,64	Pierce,	along	with	Friesner,	Sphinx’s	Queen	(2010),	and	Caitlin	Kittredge,	The	Iron	Throne	(2011),	discussed	the	role	of	women	within	young	adult	fantasy,	as	well	as	her	impetus	for	writing	strong	female	characters.	Stating,	she	spent	a	lot	of	time	“grubbing”	for	female	heroes	when	she	was	young	and	that	Tolkien’s	Eowyn	was	the	first	she	found	within	fantasy	(Buzz	2011),	a	comment	that	resounds	with	the	theme	of	a	2006	phone	interview	between	Phillip	Pullman	(His	Dark	Materials),	Tamora	Pierce,	and	Christopher	Paolini	(Inheritance	Cycle).	Hosted	by	Powell’s	Books	in	conjunction	with	the	Random	House	group,	this	interview	saw	all	three	authors	situate	themselves	as	working	within	a	Tolkienian	inspired	tradition.	Pierce	even	states,	“from	the	very	beginning	[…]	I	bowed	to	Tolkien;	he	was	the	master.	He’s	where	I	started	with	fantasy”	(Powell’s	Books).			 Tolkien	may	have	been	where	Pierce	“started	with	fantasy,”	but	he	is	not	where	she	remained.	Thus,	while	the	exclusionary	conceptual	centre	of	the	hero’s	journey	and	Tolkien’s	fantasy—as	the	direct	forefather	of	this	genre—are	controversial	foundations,	they	do	provide	many	positive	features.	In	fact,	the	notion	of	journeying	is,	itself,	advantageous.	For,	it	is	through	the	journeys	undertaken	by	Pierce	and	Meyer’s	sheroes	(female	heroes)	that	these	texts	write	themselves	into	mythic	narratives.	Mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	is	the	stories	of	heroes:	“an	idea	made	her	[Daine’s]	jaw	drop:	if	she’s	[Alanna]	a	legend,	and	a	hero,	then	anyone	could	be	a	hero”	(Pierce	[1994]	1999,	61);	even	when	those	heroes	turn	up	in	the	most	unlikely	of	places:	“Oh,	wonderful.	You’re	[Kel]	on	a	hero’s	quest	to	get	rid	of	bullies”	([1999]	2004,	149),	or,	in	Meyer’s	world,	as	a	revolutionary.			 ‘The	people	of	Luna	don’t	need	a	princess.	They	need	a	revolutionary.’		[…]			
                                                64	Briefly,	ComicCon	is	the	now	massive	conference/festival	covering	all	things	science	fiction,	fantasy	and	otherwise	“geeky.”			
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Cinder	furrowed	her	brow.	‘A	revolutionary,’	she	repeated.	She	liked	that	a	lot	better	than	princess.	(2014a,	549,	emphasis	original)		Thus,	while	the	hero—or	“shero”—may	take	a	different	shape	or	earn	their	title	fighting	“bullies,”	he	or	she	is	still	a	“hero”	as	long	as	actions	merit	the	title:	“She’s	[Alanna]	a	hero.	She’s	proved	it	over	and	over”	(Pierce	[1999]	2004,	165).	All	one	has	to	do,	as	Throne	suggests	to	Cress	(Rapunzel),	is	“be	heroic”	(Meyer	2015c,	606).			Yet,	heroes	to	sheroes	is	not	an	easy	transition	to	make,	and	even	Pierce’s	work,	for	all	that	it	does	for	expanding	the	notion	of	the	hero,	is	not	without	flaw.	For	example,	the	Song	of	the	Lioness	quartet	(1983–1988)	evokes	a	superficial	conversation	with	myth:	Alanna	is	simply	shoved	into	the	role	of	a	male/masculine	hero	(Flanagan	2008),	and	this	quartet	essentially	replicates	Campbell’s	hero’s	journey.	Alanna	“ventures	forth”	in	order	to	become	a	knight,	disguising	herself	as	a	boy	([1949]	1973,	35).	She	encounters	many	“fabulous	forces”	(35),	including	malevolent	spirits	in	the	“Ysandir”	(1984,	40),	a	human	villain	in	Roger,	and	a	mythical	foe	in	the	“God	of	the	Roof”	(1988,	175).	With	each,	she	is	victorious,	and	for	so	being,	she	is	blessed	and	granted	a	boon	by	the	Goddess,	“‘wear	my	token,	and	be	brave’	(1984,	18).”65	Alanna’s	final	victory,	within	the	separation-initiation-return	framework,	occurs	with	Chitral	(the	“God	of	the	Roof”	(175))	with	whom	she	battles	to	win	his	Dominion	Jewel.	When	in	the	hands	of	natural	leader,	this	Jewel	grants	fabulous	power,	for	good	or	evil.	Upon	returning	home	to	Tortall,	Alanna	gifts	the	Dominion	Jewel	to	King	Jonathan	of	Conté	(her	former	fellow	page,	knight	master,	and	lover).	At	a	time	of	great	peril,	Jon	uses	it	to	save	the	kingdom,	while	Alanna	is	busy	battling	Roger	who,	in	turn,	is	attempting	regicide.	On	the	surface,	Alanna’s	narrative	is	a	straightforward	replication	of	the	monomyth,	particularly,	in	that	she	cross-dresses	in	order	to	participate	in	the	male	world	of	knighthood.	While	Alanna’s	femaleness	does	assert	itself	through	a	changing	body	and	menarche	and	she	is	narrated	as	eventually	coming	to	terms	with	being	female,	this	quartet	is	superficially	more	about	replication	than	are	Pierce’s	subsequent	offerings.	
                                                65	The	Goddess	is	alternatively	known	as	“the	Great	Mother”	within	this	mythology.	See,	Pierce	(1984,	18).		
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However,	it	is	unsurprising	that	Pierce’s	first	quartet—with	the	four	texts	published	in	1983,	1984,	1986,	and	1988—engaged	with	the	hero’s	journey	and	thus	mythopoeic	fantasy	in	such	an	apparently	superficial	way.	It	is	an	issue	that	The	Blue	Sword	also	shares	(McKinley	1982).	In	that,	while	Angharad	Crew—the	shero	of	this	text—may	not	cross-dress	to	the	same	extent	as	Alanna	does,	she	does	insist	on	being	called	Harry,	implying	a	masculine	persona.	It	is	a	“problem”	that	has	to	do	with	both	the	tradition	of	myth	and	the	Tolkienian	inspired	fantasy	within	which	these	texts	are	working	as	well	as	the	discursive	space—the	cultural	situation	prior	to	“girl	power”—within	which	they	were	produced.	The	transition	to	Sheroes	takes	time,	as	Alanna	tells	her	daughter	(Aly)	in	Trickster’s	Choice,	“the	whole	point	to	doing	as	I	did	[becoming	a	knight]	was	so	you	could	do	something	else,	if	you	wanted	to”	([2003]	2005,	18).	In	this	moment,	this	later	text	by	Pierce	not	only	demonstrates	a	more	complex	engagement	with	myth,	by	expanding	the	role	of	the	hero	(“you	could	do	something	else”),	but	it	also	comments	on	its	own	world	building,	explaining	the	kinds	of	changes	seen	across	Pierce’s	corpus:	Alanna	cross-dressed	(replicating	the	male	hero	journey)	so	that	Aly	(and	Pierce’s	subsequent	female	heroes)	did	not	have	to.	Beginning	publication	in	2012,	Meyer’s	texts	also	benefit	from	the	various	avenues	opened	by	Pierce’s	fantasy	(as	well	as	other	earlier	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy),	and	they	take	full	advantage:	Cinder(ella)	is	a	cyborg;	Scarlet	(Little	Red	Riding	Hood)	must	rescue	her	missing	grandmother,	with	the	help	of	the	wolf;	Cress	(Rapunzel)	has	been	trapped	on	a	satellite	for	most	of	her	life,	rather	aggrandising	a	certain	tower;	Winter	(Snow	White)	is	a	disfigured	citizen	of	the	moon,	with	magical	powers	that	she	refuses	to	use—a	refusal	that	is	driving	her	insane.		The	Chronicles	interweave	these	four	(fairytale)	sheroes	into	one	narrative	arc:	starting	with	Cinder,	the	subsequent	texts	introduce,	respectively,	Scarlet,	Cress	and	Winter.	Thus,	it	is	ultimately	Cinder’s	story—most	obviously	because	her	text	comes	first,	but	also	because	she	undertakes	the	most	developed	“hero	journey.”	She	is	also	Cinder(ella)	and	Cinderella	is,	as	I	discussed,	a	particularly	important	female	figure	within	the	West.		Moreover,	as	a	cyborgian	female	hero,	Cinder’s	visually	fragmented	body	is	specifically	about	the	issues	of	bodily	instability	and	disability	lacking	in	the	
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hero	story—as	it	was	injury	that	caused	her	to	become	cyborg.	Cross-dressing	presents	the	visually	obscured	body,	while	the	Lunar	glamour	manipulates	the	body’s	“real”	appearance.	Menstruation,	and	the	pregnancy	that	it	makes	possible,	offers	another	kind	of	bodily	instability—a	bleeding	body	and	a	body	as	possibly	more	than	one.	Shape-shifting	offers	an	ambiguous	body,	while	also	questioning	the	division	between	humans	and	animals,	and	the	cybernetic	body	offers	the	multiple	body	whilst	also	blurring	the	opposition	between	humans	and	machines.	Through	their	heightened	embodiedness,	these	bodies	demonstrate,	the	self	in	relation	to	not	only	other	humans	but	also	to	animals	and	technology.	This	interdependency	is	critical,	as	it	contests	the	individuality	that	is	the	goal	of	the	hegemonic	developmental	models	of	adolescence,	maps	of	adolescence	that	exclude	the	adolescent	girl.	Moreover,	these	sheroic	bodies	do	so	while	also	demonstrating	that	a	unique	and	individual	self	remains	within—and	because	of—unity.	They	demonstrate	how	a	self	might	be	“scored	by	relationality	into	uniqueness”	(Battersby	1998,	7),	a	process	that	also	applies	to	the	defining	of	YAL.			
SECONDARY	WORLDS:	OR,	A	PLACE	TO	CALL	HOME	 	Not	only	do	the	complex	layers	of	history	embedded	(as	it	were)	in	the	landscape	enrich	the	texture	of	the	stories,	but	the	meanings	of	the	landscapes	themselves	provide	a	subtext	for	the	journeys:		places	mean.	(Hunt	1987,	11)		From	the	most	(seemingly)	basic	fairytale	to	the	most	complex	Secondary	World,	the	setting—the	landscape,	its	rules	and	structures—is	imperative	to	successful	fantasy	(see,	also,	Sullivan	1992),	and	it	is	through	the	fully-formed,	logically	created	Secondary	World	that	the	possibilities	of	fantasy	are	fully	realised.	In	this	vein,	the	Encyclopedia	of	Fantasy	suggests:			A	Secondary	World	can	be	defined	as	an	autonomous	world	or	venue	which	is	not	bound	to	mundane	reality,	which	is	impossible	according	to	common	sense	and	which	is	self-coherent	as	a	venue	for	story.	(Clute	and	Grant	1997,	n.p.).		
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	The	key	points	are:	the	departure	from	“mundane	reality,”	what	I	refer	to	as	consensus	reality	and	internally	“self-coherent,”	for	these	are	what	makes	the	world	different	and	yet	plausible,	within	its	own	terms.			Tolkien	([1947]	1997)	expands	on	both	these	notions	in	his	description	of	the	Secondary	World.		He	makes	a	Secondary	World	which	your	mind	can	enter.	Inside	it,	what	he	relates	is	‘true’:	it	accords	with	the	laws	of	that	world.	You	therefore	believe	it,	while	you	are,	as	it	were,	inside.	The	moment	disbelief	arises,	the	spell	is	broken;	the	magic,	or	rather	art,	has	failed.	You	are	then	out	in	the	Primary	World	again,	looking	at	the	little	abortive	Secondary	World	from	outside.	(132)			While	the	implicit	argument—that	the	fantasy	author,	this	creator	(he	who	makes),	is	male—is	questionable,	the	definition	offers	a	few	salient	points:	the	world	created	by	a	fantasy	text	does	not	physically	exist;	it	is	one	“your	mind	can	enter.”	This	has	particular	bearing	on	how	the	world	is	constructed	and	on	what	devices	are	used	in	that	construction;	as	I	discuss	below,	maps	and	narratives	comprising	multiple	volumes	are	quite	useful.	It	also	suggests	a	notion	of	immersion,	you	“believe	it,	while	[…]	inside.”		There	is	a	sense	of	separation	and	of	leaving	what	Tolkien	terms	the	Primary	World	(consensus	reality)	in	order	to	experience,	through	the	mind,	this	Secondary	World.	There	is	also	the	potential	for	failure,	which	suggests	that	there	are	certain	expectations—disbelief	must	not	arise,	for	one—regarding	the	construction	of	such	a	world	(see,	also,	Lo	2012).		Thus,	for	Tolkien,	the	setting	of	a	story	is	not	secondary	(see,	also,	Butler	2013).	“Places	mean,”	as	this	section’s	epigraph	suggests	(Hunt	1987,	11).	Places	are	of	vital	importance	because	it	is	within	a	place	that	fantasy	may	occur,	and	Tolkien	is	not	the	only	one	who	shares	this	belief.	Sullivan	(1992)	notes	“the	logically-created	Secondary	World”	ensures	the	success	of	what	he	terms	high	fantasy	(98).	Fantastical	objects,	creatures,	or	the	impossible	cannot	merely	be	thrown	in	at	random	each	must	be	grounded	within	the	rules	of	a	given	world.	As	Sullivan	(1992)	further	argues,	“you	must	create	a	space	in	which	the	impossible	can	exist”	(98).	Thus,	while	contentious—M.	John	
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Harrison	(2007)	depicts	world	building	as	“the	great	clomping	foot	of	nerdism,”	for	example	(para.	3)—Secondary	Worlds	are	integral	to	the	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	with	which	I	am	concerned,	if	for	no	other	reason	than	because	they	create	spaces	in	which	shape-shifting,	Lunar	“glamours,”	and	being	cyborg—alternative	images	of	living	and	being	an	adolescent	female	body	that	are,	as	yet,	impossible	within	Western	consensus	reality—logically	occur.	Yet,	the	worlds	Pierce	and	Meyer	create	are	markedly	different;	Pierce’s	Tortall	is	a	feudal	society	set	in	a	pseudo-medieval	world	very	much	resembling	Europe.	There	is	a	highly	developed	polytheistic	religious	system	and	some	individuals	are	Gifted,	possessing	magical	abilities.	Spanning	the	last	30	years	and	consisting	of	17	novels,66	Pierce’s	Tortall	is	not	only	particularly	well	developed	(if	only	through	sheer	longevity),	but	it	also	reflects	the	complex	web	of	changing	cultural	concerns,	expectations,	and	norms	covering	the	period	since	its	initial	publication.	This	accounts	for	the	transition	seen	across	the	corpus.	As	such,	it	is	also	rather	fitting	that	Meyer’s	Earthen	Union—the	world	created	in	her	Lunar	Chronicles	while	also	serving	as	its	setting—takes	place	in	the	third	era,	a	post	WWIV	reimagining	of	the	world	with	Lunars	(citizens	of	the	moon)	as	hostile	next-door-neighbours.		While	still	engaging	a	mythopoeic	mind-set,	this	world	does	so	by	playing	at	the	edges	of	science	fiction.	Admittedly,	my	inclusion	of	Meyer’s	texts	within	this	mythopoeic	fantasy	genre	appears	dubious,	given	the	conceptual	differences	between	science	fiction	and	fantasy;	however,	it	is	not	impossible.	Laurence	Yep	(1978)	argues	that	the	shift	from	fantasy	to	science	fiction	merely	requires	“a	series	of	transformations:	the	magical	steed	into	a	rocket	ship,	the	knight’s	armor	into	a	white	lab	coat,	the	enchanted	sword	into	a	slide	rule”	(para.	10).	I	suggest,	therefore,	that	the	science	fiction	elements	of	Meyer’s	world—hovercrafts	and	spaceships,	cyborgs	and	androids,	as	well	as	futuristic	medical	technology—are	differences	of	degree	not	of	kind,	a	point	that	Campbell	(1991)	also	makes	of	Star	Wars	(Lucas	1977).	For	Campbell,	Star	
Wars	is	myth(ic)	because	it	employs	a	mythic	mind-set;	it	is	concerned	with	
                                                66	Three	new	Tortall	novels,	following	the	early	life	of	Numair,	Daine’s	mentor	and	lover,	are	set	for	release	beginning	in	2017.	
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world	building,	with	life	and	death.	Through	the	creation	of	new	worlds,	the	mythopoeic	speaks	to	what	it	means	to	be	a	self	existing	within	this	world	while	simultaneously	offering	new	ways	of	being.	Thus,	texts	like	Star	Wars—and	Meyer’s	Lunar	Chronicles—are	merely	mythic	forms	in	modern	shapes.	This	notion	is	imperative.	A	mythopoeic	mind-set	is	not	limited	to	the	pseudo-medieval,	though	this	setting	is	the	prominent.	Dharmadhikari	(2009)	suggests,		 	When	I	was	around	thirteen	years	old,	I	tried	to	write	a	fantasy	novel.	It	was	going	to	be	an	epic	adventure	with	a	cross-dressing	princess	on	the	run,	a	snarky	hero,	and	dragons.	I	got	stuck	when	I	had	to	figure	out	what	they	would	do	after	they	left	the	city.	Logically,	there	would	be	a	tavern.			There	were	no	taverns	in	India.	(15)			While	Dharmadhikari	is	reacting	to	the	overwhelming	white,	male,	European	nature	of	fantasy	(à	la	Tolkien	and	Lewis),	he	also	misses	the	wider	point	of	this	fantasy.	Snarky	heroes	who	battle	dragons	and	frequent	taverns	are	commonplace	in	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	set	in	pseudo-medieval	worlds.	However,	the	pseudo-medieval	is,	despite	its	predominance,	only	one	metaphorical	rendering	of	a	mind-set	that	runs	much	deeper.	Yes,	“places	mean”	because	they	shape	the	story—they	shape	the	metaphorical	aspects	of	character	and	of	journey—but	the	place	does	not	have	to	be	pseudo-medieval,	as	Meyer’s	text	demonstrates,	and	the	magic	does	not	have	to	be	wizards	wielding	spells,	as	Pierce’s	wild	magic	and	Meyer’s	magical	technology	demonstrate.				 However,	Dharmadhikari	does	raise	a	valid	issue:	books	set	in	non-Western	worlds	are	necessary	and	needed—just	as	books	offering	alternative	images	of	being	an	adolescent	female	body	are	needed.	So,	while	the	metaphor	of	dragons	and	the	imagery	of	a	tavern	did	not	work	for	Dharmadhikari,	he	might	have	dreamt	of	an	on	the	run	gun-slinging	desert	girl	determined	to	save	herself,	a	still	“snarky”	(co)hero	and	djinns	and	ghouls—the	metaphors	employed	in	Rebel	of	the	Sands	owing	to	its	pseudo-Arabian,	with	an	undertone	of	the	Wild	West,	rendering	of	the	mythopoeic	(Hamilton	2015).	While	the	pseudo-medieval	is	prominent,	it	is	not	the	only	landscape	a	mythopoeic	mind-
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set	might	occupy,	as	the	questions	of	being,	life	and	death	supersede	this	one	specific	landscape.	An	interesting	avenue	of	further	study	would	be	to	explore	this	mythopoeic	mind-set	in	non-Western	worlds	as	well	as	works	written	by	non-Western	authors.					
MAGIC:	THE	GREAT	EQUALISER			The	logical	occurrence	of	magic	within	a	particular	Secondary	World	is	one	of	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy’s	most	obvious	divergences	from	the	consensus	reality	of	contemporary	Western	culture.	In	fact,	the	Secondary	World	itself	depends	on	a	certain	kind	of	magic	as	Tolkien	([1947]	1997)	suggests,	the	moment	“the	magic,	or	rather	art,	has	failed.	You	are	then	out	in	the	Primary	World	again”	(132).	Art	is	a	kind	of	magic,	one	bound	up	in	craft	and	in	creation.	However,	in	order	for	this	magic	(art)	to	succeed,	the	magic	(fantastical	occurrences)	within	the	world	has	to	maintain	a	logical	consistency.	Cathi	Dunn	MacRae	(1998)	even	argues,	in	Young	Adult	Fantasy	Fiction,	that,	“in	a	logical	otherworld	[a	Secondary	World],	magic	works	as	meticulously	as	science”	(33),	a	useful	pairing	as	the	“magic”	that	occurs	within	Meyer’s	Lunar	Chronicles	is	often	more	scientific	than	conventionally	magical.		Thus,	this	section	is	concerned	with	establishing	a	framework	of	the	magic	that	occurs	within	Pierce’s	Tortall	Universe	and	Meyer’s	Lunar	Chronicles	because	magic	not	only	contributes	to	the	success	(or	not)	of	the	Secondary	World,	but	it	also	underscores	my	readings	in	the	following	chapters,	especially	as	Pierce	often	refers,	in	interviews,	to	magic	as	the	“great	equaliser”	(Pierce	1993,	51	and	Lo	2009b,	n.p.).	In	this	vein,	magic	quite	literally	makes	that	which	is	impossible	(within	Western	consensus	reality)	possible,	and	this	“making	possible”	aspect	of	world	building	is	imperative	to	exploring	how	cross-dressing,	glamouring,	menstruating,	shape-shifting	and	being	cyborg	offer	alternative	frameworks	for	living	and	being	an	adolescent	female	body.	Finally,	it	is	outside	the	scope	of	this	section	to	explore	all	the	complexities	of	magic	within	these	texts.	Rather,	this	section	is	concerned	with	establishing	a	framework	of	magic	in	order	to	support	the	readings	of	magic	throughout.			
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In	Pierce’s	Tortall,	magic	has	two	primary	forms:	“the	gift”	(1983,	49),67	which	is	the	sanctioned	magic,	the	one	taught	in	schools,	and	the	magical	ability	most	often	possessed	and	“wild	magic”	(1992,	115),	a	magical	ability	that	connects	an	individual	to	the	world	around	them—animals,	most	frequently.	The	Gift,	the	all-purpose	magic	within	this	world,	is	magic	in	its	most	conventional	sense.	Gifted	individuals	can	start	fires,	move	objects	telepathically	and—once	trained—anything	else	the	wielder	sets	her	(or	his)	mind	to:	in	Wolf	Speaker	(1994),	the	Great	Mage	Numair	Salmalín	(and	Daine’s	teacher)	uses	“a	word	of	power”	to	turn	an	enemy	mage	into	an	apple	tree	(298).68		While	anything	is	theoretically	possible,	there	are	basic	aspects	of	the	Gift,	aspects	that	everyone	Gifted	possesses—Daine	suggests	she	is	not	Gifted	because	she	cannot	magically	“start	a	fire,	and	Gifted	babies	manage	that”	(emphasis	original,	1992,	15).	It	is	in	this	traditional	sense	of	Gifted	that	Alanna	demonstrates	ability,	and	she	has	a	particular	proclivity	for	“heal[ing],	and	[…]	conjure[ing],”	and	her	“brother’s	the	same,	only	he	can	see	people’s	minds	and	sometimes	the	future”	too	(1983,	96).	The	strength	of	one’s	ability	and	its	particular	focus	varies	between	individuals.	The	other	(and	Othered)	magic	in	Pierce’s	Tortall	universe	is	wild	magic.	Less	schooled	and	more	a	“sympathetic”	magic	than	the	Gift;	this	magic	sees	a	wielder	as	bonded,	often,	to	a	specific	animal	group.		‘I	am	Tano,	the	cat-man.	The	cats	come	to	me,	also	to	my	wife.	We	have	cat-children.’	[…]	‘Cholombi	is	dog-man.’	[…]	Twins	are	monkey-girls.’	[…]	‘See?	We	all	one-kind	beast.’	(1995,	95)		This	is	how	wild	magic	typically	functions	within	Pierce’s	Tortall.	Yet,	Daine	possesses	wild	magic	to	such	an	extent	that	she	earns	the	name	“Daine,	the	
                                                67	While	the	Gift	is	not	quite	inconsistently	capitalised	within	Pierce’s	Tortall	universe,	there	does	seem	to	have	been	a	shift	towards	capitalisation	in	more	recent	texts.	I	adopt	the	capitalised	version,	for	clarity.				68	I	refer	to	those	Gifted	(in	the	all-purpose	sense)	within	Pierce’s	Tortall	universe	as	mage.	It	is	one	of	the	titles	used	within	the	texts	(see,	especially,	1995),	though	“witch”	(13),	“sorcerer”	(13)	and	the	distinction	Gifted/UnGifted	are	also	employed.		
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Wildmage”	(2000,	17),69	because	she	is	bonded	to	all	the	“beasts.”	While	I	explore	this	wild	magic	through	readings	of	Daine’s	shape-shifting	throughout	(her	shape-shifting	depends	on	the	wild	magic),	it	is	here	sufficient	to	say	that	this	is	the	unofficial,	and	often	ignored,	magic	within	Tortall.	There	is,	in	other	words,	a	binary	distinction	between	the	Gift	(sanctioned	and	of	discourse)	and	wild	magic	(unsanctioned	and	of	the	body).	Raka	magic,	another	othered	magic	within	the	Tortall	universe	serves	as	an	excellent	example,	especially,	as	raka	magic	offers	an	illustration	of	magic	that	is	not	just	othered	but	that—in	that	othering—becomes	a	magic	between	the	poles	of	opposition	(Gifted/wild	magic),	while	also	continuing	to	develop	the	wider	Tortall	universe,	the	Secondary	World.70		Once	the	Kyprish	Isles	and	held	by	native,	brown-skinned	raka	queens,	the	Copper	Isles	were	conquered	in	the	years	between	174	H.E.	and	181	H.E.,71	when	“the	first	Rittevon	king	was	crowned	as	ruler	of	the	newly	renamed	Copper	Isles”	([2003]	2005,	3).	From	that	time	until,	when,	“in	the	winter	of	462-463	H.E.,	the	brown-skinned	raka	people	and	their	many	allies,	part-bloods	and	white-skinned	luarin,	prepared	for	revolution	against	the	luarin	ruling	house,	the	Rittevons”	([2004]	2005,	1).	While	the	deeply	complex	issues	of	race	are	outside	of	the	scope	of	this	thesis,	race—in	that	the	“hero	is	white,”	as	Hourihan	(1997,	58)	suggests—is	present	here	in	the	difference	between	the	ruling	Rittevons	(white-skinned,	luarin)	and	the	conquered	raka	queens	(brown-skinned).	Incidentally,	the	terms	“luarin”	and	“raka”	are	not	capitalised	because	they	denote	a	person’s	race	(white	and	“brown-skinned,”	respectively)	not	a	nationality.	This	situating	is	necessary	because	it	explains	how,	in	the	
                                                69	Epithets,	like	Daine’s,	are	characteristic	of	classic	and	mythic	narratives.	In	this	use	of	the	epithet,	it	succinctly	describes	a	key	aspect	of	the	person.	See,	for	example,	Ong	(1982).		70	Part	of	the	work	undertaken	by	Pierce’s	quartet	is	the	normalising	of	this	‘othered’	magic,	speaking	to	the	normalising	of	the	fleshiness	of	the	female	body	that	is	my	specific	concern.	In	other	words,	these	texts—Meyer’s	too—are	not	only	concerned	with	demonstrating	alternative	bodies,	they	are—owing	to	their	speculative	nature—inherently	about	alternatives	of	all	kinds.					71	H.E.	designates	the	Human	Era	within	this	world	(see,	also,	Pierce	[2003]	2005,	1).		
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Copper	Isles,	the	Gift	and	raka	magic—despite	raka	magic	being	a	figuration	of	the	Gift—are	different,	a	notion	a	description	of	raka	magic	makes	explicit:		Raka	magic	was	shaped	by	subtlety,	crafted	by	mages	who	spent	their	lives	hiding	things	from	other	mages.	To	those	who	wielded	their	Gift	as	the	mages	of	the	Eastern	and	Southern	Lands	had	been	taught,	raka	magic	seemed	weak,	good	for	only	simple	tasks.	Its	symbols	were	different,	its	spells	far	quieter,	shaped	for	that	effect	over	three	hundred	years	of	practice	and	development,	with	death	for	the	raka	mage	who	drew	a	luarin	mage’s	attention.	([2004]	2005,	74)		The	Gift	and	raka	magic	(an	aspect	of	the	Gift)	both	involve	“spells”	and	“symbols;”	they	both	involve	language.	Yet	they	are	not	the	same:	“raka	magic	seemed	weak;”	presumably,	luarin	magic	does	not.	Crucially,	however,	this	is	from	the	perspective	of	“mages	of	the	Eastern	and	Southern	lands,”	mages	who	wield	their	magic	in	the	manner	of	the	dominant.	In	this	way,	the	differentiating	of	the	(luarin)	Gift	from	the	“lesser”	raka	magic	is	about	discourse	and	the	power	of	discourse	to	linguistically	(spells	and	symbols)	establish	superiority	and	truth.	“Crown	magic,”	that	is,	“luarin	magic”	([2004]	2005,	327),	the	Gift,	these	are	all	various	names	of	the	legitimate	magic	within	this	world.	Crucially,	this	passage	also	establishes	superiority	along	the	lines	of	race:	crown	magic	is	white	magic	and	this	crown	magic	is	a	discourse	of	(literal)	power	within	this	world.	Crown	magic	is	the	magic	a	(white)	hero	would	wield.		However,	raka	magic	does	not	constitute	a	straightforward	opposition	to	the	Gift,	rather,	it	sits	between	the	polls	of	a	larger	binary	opposition	between	the	Gift	and	wild	magic.	Raka	magic	disrupts	the	binary	pair,	making	it	a	“third”	(Garber	1992,	11)	or	an	inter-dict	(Irigaray	[1974]	1985,	22).	Thus,	raka	magic	operates	in	the	blank	space	between	binary	oppositions,	and	as	is	the	case	with	all	limen,	it	displays	facets	of	both	oppositional	sides:	raka	magic	uses	“spells”	and	“symbols”	just	as	the	Gift	does	(Pierce	[2004]	2005,	74)	but	its	results	are	designed	to	be	“carefully	hidden	under	other	spells	[so]	that	Crown	mages	might	not	detect	them”	(ibid.).	In	this	way,	raka	magic	is	also	like	wild	magic,	a	magic	that	is	typically	ignored	by	because	of	its	perceived	simplicity—Carthakis	(another	nationality	within	this	world)	“think	it’s	old	wives’	tales”	(1992,	272).		In	Meyer’s	Lunar	Chronicles,	magic	takes	an	altogether	different	shape,	given	the	futuristic	nature	of	the	fantasy.	Lunars,	citizens	of	the	moon	(Luna),	
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have	the	ability	to	manipulate	“bioelectricity”	causing	others	to	“see	what	the	Lunar	wishes	them	to	see,	and	even	feel	what	the	Lunar	wishes	them	to	feel”	(2012,	172),	and,	as	“bioelectricity”	suggests,	this	ability	is	a	blurring	of	the	distinction	between	“science”	and	“magic,”	one	the	text	continually	navigates.	Here,	narration	makes	specific	the	scientific	nature	of	the	“lunar	gift”	to	Cinder	(and	thus	readers):			‘Well	[…]	the	Lunar	gift	is	nothing	more	than	the	ability	to	manipulate	bioelectric	energy—the	energy	that	is	naturally	created	by	all	living	things.	For	example,	it	is	the	same	energy	that	sharks	use	to	detect	their	prey.’	(2012,	176)		The	text	posits	this	“gift”	as	both	“natural,”	in	that	it	is	“created	by	all	living	things”	and	also	a	“gift,”	an	out	of	the	ordinary	ability.	In	other	words,	this	fantasy	text	takes	something	scientific—some	research	suggests	that	animals	both	produce	bioelectricity	and	use	it	to	communicate	(see,	also,	Quantumbiologist	2010)—and	makes	it	magical.	With	this	gift,	Lunars	are	able	to	construct	a	“glamour	[…]	what	they	call	the	illusion	of	themselves	that	they	project	into	the	minds	of	others”	(172),	a	topic	under	consideration	in	Chapter	Three.	Here,	not	only	is	the	Lunar	ability	different	from	the	Gift	of	Pierce’s	Tortall	universe,	in	that,	its	speaks	to	a	kind	of	scientific	ability,	but	it	also	does	not	require	the	working	of	spells	in	order	to	function:	“although	it	still	seemed	like	magic	to	her	[Cinder],	it	was	really	a	genetic	trait	Lunars	were	born	with”	(2013,	52).	In	this	way,	it	is	more	akin	to	Daine’s	wild	magic,	especially	as	the	strengthening	of	the	ability	occurs	through	the	strengthening	of	one’s	mind,	as	is	also	the	case	for	Daine.72			 Thus,	while	all	Lunars	possess	this	ability—unless	they	are	born	a	“shell,”	meaning	“bioelectrically	challenged”	(2012,	176)	or	without	“the	gift”	(176)—those	most	strongly	gifted	are	made	thaumaturges,	or	commanders	in	Queen	Levana’s	army,	and	here	this	“magical”	ability	is	all	about	power.	
                                                72	Early	on,	Daine	learns	to	meditate	as	a	part	of	her	magical	training.		Numair	also	teaches	her	mammalian	anatomy.	Both	of	these	activities	are	to	teach	her	control	over	her	mind	and	body,	and	thus	her	power.	Moreover,	while	her	magic	is	unpredictable,	the	strength	and	organisation	of	her	mind	give	her	control	over	her	magic.	See,	Pierce	(1992).		
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	 It	was	believed	that	their	queen	ruled	through	mind	control	and	that	her	thaumaturges	were	almost	as	strong	as	she	was.	That	they	could	manipulate	people’s	thoughts	and	emotions.	That	the	could	even	control	people	bodies	if	they	chose,	like	puppets	on	strings.	(2013,	301)		The	Lunar	ability	to	manipulate	bioelectricity	is	about	control;	here,	in	the	guise	of	law	enforcement	but	also	in	terms	of	the	glamour,	as	constructing	a	glamour—most	often	rendered	as	a	more	beautiful	appearance—is	how	a	Lunar	controls	how	she	(or	he)	is	seen.	In	this	way,	the	Lunar	ability	directly	engages	the	ideals	of	popular	and	media	culture	while	also	offering	the	potentiality	of	their	undoing,	when	illustrating	the	disconnect	between	the	glamoured	appearance	and	the	physical,	material	body.		 Briefly,	there	is	also	a	second	“magic”	within	Meyer’s	Lunar	Chronicles,	the	magic	of	futuristic	technology.	To	those	of	a	perspective	aligned	with	contemporary	Western	consensus	reality,	androids,	cyborgs,	and	hovercrafts	do	not	yet	exist,	or	do	not	yet	exist	to	extent	they	do	in	Meyer’s	futuristic	rendering	of	the	world.73	Thus,	this	technology	functions	like	magic,	a	claim	supported	by	my	above	reading	of	Yep’s	(1978)	“series	of	transformations”	(para.10).	Moreover,	in	their	execution,	magic	and	science	are	not	so	far	removed,	as	MacRae	(1998)	suggests	with	her	notion	that	“magic	works	as	meticulously	as	science”	(33).	I	suggest	the	inverse	is	also	true;	in	a	(futuristic)	Secondary	World,	science	works	as	wondrously	as	magic.		 	Finally,	the	form	of	magic	occurring	in	a	Secondary	World	also	speaks	to	the	shape	of	that	world.	The	Lunar	ability,	depicted	as	scientific	and	genetic,	could	not	logically	occur	in	Pierce’s	pseudo-medieval	universe,	just	as	spells,	sorcery,	and	wild	magic	(that	is	specifically	linked	to	nature)	could	not	logically	occur	in	Meyer’s	futuristic	re-envisioning	of	the	world.	Yet,	these	specific	magics	do	logically	occur	within	their	respective	worlds,	setting	the	tone	of	the	fantastic	bodies	and	selves	available	within	that	space	as	well	as	contributing	to	
                                                73	I	use	“same	extent”	because	much	of	the	technology	in	Meyer’s	world	is	inspired	by	technology	that	does	exist	in	contemporary	culture.	On	her	website,	Meyer	gives	a	thorough	reading	of	the	“Real-World	Technology”	that	she	suggests	influenced	her	construction	of	the	futuristic	world	in	which	The	Lunar	Chronicles	is	set.	See,	Meyer	(2013a).			
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the	space	itself.	Daine	is	a	shapeshifter	because	of	her	wild	magic	just	as	Cinder	is	a	cyborg	because	of	the	technological	magic	of	her	world.			
MAPS			Within	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy,	there	is	no	crossing	of	a	threshold—no	rabbit	hole,	wardrobe,	rainbow,	platform	9	¾,	or	magical	flight	towards	the	second	star	on	the	right.	The	“reality”	of	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	is	the	reality	created	within,	and	by,	the	Secondary	World.	For	this	reason,	maps	often	serve	as	both	introduction	to,	and	grounding	within,	the	world	of	the	story.	They	appeal	to,	while	simultaneously	creating,	a	sense	of	reality,	a	sense	that	this	place	is—or	could	be—“real”	(see,	also,	Muehrcke	and	Muehrcke	1974).	For	Pierce’s	Song	of	the	Lioness	quartet,	this	is	an	apparently	straightforward	portrayal	of	Tortall;	including:	Tortall’s	mountains,	hills,	roads,	cities,	and	fifes,	the	seas	and	oceans	surrounding	the	land	as	well	as	the	boundaries	between	Tortall,	and	its	neighbouring	countries:	Scanra	to	the	north,	Galla,	Tusaine,	Maren	and	Tyra	eastwards	and	Carthak	to	the	south,	as	figure	2.1	shows.	
 
Figure	2.1	Pretextual	Map	of	Tortall	(Pierce	1983)	
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However,	these	mapped	spaces	correspond	to	no	physical,	geographical	place.	There	is	no	mimetic	representation;	this	literary	map	creates	the	world	it	represents,	as	is	the	case	for	all	such	maps.	Moreover,	while	maps	are	critical	to	the	creation	of	Secondary	Worlds,	this	notion	of	mapping—as	in,	establishing	a	framework—also	speaks	to	this	thesis’s	overall	aim:	to	map	alternative	frameworks	of	living	and	being	an	adolescent	female	body.	In	this	way,	mythopoeic	fantasy	texts	(with	maps)	are	themselves	maps;	they	map	new	ways	of	being	female.	Maps	are	crucial	to	Secondary	Worlds	in	that	they	serve	to	develop	not	merely	the	geography	of	the	world	but	also	the	place	itself	and	also	because	this	reading	of	maps	establishes	a	framework	for	my	subsequent	readings	of	bodies,	readings	that	chart	new	bodily	territories.		First,	literary	maps	are	paratextual	material,	as	Gérard	Genette	([1987]	2010)	sets	out	in	Paratexts:	Thresholds	of	Interpretation.	Paratextual	materials	are,	in	general,	the	“accompanying	productions”	to	a	text	that	“surround	it	and	extend	it”	(1).	While	Genette’s	theory	is	somewhat	limited	to	the	materials	actually	printed	on	the	text	(author’s	name,	imprint,	reviews,	blurbs),	I	suggest	that	in	the	21st	century	this	paratexual	material	extends	to	include	the,	seemingly	unlimited,	ways	of	engaging	with	texts	made	possible	through	Internet	technologies.	For	example,	fanfiction	(fanfic)	is	a	paratextual	material.	It	is	a	reading	that	Jonathan	Gray’s	(2010)	Show	Sold	Separately:	Promos,	
Spoilers,	and	Other	Media	Paratexts	makes	explicit.	In	this	work,	Gray	extends	Genette’s	definition	to	suggest,			a	‘paratext’	is	both	‘distinct	from’	and	alike—or	[…]	intrinsically	part	of—the	text	[…]	paratexts	are	not	simply	add-ons,	spinoffs,	and	also-rans:	they	create	texts,	they	manage	them,	and	they	fill	them	with	many	of	the	meanings	that	we	associate	with	them.	(6)		The	relationship	between	a	text	and	its	paratexual	materials	is	one	of	continuity;	paratextuality	does	not	define	a	binary	relationship	between	text/not	text.	Thus,	paratextuality	offers	a	way	of	considering	the	materials	(texts	themselves)	that	surround	and	extend	a	text	as	constituent	to	one	another,	as	relating	to,	and	developing,	one	another—this	kind	of	modelling	of	interdependency	is	crucial	to	speaking	from	the	place	between	oppositions	and	its	appears	throughout	this	thesis.	Crucially,	paratexts	are	about	developing	and	
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influencing	the	meaning	of	the	whole	story—or,	the	(Secondary)	World,	and	they	do	so	through	relationships	between	various	materials.		Thus,	I	use	“Secondary	World”	in	a	very	specific	way:	the	Secondary	World,	as	“places	mean”	suggests,	is	not	just	the	place	of	fantasy;	it	is	also	that	which	metaphorically	represents,	or	holds	together,	the	story	in	all	its	many	and	disparate	parts	(Hunt	1987,	11).	Because	it	is	textual,	Tamora	Pierce’s	Tortall	Universe	is	the	seventeen	novels	and	the	collection	of	short	stories,	Tortall	and	
Other	Lands	(2011b),	that	comprise	the	“official”	universe—that	which	is	sanctioned,	by	Pierce	and	her	publishers—but	the	Tortall	Universe	is	also:	Pierce’s	interviews;	the	fan	created	fictions	and	works	of	art;	the	Tamora	Pierce	Wiki	(“Tamora	Pierce	Wiki”	2016);	the	two	casebooks:	Reading	Tamora	Pierce:	
The	Immortals	(Lennard	2007)	and	Reading	Tamora	Pierce:	The	Protector	of	the	
Small	(Lennard	2013);	as	well	as	The	Queen’s	Readers:	A	Collection	of	Essays	on	
the	Words	and	Worlds	of	Tamora	Pierce	(Diehl	and	Vaughn	2014).	The	Tortall	universe	is	created	by,	as	it	creates,	all	its	(para)textual	materials.	In	this	way,	it	is	also	this	thesis.		While	this	premise	of	paratextuality	allows	for	a	host	of	material	to	be	associated	with,	and	thus	to	inform,	the	text,	I	want	to	focus	on	the	introductory	map—the	map	that	serves	to	both	invite	the	reader	into	the	Secondary	World	and	then	to	ground	her	within	that	world.	Coming	after	any	publication	information	and	usually	immediately	preceding	the	story,	these	maps,	as	Genette	([1987]	2010)	suggests,	function	as	a	threshold	into	the	world.	This	pretextual	map	is	illustrated	by	figure	2.1	(see	page	98,	above),	with	the	map	of	Tortall	on	the	left	hand	side	(where,	in	the	West,	we	typically	start	reading)	and	the	narrative	beginning—“that’s	my	decision”—on	the	right	(1),	the	pretextual	map	visually	offers	a	potential	transition	into	the	Secondary	World,	the	world	of	the	story.	Moreover,	this	pretextual	map	also	serves	to	facilitate	the	“meaning”	of	this	place	and	to	foreshadow	the	kind	of	story	that	might	occur.	Even	before	the	“story”	begins,	the	coastline,	desert,	hills,	and	mountains	engender	an	expectation,	not	just	as	to	the	shape	of	the	landscape	but	also	as	to	what	kind	of	story	might	follow—the	story	will	not,	the	map	suggests,	include	adventures	into	space,	but	it	might	include	crossing	a	desert.			
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Finally,	defining	the	“pretext”	(specific	paratexual	materials	that	proceed	the	narrative	proper)	as	“more	than	a	boundary	or	a	sealed	border,”	Genette	([1987]	2010)	suggests,	“the	pretext	is	[…]	a	threshold	[…]	that	offers	the	world	at	large	the	possibility	of	either	stepping	inside	or	turning	back”	(1-2,	emphasis	original),	Ekman	(2013)	makes	a	similar	argument.	This	is	key:	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy—itself	a	liminal	(threshold)	literature—employs,	when	featuring	pretextual	maps,	the	liminal	in	order	to	effectively	“invite	the	reader	inside,”	to	offer	the	“possibility	of	[…]	stepping	inside.”	Moreover,	this	concern	with	“inside”	develops	my	earlier	reading	of	YAL	as	a	literature	particularly	concerned	with	“hailing”	its	audience	(Althusser	1971,	163),	a	task	here	achieved	through	the	pretextual	map.	Thus,	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy—through	being	YAL	and	through	including	pretextual	materials—doubly	invites	readers	inside,	an	invitation	that	includes	not	just	passively	reading	but	also	actively	participating	in	the	narratives,	as	fanfic	evidences.		Returning	to	the	issue	at	hand,	these	maps	speak	to,	or	indicate,	what	is	known	about	a	world.	They	depict—or	create—the	perceived	shape	of	the	world	at	the	time	of	map-making,	and	they	offer	an	apparent	truth:	the	reality	of	the	landscape	they	map.	The	same	holds	true	for	the	developmental	theories	“mapping”	adolescence	and	with	the	images	of	the	“ideal”	female	body	that	pervade	popular	and	media	culture.	These	images	“map”	the	expectations	of,	and	for,	femininity	in	that	space.	However,	there	is	a	blank	space	between	the	map	and	the	thing	mapped,	and	in	this	space,	change	may	occur.	It	is	an	issue	that	Mastiff	(2011a),	book	three	of	Pierce’s	Beka	Cooper	trilogy,	engages	through	a	narration,	a	conversation	regarding	the	“truth”	(or	accuracy),	of	a	map.	 	Lady	Sabine	shook	her	head.	‘Do	we	look	like	coneys	to	you?	Cooper’s	map	says	the	distance	round	this	end	of	the	marsh	is	forty	miles	back	to	the	Rivers	Road.	It’s	a	map	by	the	Crown’s	own	cartographers’			[…]		Ormer	said,	‘A	Crown	what’s-it,	you	say.	Mapmaking	cove,	he	is?	And	he	walked	the	ground	himself	in	his	pretty	court	slippers?’	(2011,	229)		There	is	an	issue	of	authenticity—of	the	“real”—at	stake	in	this	exchange:	a	map	
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should	represent	the	“real”	land,	and	as	this	map	was	made	by	the	“Crown’s	own	cartographer,”	there	is	a	heightened	expectation	regarding	its	authority—at	least	according	to	Lady	Sabine	of	Macayhill,	lady	knight	of	the	realm	of	Tortall.74		In	one	respect,	this	is	a	reading	bound	up	in	issues	regarding	the	“real”	(see,	also,	Walsh	2002;	2013)	and	the	naming	of	things—cartographer	and	mapmaking	cove—that	I	develop	in	relation	to	Daine’s	shape-shifting	in	Chapter	Four.	Here,	I	am	concerned	with	the	text’s	preoccupation	with	illustrating	the	disjunction	between	the	map(s)	of	a	place—meant	to	illuminate,	make	known	its	truth—and	the	reality	of	that	space,	another	kind	of	truth.	For	example,			‘When	was	it	[Cooper’s	map]	done?’	Ormer	asked	[…]	‘We’ve	had	that	much	flooding	these	last	three	year.	If	your	map	be	old,	mayhap	it’s	missing	as	much	as	thirty	square	mile	of	marsh,	give	or	take.’	(230)		Landscapes	change,	and	while	maps	can	also	change,	there	is	a	(blank)	space	between	the	physical,	geographical	land	and	the	map	of	it,	a	striking	resemblance	to	the	tension	between	the	fleshy,	physical	adolescent	body	and	conceptions	of	it.	This	is	crucial	for	it	models	the	kind	of	dissonance	that	may	exist	between	the	maps	of	adolescence	(developmental	theory)	and	the	adolescent	body.	For	example,	how	too	might	changes	to	the	adolescent	body	or	to	the	cultural	situation	of	the	adolescent	affect	the	maps	of	adolescence?	By	introducing	a	provisionality	to	maps,	these	texts	also	question	other	truths,	importantly,	this	is	not	to	establish	the	physical	geography,	or	the	physical	body,	as	more	“real”	or	“true”	than	the	maps	of	them;	it	is,	rather,	to	illustrate	how	the	space	in-between	the	two	offers	the	potential	for	change.		
                                                74	Set	nearly	two	hundred	years	prior	to	The	Song	of	the	Lioness	quartet—in	which	Alanna	cross-dresses	in	order	to	become	a	knight—the	Beka	Cooper	trilogy	concerns	a	period	of	Tortall’s	history	in	which	women	could	be	both	Provost’s	Guards,	as	is	Beka,	as	well	as	lady	knights,	as	is	Lady	Sabine.	Poignantly,	this	series	also	include	a	narrative	in	which	“the	cult	of	the	Gentle	Mother,”	a	religious	movement	positing	women	as	“delicate	souls”	who	are	“too	pure	to	dirty	[themselves]	with	combat”	(2009,	187),	is	coming	into	prominence.	While	the	cult	does	not	exist	in	Alanna’s	period	of	Tortall	history,	its	teachings	laid	the	groundwork	for	woman’s	exclusion	from	knighthood.	For	the	Tortall	Timeline,	see	Konst	2016.							
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	 Additionally,	this	discussion	of	a	map,	and	of	how	the	land	it	is	meant	to	represent	has	changed	(and	the	map	has	not),	also	participates	in	world	building,	an	aspect	of	literary	maps	that	Pierce’s	Tortall	utilises	to	a	great	degree—through	not	just	pretextual	maps	but	also	maps	included	(as	image)	within	the	text	(as	opposed	to	one	positioned	as	pretext),	narrations	of	maps,	as	well	as	inset	maps.	As	Muehrcke	and	Muehrcke	(1974)	note,	the	creative	aspect	of	literary	maps	is	precisely	their	appeal:	these	maps,	even	more	so	than	cartographic	maps,	“do	[…]	not	reproduce	reality”	(317).	They	participate	in	the	creation	of	one.	As	Pierce’s	Tortall	is	a	fully	formed	Secondary	World,	maps—including	discussions	of	maps	and	mapping—abound.		In	terms	of	developing	the	world,	the	narration	of	a	magical	map	within	Squire	(2001),	the	fourth	book	of	the	Protector	of	the	Small	Quartet,	is	particularly	useful.		During	a	hunt	for	bandits	that	have	attacked,	burned,	and	robbed	a	small	village,	Raoul	(Kel’s	knightmaster	and	commander	of	the	army,	known	as	the	King’s	Own)	uses	not	a	flat,	two-dimensional	map	to	track	the	bandits,	but	he—through	magic—uses	a	map	that	reproduces	in	miniature	the	“actual”	terrain	of	this	fictive	place.		Using	the	key,	he	drew	a	circle	around	the	dot	labelled	Owlshollow.	It	included	the	bandits’	last	known	location.	When	he	closed	the	circle	the	map	vanished.	They	were	looking	down	at	real	terrain,	forested	hills,	streams	and	rivers,	marshes.	Owlshollow	appeared	as	a	small	town	at	the	junction	of	two	roads	and	a	river.	It	was	situated	on	rocky	bluffs,	protected	on	two	sides	from	raiders	who	came	by	water.	(75,	emphasis	original)		The	magic	charm	(the	“key”)	transforms	that	which	is	encircled,	in	this	case	
Owlshollow,	into	“real	terrain.”	Not	only	does	the	narration	make	it	clear	that	a	shift	has	occurred—“the	map	vanished”—but	the	change	in	italics	suggests	a	shift	from	“the	dot	labelled”	Owlshollow	(indicated	by	italics)	to	the	“real”	thing	(not	italicised).	This	magical	map	quite	literally	(re)creates	Owlshollow	and	its	surrounding	terrain,	within	narration.	In	other	words,	this	map	develops	Tortall	by	appealing	to	the	“real”	(physical)	place	through	the	mapping	of	it,	and	it	heightens	this	appeal	through	the	magical	(re)creation	of	the	physical	place.	Moreover,	this	is	a	(re)creation.	The	narration	both	creates	and	recreates	that	which	already	exists	(the	physical	place)	while	also	creating	it	anew	(that	which	
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“they”	see	after	“the	map	vanished”).	Yet,	and	most	importantly,	all	of	this	happens	within	narration;	there	is	no	“real”	place	that	is	mapped	or	(re)created;	rather,	the	narration	creates	it	all.			 The	exchange	regarding	the	map	of	War	Gorge	Marsh	and	the	use	of	the	map	of	Owlshollow	in	the	hunt	for	bandits	also	participates	in	the	construction	of	Tortall	and	its	neighbouring	countries—by	appealing	to	“actual”	geography,	with	Raoul’s	magical	working	going	as	far	as	(re)creating	the	narrated	place	in	miniature	(albeit	still	within	narration).	However,	the	literary	map	can	only	ever	appeal	to	the	reality	that	it	appears	to	offer.	Or,	does	it?	Maps	of	Secondary	Worlds	create	that	which	they	claim—by	being	maps—to	map.	There	is	no	Owlshollow,	apart	from	the	one(s)	created	by,	and	within,	narration,	thus,	this	narration,	crucially	using	the	device	of	a	map,	participates	in	world	building.	Moreover,	this	map	is	also	particularly	key	to	this	thesis’s	overall	concern	with	refusing	the	superficiality	of	self-through-appearance	in	popular	and	media	culture.	The	magically	heightened	topographical	nature	of	this	magical	map	contests	the	flatness	of	not	just	conventional,	two-dimensional	maps	but	also,	by	extension,	the	flatness—and	superficiality—of	the	images	by	which	the	adolescent	girl	in	popular	and	media	culture	constructs	herself.	Finally,	there	is	yet	another	kind	of	paratext	worth	including	here:	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	itself.	Gray	(2010)	notes,	while	“a	genre	is	not	a	paratext	it	can	work	paratextually	to	frame	a	text”	(6).	In	many	ways,	the	whole	point	of	Chapter	One	and	Two	has	been	to	construct	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	(and	the	frames	of	YAL,	myth	and	fantasy	inherent	therein)	as	paratextually	informing,	through	a	relationship	of	interdependency,	the	texts	with	which	I	am	concerned.	This	is	about	a	series	of	frames	that	surround	and	extend	these	texts:	maps,	myth,	fantasy,	YAL,	and,	even,	popular	and	media	culture,	and	it	is	about	demonstrating	the	kind	of	topographical	approach	to	the	adolescent	female	body	that	the	following	chapters	demonstrate,	while	taking	into	account	instability	and	difference.	In	this	light,	this	paratextuality	speaks	to	not	only	a	final	aspect	of	world	building—the	linked	nature	of	these	texts	offers	a	particular	means	of	developing	the	world—but	it	also	develops	my	approach	to	female	adolescence	(as	it	is	offered	within	these	texts):	not	only	am	I	concerned	with	a	topography	of	the	adolescent	female	body	that	does	not	refuse	lumps,	
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bumps,	and	scars,	but	I	am	also	interested	in	refusing	the	individuality	and	isolation	required	of	hegemonic	models	of	self,	a	refusal	that	the	linked	nature	of	these	texts	demonstrates.			
QUARTETS,	A	HARMONY	IN	PARTS		The	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	with	which	I	am	concerned	is	not	the	single	novel;	these	books	exist	as	series,	according	to	conventional	YAL	marketing	terms—and	with	“conventional”	there	is	a	difficulty.	In	Reading	Series	Fiction:	From	
Arthur	Ransome	to	Gene	Kemp,	Victor	Watson	(2000)	indicates	that	he	employs	series	in	order	to	describe	“a	sequence	of	related	stories	about	the	same	groups	of	characters,	usually	by	the	same	author”	(6).	In	this	sense,	Pierce’s	Tortall	books	and	Meyer’s	Lunar	Chronicles	are	series.	Yet,	they	are	also	not	series,	at	least	not	entirely:	the	series	implies	a	collection	of	stories—written	in	the	same	format	and,	often,	by	the	same	author—in	which	each	instalment	contains	a	fully	resolved	plot	(see,	also,	Geraghty	1990,	Watson	2000).	While	each	of	Pierce	and	Meyer’s	texts	meet	the	characteristics	of	the	series,	they	also	do	
more	than	this	definition	allows.	In	Pierce’s	Tortall	universe,	the	plots	of	each	individual	text	do	resolve	at	the	text’s	conclusion,	but	a	larger	narrative	also	resolves	at	the	quartet’s	end.	Moreover,	each	text	and	each	quartet,	duology,	or	trilogy	also	contributes	to	the	construction	of	the	Tortallan	universe.	Thus,	this	section	is	concerned	with	exploring	the	linked	multiplicity	of	these	texts,	while	also	considering	how	Pierce’s	quartets,	especially,	diverge	from	conventional	notions	of	series.	Finally,	while	this	linked	multiplicity	is	crucial	to	world-building,	it	is	also	integral	to	reconceiving	the	adolescent	girl	in	terms	of	relation—as	opposed	to	isolating	individuality,	the	model	of	self	available	in	contemporary	Western	culture.	In	other	words,	the	interdependency	I	read	in	relation	to	the	texts	mirrors	the	model	of	relation	I	call	for	in	the	Conclusions.			 In	his	entry	on	“Series	Fiction”	for	the	International	Companion	
Encyclopedia	of	Children’s	Literature,	Victor	Watson	(2004)	appears	to	categorically	offer	two	distinct	definitions	of	series:	successive	and	progressive	series.	He	even	goes	as	far	as	claiming	that	“all	series	fiction	is	either	progress	or	successive”	(532),	establishing	a	binary	in	the	process.	For	Watson,	“a	
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successive	series	is	one	in	which	the	characters	show	few	signs	of	growing	older	or	changing	in	any	significant	way”	(533).	This	kind	of	series	is	represented	by:	Nancy	Drew	(1930–2004)	and	Sweet	Valley	High	(1983–2003)	as	well	as	“most	of	the	series	by	Enid	Blyton,”	according	to	Watson	(533).	The	progressive	series,	on	the	other	hand,	is	much	more	visible	in	the	twentieth	century:	Harry	Potter	(1991–2007),	The	Hunger	Games	(2008–2010),	and	Twilight	saga	(2005–2008),	to	name	a	few.	With	the	narrative	spanning	a	period	of	time	that	may,	or	may	not,	reflect	the	passage	of	time	in	consensus	reality,			 a	progressive	series	is	one	in	which	a	continuous	and	developing	story	is	told	in	instalments,	each	book	telling	a	different	part	of	a	sequential	narrative,	with	the	characters	going	older	and	more	mature.	(532)		This	type	of	series	readily	lends	itself	to	YAL,	in	its	concern—if	Trites’	(2000;	2001)	definition	holds—with	the	adolescent’s	coming	to	terms	with	discourses	of	power,	which	is,	in	effect,	a	maturation	narrative.	In	this	way,	Pierce’s	Song	of	the	Lioness	quartet	(1983–1988),	Immortals	quartet	(1992–1996),	Protector	of	the	Small	quartet	(1999–2002),	Daughter	of	the	Lioness	duology	(2003–2004)	as	well	as	the	Beka	Cooper	trilogy	(2006–2011),	alongside	Meyer’s	Lunar	Chronicles	(2012–2015)	are	progressive	series.	They	do	reflect	the	passage	of	time,	and	yet,	they	are	also	not,	simply,	progressive	series.		The	texts	comprising	Pierce’s	Tortall	Universe,	in	particular,	do	something	more	than	this	categorisation	“progressive	series”	entails:	they	each	exist	independently	but	also	interdependently.	The	category	of	progressive	series	cannot,	in	its	focus	on	a	singular	developmental	line,	take	this	multiplicity	into	account,	just	as	the	singular,	linear	developmental	line	of	adolescent	theory	cannot	take	female	adolescence	into	account.	To	illustrate:	Pierce’s	Tortall	universe	currently	exists	as	three	quartets,	a	duology,	trilogy	and	seven	short	stories.	Each	text	exists	independently	but	also	interdependently,	first	within	its	quartet	and	more	widely	within	the	Tortall	universe.	Imperatively,	this	interdependency	is	not	at	the	expense	of	individuality;	rather,	the	linked	nature	of	these	texts	allows	individuality	to	flourish	by	deepening	the	specific	through	its	engagement	with	the	many.	In	other	words,	the	universe	is	constructed	through	12	distinct	story	lines;	yet,	each	story	line	and	each	quartet	(duology	
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and	trilogy)	also	participates	in	the	construction	of	the	universe,	each	contributes	to	the	whole,	while	the	arcs	are	wholes	themselves.	In	this	way,	the	Tortall	universe	acts	as	a	secondary	series,	or—and	I	believe	more	importantly—there	are	seventeen	novels	creating	and	developing	a	single	Secondary	World.	In	other	words,	the	uneasiness	of	definition	that	I	read	in	relation	to	YAL	itself	is	echoed	here	in	a	resistance	to	categorisation.			 In	fact,	Pierce’s	Tortall	universe	is	quite	preoccupied	with	establishing	its	collective	existence:	the	covers	of	Terrier	(2006),	Bloodhound	(2009)	and	
Mastiff	(2011a)—the	three	texts	of	the	Beka	Cooper	trilogy—indicate	that,	for	whatever	else	they	may	be,	they	are	also	“A	Tortall	Legend.”	In	other	words,	each	story	is	a	legend	contributing	to	the	overall	folklore,	or	story,	of	this	place.	Jan	Harold	Brunvand’s	(1998)	description	of	a	legend	in	The	Study	of	American	
Folklore	is	particularly	insightful	in	regards	to	just	what	this	declaration	of	being	“A	Tortall	Legend”	might	achieve.	For	Brunvand,	“legends,	the	second	largest	category	of	traditional	prose	narratives,	resemble	myths	in	that	they	are	stories	regarded	by	their	tellers	as	true,”	as	such,	they	“are	sometimes	referred	to	as	folk	history”	(196,	emphasis	original).	The	connection	to	history	is	particularly	compelling,	especially,	to	the	kind	of	history—“myth”—with	which	Brunvand	is	interested.	This	is	not	the	“legitimate”	history	of	textbooks;	it	is	the	people’s	history,	as	told	through	the	stories	they	share.	The	Beka	Cooper	books	(as	well	as	they	other	Tortall	stories)	are	the	folk	history	of	Tortall,	and	they	are	the	stories	of	Rebekah	(Beka)	Cooper.	The	Beka	Cooper	books	constitute	the	stories	of	Tortall,	some	two	hundred	years	before	the	stories	of	Alanna,	Daine,	Kel	and	Aly.	Poignantly,	Beka	is	the	“six-times-great-grandmother”	(2006,	6)	of	George	Cooper,	a	main	character	in	both	The	Song	of	the	Lioness	quartet	and	the	Daughter	of	the	Lioness	duology.	George	is	Alanna’s	husband.	Pierce’s	Tortall	universe	is	a	complex	offering	of	interwoven	narratives,	which	also	suggests	a	second	reason	for	the	importance	of	this	declaration	of	legend:	in	being	legends	of	this	world,	the	Beka	Cooper	trilogy	writes	itself	into	the	Tortallan	history,	despite	the	distance	between	these	“new”	stories	and	the	first	Tortall	books.	Not	only	is	there	some	two	hundred	years	separating	them	
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in	terms	of	the	Tortallan	timeline,75	but	there	are	also	twenty-eight	years	between	the	publications	of	Alanna:	The	First	Adventure	(1983)	and	Mastiff	(2011a),	Pierce’s	first	and	most	recent	Tortallan	stories,	respectively.	In	this	way,	the	label	legend	is	also	about	establishing	a	shared	lineage	between	this	new	set	of	stories	and	the	original,	or	first—analogous	to	Disney’s	(1950)	citing	of	Perrault’s	version	of	the	“Cinderella”	tale	as	“the	Original	Classic.”		Finally,	in	her	concern	with	shape-shifting,	Chappell	(2007)	refers	to	Pierce’s	Immortals	quartet	as	a	tetralogy,	recognising	the	difficulty	of	referring	to	these	works	as	series.	Yet,	I	disagree	with	her	choice	of	terminology.	The	three	core	stories:	Alanna’s,	Daine’s	and	Kel’s	are	quartets,	at	least,	as	they	are	marketed	in	the	United	States	and	the	United	Kingdom.	The	inference	of	a	quartet—in	that	a	quartet	is	often	conceived	as	group	of	four	musicians,	for	example,	playing	a	single	song—speaks	quite	strongly	to	the	world	building	role	of	multiple,	linked	texts.	This	notion	of	parts	contributing	to	a	single	whole	speaks	to	the	creating	of	a	Secondary	World,	through	multiple	parts:	sheroes,	magic,	maps,	and	quartets—or	linked	multiplicity.	The	notion	of	quartet	allows	for	an	image	of	parts	creating	and	contributing	to	a	whole,	without	establishing	one	part	as	better,	or	more	valuable,	than	another.	In	this	way,	the	books	themselves	model	an	interdependency	that	refuses	opposition.		In	this	sense,	these	texts	do	align	to	some	degree	with	Christine	Geraghty’s	(1990)	notion	of	a	soap	opera,	in	as	much	as	soap	operas	are	often	created	to	appear	“as	if	life	has	been	going	on	without	us”	(12).	Though,	I	would	not	class	them	as	serials,	as	serial	does	not	take	into	account	the	nuanced	nature	of	these	worlds.76	However,	this	“appearing	as	life	has	gone	on”	is	particularly	evident	in	the	title	of	Meyer’s	series:	The	Lunar	Chronicles,	with	chronicles	suggesting	that	these	events	have	been	recorded,	not	created.	This	notion	of	recording	is	fundamental	to	the	development	of	the	Secondary	World,	and	while	Meyer’s	texts	do	it	through	being	“chronicles,”	Pierce’s	texts	suggest	
                                                75	This	can	be	found	at:	http://www.tamora-pierce.com/timeline_tortall.htm	(Konst	2016).	76	Pattee	(2010)	makes	the	case	that	soap	opera,	within	YAL,	is	often	akin	to	those	early	publisher’s	format	series.		
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it	quite	clearly	through,	again,	the	maps	(not	to	excluded	the	ways	in	which	the	narratives	themselves	develop	this	sense	of	community	within	the	text).		The	pretextual	map	in	Wild	Magic	(1992)—the	first	text	of	the	Immortals	quartet,	and	more	importantly	the	first	story	in	Tortall	taking	place	after	Jonathan’s	coronation	at	the	end	of	the	Song	of	the	Lioness	quartet—includes	this	note:	“a	Revised	Map	of	the	Kingdom	of	Tortall	as	commissioned	by:	Their	Royal	Majesties	King	Jonathan	III	and	Queen	Thayet	in	the	2nd	Year	of	Their	Reign”	(n.p.),	as	figure	2.2	shows.	Tolkien’s	author-god	did	not	create	this	map;	the	King	and	Queen	commissioned	it.	In	this	way,	these	texts	provide	a	snapshot	of,	or	glimpse	into,	certain	key	moments	within	the	world’s	narrative.	While	participating	in	the	development	of	the	Secondary	world,	this	world-building-through-multiple	texts	also	contributes	to	how	these	texts	invite	the	reader	in	to	participate.	Secondary	Worlds	invite	the	reader	into	their	space	and	story.	This	invitation	inside	also	includes	an	offer	to	participate.	In	one	sense,	fantasy	itself	is	contingent	upon	a	certain	kind	of	participation:	“unless	one	participates	sympathetically	in	the	ground	rules	of	a	narrative	world,	no	occurrence	in	that	world	can	make	sense—or	even	nonsense”	(Rabkin	1976,	4).	Fantasy	deals	in	the	impossible	through	departures	from	consensus	reality,	and	in	doing	so,	it	immediately	asks	a	reader	to	participate:	to	accept	its	world,	its	
Figure	2.2	"Revised"	Map	of	Tortall	(Pierce	1992)	
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ground	rules,	its	reality.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	maps	and	quartets,	or	linked	multiplicity	of	texts,	are	so	important—both	work	to	ground	the	reader	within	a	world	and	to	develop	that	world.	Yet,	this	participation	is	not	limited	to	the	individual	reader;	for	in	existing	as	popular,	formulaic—in	as	much	as	they	speak	to	the	hero	pattern,	which	is,	after	all,	a	certain	formula—literature,	these	texts	“provid[e]	[…]	currency	for	conversation,”	as	Roger	Sutton	argues	in	terms	of	the	Sweet	Valley	High	novels	(Pattee	2010,	24).	Sutton’s	reading	of	Sweet	Valley	High—and	the	notion	holds	true	for	my	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy—constructs	the	novels	as	a	point	around	which	“communit[ies]	of	shared	meaning”	(3)	may	form,	as	noted	in	Pattee	(2010)	(see,	also,	Long	1985).	Being	a	community	of	books	is	one	of	the	key	ways	this	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	serves	as	point	around	which	communities	may	form.		Moreover,	this	“currency	for	conversation”	and	the	“communities	of	shared	meaning”	also	participate	in	a	very	particular	kind	of	engagement	with	these	texts:	the	activities	of	fandom.	Mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	is	a	vein	of	literature	that	receives	a	particularly	large	amount	of	attention	online,	and	both	Pierce’s	and	Meyer’s	texts	have	extensive	fandoms,	spaces	in	which	readers	write	fanfic,	developing	aspects	of	plot	and	create	fanart,	depicting	their	favourite	characters.	In	doing	so,	fans	effectively	become	another	“Sub-creator”	(1988,	98),	just	as	Tolkien’s	author-god	creates	the	Secondary	World,	the	fan	creates	the	fandom	of	that	world.	This	premise	is	informed	by	two	separate,	though	complementary,	strands	of	thought:	the,	first,	is	Roland	Barthes’	(1974)	concept	of	the	“writerly”	text,	a	text	open	to	interpretation,	as	opposed	to	the	“readerly”	text,	one	perceived	as	closed	or	complete;	or,	as	Barthes	notes,	“a	classic”	(4).	The	second	is	Jenkins’	(2006)	argument	that	through	the	mechanisms	of	“convergence	culture”	(2),	consumers	no	longer	passively	receive	media	content,	but	they	actively	create	it.	In	this	sense,	media	refers	to	published	content,	including	print,	broadcast	and	digital.	In	this	way,	the	two	premises	function	together:	the	writerly	text	is	a	text	open	to	participation,	and	it	is	through	the	mechanisms	of	convergence	culture	that	adolescents—as	the	addressed	reader	of	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy—actively	participate	in,	actively	engage,	these	texts.		
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Finally,	this	twofold	reading	of	community—the	linked	multiplicity	of	these	texts	and	how	this,	as	well	as	other	features,	contributes	to	a	notion	of	“inviting	the	reader	in,”—is	integral	to	this	thesis’s	overall	concern.	Mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	texts	offer	models	of	adolescence	that	directly	contest	the	hegemonic	models	of	contemporary	Western	culture	where	individuality,	uniqueness,	and	bodily	perfection	are	the	dominant	paradigms	of	self.	Mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	offers	images	that	contest	those	paradigms,	and	in	doing	so	it	offers	models	of	being	an	adolescent	female	girl	that	the	adolescent	girl	may	take	up—because	of	the	interpellative	aspect	of	YAL.	The	participation	with	the	fantasy	world,	for	example,	through	fandoms	and	social	media,	is	vital	because	it	demonstrates	the	viability	of	this	taking	up,	but	what	exactly—in	terms	of	the	alternative	images	to	those	popular	and	media	culture—are	adolescent	girls	taking	up?				
CINDER:	CINDERELLA	IS	A	CYBORG		 	“I	[Winter]	have	begun	to	wonder	if	perfection	might	be	its	own	flaw.”		(Meyer	2015c,	513)		Opening	with	“[t]he	screw	through	Cinder’s	ankle	had	rusted”	(2012,	1),	Marissa	Meyer’s	Cinder	wastes	no	time	indicating	that	Cinder’s	body	is	not	the	whole,	human,	fit	body	required	of	the	adolescent	girl	by	popular	and	media	culture.	It	is	not	the	body	made	available	through	the	“assembly	line	beauty”	of	the	makeover	(Balsamo	1996,	58).	In	fact,	this	opening	sentence	undoes	all	those	requirements:	the	“screw	through	her	ankle”	suggests	the	body	is	not	whole,	while	also	indicating	that	it	is	not,	at	least	entirely,	human.	Her	body	is	not	fit,	as	in	healthy,	because	this	screw	has	“rusted,”	a	kind	of	failing,	while	the	rust	also	insists	that	it	is	not	fit,	as	in	attractive.	In	short,	Cinder’s	body	is	not	Cinderella’s;	it	is	not	the	body	of	hegemonic	fantasy.	It	is	a	body	of	difference.	Moreover,	it	emphatically	speaks	to	bodies	existing	outside	of	the	text:	my	left	hip	was	once	held	together	with	screws;	there	were	many	screws	in	the	braces	that	straightened	my	teeth;	I	require	contact	lenses	(or	glasses)	to	see	clearly;	my	left	big	toe	currently	hosts	three	pins.	Cinder’s	body—my	body,	as	is	also	the	case	for	many	other	bodies—has	been	“cut	and	sewed	and	pieced	[…]	together”	(2013,	320).	Cinder’s	body	heightens	the	complexity	as	it	also	comprises	
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“foreign	steel	limbs,”	and	there	are	“wires	in	her	brain.	Optobionics	behind	her	retinas.	Synthetic	tissue	in	her	heart,	new	vertebrae,	[and]	grafted	skin	to	cover	the	scar	tissue”	(2013,	320).	This	is	not	the	body	of	the	makeover,	and	in	so	being,	it	is	a	body	of	difference.	Cinder’s	body	is	a	body	that	directly	contests	the	“ideal	feminine	beauty”	produced	through	the	mechanisms	(cosmetic	surgery	and	selfies)	of	the	makeover	paradigm	(58)	and	crucially	it	does	so	by	speaking	to	the	very	real	bodies	outside	of	the	text.	Thus,	this	section	is	concerned	with	bodies	of	difference,	with	making	available	bodies	of	difference	in	order	to	contest	both	the	ideal	heroic	form	as	well	as	the	hegemonic	image—young,	thin,	fit—of	femininity	in	popular	and	media	culture.	One	key	way	in	which	bodies	of	difference	are	suppressed	is	through	the	erasure,	or	minimising,	of	disability	within	the	media	images	of	contemporary	culture,	an	argument	that	Rosemarie	Garland-Thompson	(2002)	makes.	Specifically	looking	at	Aimee	Mullins’	cover	and	spread	for	Dazed	and	Confused	magazine	in	1998,	Garland-Thompson	engages	how	the	high-fashion	images	of	Mullins	within	the	magazine	either	erase,	or	“normalise,”	difference:	in	one	image,	the	curves	of	Mullins’	prosthetic	legs	simply	accentuate	the	“womanly”	curves	of	her	pert	bottom	and	breast,	and	in	another,	she	is	so	heavily	rendered	as	a	doll-like	creature	that	the	prosthetics	become	hardly	noticeable.	In	both	images	that	Garland-Thompson	discusses,	Mullins	is	rendered	over	into	the	appropriate	appearance	of	femininity.	She	is	made	glamorous.	This	is	not	the	presentation	of	Cinder’s	body,	as	my	reading	has	made	clear.		Thus,	while	I	am	not	specifically	interested	in	disability	within	this	project,	I	am	interested	in	bodies	of	difference,	and	as	Garland-Thompson	suggests		 disability	is	a	broad	term	within	which	cluster	ideological	categories	as	varied	as	sick,	deformed,	crazy,	ugly,	old,	maimed,	afflicted,	mad,	abnormal,	or	debilitated—all	of	which	disadvantage	people	by	devaluing	bodies	that	do	not	conform	to	cultural	standards.	(5)		This	devaluing	of	bodies	of	difference—bodies	that	“do	not	conform	to	cultural	standards”—is	very	much	of	concern.	As	I	discussed	in	Chapter	One,	this	devaluing	is	at	the	core	of	the	adolescent	girl’s	silencing	within	and	between	binary	oppositions.	In	terms	of	this	chapter,	it	is	in	how	the	heroic	requirement	
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of	bodily	stability	refuses	woman	as	hero,	and	in	Chapter	Three,	it	is	in	a	concern	with	the	limiting	nature	of	“pretty”	as	the	ideal	existence	of	adolescent	girls.	Narrations	that	make	visible	bodies	of	difference—bodies	that	are	unstable,	changeable	and	mechanical—are	integral.	For	one,	bodies	are	not	homogenous,	unchangeable	and	perfect.	Bodies	grow	and	break.	Bodies	change.	Through	including	such	bodies	in	narration,	the	privilege	of	beauty,	healthy,	and	“normal”	is	questioned.		This	“normal”	body—better,	ideal	body—is	one	often	produced	through	the	makeover,	surgical	or	otherwise,	at	least	in	as	much	as	the	makeover	paradigm	plays	a	considerable	role	in	neoliberal	practices	of	the	self.	Of	this	makeover,	Susan	Bordo	(1993)	suggests	that	it	is	not	only	contrived	by	the	cosmetics	industry—a	source	of	hegemonic	discourse,	in	my	argument—but	that	it	has	also	given	rise	to	“fantasies	of	rearranging,	transforming,	and	correcting,	limitless	improvement	and	change”	on	the	body	(245).	Furthermore,	the	changes	that	are	made—rather	than	embracing	difference,	not	to	mention	the	body’s	fleshiness—seek	to	“defy	[…]	the	historicity,	the	mortality,	and	indeed,	the	very	materiality	of	the	body”	(ibid.).	This	is	the	body-cum-self	in	popular	and	media	culture,	especially	as	it	is	ubiquitously	presented	by	the	digital	images	shared	on	social	media.	Thus,	I	briefly	want	to	establish	the	makeover	paradigm	in	terms	of	Cinderella	in	order	to	more	fully	demonstrate	how	Cinder,	as	a	cyborgian	Cinderella,	diverges	from	that	patterning.		To	start,	Cinderella’s	makeover,	the	fairy-godmother-wrought	transformation	in	which	Cinderella’s	appearance	is	made	suitable	for	attending	the	ball,	as	this	serves	as	an	example	of	the	archetypal	makeover	upon	which	the	paradigm	is	modelled.	In	Disney’s	Cinderella(s)—the	1950	animated	and	the	2015	live-action	film—Cinderella’s	makeover	occurs	after	the	destruction	of	the	resourcefully	altered	dress	at	the	hands	of	her	stepsisters	(Anastasia	and	Drizella)	and	Lady	Tremaine.	Crucially,	while	the	mice	and	birds	created	the	dress	in	the	1950	film,	Cinderella,	with	their	minimal	assistance,	makes	the	dress	herself	in	the	2015	version.	This	minor	alteration	speaks	to	the	neoliberal	narratives	of	self	(in	that	Cinderella	makes	the	dress	herself)	underpinning	the	newer	film’s	discursive	space,	while	also	recapitulating	the	work	essential	to	the	feminine	identity	offered	in,	and	by,	the	1950	version.	Nevertheless,	in	both	
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films,	Cinderella	rushes	to	the	garden	in	tatters	and	tears,	only	to	be	saved	by	the	magical	assistance	of	her	fairy	godmother.	While	within	the	1950	version,	there	is	a	strong	insistence	that	this	“saving”	occurs	because	Cinderella	still	believes	(she	still	dreams,	despite	“how	her	heart	is	grieving”),	it	is	the	makeover,	and	Fairy	Godmother’s	role	in	actualising	that	transformation,	with	which	I	am	here	concerned.77			In	many	respects,	this	makeover	is	about	the	heightened	fantasy	femininity	discussed	earlier:	while	Cinderella	is	made	suitable	for	attending	the	ball,	both	in	terms	of	her	consequence	(coach,	horses,	coachman,	footman)	as	well	as,	and	most	importantly,	her	appearance	(“Good	Heavens,	child!	You	can’t	go	in	that!”),	the	transformation	is	magical	and	its	result	is	fantastical.	It	is	“heightened	fantasy	femininity”	(Cochrane	2014),	a	point	made	even	more	clearly	in	Disney’s	2015	offering.	In	what	can	only	be	termed	a	sparkle-mation,	Helena	Bonham	Carter	initiates	the	makeover	sequence	by	transforming	herself	from	crone	to	Fairy	Godmother,	and	the	sparkles	continue	to	abound.78	They	accompany	the	transformation	of	pumpkin	into	coach,	mice	into	horses,	lizards	into	footman,	and	goose	into	coachman,	culminating	in	a	surreal,	dreamlike	sequence	in	which	Ella	is	encased,	rather	womblike,	in	a	profusion	of	sparkles—for	thirty-five	seconds,	a	veritable	eternity.	This	is	the	“belly	of	the	whale”	moment	from	classic	mythological	patterns	rearticulated	for	woman	as	the	sparkle,	the	marker	of	the	makeover’s	transformative	power	(Campbell	[1949]	1973,	90).	This	is	where	Ella’s	old	self	effectively	dies,	so	that	she	may	be	(re)born	appropriately	feminine.					Directly	contrasting	Cinderella’s	“belly	of	the	whale”	moment,	Cinder	spent	eight	years	“in	a	tank,	sleeping	and	dreaming	and	growing”	whilst	doctors	intermittently	operated	to	repair	the	injuries	she	received	in	the	fire	set	to	kill	her—missing	left	leg	and	hand,	burned	right	arm,	shoulder,	and	cheek,	as	well	as	injuries	to	her	spine,	heart	and	eyes	(2013,	320	and	324).	In	this	way,	
                                                77	Within	both	(1950	and	2015)	of	Disney’s	Cinderella	films,	the	fairy	godmother	is	named	Fairy	Godmother,	thus	literalising	the	archetypal	figure.		78	Moseley	(2002)	offers	an	excellent	reading	on	the	use	of	the	sparkle	in	relation	to	teen	films,	especially	poignant	is	how	the	sparkle	serves	as	both	a	“signifier	of	glamour,	of	superficial	beauty”	and	as	a	marker	of	feminine	power	(407).			
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Cinder’s	body	is	not	the	fit	and	able	body	both	required,	and	produced,	by	the	makeover	paradigm.	It	is	not	only	fragmented	and	scarred,	and	thus	seemingly	unfit	for	the	purposes	of	neoliberal	selfhood,	but	it	also	engages	technology	in	a	way	that	has	ramifications	for	both	subjectivity	and	femininity.	Cinder	also	serves	as	a	counterpoint	to	the	model	of	“being	female”	offered	by	Disney’s	Cinderella,	a	model	that	is	tied	to	(male)	hero	patterns	and	to	the	femininity	allowed	within	that	frame.	In	its	divergence,	this	reading	also	serves	as	an	example	of	how	the	remainder	of	this	thesis	engages	the	hero	story	(dominant,	hegemonic	narratives	of	self)	through	narratives	of	sheroes,	females	who	are	heroes	despite—and	because	of—bodily	instability.			Finally,	Cinder’s	feminine	identity	is	bound	up	in	her	cybernetic	(fragmented)	body.	It	is	bound	up	in	the	technology	that	saved	it,	and	in	so	being,	The	Lunar	Chronicles	present	a	complex	commentary	on	Western	culture’s	obsession	with	appearance.	While	Cinder’s	narrative	does	offer	a	direct	rearticulation	of	Cinderella’s	Fairy	Godmother	enabled	“sparkle-mation,”	a	look	at	how	The	Lunar	Chronicles	contest	the	“assembly-line	beauty”	of	cosmetic	surgery	is	particularly	useful	for	illustrating	just	how	Cinder,	and	The	Lunar	Chronicles	more	widely,	offer	a	different	image	of	femininity	(Balsamo	1996,	58).	As	an	ideal	mechanism	of	the	makeover	paradigm,	cosmetic	surgery	is,	for	Balsamo	(1996),	where	“‘difference’	is	made	over	into	sameness”	(58).	With	this	surgery,	the	medical	image,	as	a	means	of	“discipline[ing]	the	unruly	female	body”	is	a	key	area	of	her	concern	(56).	Of	this	image,	Balsamo	suggests			 it	is	not	so	much	the	inner	or	essential	woman	that	is	visualized;	her	interior	story	has	no	truth	of	its	own.	Both	her	surface	and	her	interiority	are	flattened	and	dispersed.	Cosmetic	surgeons	use	technological	imagining	devices	to	reconstruct	the	female	body	as	a	signifier	of	ideal	feminine	beauty.	(57–58)		I	am	specifically	concerned	with	the	flattening	and	dispersion	that	occurs	with	this	image:	with	how	the	body’s	curves	and	contours,	not	to	mention	this	interior	story,	are	refused.	Moreover,	within	this	image,	the	body	has	no	meaning;	it	merely	signifies	this	ideal.	In	popular	and	media	culture,	the	medical	image	is	no	longer	the	sole	mechanism	of	this	process.	In	this	space,	the	selfie	
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serves	in	the	same	disciplining	role,	but	with	a	twist:	through	photo	editing	software,	endless	improvement	can	be	enacted	on	the	body,	and	it	is	not	the	“cosmetic	surgeon,”	the	medical	professional,	who	enacts	these	changes,	it	is	the	girl	herself:	the	adolescent	girl	uses	“technological	imagining	devices	to	reconstruct”	herself	as	pretty,	the	ideal	of	this	space.	Moreover,	she	does	so	
without	the	scars	that	trouble	cosmetic	surgery—reaching	a	zenith	of	flattening	in	the	process.	Scars	are	crucial;	as	a	kind	of	writing	on	the	body,	they	refuse	the	flattening	inherent	in	these	images.	The	absence	of	scars—the	story	of	the	body—makes	“sameness”	all	the	more	pervasive.	The	Lunar	Chronicles	not	only	contest	the	flatness	of	images	but	it	does	so	by	specifically	making	scars—evidence	of	where	and	how	the	body	has	been	pieced	together—available.	As	Balsamo	suggests	and	the	selfie	demonstrates,	images	often	simply	(re)offer	a	superficial	perspective	of	the	body,	securing	a	reliance	on	the	visual	and	bolstering	the	centrality	of	appearance.	However,	they	are	not	always	so,	a	point	that	an	image—a	holographic	medical	image—of	Cinder	makes	clear.			It	was	as	if	someone	had	chopped	her	down	the	middle	dividing	her	front	half	from	her	back	half,	and	then	put	her	cartoonish	image	into	a	medical	textbook.	Her	heart,	her	brain,	her	intestines,	her	muscles,	her	blue	veins.	Her	control	panel,	her	synthetic	hand	and	leg,	wires	that	trailed	from	the	base	of	her	skull	all	the	way	down	her	spine	and	out	to	her	prosthetic	limbs.	The	scar	tissue	where	flesh	met	metal.	A	small	dark	square	in	her	wrist—her	ID	chip.	(2012,	82)				While	this	medical	image	demonstrates	a	keen	neoliberal	sense	of	self-awareness	in	its	fracturing	of	Cinder’s	body—“chopping	her	down	the	middle”—and	its	cataloguing	of	her	body	parts—“heart,”	“brain,”	“intestines,”	and	so	on—it	also	does	something	different:	this	image	makes	“scar	tissue”	visible.		Not	only	have	“flesh”	and	“metal”	met,	but	the	flesh	and	metal	are	held	together	as	one	within	this	image.	They	are	held	together	by	the	“scar	tissue”	linking	the	component	parts,	a	joining	that	is	antithetical	to	the	ideals	of	contemporary	Western	culture.	There	is	unity	in	this	fragmentation.	This	holographic	image	of	Cinder	directly	contests	the	flat	medical	image	of	cosmetic	surgery	and	the	selfie,	as	well	as	the	many	other	images—magazine	covers	and	advertisements—proliferating	superficiality.	This	medical	image	is	different,	
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and	it	refuses	flatness	in	two	ways:	it	not	only	makes	visible	the	scars,	thus	refusing	flatness	within	the	image,	but	it	is	also	a	hologram;	it	is	three-dimensional,	thus	refusing	the	flatness	of	the	image	itself.	In	this	way,	this	image	is	not	the	medical	image	with	which	Balsamo	engages;	it	is,	rather,	something	else.	It	is	an	image	that	makes	visible	fragmentation	in	order	to	expose	unity	(“scar	tissue”)	in	that	fragmentation	and	to	contest	flatness.		In	The	Lunar	Chronicles,	there	are	two	ways	in	which	this	contestation	occurs:	through	animal-human	as	well	as	machine-human	hybrids.	The	first	is	most	visible	in	terms	of	Levana’s	mutant	soldiers,	genetically	modified	Lunars	who	are	now	part	wolf.	In	fact	Wolf—the	nickname	for	Ze’ev	Kesley—is	quite	literally	transformed	into	a	human-wolf	hybrid.			 He	could	feel	the	difference	in	his	protruding	mouth,	his	enlarged	teeth,	his	malformed	jaw.	They’d	altered	his	facial	bone	structure,	making	way	for	the	row	of	implanted	canine	teeth.	There	was	a	new	curvature	to	his	shoulders	an	and	awkward	flex	of	his	feet,	which	looked	more	like	paws	now,	made	for	running	and	bounding	at	great	speeds.	His	hands	were	enormous	now,	fixed	with	reinforced,	claw-shaped	fingernails.	(2015c,	561)		While	foreshadowing	issues	that	arise	around	Daine’s	shape-shifting,	this	transformation	of	Wolf	into	a	“wolf”	is	striking,	especially	given	the	descriptions:	“protruding,”	“malformed,”	“awkward”	that	suggest	just	how	“unnatural,”	for	him,	this	change	is	(434).	This	transformation	is	also	a	deviation	from	the	“cultural	standards”	of	this	world,	and	in	so	being,	difference	is	made	available	in	narration.	The	mutant	wolf	soldiers	offer	visibly	fragmented	bodies,	bodies	that	are	comprised	of	multiple	parts.			Unity	in	fragmentation—or	the	ironic	homogenisation	of	human	and	machine,	as	Donna	Haraway	(1991)	conceives	the	cyborg	body—is	imperative.	The	cyborg	body	and	the	bodies	of	these	mutant	wolf	soldiers,	“do	not,”	as	Haraway	suggests,	“resolve	into	larger	wholes,	even	dialectically,	[they	are]	about	the	tension	of	holding	incompatible	things	together	because	both	or	all	are	necessary	and	true”	(149).	These	bodies	do	not	resolve	into	larger	wholes	because	they	are	about	allowing	and	making	space	for	bodies	that	demonstrate	“mutation,	variation	and	becoming”	(Seaman	2007,	247).	This	is	also	exactly	my	point	regarding	YAL	itself:	YAL	is	a	literature	in-between;	it	does	not	resolve	
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into	the	larger	whole	of	children’s	literature	or	(adult)	literature.	Rather,	YAL,	because	of	its	in-betweenness,	demonstrates	aspects	of	both,	while	also	maintaining—through	this	multiplicity—its	uniqueness.	Cinder,	and	also	the	mutant	soldiers,	is	precisely	who	she	is	because	of	the	“incompatible	things”	comprising	her	body,	and	this	multiplicity	is	crucial,	particularly,	the	scars	that	evidence	it.	The	scars	are	important	because	they	bear	witness	to	change;	they	bear	witness	to	our	life	experiences,	a	reading	that	Winter,	the	heroine	of	
Winter	(Meyer	2015),	makes	explicit.		In	a	“world	of	perfection”	(2015c,	25),	“the	young	princess	was	as	
beautiful	as	daylight.	She	was	more	beautiful	even	than	the	queen	herself”	(1,	formatting	original).	Winter—a	refiguring	of	Snow	White	who	is	“fairest	of	them	all”	(Disney	1937)—is	the	“young	princess.”	She	is	also	Queen	Levana’s	stepdaughter,	and	while	she	is	“beautiful,”	she	is	also,	according	to	this	world’s	“cultural	standards,”	flawed.			She	dipped	her	head,	turning	to	hide	the	three	scars	on	her	right	cheek.	For	years,	Winter	had	assumed	that	when	people	stared	at	her,	it	was	because	the	scars	disgusted	them.	A	rare	disfigurement	in	their	world	of	perfection.	(2015c,	25)		“Rumor[ed]	to	have	“been	inflicted	by	the	queen	[Levana]	herself”	(2014a,	524),79	these	scars	set	Winter	apart	from	other	Lunars,	not	least	because	she	refuses	to	use	her	glamour—or	even	makeup,	“she	did	not	let	them	put	any	makeup	on	her—not	even	to	cover	the	scars”	(2015c,	150)—to	alter	her	appearance,	to	hide	them.	The	scars	are	a	kind	of	writing	of	the	body’s	history	on	its	surface.	Crucially,	I	am	not	calling	for	intentional,	self-inflicted	harming	in	this	interest	with	scars.	Yet,	as	self-harm	is	a	pervasive	issue	faced	by	many	adolescent	girls	within	contemporary	Western	culture,	this	reading	does	not	take	those	scars	lightly.	Here,	I	am	concerned	with	scars	as	a	record	and	with	
                                                79	A	rumour	confirmed	as	truth	in	Winter	(2015c),			 She	[Levana]	should	have	killed	her	[Winter]	when	she’d	ordered	Winter’s	hand	to	take	that	knife,	when	she’d	thought	for	sure	a	slight	disfigurement	would	erase	all	the	whispers	in	the	court,	all	the	talk	of	her	thirteen-year-old-stepdaughter	already	vying	for	most	beautiful	girl	
on	Luna.	(513,	emphasis	original).		
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how	a	making	visible	of	scars	in	narration	offers	a	re-mapping	of	the	contours	of	the	body.	I	also	do	not	want	to	offer	scars	as	the	only	possible	means	of	this	re-mapping;	rather,	scars	hold	a	particular	interest	because	of	their	raised	nature	and	because,	in	Cinder’s	case,	they	demonstrate	a	kind	of	interdependency,	a	relationship	between	her	fleshy,	physical	body	and	her	cybernetic	body	parts.		Fittingly,	in	Pierce’s	Tortall	universe	and	Meyer’s	Lunar	Chronicles,	scars	abound:	Cinder’s	“scar	tissue	where	flesh	met	metal”	(2012,	82);	Alanna	receives	“a	scar	from	[her]	neck	to	[her]	abdomen,	right	between	[her]	breasts,”	after	battling	the	God	of	the	Roof	for	his	Dominion	Jewel	(1988,	134).	She	and	Jon	both	also	receive	scars	as	part	of	the	initiation	ritual	when	they	join	The	Bloody	Hawk,	a	Bazhir	tribe	(a	nomadic	people	inhabiting	Tortall’s	Great	Southern	Desert)	(see,	also,	1986,	26).	Kel’s	scars—and	bruises—are	frequently	mentioned,	for	example,	“‘Your	back	is	covered	with	bruises	[…]	And	your	arms	and	hands	are	scarred”	(2001,	116	–	117),	as	several	ladies	notice	when	Kel	visits	the	communal	baths	after	a	session	of	jousting	with	Raoul,	her	knight-master.	After	battling	Ozorne	(former	king	of	Carthak)	during	the	culmination	of	his	attempt	to	invade	and	takeover	Tortall,	Gainel	(god,	the	Dream	King)	says	to	Daine,	“You	will	have	scars	[…]	but	those	are	signs	of	battles	fought	bravely”	(259,	formatting	original).	This	including	scars	within	narration	serves	a	twofold	purpose:	first,	the	scars	themselves	contest	the	flatness	of	appearance	with	which	I	have	been	concerned	and	second,	the	including	of	something	that	contests	the	dominant	paradigm	serves	to	make	normal	that	which	is	considered	abnormal.	In	this	way,	the	scars	participate	in	re-mapping.	Through	Winter’s	scars,	this	“making	normal”	concerns	the	countering	of	perfection,	an	idea	that	the	opening	epigraph	foreshadows,	“I	have	begun	to	wonder	if	perfection	might	be	its	own	flaw”	(2015c,	513).	This	perfection	is	one	centred	on	appearance—on	appearing	perfect,	flawless,	beautiful—and	it	is	a	mind-set	that	dominates	both	Luna,	the	home	of	Lunars,	as	well	as	popular	and	media	culture,	and	it	is	one	that	depends	on	the	“flatten[ing]	and	dispers[ion]”	and	on	the	erasure	of	difference	through	“assembly-line	beauty”	that	I	discussed	through	Balsamo’s	working	on	medical	imaging	and	in	relation	to	selfies	(1996,	58).	Scars	are	not	flat—“she	traced	a	finger	over	the	raised	flesh”—and	as	such,	they	refuse	that	flattening,	dispersion,	erasure	and	homogeneity	of	appearance	
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(2015c,	625).80	Yet,	Cinder’s	and	Winter’s	bodies,	as	well	as	Alanna’s,	Kel’s	and	Daine’s,	foreground	all	of	these	issues:	their	bodies	include	difference	and	disability,	and	in	so	doing,	this	ironic	body	expands	the	(feminine)	positions	available	for	occupation,	as	the	offering	of	such	bodies	is	about	providing	alternative	images	of	living	and	being	an	adolescent	female	body.	In	the	case	of	Cinder	and	Winter,	a	body	that	is	not	necessarily	whole,	fit,	or	stable—though	it	is	still	able.			 *	*	*		Popular	and	media	culture	and	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	literature	are	competing	discursive	spaces,	but	while	different,	both	mark	and	are	marked	by	the	other.	The	adolescent	and	the	hero	have	been	the	primary	focus	of	this	reading	since	both	the	heroic	figure—with	whose	journey	myth	is	concerned—and	the	adolescent	girl—who,	as	youth,	is	tied	to	the	hero	paradigm—face	a	requirement	of	bodily	stability	that	is	both	limiting	and	exclusionary.	Moreover,	it	is	a	reading	that	has	shown	the	two	figures,	hero	and	adolescent,	as	effectively	one	and	the	same,	a	point	made	quite	tellingly	when	considering	that	the	first	hero	pattern	research	was	taking	place	in	Europe	(Rank	1909),81	while	G.	Stanley	Hall	was	defining	adolescence	in	America	(Hall	1904).		The	hero	is	adolescent.	The	hero-journey	essentially	describes	the	liminal	transition	of	a	child	becoming	a	man	(who	is	hero).	The	problem:	both	popular	and	media	culture	as	well	as	traditional	mythic	narrative,	posit	the	male	form—as	well	as	concomitant	bodily	stability,	wholeness	and	perfection—as	their	ideal.	Moreover,	both	discourses	use	this	ideal,	which	has	taken	on	the	appearance	of	truth,	in	order	to	refuse	bodily	multiplicity,	change,	and	
                                                80	The	touch,	in	“she	traced,”	is	an	issue	that	I	return	in	Conclusions,	as	touch	offers	an	additional,	beyond	sight,	means	of	perceiving	the	body,	and	in	so	doing	potentially	lessens	the	dominance	of	visuality.		81	The	folklorist	Alan	Dundes	notes	that	J.G.	van	Hahn,	an	Austrian	Philologist,	probably	initiated	“modern	hero	pattern	research”	with	his	“Arische	Aussetzungs-und-Rückkehr-Formel”	(“The	Aryan	Expulsion	and	Return	Formula).	Van	Hahn’s	text	was	published	posthumously	in	1876.	See,	Dundes	(1990).		
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difference	thereby	excluding	the	adolescent	female	who	is,	through	that	biological	determinism	marking	her	as	both	adolescent	and	adolescent-becoming-woman,	bodily	multiplicity	and	change.			 In	this	chapter,	Cinderella,	especially	Disney’s	adaptions	of	the	figure	and	Meyer’s	reworking	of	her,	has	served	as	a	frame	to	illustrate	both	how	females	fare	under	the	hegemonic	hero	narrative	and	how	that	positioning	might	be	changed.	Disney’s	adaption	of	Cinderella	offers	a	femininity	underscored	by	appearance,	appropriate	work,	and	dreaming.	While	there	are	some	positives	to	the	construction—Cinderella	is	a	“loving	caregiver”	(Wood	1996,	35)—the	image	is	rather	dated,	as	one	recent	commentary	on	the	film—a	“Princess	Rap	Battle”—puts	it,			 Your	tale	as	old	as	time	Sets	us	back	50	years—	Do	your	chores,	clean	the	floors	‘Til	a	man	just	appears!	(Avalon	2015,	n.p.)		
Cinderella	is	both	timeless	and	also	of	her	time—it	was	just	over	a	decade	after	Disney’s	1950	offering	that	Betty	Friedan	(1963)	published	The	Feminine	
Mystique,	calling	attention	to	the	ideal	construction	of	femininity	at	that	time:	a	pretty	home	and	self.	For	me,	the	way	in	which	Cinderella	both	continually	reappears—recognisable	as	Cinderella	but	also	changed—and	is	linked	to	a	feminine	identity,	to	what	it	means	to	be	woman,	is	pivotal.		Thus,	it	is	not	that	Cinderella	herself	is	inherently	problematic.	It	is,	rather,	how	the	makeover	narrative,	exemplified	by	Disney’s	Cinderella(s—both	1950	and	2015),	has	become	a	paradigm	underscoring	seemingly	all	aspects	of	living	and	being	a	female	body	that	is	vexatious.			This	paradigm,	particularly	for	girls,	in	popular	and	media	culture	limits	the	positions	available	for	occupation,	the	feminine	identities	available.	The	heightened	fantasy	femininity	offered	by	the	Disney	Princesses	and	made	available	to	little	girls	at	venues	such	as	the	Bibbidi	Bobbidi	Boutiques	is	
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limited.82	The	choice	available	is	limited.	However,	in	that	Cinder’s	story	is	not	only	not	a	recapitulation	of	the	makeover	narrative	typified	by	conventional	Cinderella	narratives,	and	that	her	body,	the	fundamental	element	of	that	narrative,	exists	directly	in	opposition	to	the	whole,	fleshy,	fit	body	that	the	makeover	produces,	there	is	scope	for	change.	Cinder’s	body	is	a	body	comprised	of	parts,	of	mechanical,	inorganic	parts,	and	it	is	the	negotiation	of	this	relationship	that	constructs	Cinder’s	subjectivity,	her	feminine	identity,	within	this	world—while	also	offering	not	just	a	position	to	occupy,	but	also,	arguably,	the	possibility	of	positions.			 Conventional	mythic	narratives	(through	the	hero)	and	discourses	of	popular	and	media	culture	(through	the	images	of	celebrity	and	air-brushed	perfection)	insist	upon	a	very	particular	image	of	woman:	thin,	long	and	flowing	hair	as	well	as	appearing	youthful,	including	a	pert	bottom	and	breasts.	The	adolescent	girl’s	becoming-woman	depends	on	a	successful	shape-change	in	order	to	achieve	this	appearance	of	woman;	in	order	to	be	woman,	she	must	appear	as	woman.	Yet,	the	image	resists	the	bodily	change	that	marks	the	adolescent	girl	as	adolescent:	body	hair	must	be	removed,	hips	cannot	widen	“too	much,”	the	ideal	breast	shape	is	very	narrow.	For	these	reasons,	the	following	chapter	takes	issues	with	appearance,	with	the	assumption	that	appearance	can,	or	should,	mark	one	as	feminine	(that	is	to	say	woman)	as	well	as	with	the	assumed	one-to-one	relation	between	self	and	appearance	that	is	implicit	in	this	positioning.	The	chapter	is	concerned	with	how	this	dominance	of	appearance,	and	of	appearing,	might	be	loosened,	if	images	of	bodily	instability,	change,	and	difference	are	made	available.	Finally	and	briefly,	the	following	two	chapters	engage	the	methods	and	frameworks	of	psychoanalysis	not	because	I	see	this	as	a	project	of	psychoanalysis;	rather,	it	does	so	because	myth	and	psychoanalysis	have	been	made	to	be	inseparable,	and	this	thesis	is	concerned	with	myth	and	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy.	The	foundational	works	of	hero	studies—Rank	(1909),	Raglan	(1936),	and	Campbell	(1949)—employ	psychoanalysis.	Bettelheim	(1976)	
                                                82	These	boutiques	are	magical	places	where	mothers	and	fathers	(or	other,	presumably	adult,	persons	with	money)	can,	for	the	right	amount,	give	young	girls	a	day	of	pampering	as	their	favorite	Disney	princess.		
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offers	a	psychoanalytic	approach	to	fairy	tale	and	Bascom	(1954),	in	his	concern	with	its	functions,	offers	the	same	for	folklore.	Similarly,	Campbell	(1968)	contends,	“mythology	serves	four	functions”	(609).	Briefly,	these	are:	the	metaphysical,	the	cosmological,	the	sociological,	and	the	psychological,	with	the	hero’s	function	being	primarily	the	latter	(609–624),	and	in	its	concern	with	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy,	this	thesis	focuses	on	the	hero.	Thus,	as	does	psychoanalysis,	this	thesis	seeks	to	see	below,	or	more	than,	the	surface	of	things	and	it	does	so	from	the	silenced	positions	between	binary	oppositions.	Mythologists	and	folklorists	employ	the	lens	of	psychoanalysis	because	its	methods	and	frames	provide	a	way	into	the	questions	of	myth,	of	life.	Who	are	we?	What	happens	when	we	die?	Where	did	this	world	come	from?	Thus,	Chapter	Three,	in	its	concern	with	contesting	the	images	of	popular	and	media	culture,	and	Chapter	Four,	in	its	concern	with	contesting	discourse,	also	utilise	psychoanalytic	frames.		
 124	
CHAPTER	THREE	APPEARANCES	MAY	BE	DECEIVING			Christine	Battersby	(1988)	argues	that	woman	is	phenomenal	in	a	“double	sense,”	and	while	the	first	celebrates	the	“wonderful”	nature	of	a	phenomenon	(1),	it	is	the	second	sense	with	which	I	am	concerned:	“she’s	also	just	a	surface	deviation;	mere	‘appearance;’	unrepresentative	of	that	distinctive,	underlying	‘essence’	of	humanity	that	philosophers	have	associated	with	‘truth’"	(1).	In	this	figuring,	she	(woman)	is	the	object,	or	surface,	to	his	subject(ive	self).	Moreover,	woman	is	not	just	that	which	is	superficial—a	positioning	that	is	limiting	enough,	as	it	refuses	her	“essence”—she	is	also	“surface	deviation.”	She	is	“mere[ly]	appearance,”	and	the	appearance—that	she	is—deviates	from	the	norm	or	standard.	The	norm	is	bodily	wholeness	and	stability,	as	the	hero	(man)	represents.	In	popular	and	media	culture,	this	“being	appearance”	is	articulated	as	a	representational	economy	of	self-through-appearance	that	uses	the	status	of	“deviation”	to	require,	what	Wolf	(1991)	terms,	“beauty	work”	(16).	Through	this	work	on	the	body,	woman	becomes	feminine,	and	thus	a	self,	within	dominant	hegemonic	regimes.			 Moreover,	this	paradigm	of	female	self	through	appearing	feminine	excludes	other	possible	ways	of	being	woman.	As	Bartky	(1988)	suggests			 normative	femininity	is	coming	more	and	more	to	be	centered	on	woman’s	body—not	its	duties	and	obligations	or	even	capacity	to	bear	children,	but	it’s	sexuality,	more	precisely,	its	presumed	heterosexuality	and	its	appearance.	(80)		This	is	the	beginning—“is	coming	more	and	more”—of	the	narrative	arc	that	has	resulted	in	the	representational	economy	of	self-through-appearance	that	exists	in	popular	and	media	culture.	As	Gill	(2007)	suggests,	“in	today's	media,	possession	of	a	‘sexy	body’	is	presented	as	women’s	key	(if	not	sole)	source	of	identity”	(149).	The	distance	between	identity	and	appearance	has	collapsed.	You	are	a	(heterosexual)	woman	if	you	appear	as	such,	if	you	appear	“sexy.”	Gill	also	notes	the	neglect	of	markers	such	as	“caring,	nurturing	or	motherhood”	in	constructions	of	femininity	(149).	It	is	transition	reflected	in	my	above	reading	
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of	Cinderella:	Disney’s	1950	animation	includes	“loving	caregiver”	within	its	depiction	of	the	femininity	Cinderella	offers,	while	also	offering	the	appearance,	“beautiful”	and	“innocently	sexy,”	that	has	only	intensified	since	(Wood	1996,	35).	Gill’s	(2007)	“today’s	media”	culture	is	the	hegemonic	discursive	space	of	contemporary	popular	and	media	culture,	and	it	is	within	this	space	that	a	“sexy	body”	is	“women’s	key	(if	not	sole)	source	of	identity”	(149).	This	is	what	the	adolescent	girl	faces	as	she	becomes—as	she	shape-changes	into—woman.		Thus,	this	chapter	is	concerned	with	appearance,	with	the	problems	implicit	in	relying	on	appearance	for	determining	the	self,	specifically,	with	how	such	an	over-reliance	on	appearance	limits—through	refusing	bodily	change,	multiplicity,	and	difference—ways	of	being	bodies.	The	first	section	lays	out	this	premise:	the	superficiality	inherent	in	popular	and	media	culture	refuses	not	only	other	ways	of	being	woman	but	also	nuances	of	the	body	that	go	beyond	its	surface,	while	also	indicating	that	the	“beauty	work”	required	of	woman	silences	multiplicity	and	difference.	It	also	establishes	the	context	for	four	case	studies	focusing	on	cross-dressing,	the	Lunar	glamour,	pregnancy	and	shape-shifting.	These	case	studies	offer	images	of	bodily	instability,	multiplicity	and	change	that	contest	and	complicate	dominant,	hegemonic	expectations	of	appearance.	Taken	from	the	texts	of	Pierce’s	Tortall	Universe	and	Meyer’s	Lunar	Chronicles,	these	readings	of	a	brother	and	sister	sharing	one	appearance	(cross-dressing),	the	Lunar	glamour,	pregnancy	(made	possible	by	menstruation)	and	shape-shifting	show	appearance	as	an	unreliable	marker	of	the	self,	while	also	expanding	what	it	means	to	be	a	body	that	appears.	In	so	doing,	they	open	a	space	in	which	popular	and	media	culture’s	representational	economy	may	be	questioned.			
SUPERFICIALITY	IN	POPULAR	AND	MEDIA	CULTURE:	“I’M	A	BRAND”		“Status	Update.”	The	topic	under	discussion	on	the	573rd	edition	of	This	
American	Life,	an	American	radio	programme	currently	hosted	by	Ira	Glass	(2015),	is	the	ever-prevalent	“status	update,”	and	while	Glass	claims	that	the	“program	is	about	status	updates	of	various	kinds—the	literal	kind,	like	on	Instagram,”	he	also	says,	
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	but	most	of	our	show	today	is	about	the	kind	of	slow	changes	in	status	that	happen	to	adults	[…]	where	what	happens	is,	you	know,	quiet,	and	slow,	and	really,	is	sometimes	kind	of	rude	to	talk	about.	(n.p)		In	principal,	the	show	has	nothing	to	do	with	teenagers	or	adolescents,	and	yet,	it	opens	with	“three	teenage	girls	explain[ing]	why	they	are	constantly	telling	their	friends	they	are	beautiful	on	Instagram”	(2015),	and	it	does	so	because	these	teenage	girls	experience—through,	as	Glass	argues,	the	posts	they	make	on	Instagram—a	kind	of	perpetual	“status	update.”	This	online,	digital	bubble	of	Instagram	(Julia,	one	of	the	three	girls	suggests,	“People	are	always	on	Instagram.	Everyone’s	always	on	Instagram”)	offers	a	highly	concentrated,	and	sometimes	contentious,	space	in	which	status	updates	occur	at	such	a	frequency	that	often	very	little	has	actually	changed,	in	the	sense	of	“slow	changes”	Glass	posits	adults	as	experiencing	(n.p.).		As	Julia	(aged	13),	Jane	(14),	and	Ella	(14)	demonstrate,	the	status	update	becomes—for	the	adolescent	girl—a	continuous	marking	off	of	the	self	as	it	is	meeting	(sometimes	not)	the	expectations	of	appearance	within	the	discursive	space	of	popular	and	media	culture.	When	the	girls	get	it	right,	“130	to	150	likes	[…]	and	anywhere	between	20	and	50	comments,”	comments	that	are	“overwhelmingly	[…]	super-positive,	you’re	so	pretty,	OMG,	you’re	so	cute”	(n.p).	When	they	get	it	wrong,	“other	girls	will	take	screenshots	to	save	the	image	and	gossip	about	it	later”	(n.p).	Not	only	is	the	extent	of	response	staggering	but	so	too	is	the	polarity.	The	image,	most	often	a	selfie,	is	either	“right”	or	“wrong”—there	is	no	middle	ground.			 This	heightened	performance	of	self-through-image	creates	a	situation	in	which	girls	must	consciously	take	control	of	their	own	self-image,	also	required	by	neoliberal	narratives	of	self.	While	such	self-creation	is	not	inherently	bad,	the	self	as	image—the	way	in	which	that	image	is	communicated	(constant	attendance	to	Instagram	and	other	social	media	sites)	and	the	very	narrow	image	that	is	required—is	constraining.	An	exchange	between	Julia	and	Ella	makes	this	clear:		
Julia	It’s	like—I’m	a	brand,	and	I	am	like—	
Ella	You’re	trying	to	promote	yourself.		
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Julia	The	brand.	I’m	the	director	of	the—	(n.p,	emphasis	original)		To	which	Glass	supplies,	“and	you’re	the	product.”	This	is	the	narrative	of	self	offered	by	celebrities—Taylor	Swift,	Rhianna,	the	Kardashians,	who	are	obviously	products—wrought	in	the	lives	of	ordinary	girls.	As	teenagers	experiencing	their	first	few	weeks	of	high	school,	Julia,	Jane	and	Ella	are	representative	of	the	norm,	of	the	normal	means	of	being	girl	in	the	West.		In	this	space,	the	self	we	cultivate	is	most	obviously	evidenced	by	the	digital	image,	the	selfie.	Katie	Warfield	(2014a)	discusses	how	girls	take	streams	of	selfies	and	how	as	they	“curate	the	images,”	they	delete	the	ones	they	do	not	like,	keeping	the	ones	the	do.	For	Warfield,	the	kept—and	posted—images	are	the	ones	in	which	the	girl	perceives	herself	as	“looking	good,”	and	it	is	this	self	perception	that	Warfield	finds	provocative.	However,	Warfield	fails	to	take	into	account	the	homogeneity	of	the	images,	a	homogeneity	that	is	heightened	within	the	social	media	bubble	within	which	these	young	girls	exist.	For	these	girls,	this	image	is	not	about	personal	choice,	or	personal	views	of	“looking	good;”	it	is	entirely	about	meeting	expectations.			We	all	ask	people	before	we	post	it	[a	selfie],	like	send	in	like	a	group	chat,	or	like,	send	to	your	friends,	like,	should	I	post	this?	Do	I	look	pretty?	(Glass	2015,	n.p.)		“Do	I	look	pretty?”	Looking	pretty	is	what	matters,	because	looking	pretty	is	what	is	required	by	the	discourse	of	self-through-selfie—a	particular	kind,	or	way	of,	appearing.	Despite	Warfield’s	arguments,	this	discourse	of	looking	pretty	is	not	only	the	dominant	discourse	but	it	is	one	so	entrenched	within	the	(un)reality	of	the	selfie	(this	image	is	always	edited	and	manipulated,	an	illusion)	that	the	selfie’s	salvation,	its	reconfiguration	as	a	tool	of	empowerment,	is	impossible.	The	“selfie”	is	a	deeply	rooted,	hegemonic	discourse,	and	as	its	practices	and	paradigms	require	a	limited	way	of	being	in	this	world,	it	is	a	mechanism	of	the	girl’s	silencing	and	exclusion.		 Finally,	while	this	insistence	on	her	superficiality—as	in,	she	is	“mere	‘appearance’”	(Battersby	1998,	1)—has	reached	a	particular	apex	in	the	discursive	space	of	popular	and	media	culture,	especially	in	those	areas	concerning	females,	this	reliance	on	the	visual	is	not	new,	as	I	discussed	in	
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Chapter	One	and	Two.	Yet,	in	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy,	despite—or	perhaps	because	of—being	entwined	with	these	dominant	discourses	of	the	body,	there	are	bodies	not	limited	to	surface-ness.	Cross-dressing	(Pierce’s	Song	of	the	Lioness	quartet),	the	Lunar	glamour	(Meyer’s	Lunar	Chronicles),	pregnancy	throughout	Pierce’s	Tortall	Universe,	and	shape-shifting	(Immortals	quartet)	all	demonstrate—in	varying	ways—that	the	body	is	much	more	complex	than	merely	something	that	appears.			
CASE	STUDIES		 		Femininity	(what	it	means	to	be	a	woman)	relying	solely	on	the	body’s	surface,	on	one	appearing	feminine,	does	not	work.	Not	only	does	it	not	work	because	it	is	a	superficial	rendering	of	being	woman—at	the	expense	of	other	possible	ways	of	being	(Gill	2007)—but	also	because	self	is	much	more	complex	than	the	figuring	allows.	The	body	can	be	misread,	as	Megan	Friedman	(2015)	makes	explicit	when	she	discusses,	for	Cosmopolitan,	the	model	Rain	Dove.	Noting,	Rain’s	“height	and	facial	features	often	get	her	mistaken	for	a	man	or	a	transgender	woman”	(n.p.).	This	misreading	also	applies	to	the	pregnant	body.	Is	it	ever	safe	(or	polite)	to	ask	a	woman	if	she	is	pregnant?	The	body	can	also	be	deliberately	altered—through	means	as	dramatic	as	cosmetic	surgery—and	disguised—through	means	as	ordinary	as	makeup.	Moreover,	and	as	I	have	discussed,	the	body	itself	changes,	and	according	to	the	discursive	space	of	contemporary	popular	and	media	culture	(with	roots	much	earlier),	this	is	especially	true	for	adolescent	female	bodies.	Thus,	the	following	case	studies	are	images	of	bodily	instability	that	contest,	or	complicate,	the	dominant	hegemonic	discourse	of	self-through-appearance.		Thus,	the	following	case	studies	are	concerned	with	the	way	in	which	instances	of	bodily	instability,	or	uncertainty,	offer	ways	out	of	the	trap	of	appearance	that	is	not	only	engendered	by	the	visuality—or	specularization,	as	Irigaray	([1974]	1985)	terms	it—of	popular	and	media	culture	but	also	by	the	by	the	mythic	tradition—with	its	ideal,	heroic	form—underscoring	the	mythopoeic	nature	of	these	texts,	a	reading	I	make	clear	in	this	chapter’s	
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concluding	concern	with	seeing	through,	or	more	than,	the	surface.	Such	a	seeing	makes	more	than	just	the	body’s	surface	available	for	determining	self.			
Little	Boys	and	Little	Girls:	Is	There	a	Difference?		Freud	([1933]	1973)	claims,	“when	you	meet	a	human	being,	the	first	distinction	you	make	is	‘male	or	female’?”	(146),	and	this	distinction	is	made—and	has	always	been	made—through	sight,	through	seeing	the	publicly	available	body.	However,	there	are	two	issues	within	this	positioning	that	I	find	disputable.	First,	the	lack	of	acknowledgement	that	it	is	not	that	the	body	speaks	some	truth	of	itself	through	being	viewed;	it	is,	rather,	that	“you”	make	a	assumption,	based	on	expectations	of	appearance.	The	body	is	male	or	female	because	of	the	male	or	female	“you”	expect	to	see.	This	is,	however,	not	just	an	deciding	of	sex,	which	is	problematic	enough.	As	I	demonstrate	through	narrations	of	Alanna’s	cross-dressing,	there	is	also	an	assumption	of	humanity	(“human	beings”)	within	this	hegemonic,	patriarchal	“distinction,”	and	of	what	a	human	is,	not	animal	or	artificial	(not	machine).	Moreover,	Western	rationality,	of	which	Freud’s	work	is	a	part,	would	see	Alanna	and	Thom	as	two	distinct	selves—because	they	inhabit	two	distinct	bodies.	However,	through	being	twins	and	children,	Alanna	and	Thom	appear	as	one;	they	appear	as	Thom,	a	reading	the	text	reinforces	by	coding	Alanna	as	masculine.	Alongside	this	appearing	as	one,	this	section	is	concerned	with	Alanna	and	Thom’s	physical	similarities—because	they	are	twins	and	children—and	the	physical	differences	that	will	one	day	appear—because	Alanna	is	female.		Tamora	Pierce’s	(1983)	Alanna:	The	First	Adventure	opens	with	the	Lord	Alan	of	Trebond	informing	his	two	children—the	twins,	Alanna	and	Thom—that	they	are	to	“leave	for	the	convent,	and	[…]	the	palace”	(2),	in	order	to	begin	training	for	their	adult	roles.	Because	she	is	female,	Alanna	is	to	be	a	lady	(wife	and	mother)	and	Thom	a	knight,	a	role	made	possible	by	his	being	male	(and	of	a	certain	social	rank).	However,	the	twins—specifically	Alanna—have	other	plans.	 	‘Tomorrow	he	gives	us	the	letters	for	the	man	who	trains	the	pages	and	the	people	at	the	convent.	You	can	imitate	his	writing,	so	you	can	do	new	
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letters,	saying	we’re	twin	boys.	You	go	to	the	convent	[…]	And	I’ll	go	to	the	palace	and	learn	to	be	a	knight!’		(2)		Effectively,	the	twins	plan	to	trade	places—only,	for	Alanna,	it	is	not	a	straightforward	swap.	For	Thom,	the	plan	is	quite	simple:	he	will	pretend	to	be	Alanna	until	they	have	left	the	family	grounds,	but	as	“younger	sons	[…]	could	go	first	to	the	convent,	then	to	the	priests’	cloisters,	where	they	studied	religion	or	sorcery,”	his	deception	is	minimal	(7,	my	emphasis).	Alanna,	however,	will	remain	disguised—or	cross-dressed—for	years,	and	she	does	not	just	pretend	to	be	Thom.	She	becomes	Alan,	a	boy	training	to	become	a	knight.		This	becoming	first	Thom	and	then	Alan	is	made	possible	throughout	the	quartet	in	a	number	of	ways.	Here,	I	am	concerned	with	the	appearance	that	is	shared	between	this	brother	and	sister,	and	with	how	being	twins	and	children	Alanna’s	cross-dressing	is	possible—being	a	twin	and	a	child	construes	her	as	looking	like	her	brother.	Thus,	Alanna’s	cross-dressing	or—this	“crazy	idea”	(2),	as	Thom	anticipates	it	to	be—is	made	possible	owing	to	appearance,	to	the	physical	appearance	that	as	twins	Alanna	and	Thom	share.		The	only	difference	between	them—as	far	as	most	people	could	tell—was	the	length	of	their	hair.	In	face	and	body	shape,	dressed	alike,	they	would	have	looked	alike.	(1)			Their	bodies	are	the	same.	The	things	that,	in	the	present	of	narration,	differentiate	Alanna	and	Thom	are	superficial:	“length	of	hair”	and	clothes.	Once	her	hair	is	cut	and	her	clothes	changed,	Alanna	“look[s]	enough	like	Thom	to	fool	anyone	but	Coram,”	who	also	looks	after	the	children	and	who	accompanies	Alanna-as-Thom-becoming-Alan	to	the	palace	(9).			Yet,	while	integral,	the	twin-ness	is	not	enough,	the	foundation	of	similarity	that	initially	makes	Alanna’s	cross-dressing	possible	also	depends	upon	their	being	children,	as	being	children	also	contributes	to	Alanna’s	“look[ing]	enough	like	Thom”	(9).	In	other	words,	Alanna	has	not	yet	experienced	the	bodily	changes	of	puberty	that	would	see	her	“turn	into	a	girl—you	know,	with	a	chest	and	everything”	(2),	and	in	this	way,	the	text	recapitulates	Freud’s	([1933]	1973)	call	to	“recognize	that	the	little	girl	is	only	a	little	man”	(151).	Alanna	“‘look[s]	enough	like	Thom”	not	just	because	they	are	
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twins	but	also	because	they	are	children,	because	she	is	not	yet	“a	girl,”	because	she	is	a	“little	man.”		In	her	critique	of	Freud,	Irigaray	([1974]	1985)	suggests	that	hegemonic	discourse,	of	which	Freud’s	reading	is	a	part,	recognises	“the	little	girl”	as	“only	a	little	man”	because	her	body	lacks	a	visible	marker	of	its	sexed	state.			She	has	nothing	you	can	see.	She	exposes,	exhibits	the	possibility	of	a	nothing	to	see.	Or	at	any	rate	she	shows	nothing	that	is	penis-shaped	or	could	substitute	for	a	penis.	(47)		In	exhibiting	nothing,	there	is	nothing	for	representation.	The	girl-child’s	body	does	not	mean,	the	issue	of	concern	in	Chapter	Four.	Here,	I	am	concerned	with	how	this	insistence	on	seeing,	on	specularization	in	Irigaray’s	terms,	positions	the	little	girl	as	“only	a	little	man”	(Freud	[1933]	1973,	151).	While	Thom’s	“maleness”	is	assumedly	a	visible	presence,	Alanna’s	visible	difference—her	“chest	and	everything”—has	not	yet	appeared,	so	she	is	not	yet	“a	girl”	(Pierce	1983,	2).	She	is	not	yet	a	“real	girl,”	as	Page	(2000),	a	subsequent	Tortall	book,	suggests	(125).	The	specularization	of	the	body	elides	sexed	difference	because	it	cannot	be,	as	yet,	ascertained	by	sight.	Yet,	Alanna’s	being	a	girl	is	the	very	thing	that	establishes	the	need	for	this	cross-dressing,	whilst	also	making	it	possible.83		This	perceptual	absence	of	a	gendered	body	is	not	an	unusual	figuring	in	terms	of	childhood,	as	Rose	([1984]	1992)	charts.	Rose	suggests	that	the	child’s	body	is	erased	because	childhood	sexuality—“bisexual,	polymorphous,	perverse”	(4)—threatens	the	stability	of	adult	“normal”	heterosexuality.	Yet,	it	is	not	that	the	child’s	fleshy,	physical	body	does	not	exist—that	would	be	another	kind	of	impossibility—it	is,	rather,	that	this	discursive	production,	in	its	binary	nature,	requires	that	the	child’s	body	have	no	sexual	meaning.	Thus,	while	at	birth	children	are	immediately	marked	male	or	female,	it	is	both	a	biological	sexing	of	the	body	that	lacks	sex	as	well	as	one	that	depends	on	a	visual	apprehension	of	having/not	having	a	penis.	In	this	way,	the	female-child’s	
                                                83	Flanagan	(2008)	notes	“this	intro	frames	Alanna’s	decision	to	cross-dress	as	a	response	to	her	dissatisfaction	with	traditional	femininity	and	desire	to	escape	it	by	assuming	a	masculine	identity	as	a	royal	page”	(68).		
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body	is,	perhaps,	not	so	much	erased	as	her	sexed	body	is	elided,	and	while	it	is	an	elision	that	adolescence	disrupts—as	Alanna’s	body	demonstrates	through	becoming	a	“real	girl”—it	is	also	the	possibility	of	becoming	a	“real	girl”	that	makes	Alanna’s	cross-dressing	possible	(2000,	125).	Thus,	while	these	statuses	“boy”	and	“girl”	are	precarious,	it	is	also	precisely	because	Alanna	is	a	girl	that	she	may	cross-dress.	If	she	were	not,	it	would	not	be	cross-dressing;	it	would	just	be	wearing	Thom’s	clothes.	It	takes,	in	other	words,	both	the	foundation	of	similarity	and	this	(future)	difference	to	make	Alanna’s	cross-dressing	possible.		This	distinction	between	girl-child	(who	is	both	girl	and	not	girl)	and	a	“real	girl”	is	not	an	isolated	distinction	within	Pierce’s	work	(2000,	125).	In	Pierce’s	later	Protector	of	the	Small	quartet,84	Kel—also	training	to	become	a	knight,	though	not	disguised	as	a	boy—becomes	this	girl	that	Alanna	will,	eventually,	become:			When	she	straightened,	she	was	startled	to	see	his	eyes	bulge.	‘Mithros’s	spear,	Kel!’	he	[Owen]	exclaimed.	‘When	did	you	turn	into	a	real	girl?’							‘You	said	she	was	a	girl	already,’	muttered	one	of	his	cousins—was	it	Iden	or	Warric?	Kel	hadn’t	gotten	them	straight.						 	 		‘But	not	a	girl-girl,	with	a	chest	and	all!’	protested	Owen.	(2000,	125–126)		Prior	to	the	growth	of	this	“chest,”	Kel	was	not	a	“girl-girl,”	as	Freud’s	argument	suggests	and	as	Owen’s	comments	make	clear.	Thus,	there	is	a	distinction	within	these	texts	between	the	girl-child,	who	can	look	like	her	brother,	and	this	“real	girl”	or	“girl-girl.”	There	are	two	issues	worth	drawing	out	from	this	construction;	first,	this	not	being	a	girl	until	the	“chest”	develops	speaks	to	the	erasure	of	woman’s	sexual	history	prior	to	adulthood	(see,	also,	Rose	1984).	Thus,	while	Alanna	and	Thom’s	relationship	as	twins	complicates	the	issue	by	offering	the	suggestion	that,	in	some	ways,	Alanna	merely	dissolves	into	Thom,85	the	ambiguity	of	girl,	
                                                84	In	terms	of	“published	after”	and	“set	after,”	according	to	the	Tortall	timeline	(see	Konst	2016).		85	The	brother	and	sister	seem	to	dissolve	into	one,	an	issue	that	I	return	to,	using	Irigaray’s	concern	with	the	unity	of	the	brother	and	sister,	in	“Who’s	
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its	double	usage	(the	girl-child	and	this	Other	“real	girl”	that	she	will	become)	suggests	that	it	is	not	just	this	twin-ness	that	allows	Alanna	to	become	Thom.	Rather,	it	has	something	to	do	with	the	text’s	construction	of	being	a	girl-child/“little	man,”	and	it	depends	quite	heavily	on	the	not	yet	having	a	“chest,”	on	an	absence	of	visible	of	bodily	difference.	The	second	issue	is	a	two-part	questioning	of	popular	and	media	culture’s	representational	economy	that	Alanna’s	quartet	continually	navigates,	often	along	the	lines	of	what	makes	a	girl.	In	one	sense,	Alanna’s	body—even	before	the	changes	of	puberty	that	would	mark	her	as	adolescent	and	“real	girl”—threatens	to	break	through	(2000,	125).	She	is	always	already	a	girl.		In	terms	of	the	first,	Alanna	and	Thom	will	always	be	twins,	but	they	will	not	always	be	children.	Thus,	the	prospect	of	Alanna’s	changing	body	threatens	their	shared	appearance.	Yet,	this	threatening	also	occurs	in	the	present	of	narration;	their	hair	is,	at	once,	a	sameness	(its	colour)	and	a	difference	(its	length):	“the	only	difference	between	them—as	far	as	most	people	could	tell—was	the	length	of	their	hair”	(1983,	1).	Moreover,	even	as	children,	they	only	appear	identical	when	“dressed	alike”	(1).	In	this	way,	there	is	a	tension	between	that	which	is	constructed	as	essential	and	unchanging	(hair	colour,	face,	body	shape)	and	that	which	is	constructed	as	supplementary	and	thus	changeable	(hair	length,	clothing,	body	shape).	It	is	poignant	that	“body	shape”	is	both	unchanging	and	also	changeable.	For	the	present	of	narration,	this	ambiguity	of	the	body	(its	doubleness)	means	that	bodily	difference	does	not	matter;	even	the	possibility	of	more	“developed”	differences,	do	not	matter—“I	can	hide	all	that”	(14).	In	this	way,	it	takes	more	than	just	a	shared	“body	shape”	for	Alanna	and	Thom	to	swap	places.		First,	the	clothing	Alanna	wears	in	order	to	cross-dress	both	presents	her	as	a	boy,	whilst	also	making	certain	that	she	is,	in	fact,	a	girl.	It	is	also	the	clothing	that	will	mask	her	developing	body,	when	that	time	comes.	For	this	reason,	the	relationship	between	bodies	and	clothing	is	important.	In	
Fashioning	the	Frame:	Boundaries	and	the	Body,	Alexandra	Warwick	and	Dani	
                                                                                                                                     Looking	at	Whom”	when	engaging	issues	specifically	related	to	woman’s	exclusion	from	the	Symbolic.		
 134	
Cavallaro	(1998)	ask,	“Should	dress	be	regarded	as	part	of	the	body,	or	merely	as	an	extension	of,	or	supplement	to	it?”	(xv).	This	inclusion	of	other	things	within	conceptions	of	the	body	is	also	an	issue	that	Balsamo	(1996)	engages	in	her	concern	with	how	technologies—and	this	is	not	just	technology	in	the	sense	of	devices,	but	it	is	anything	interacting	with	a	fleshy,	physical	body—“have	subtly	altered	the	dimensions	and	markers	of	what	counts	as	a	‘natural’	body”	(1).	The	entanglement	of	bodies	with	other	things—digital	images,	as	I	have	discussed,	clothing,	other	bodies	through,	for	example,	pregnancy,	animals,	and,	yes,	machines—is	complicated.	In	other	words,	it	is	often	rather	difficult	to	determine	just	where	body	ends	and	where	clothing—or	any	other	technology—begins,	as	they	are	entangled	with	one’s	sense	of	self.	Including	clothing,	an	unnatural	(as	in	not	fleshy)	thing,	as	part	of	the	body	not	only	speaks	to	my	readings	of	Cinder’s	cybernetic	body	(her	body	includes	both	human	and	machine	in	its	composition),	but	it	also	suggests	that,	even	here,	there	is	no	natural	body.	The	body	is	always	already	conceived	in	relation	to	other	things,	and	this	conceiving	in	relation	is	integral.	In	Alanna’s	case,	clothing	contributes	to	her	being-Alan;	it	participates	in	her	complicated	return	to	a	female	self,	and,	here,	it	hides	the	differences	that	will	come.		Interestingly,	clothes	come	just	as	much	into	play	in	the	revealing	of	Kel’s	“real	girl”	status	as	they	do	in	Alanna’s	hiding	of	hers,	a	thread	I	also	pick	up	in	the	following	case	study	in	relation	to	Cinder	and	the	hiding,	or	not,	of	her	cybernetic	parts.	Here,				Kel	looked	down.	That	summer	Lalasa	[Kel’s	friend	and	handmaid]	had	talked	her	into	donning	lighter	shirts	than	her	palace	wear.	These	were	still	cotton,	but	thinner,	and	they	draped	like	silk.	(2000,	126)		These	“lighter	shirts,”	and	especially	that	“they	draped	like	silk,”	reveal	the	body	underneath.	They	reveal	Kel’s	“chest	and	all.”	Kel,	Alanna	too,	is	always	already	a	girl.	As	she	later	speculates,	“maybe	I’m	the	same	whatever	I	wear,	she	thought.	It’s	just	easier	to	fight	in	breeches”	(2001,	261).	On	one	hand,	clothing	does	not	affect	Kel’s	being	a	girl,	“I’m	the	same	whatever	I	wear,”	but	on	the	other,	“a	pale	pink	shift,	pink	wool	stockings,	and	a	fine	wool	gown”	construct	her	as	“the	girl	she	would	have	been	had	she	not	tried	for	her	shield”	(261).		
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Pierce’s	Tortall	universe	offers	a	complex	positioning	on	what	it	means	to	be	a	girl,	one	that	problematises	the	conflation	of	sex	and	gender	as	the	two	are	not	always	mutually	exclusive	or	mutually	dependent	(Butler	1990).	With	Alanna,	the	suggestion	of	cross-dressing	brings	future	sexed,	and	sexual,	difference	into	awareness.	Their	father’s	edict	that	his	children	will	be	sent	off	to	train	initiates	Alanna’s	becoming	“a	lady,”	a	position	also	coded	as	feminine	and	one	involving	bodily	comportment.	To	“walk	slowly,”	“sit	sill,”	and	to	keep	her	“shoulders	back,”	is	the	gendered	performance	required	to	be	“be	a	lady”	(1).	Because	there	is	nothing	to	see—Alanna	is	not	yet	this	“real	girl”	(2000,	125)—the	comportment	of	the	body,	holding	and	presenting	the	body	in	ways	that	appear	“lady”-like,	is	what	constructs	it	as	feminine,	that	is	to	say	woman.	This	narration	of	femininity—of	being	a	girl,	when	one	is	also	a	child—thus	depends	upon	presenting	the	body	as	feminine,	despite	an	absence	of	visual	markers	of	the	body’s	femaleness.	Of	this	comportment	and	its	relationship	to	femininity,	Young	(1980)	offers:			I	take	‘femininity’	to	designate	not	a	mysterious	quality	or	essence	that	all	women	have	by	virtue	of	their	being	biologically	female.	It	is,	rather,	a	set	of	structures	and	conditions	that	delimit	the	typical	situation	of	being	a	woman	in	a	particular	society,	as	well	as	the	typical	way	in	which	this	situation	is	lived	by	the	women	themselves.	(144)			This	perfectly	describes	Alanna’s	situation:	as	a	child,	she	does	not	have	“a	mysterious	quality	or	essence.”	In	fact,	despite	being	“biologically	female,”	she	is—until	the	changes	of	puberty—identical	to	her	brother.	She	is	not	“a	real	girl”	(2000,	125).	Thus,	it	takes	her	comportment	in	order	to	effect	femininity	on	her	body.	In	her	specific	situation,	“walking	slowly,”	“sitting	still”	and	keeping	her	“shoulders	back”	construe	her	as	a	woman,	as	“be[ing]	a	lady”	(1983,	1).	Taking	issue	with	the	adage	“throwing	like	a	girl,”	Young	suggests	it	is	not	that	girls	throw	in	a	feminine	way	because	they	are	girls;	it	is,	rather,	that	throwing	like	a	girl	makes	them	feminine,	a	culturally	learned	behaviour	makes	them	feminine.	For	Alanna,	the	learned	bodily	comportment	of	being	a	“lady”	would	construe	her	as	(also)	a	girl	(that	is	feminine)—although,	“be	a	lady,”	is	far	more	complicated	than	this	allows.		
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	 In	this	pseudo-medieval	world,	“lady”	is	also	a	station	of	rank,	a	classed	position.	It	is	not,	merely,	being-woman,	and	it	can	include	activities	that	are	not	ladylike—“my	aunt	lit	barrels	of	lard	and	had	them	catapulted	onto	Scanran	ships	this	summer”—but	that	are	appropriate	to	the	rank—“as	would	any	delicately	reared	noblewoman”	(Pierce	[1999]	2004,	29).	In	this	way,	the	text	calls	into	question	the	expectations	associated	with	a	gendered	performance,	first	by	expanding	what	“be	a	lady”	means—it	is	both	a	marker	of	femininity	and	a	social	position—and	second	by	refiguring	terms	like	“delicate.”	Moreover,	and	this	is	why	I	do	not	call	for	a	strictly	performance-based	constructing	of	gender,	this	reading	does	not	include	the	visible	bodily	markers	(“chest	and	everything”)	that	transform	Kel	and	Alanna	into	“real	girl[s].”	The	performance	of	gender—and	even	our	interpretation	of	what	that	performance	means—can	change	through,	for	example,	cross-dressing.	Simultaneously,	the	body	itself	both	can	change	(it	becomes	that	which	signifies	“a	girl”)	and	it	cannot	change	(it	does	not	become	physically	male)	through	cross-dressing.	Alanna’s	body	remains,	or	still	becomes,	female	despite	what	she	does	with	it:	walking	slowly,”	“sitting	still”	or	“falling	down	and	whacking	things,”	the	things	Thom	suggests	are	part	of	becoming	a	knight,	do	not	matter	to	this	being	a	“real	girl.”	Directly	contesting	contemporary,	hegemonic	conceptions	of	femininity	on	the	body,	this	is	about	how	perceptions	of	her	body	change,	an	issue	that	I	explore	in	the	following	case	study.		Finally,	as	children	and	twins,	Alanna	and	Thom	appear	identical,	apart	from	those	particularly	superficial	differences	of	hair	length	and	clothing.	Yet,	these	identical	twins	are	also	different:	Alanna’s	inner	qualities,	or	traits,	align	more	with	those	coded	as	masculine	within	this	world	and	Thom’s	with	the	feminine.86	In	other	words,	the	bodily	difference	that	is	always	already	present,	as	well	as	the	visible	difference	that	is	yet	to	come,	are	not	the	only	differences	that	the	text	constructs	between	Alanna	and	Thom.	Alanna	is	also	constructed	as	both	better	at,	and	as	liking	more,	the	skills	associated	with	boys	and	men	within	this	world,	a	construction	of	masculinity	that	mimetically	appeals	to	
                                                86	Alanna’s	particular	strength	at	healing,	which	is	typically	aligned	with	the	feminine	is	excluded.	
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hegemonic	masculinity.	As	Coram,	once	he	has	been	included	within	the	deception,	muses:		Alanna	was	much	quicker	than	her	brother.	She	rarely	tired,	even	hiking	over	rough	country.	She	had	a	feel	for	the	fighting	arts,	and	that	was	something	that	could	never	be	learned.	She	was	also	as	stubborn	as	a	mule.	(1983,	15)		Alanna	has	what	it	takes—quickness,	stamina,	a	feel	for	the	fighting	arts,	and	stubbornness—in	order	to	become	a	knight	and	a	boy.	Crucially,	Alanna	possesses	the	skills	required	to	become	a	knight—coded	as	masculine	by	both	the	text	and	the	hero	paradigm,	which	this	quartet	follows—and	her	brother	does	not.	Victoria	Flanagan	(2008)	suggests	that	this	is	typical	of	cross-dressing	in	children’s	literature	as	the	absence	of	strong	male	and	masculine	characters	allows	the	girl	to	carve	her	“own	gender	niche”	(104).	As	examples,	Flanagan	cites	Thom’s	inability	to	fight	as	well	as	the	frailty	of	Mulan’s	father	in	Walt	Disney’s	Mulan	(Bancroft	1998).87			 The	male	characters	within	these	narratives	rarely	fulfill	the	conventional	expectations	of	masculinity,	and	it	is	in	the	context	of	these	failed	personifications	of	traditional	masculinity	that	the	cross-dressing	protagonist	is	able	to	carve	her/his	own	gender	niche,	which	falls	outside	the	socially	condoned	categorizations	of	‘masculinity’	and	‘femininity.’	(104)		This	notion	that	Alanna	carves	her	“own	gender	niche”	is	integral	both	here	and	to	the	overall	argument	of	this	thesis:	through	cross-dressing,	shape-shifting,	bleeding	and	being	cyborg,	these	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	texts	offer	alternative	frameworks	of	living	and	being	a	body.	Moreover,	Chapter	Four	specifically	reads	how	Alanna	constructs	her	own	“gender	niche”	through	a	hero’s	journey	that	takes	the	body,	particularly	the	bleeding	of	menstruation,	into	account.	Here,	Flanagan’s	position	fails	to	take	into	account	that	it	is	precisely	because	Alanna	is	a	girl	that	she	must	possess	these	skills,	as	they	not	only	contribute	to	her	cross-dressed	persona,	but	they	also	contribute	to	how	the	text	constructs	
                                                87	In	the	film,	Mulan	cross-dresses	in	order	to	stand	in	for	her	ageing	and	injured	father,	when	the	Emperor	has	conscription	notices	issued	in	order	to	fight	the	invading	Huns.		
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Alanna	and	Thom	as	merely	one	self	in	two	bodies,88	a	positing	that	is	key	as	it	not	only	questions	the	gendered	body’s	relationship	to	the	sexed	self	and	gendered	identity	(see,	also,	Butler	1990),	but	it	positions	Alanna’s	“gender	niche”	as	existing	on	a	continuum	of	potential	between	hegemonic	femininity	and	hegemonic	masculinity.	In	this	way,	it	is	not	so	much	“outside	the	socially	condoned	categorizations”	as	it	is	between	them.			 This	coding	of	Alanna’s	skills	and	attributes	as	masculine—through	their	specific	manifestation	in	terms	of	“quick[ness],”	endurance,	and	a	“feel	for	the	fighting	arts”—also	begins	establishing	that	this	is	(15),	or	will	be,	a	hero	narrative.	As	I	demonstrated	in	Chapter	Two,	the	hero	is	bodily	stability.	He	is	bodily	stability	because	he	tests	his	body	against	foes,	and	it	does	not	fail.	Thus,	masculinity	(coded	as	strength,	stamina,	and	an	ability	to	fight)	is	part	of	the	heroic	makeup.	In	other	words,	by	the	time	Alanna	is	a	full	and	“bloodied”	knight,	she	is	also	“a	hero.	She’s	proved	it	over	and	over”	([1999]	2004,	165).	The	hero	and	heroic	deeds—deeds	that	are	achieved	because	of	physical	prowess—are	one	and	the	same,	and	it	is	a	point	evidenced	in	The	Woman	Who	
Rides	Like	a	Man	(1984),	when	both	Alanna	and	Jonathan	undergo,	at	different	times,	“the	trial	by	combat”	in	order	to	become	members	of	the	Bloody	Hawk	(24).		 The	Bloody	Hawk	are	a	Bazhir	tribe	comprised	of	a	primarily	nomadic	people	who	live	within	Tortall’s	Great	Southern	Desert	and	who	are	known	for	the	their	combat	skills.	At	the	time	of	Jonathan’s	trial,	Myles	stops	Alanna	from	interfering	in	order	to	protect	Jonathan,	suggesting,	“‘He	[Jonathan]	was	a	full	knight	during	the	war	with	Tusaine—he’s	no	unblooded	boy!’”	(138).	It	is	interesting	on	two	fronts,	as	it	develops	my	reading	of	“being	hero”	through	physical	prowess,	while	also	suggesting	that	Alanna	is	more	confident	in	her	abilities	than	she	is	in	Jonathan’s,	the	man	who—as	male,	knight	and	king-to-be—ought	to	be	the	hero.	Through	her	actions,	Alanna	has	become	heroic,	and	it	is	a	heroic	that	is	made	possible	by,	and	through,	a	body	that	is	not	traditionally	heroic.	In	this	way,	the	text	offers	a	notion	of	“being”	that	is	not	
                                                88	Hunt	(1986)	suggests	that	this	figuring	of	twins,	as	one	person	split	into	bodies,	is	typical	in	books	for	children.		
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contingent	on	the	sexed	body,	though,	at	the	same	time,	that	sexed	body	is	a	part	of	the	“being.”	In	other	words,	Alanna	is	much	quicker	than	her	brother	and	posses	a	“feel	for	the	fighting	arts”	(1983,	15)	that	he	does	not,	and	the	sex	of	her	body	matters	little	in	this	figuring;	yet,	at	the	same	time,	the	sex	of	her	body	is	crucial	because	it	is	hers;	she	is	a	girl.		Finally,	as	children	and	twins,	Alanna	and	Thom	appear	identical,	apart	from	those	particularly	superficial	differences	of	hair	length	and	clothing.	Yet,	these	identical	twins	are	also	different:	Alanna’s	inner	qualities,	or	traits,	align	more	with	those	coded	as	masculine	within	this	world,	and	Thom’s	with	the	feminine	(Alanna’s	healing	magic	excluded).	Thus,	Alanna	appears	to	be	merely	a	little	boy.	She	appears	to	be	her	brother,	or,	perhaps,	it	is	as	if	the	two	twins	comprise	the	whole	of	a	single	person,	a	reading	that	Thom’s	death—at	the	end	of	the	final	book	and	concomitant	to	Alanna’s	incorporation	of	both	feminine	and	masculine	aspects	of	herself—suggests.	Here,	it	is	about	how	a	reading	of	their	similarity	is	dependent	upon	a	difference	between	surface	and	depth,	between	that	which	can	change	(length	of	hair,	clothes,	body	shape)	and	that	which	cannot	(hair	colour,	face,	body	shape).	It	is	a	distinction	that	is	continually	made—and	troubled—throughout	Pierce’s	Tortall	universe.		Alanna	and	Thom’s	shared	appearance	is	also,	at	least	in	part,	concerned	with	the	mutability	of	both	gender	and	appearance,	as	both	qualities	are	read	on	the	body.	Alanna’s	cross-dressing,	in	particular,	depends	on	a	notion	that	the	body	can	be	hidden	and	disguised,	an	act	that	alters	perceptions	of	it.	This	mutability	of	appearance	is	a	topic	that	the	Lunar	glamour,	“the	illusion	of	themselves	that	they	project	into	the	minds	of	others,”	explores	in	greater	detail	(Meyer	2012,	172),	whilst	also	speaking	to	issues	of	appearance—digitally	edited	photographs	and	cosmetic	surgery—of	popular	and	media	culture.			
Hiding	the	Body’s	“Truth:”	The	Lunar	Glamour			The	apparent,	that	is	to	say	visible,	differences	between	humans	and	Lunars	are	minimal,	save	the	Lunar’s	ability	to	construct	a	“glamour,”	a	magical	method	of	appearance	improvement:		“beautiful”	is	often	the	aim	(Meyer	2012,	172).	In	other	words—excluding	this	glamour,	a	sort	of	continuous	makeover	with	
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endless	possibilities—Lunars	are	“human”	in	appearance.	Thus,	this	section	explores	how	the	glamour—“the	illusion	of	themselves	that	they	[Lunars]	project	into	the	minds	of	others”	(172)—questions	the	reliability	of	appearance,	whilst	also	erasing	the	very	materiality,	a	kind	of	“truth,”	of	the	body	in	favour	of	this	“illusion”	of	glamour.	This	hiding,	or	obscuring,	the	body	is	also	picked	up	in	a	narration	of	Cinder’s	preoccupation	with	hiding	her	cybernetic	parts,	a	hiding	that	speaks	to	Alanna’s	hiding	of	her	female	body	through	cross-dressing.	Finally,	while	the	glamour	is	a	“project[ion]”—not	an	actual,	as	in	physical,	change	to	the	Lunar’s	appearance—the	narration	also	offers	an	illustration	of	how	even	perceptual	changes	(the	Lunar	glamour)	are	not	as	superficial	as	they	might	appear,	while	also	speaking	to	the	effects	of	images	on	adolescent	girls.			 While	most	Lunars	have	the	ability	to	construct	a	glamour	(those	known	as	“shells”	are	the	exclusion),	(Queen)	Levana’s	is	both	the	most	powerful	and	the	most	pervasively	discussed	within	The	Lunar	Chronicles.	Known	as	the	“endless	lie,”	Levana’s	glamour	not	only	masks	a	body	that	is	thoroughly	“disfigured”	(2015,692),	but	the	glamour	becomes	“so	real	that	she	[Levana]	had	no	use	of	her	true	skin	anymore”	(2015b,	96).	Crucially,	the	glamour	does	not	change	the	physical	body.	Rather,	this	is	a	magical	means	of	changing	perceptions	of	the	body.	In	the	case	of	Levana,				 Beneath	the	glamour,	her	face	was	disfigured	from	ridges	and	scars,	sealing	shut	her	left	eye.	The	destroyed	skin	continued	down	her	jaw	and	neck,	disappearing	beneath	the	collar	of	her	dress.	Her	hair	was	thinner	and	a	lighter	shade	of	brown,	and	great	chunks	were	missing	where	the	scars	had	reached	around	to	the	back	of	her	head.	More	scars	could	be	seen	on	her	left	arm	where	her	silk	sleeve	didn’t	hide	them.	(2015c,	692)		These	“ridges”	and	“scars”	are	Levana’s	“true	skin,”	and	it	is	their	truth	that	the	glamour	conceals,	not	only	from	others	but	also	from	Levana	herself:	“after	so	many	years	of	wrapping	herself	in	the	glamour,	it	was	nearly	impossible	to	let	it	go”	(2015b,	191).	Just	as	Alanna’s	cross-dressing	does	not	change	the	“truth”	of	her	skin—she	is,	or	will	be,	a	“real	girl”	(Pierce	2000,	125)—the	glamour	does	not	change	Levana’s	body,	although	it	does	affect	perceptions	of	it.	Moreover,	while	I	suggested	in	Chapter	Two	that	scars	are	important	for	mapping	the	
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contours	of	the	body,	this	narration—through	Levana’s	perception	of	her	scars—demonstrates	the	view	of	scars	taken	by	hegemonic	culture,	that	is,	scars	should	be	hidden.	Finally,	this	use	of	“truth”	in	relation	to	the	“true	skin”	is	not	to	posit	the	fleshy	body	as	more	“true”	or	“real”	than	the	glamour.	The	glamour	is	its	own	kind	of	truth,	the	“truth”	of	the	way	Levana	wishes	to	be	seen.	Thus,	this	notion	of	“true	skin”	is	an	appeal	to	the	physical,	materiality	of	the	body	that	is	posited	as	a	kind	of	truth.		Poignantly,	Levana	relies	so	heavily	on	her	glamour,	instead	of	taking	advantage	of	surgery	that	would	materially	improve	her	body	(as	opposed	to	the	transience	of	the	glamour),	because	with	surgery	“there	would	always	be	scars	no	matter	how	faint”	(2015b,	206).	This	is	the	power	of	the	glamour	and	of	the	selfie.	There	are	no	scars	with	either	of	these	mechanisms,	yet	they	still	transform	the	body.	The	“makeovers”	they	afford	represent	ideal	bodily	improvement,	a	better	body	without	evidence	(scars)	of	the	body	that	came	before.	The	transformations	wrought	through	the	glamour	and	selfie	also	speak	to	the	ephemeral	quality	of	a	“perfect”	appearance.	Ideals	do	not	last,	so	new	changes,	new	makeovers,	need	always	be	enacted.	The	temporary	nature	of	the	glamour	and	the	selfie	allow—because	they	are	illusions	of	(temporary)	perfection—for	this	perpetual	making	over,	reinforcing	Wolf’s	(1991)	definition	of		“beauty	work”	(15).				The	Lunar	glamour,	and	the	same	holds	true	for	Alanna’s	cross-dressing,	also	questions	the	connection	between	gender	and	the	body.	More	specifically,	the	Lunar	glamour	questions	the	contemporary	Western	assumption	that	femininity	depends	on	a	body	that	appears	feminine.	After	encountering	two	Lunar	“ladies”	(Meyer	2015c,	591),	the	following	exchange	occurs	between	Thorne	and	Cress,	who,	as	a	“shell”	(not	gifted	within	this	world),	is	not	affected	by	the	Lunar’s	“ability	to	manipulate	bioelectricity”	(2012,	171).			 Thorne	let	out	a	low	whistle.	“Holy	spades.	The	women	in	this	place.”		Cress	bristled.	“You	mean	the	glamours	in	this	place.	One	of	them	was	a	man.”		Stumbling,	Thorne	looked	down	at	her.	“You	don’t	say.	Which	one?”	(2015c,	591,	emphasis	original)			
 142	
Just	as	the	glamour	disguised	the	“truth”—the	“ridges”	and	“scars”—of	Levana’s	skin	(2015c,	692),	it	also	disguises	the	sex	of	this	Lunar	man,	to	such	an	extent	that	Throne	thoroughly	(“You	don’t	say”)	perceives	both	Lunars	to	be	not	just	women	but	attractive,	“holy	spades,”	women.			 This	twofold	construction	of	glamour—that	it	is	a	magical	ability	and	an	ability	that	is	concerned	with	beauty—speaks	to	glamour	as	it	is	conceived	in	Western	consensus	reality.	In	fact,	the	Lunar	glamour	unites	the	original	and	contemporary	uses	of	the	word,	an	issue	at	stake	for	Rachel	Moseley	(2002).	Moseley	suggests,	“in	the	history	of	the	usage	of	the	word	[glamour],	the	primary	meaning—‘magic,	enchantment,	spell’—has	been	displaced	by	the	idea	of	surface	or	physical	feminine	allure”	(404).89	This	is	the	Lunar	glamour,	or,	should	I	say,	the	Lunar	glamour	is	both	“magic,	enchantment,	spell”	and	a	creating	of	“allure.”	Interestingly,	while	both	male	and	female	Lunars	construct	glamours,	the	descriptions	of	Lunar	appearance	often	tends	toward	the	feminine:	“He	[Jael]	was	willowy	and	lean,	with	wavy	dark	hair	and	near-black	eyes	that	burned	in	the	candlelight”	(Meyer	2013,	278).	Within	this	world,	a	gendered	appearance	is	mutable.	In	the	quest	for	pretty	or	beauty,	the	glamour	aligns	women	and	men	with	the	feminine,	as	“one	of	them	was	a	man”	indicated	above	(2015c,	591).	Here,	the	attributes	“willowy”	and	“wavy	dark	hair”	speak	to	conventional	markers	of	femininity,	and	while	it	is	unclear	if	this	is	Jael’s	glamoured	appearance	or	his	“natural”	one,	it	does	describe	the	kind	of	appearance	preferred	by	Lunars.		The	central	aim	of	Moseley’s	article	is	to	unite	glamour’s	two	definitions—magic	and	appearance—in	order	to	trace,	through	the	figure	of	the	“teen	witch”	(403),	shifting	discourses	of	feminism.	Moseley	states,			 in	reinstating	the	primary	meaning	of	the	word,	a	profound	but	contradictory	link	is	posited	between	femininity	and	magic	in	which	femininity	is	produced	as	superficial	and	deceptive	charm,	mysterious	and	unknowable	essence,	and	as	power.	(2002,	404,	emphasis	original)		Within	The	Lunar	Chronicles,	this	“link”	is	manifest	in	the	figure	of	the	glamour-wielding	Lunar,	with,	as	I	discussed	above	significant	implications	for	
                                                89	For	a	social	history	of	glamour	in	the	West,	see	Dyhouse	(2010).		
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femininity.	The	Lunar	glamour	is	power,	and	it	is	power	that	often	produces	Cochrane’s	(2014)	“heightened	fantasy	femininity.”	The	glamour	offers	femininity	as	illusion,	as	powerful	and	persuasive	but	as	illusion.	With	the	glamour	not	only	is	there	no	depth—femininity	is	only	performance—but	there	is	also	a	profound	rift	between	the	glamour	and	the	body’s	materiality,	what	the	text	posits	as	a	kind	of	“truth,”	and	what	I	refer	to	as	materiality.			 Within	The	Lunar	Chronicles,	the	glamour	is	not	the	only	means	by	which	the	body	is	superficially	altered,	as	clothing	also	plays	a	pivotal	role.	Within	the	first	three	texts,	narration	presents	Cinder	as	preoccupied	with	hiding	her	cybernetic	parts.			 She	covered	her	steel	hand	first,	and	though	her	right	palm	began	to	sweat	immediately	inside	the	thick	material,	she	felt	more	comfortable	with	the	gloves	on,	hiding	the	plating	of	her	left	hand.	(2012,	5)		While	the	narration	is	telling	in	itself,	these	“thick”	gloves,	one	of	which	is	“hiding	the	plating	of	her	left	hand,”	are	in	direct	contrast	with	the	“silk	gloves”	Cinder	later	wears	in	order	to	attend	the	ball	(2012,	324).	Where	those	“felt	too	fine,	too	delicate,	too	flimsy”	(324),	the	“thick”	gloves	cause	Cinder’s	“right	palm”	to	“sweat”	(5).	In	this	way,	while	the	hiding—or	revealing—of	Cinder’s	cybernetic	parts	is	obviously	at	stake	in	relation	to	these	pairs	of	gloves,	the	gloves	also	speak	to	what	it	means	to	be	(human)	female	within	this	world.			 The	“silk	gloves,”	gifted	to	Cinder	by	Prince	Kai	and	ostensibly	for	her	to	wear	at	the	ball	(2012,	324),	mark	(human)	femininity	within	this	world.	Not	only	are	the	gloves	“pure	silk	and	shining	sliver-white”	as	well	as	“the	finest	pair”	Cinder	“could	have	imagined,”	they	are	also	“fit	for	a	princess”	(299),	a	certain	kind	of	heteronormative	femininity	as	I	discussed	in	relation	to	Disney’s	Cinderella.	The	silk	gloves	also	speak	to	the	“real	girl”	that	Kel	became	through	the	development	of	breasts	(2000,	125),	a	becoming	that	was	made	evident	because	of	the	“lighter	shirts,”	that	while	“still	cotton	[…]	draped	like	silk	(126),	revealing	her	“chest	and	all”	(126).	In	draping	“like	silk,”	the	“lighter	shirts”	expose	Kel’s	bodily	femininity	(its	femaleness);	the	“palace	wear”	(her	training	clothes)	obscured	it.	The	silk	gloves	mark	femininity;	the	“thick”	gloves	hide	“plate	metal.”	
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The	“plate	metal”	is	integral.	Not	only	is	it	that	which	is	not	feminine,	but	it	is	also	that	which	is	not	human.			Then	the	prince	reached	for	her	hand—her	cyborg	hand.	Cinder	tensed,	terrified	that	he	would	feel	the	hard	metal,	even	through	the	gloves	[…].		She	mentally	urged	the	robotic	limb	to	go	soft,	to	be	pliant,	to	be	human.	(163)		In	other	words,	because	she	wears	thick	gloves,	Cinder	is	not	only	not	feminine—at	least,	not	the	heteronormative	feminine	marked	by	the	silk	gloves—she	is	also	not	entirely	human.	Thus,	while	there	are	two	kinds	of	hiding	occurring	here—the	covering	with	a	glove	and	the	mental	urging	of	softness,	pliability	and	humanness,	both	speak	to	a	preoccupation	with	keeping	the	cybernetic	body,	a	body	that	is	not	only	machine	but	also	not	feminine,	hidden,	with	not	letting	it	reveal	itself.90	In	this	way,	the	narration	also	situates	itself	within	the	discourses	of	popular	and	media	culture.	Cinder	could	be	any	adolescent	girl	hiding	braces,	a	prosthesis,	or	any	other	“thing”	deemed	inappropriate	to	the	appropriate—thin,	fit,	whole—appearance.			 Yet,	this	is	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy,	and	as	such,	while	the	text	may	demonstrate	the	position	of	popular	and	media	culture—that	things,	spots,	braces,	scars	not	meeting	the	ideals	of	appearance	must	be	hidden—it	also	offers	alternatives;	it	“progresses”	to	new	positions.			 Cinder	peeled	off	her	work	gloves	and	shoved	them	into	her	back	pocket.	There	was	still	a	tinge	of	panic	at	the	action—her	brain	reminding	her,	out	of	habit,	that	she	wasn’t	supposed	to	remove	the	gloves	in	front	of	anyone,	especially	Kai—but	she	ignored	it.	Kai	didn’t	blink	at	the	unveiling	of	her	cyborg	hand,	like	he	didn’t	even	notice	it	anymore.	(2015c,	92)		
                                                90	The	text	makes	it	clear	that	Cinder’s	cybernetic	reconstruction	has	rendered	her	not	feminine.			 If	Cinder’s	body	had	ever	been	predisposed	to	femininity,	it	had	been	ruined	by	whatever	the	surgeons	had	done	to	her,	leaving	her	with	a	stick-straight	figure.	Too	angular.	Too	boyish.	Too	awkward	with	her	heavy	artificial	leg.	(2012,	34)			
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This	self-reflexive	engagement	with	Cinder’s	preoccupation	(“out	of	habit”)	with	hiding	the	cybernetic	parts	allows	the	text	to	comment	on	its	initial	alignment.	In	so	doing,	it	also	offers	a	comment	on	that	earlier	preoccupation.			She	knew	she	was	thinking	about	it	less	and	less.	Sometimes	she	was	even	surprised	upon	seeing	a	flash	of	metal	in	the	corner	of	her	eye	when	she	went	to	pick	something	up.	It	was	strange.	She’d	always	been	aware	of	it	before,	mortified	that	someone	might	see.	(92)			While	problematically	still	giving	weight	to	Kai’s	not	“notic[ing]”	her	hand	anymore,	the	narration	makes	it	clear	that	not	being	“mortified”	upon	the	“unveiling	of	her	cyborg	hand”	is	an	accomplishment	of	Cinder’s—“she	knew	
she	was	thinking	about	it	less	and	less”	(my	emphasis).	Interestingly,	within	the	transition,	the	gloves	become	not	that	which	hides	her	body	but,	instead,	her	“work	gloves;”	they	are	given	a	purpose.	They	are	useful	to	her	work	as	a	mechanic.	This	shift	in	perspective	is	integral	for	it	models	exactly	the	kinds	of	shifts	in	perspective	girls	could	make	outside	of	the	texts	if	exposed	to	images,	like	these,	within	the	texts.	This	cannot	be	over-emphasised:	these	sorts	of	narrations—the	self	reflexive	engagements	with	issues	of	popular	and	media	culture	that	show	alternatives—are	crucial	for	demonstrating,	for	modelling,	how	such	shifts	in	perspective	can,	and	do,	occur.		 This	importance	is	reiterated	by	how	frequently	the	text	demonstrates	this	change	in	perspective.	Here,			 Putting	them	[heavy	gloves]	on	had	dredged	up	a	number	of	memories.	There	had	been	a	time	when	she	wore	gloves	everywhere,	when	she’d	been	so	ashamed	of	being	cyborg	she	refused	to	let	her	prostheses	show.	She	couldn’t	recall	when	that	had	changed,	but	now	the	glove	felt	like	a	lie.	(2015,	167)		Speaking	to	issues	of	disability	and	difference,	Cinder	is	no	longer	“ashamed”	not	just	of	“being	cyborg”	but	also	of	“let[ting]	her	prostheses	show.”	The	prostheses	are	a	part	of	her	body’s	“truth;”	they	have	become	included	within	Cinder’s	body	image	(her	sense	of	self),	and	in	so	being,	they	create	a	new	“true	skin”	(2015b,	96).	They	demonstrate	how	“truth”	changes;	it	is	not	stagnate.	Thus,	the	transition	to	the	“glove	[feeling]	like	a	lie”	is	crucial	to	this	modelling	of	how	difference	can	be	made	acceptable	and	normal	through	these	narrations.		
 146	
These	readings—of	the	Lunar	glamour,	Cinder’s	preoccupation	with	hiding	her	cybernetic	parts	as	well	as	Alanna’s	cross-dressing—have	been	concerned	with	superficial	changes	to	the	body,	that	is	to	say,	with	changes	that	occur	at	the	level	of	the	body’s	surface	in	order	to	effect	perceptions	of	the	body,	as	is	also	the	case	with	the	selfie.	Alanna	appears	as	Thom,	a	disfigured	Lunar	appears	able-bodied,	a	Lunar	man	appears	as	a	woman,	and	all	gifted	Lunars	appear,	when	using	their	glamour,	more	“beautiful”	(2012,	172	and	2015c,	592).	These	changes	do	not	physically	alter	the	body,	excluding	Alanna’s	haircut	in	the	previous	section.	Yet,	how	superficial	are	“superficial”	changes,	especially	when	the	illusion	is	so	pervasive	that	it	is	all	that	is	seen	and	thus	known?			 Levana’s	glamour,	as	the	“endless	lie”	(2012,	351),	offers	a	particularly	useful	point	of	focus	for	illustrating	how	superficial	changes—changes	that	alter	others’	perception	of	the	body	but	not	the	body	itself—might	not	be	as	superficial	as	they	seem;	it	is	also	advantageous,	however,	to	hold	in	mind	both	Cinder’s	hiding	her	cybernetic	parts	and	Alanna’s	cross-dressing,	as	they	too	are	superficial	changes	in	perspective	that	do	not	physically	alter	the	body.	In	terms	of	Levana,	the	text	makes	it	quite	clear	that	her	glamour,	one	that	she	has	held	in	place	for	years,	is	reality:	“by	now,	so	many	had	forgotten	what	she	truly	looked	like,”	and	“her	glamour	was	the	reality	now,	no	matter	what	Evret	thought,	no	matter	what	anyone	thought	(2015b,	206).	While	there	is	clearly	a	tension	here—perhaps,	a	desire	on	Levana’s	part	for	the	glamour	to	be	“real,”	and	not	just	the	“reality	now”—its	pervasiveness	is	clear.	The	glamour’s	hold	is	strong:	“after	so	many	years	of	wrapping	herself	in	the	glamour,	it	was	nearly	impossible	to	let	it	go.	Her	brain	struggled	to	release	her	grip	on	the	manipulation”	(2015c,	191).	While	this	shows	another	way	in	which	the	texts	refuse	to	posit	definitively	the	“truth”	of	the	body	(physical	shape	or	glamour),	this	reading	of	the	glamour	also	and	more	importantly	crystallises	the	insidious	nature	of	the	selfie:	it,	glamour	or	selfie,	may	just	be	an	illusion,	but	it	is	a	powerful	one,	not	least	owing	to	its	pervasiveness.	After	all,	how	many	girls	have	stood	before	mirrors	unable	to	“see”	anything	other	than	the	“flaws”	dictated	by	popular	and	media	cultures	pervasive	images	of	perfection?			Finally,	the	glamour	illustrates	an	unreliability	of	appearance	if	only	because	it	erases	difference	whilst	also	expressing	bodily	unrealities,	as	Scarlet	
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(a	refiguring	of	Little	Red	Riding	in	The	Lunar	Chronicles)	is	narrated	as	musing.		Stupid	Lunars	and	their	stupid	glamours.	Anyone	could	be	an	enemy.	Anyone	she	passed	could	be	a	thaumaturge	or	one	of	those	lousy	aristocrats	or	the	queen	herself,	and	Scarlet	wouldn’t	be	able	to	tell	the	difference.	(2015c,	541)		It	is	not	just	that	anyone	could	be	“enemy,”	“thaumaturge,”	“aristocrat,”	or	“the	queen.”	It	is	that,	given	the	glamour,	anyone	could	be	anyone.	Appearance	is	not	enough	to	determine	who	someone	really	is.	The	Lunar	glamour	aside,	there	is	a	distancing	implicit	in	appearance;	there	is	a	space	between	the	viewer	and	the	viewed,	and	in	this	space,	misapprehension	can	occur.	The	dissonance	between	self	and	appearance	that	always	already	exists	is	simply	heightened	through	this	glamour.		Moreover,	this	Lunar	glamour	also	foreshadows	an	instability	of	appearance	that	goes	much	deeper	than	merely	disguising	the	body’s	surface,	a	point	that	the	impact	of	continued	exposure	to	the	glamour	initiated	and	that	one	final	narration	of	glamour	develops:			 She	[Levana]	thought	of	Solstice’s	stomach,	plump	and	round	with	the	promise	of	a	child.			[…]		Levana	settled	a	hand	on	her	own	stomach,	incorporating	the	pregnancy	into	the	glamour.	What	must	that	feel	like,	to	have	a	living	creature	growing	inside	her?	(34)			This	is	the	illusion	of	pregnancy.	Levana,	through	the	Lunar	glamour,	takes	on	the	appearance	of	being	pregnant.	In	so	doing,	the	narration	invites	questions	around	bodily	multiplicity:	not	only	does	the	glamour	link	Levana	to	Solstice	(the	wife	of	the	man	Levana	loves),	but	it	also	links	them	both	to	pregnancy,	a	heightened	situation	of	bodily	multiplicity	(and	one	that	occurs	not	just	in	fantasy	texts).	This	move	also	takes	my	reading	from	the	body’s	surface	to	a	consideration	of	the	internal,	in	that	pregnancy	is	an	internal	multiplicity	made	visible	on	the	body’s	surface.	In	other	words,	where	the	first	case	study	was	concerned	with	how	two	bodies	effectively	represented	one	self,	thus	
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complicating	the	representational	economy	as	self	must	be	singular,	and	this	section	focused	on	Lunar	glamour	and	Cinder’s	hiding	of	her	cybernetic	parts,	thus	complicating	the	one-to-one	relationship	implicit	in	the	economy,	the	following	section	is	concerned	with	how	through	pregnancy	the	body	becomes	more	than	one	(see,	also,	Battersby	1998).	More	specifically,	it	is	concerned	with	how	this	multiplicity	plays	out	on	the	body’s	surface,	as	the	body’s	surface—or	its	appearance—is	the	very	marker	of	self	under	question	throughout	all	these	changes.				
The	Pregnant	Body:	Revealing,	and	Concealing,	Multiplicity	 		Battersby	(1998)	follows	her	description	of	woman	as	a	phenomenon	with	the	call	to	stop	“treating	women	as	somehow	exceptional”	(2),	and	in	order	to	do	so,	Battersby			 start[s]	from	the	question	of	what	would	have	to	change	were	we	to	take	seriously	the	notion	that	a	‘person’	could	normally,	at	least	always	potentially,	become	two.	(2)		Battersby	is	concerned	with	pregnancy,	with	the	embodied	state	of	being	more	than	one,	and	while	this	has	implications	for	subjectivity	that	I	return	to	in	the	Conclusions,	I	here	use	narrations	of	pregnancy	in	order	to	question	the	assumption	of	a	singular	appearance	representing	a	singular	self,	in	a	straightforward	and	uncomplicated	one-to-one	fashion.	Admittedly,	narrations	of	pregnancy	initially	seem	at	odds	amidst	my	concern	with	how	YAL	narrates	the	liminal	transition	between	childhood	and	adulthood—narrations	of	menarche	would	be	more	expected.	However,	the	pregnant	body	and	the	adolescent	body	share	a	heighted	association	with	being	embodied	and	pregnancy	is	a	“natural”	progression	of	the	adolescent	female	bodily	processes,	menarche,	with	which	I	am,	and	these	texts	are,	predominantly	concerned.		For	example,	Alanna	and	Kel’s	quartets	specifically	include	narrations	of	menarche,	as	I	discuss	in	the	following	chapter,	and	while	Daine	and	Cinder’s	narratives	are	not	concerned	with	menarche	in	the	same	way,	Daine’s	mother	was	the	village	midwife,	a	point	the	text	uses	to	acquaint	
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Daine	with	female	bodily	processes,	pregnancy	and	childbirth,	and	in	Cinder,	it	is	made	clear	that,	despite	her	cybernetic	parts,	Cinder’s	reproductive	system	“is	almost	untouched”	(2012,	116),	suggesting	“normal”	female	bodily	processes	still	occur.91	In	short,	while	about	adolescent	girls,	these	texts	are	concerned	with	being	female	and	thus	the	potential	for	being	pregnant—the	potential	for	one	body	to	become	more	than	one,	as	Battersby	(1998)	suggests—is	part	of	that	concern.		While	interesting	because	it	is	the	narration	of	Alanna’s	daughter’s	pregnancy	thus	offering	a	kind	of	repetition,	the	narration	of	Aly’s	pregnancy	in	
Trickster’s	Queen	starts	this	reading	of	pregnant	embodiment	the	most	simply,	or	so	it	appears.			Aly,	whose	morning	sickness	extended	sometimes	to	evenings,	had	contented	herself	with	a	mild	broth	and	fruit	juices.	She	looked	frequently	at	the	slight	swell	of	her	belly,	mystified	by	the	thought	that	another	human	being	was	taking	shape	beneath	her	navel.	([2004]	2005,	441)		As	the	“morning	sickness,”	“slight	swell	to	her	belly,”	not	to	mention	the	“human	being	[…]	taking	shape	beneath	her	navel”	suggests,	Aly	is	pregnant,	but	these	markers	of	pregnancies	are	not	alike.	There	is	a	key	difference	between	the	markers	“morning	sickness”	and	“slight	swell”—one	is	a	visible,	physical	change	to	the	body	and	the	other	is	not.	This	visibility/invisibility	split	speaks	the	conundrum	of	pregnancy:	with	pregnancy,	there	is	a	tension	between	the	internal,	where	change	is	taking	place,	and	the	external,	where	some—and	only	some—evidence	of	that	change	is	made	available.	Moreover,	pregnancy	offers	the	possibility	of	two,	or	more,	bodies	within	one	body.	In	this	way,	narrations	of	pregnancy	have	the	potential	to	be	narrations	of	bodily	change	that	question	the	representational	economy	dominating	popular	and	media	culture,	and	they	do	so	by	complicating	the	one-to-one	relationship	between	self	and	appearance	as	well	as	the	assumed	singularity	of	self/body.		
                                                91	On	the	15th	of	January	2015,	Meyer	(@marissa_meyer)	responded	to	a	question	I	posed	on	Twitter	asking	if	Cinder	has	periods:	“@Le_phill	Yep.	But	they	hardly	seem	to	slow	her	down!”	(Meyer	2015b).		
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	 In	a	sense,	this	is	similar	to	Alanna/Thom’s	complicating	of	representational	economies;	although,	where	that	reading	complicated	this	economy	by	splitting	one	self	into	two	bodies,	narrations	of	pregnancy	show	two	(or	more)	bodies	within	one	body.	It	also	further	complicates	representational	economies	through	a	two-part	ambiguity	regarding	what	the	pregnant	body	represents	and	how	it	does	so.	First,	the	bump	allows	misreading.	Through	sight	alone—especially	in	the	early	stages	of	pregnancy—it	is	difficult	(if	not	impossible)	to	ascertain	if	a	woman	is	pregnant,	or	not.	Second,	the	body,	even	if	it	“clearly”	announces	pregnancy,	masks	that	which	it	reveals	as,	until	birth,	the	detail	of	what	is	within	is	not	available—unless	medical	imaging	devices	are	employed,	although	in	contemporary	Western	culture	even	those	only	reveal—or	create—so	much.	In	this	way,	pregnancy	also	exudes	an	air	of	the	magical,	linking	this	mundane	(as	in	occurring	with	consensus	reality)	bodily	transformation	to	magical	shape-shifting.		At	the	start	of	her	series,	Aly	is	captured	(while	sailing	from	her	home	to	Port	Legann,	a	nearby	fief)	by	a	“clutch	of	pirate	ships”	raiding	the	Tortallan	coastline	([2003]	2005,	23).	Sold	into	slavery	in	the	neighbouring	Copper	Isles,	Aly	meets,	marries,	and	“mate[s]”	Nawat	Crow,	a	“crow-turned”	man	([2004]	2005,	342).92	According	to	the	mythology	of	this	world,	all	crows	have	the	ability	to	become	human,	temporarily	or	permanently,	at	their	discretion:	“in	the	Copper	Isles,	a	tale	is	told	of	crow	who	fell	in	love	with	a	mortal	woman	and	changed	to	human	shape,	as	all	crows	can	change,	for	her”	(2011b,	75).	Sacred	to	the	trickster	god	Kyprioth	(as	explanation	for	their	antics),	shape-shifting	is	a	part	a	crow’s	arsenal	off	“tricks”	(see,	for	example	[2003]	2005,	135).	In	the	Daughter	of	the	Lioness	duology,	the	crows	temporarily	take	on	human	form	in	order	to	aid	the	raka	(indigenous	peoples	of	the	Copper	Isles)	as	they	overthrow	their	luarin	conquerors.	Moreover,	the	raka	and	the	crows	see	themselves	as	“cousins”	([2003]	2005,	287),	so	while	Nawat	contributes	to	this	complicating	of	self-through-appearance	in	that	he	is	crow	turned	man	who,	once	man,	“can	be	a	crow	at	need”	([2004]	2005,	344),	his	unique	existence	also	makes	Aly’s	pregnancy	interesting.		
                                                92	This	is	the	setting	of	the	raka	magic	that	I	discussed	in	Chapter	Two.		
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	 Throughout	her	entire	pregnancy,	Aly	is	concerned	that—rather	than	giving	birth	to	a	mortal,	human	baby—she	will	deliver	eggs,	owing	to	her	husband’s	heritage,	a	worry	Nawat	cannot	comprehend.		 Since	humans	came	inconveniently	arrayed	with	arms,	legs,	and	a	head,	all	of	which	might	get	stuck	as	they	left	their	labouring	mother,	Nawat	thought	any	woman	would	be	glad	to	birth	a	nice,	well-shaped	egg.	Aly	had	never	come	to	see	his	point	of	view.	(2011b,	76)		While	a	human	woman	giving	birth	to	eggs	is	highly	improbable	within	Western	consensus	reality,	the	fantasy	nature	of	these	tales	means	that	it	is	possible,	even	if	still	unlikely.	However,	whether	or	not	Aly	gives	birth	to	eggs	is	really	not	the	point,	the	point	is:	while	it	is	known	that	Aly	is	pregnant—those	markers	I	discussed	indicate	as	much—the	pregnancy	does	not	reveal	exactly	what	is	“taking	shape	beneath	her	navel”	([2004]	2005,	441).	In	the	case	of	this	pregnancy—set	within	a	Secondary	World	whose	logic	and	rational	differs	from	Western	consensus	reality—Aly	may	very	well	give	birth	to	eggs	and	not	a	human	child.		The	pregnant	body,	both	this	one	within	the	text	as	well	as	ones	outside	the	text,	reveals—and	conceals—its	multiplicity.	The	representational	economy	of	self	equalling	appearance	that	dominates	Western	culture	is	problematic.	On	one	level,	the	reliance	on	sight	means	that—without	the	ability	to	breach	the	barrier	that	is	one’s	skin—until	the	baby	is	born,	her	shape	is	unknown.	Thus,	while	Aly	does	not,	in	fact,	give	birth	to	eggs,	she	does,	still	surprisingly,	give	birth	to	triplets:	“‘Here’s	what’s	been	causing	the	trouble!’	Mistress	Penolong	[the	midwife]	said	with	pleasure’	[…]	She	lifted	up	a	small	wriggling	body	[…]	‘You	have	another	daughter’”	(2011b,	84–85).	It	is	has	been	“trouble”	because	they,	Aly	and	the	midwife,	did	not	know	how	many	babies	Aly	would	have;	in	the	end,	a	daughter	(Ochobai)	and	a	son	(Junim)	preceded	this	final	baby	girl	(Ulasu).		While	Aly’s	pregnancy	makes	available	a	certain	blurring	of	the	single,	stable	body,	it	is	a	limited	blurring,	as	is	the	case	for	all	pregnancies.	Unless	medical	technology	is	employed	to	see	within,	the	body	does	not	reveal	its	depth,	a	topic	of	this	chapter’s	conclusion.	Here,	the	limited	visibility	of	the	internal	illustrates	how	the	body’s	surface	is	not	enough	for	determining	self:	
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Aly’s	self,	while	pregnant,	has	in	fact,	been	comprised	of	three	additional	bodies/selves,	more	than	even	the	“normal”	expectations	of	pregnancy	predicted.	Pregnancy	makes	explicit	the	body’s	liminality.	It	is	a	threshold	both	revealing	and	concealing	the	depth	within,	yet	the	narrations	of	pregnancy	within	these	fantasy	texts	can	make	the	internal	more	available	on	the	body’s	surface,	as	Daine’s	pregnancy	makes	explicit,	especially	in	that	she	must	shape-shift	below	the	waist	every	time	her	unborn	child	does.	In	interviews,	Pierce	makes	it	clear	that	Daine	had	an	“anti-fertility	charm”	prior	to	her	pregnancy,93	only	that	she	lost	it	“in	all	the	shape-changes	she	made	during	Lady	Knight”	(Len	2007a).94	This	loosing	of	her,	effectively,	birth	control	is	given	as	the	reason	as	to	why,	when	Daine	was	twenty-four	and	“more	than	three	months	along”	before	“she	even	realized	she	was	pregnant,”	according	to	a	discussion	on	SheroesCentral	(Len	2007b).95	Pierce	goes	on	to	say,	that	Daine		doesn’t	remember	where	or	when	she	lost	it.	She	only	realized	something	was	a	little	off	in	September,	when	she	couldn’t	lace	up	her	
                                                93	Narratives	of	birth	control—of	the	girls	actively	choosing	to	protect	themselves	from	unwanted	pregnancies—are	central	to	Pierce’s	world.	In	
Squire	(2001),	Kel	seeks	out	a	“midwife-healer”	in	order	to	purchase	a	charm	against	pregnancy,	“as	declaration	that	she	could	decide	some	things	for	herself”	(301).	In	one	respect,	this	is	another	means	of	demonstrating	positive	embodiment,	in	that	choosing	this	“[…]	thing	for	herself”—choosing	not	get	pregnant,	whilst	still	having	sex—is	an	act	of	agency.	Alanna	also	wears	an	anti-fertility	charm,	the	magical	method	of	birth	control	within	this	world.	For	example,			‘I’ll	give	you	[Alanna]	a	charm	against	your	getting	pregnant,	then.		If	you	change	your	mind	you	can	throw	it	away.’		‘Pigs	might	fly,’	the	girl	muttered.	(1983,	138)		The	narrations	around	pregnancy	and	birth	control	within	Pierce’s	Tortall	universe	consistently	give	the	adolescent	girl	choice	over	her	body.		94	Tortall	is	at	war	with	the	neighbouring	country	Scanra	during	Lady	Knight	(2002).	Given	her	unique	set	of	abilities,	Daine	is	among	the	first	line	of	defence.	Needless	to	say,	she	was	rather	busy.		95	Sadly,	the	original	discussion	has	been	archived.	However,	Pierce’s	comments	have	been	collected	by	“Len”	on	Words	of	Tamora	Pierce,	which	is	the	source	I	reference.		
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breeches.	She	went	to	a	healer,	who	gave	her	the	news	that	she	was	pregnant.	Numair	was	over	the	moon.	(Len	2007a,	n.p)			There	are	several	things	going	on	in	this	passage:	issues	of	how	pregnancy	is	known,	which	Aly’s	narration	began	exploring	and	that	will	also	be	picked	up	in	Chapter	Four,	as	well	as	a	securing	of	the	joy	for	this	pregnancy,	a	joy	for	the	child	it	will	bear—Numair	(father	and	Daine’s	partner)	is	“over	the	moon.”	While	this	last	has	little	to	do	with	the	bodily	instability	with	which	I	am	concerned,	it	does	speak	to	the	wider	issue	of	making	available	narrations	of	difference	within	these	texts;	in	that,	this	background	provides	a	story,	a	narrative	of	not	just	acceptance	but	happiness,	both	of	which	are	often	lacking	in	realistic	YAL	featuring	stories	of	pregnant	teenage	girls.96		 While	not	a	part	of	any	specific	quartet,	these	interviews	are	integral	to	the	development	of,	generally,	this	Secondary	World	and,	specifically,	Daine’s	pregnancy.	In	this	case,	these	paratextual	materials	not	only	situate	Daine’s	pregnancy,	but	they	also	explain	why	Daine	has	to	shape-shift	below	the	waist	every	time	her	unborn	child	does:	“she	changed	shape	so	many	times	in	her	first	three	months	that	the	baby	got	used	to	it,	and	has	continued	to	shape-shift	ever	since”	(Len	2007a).	This	makes	explicit	a	relationship	between	mother	and	child	that	is	crucial;	the	pregnant	woman	is	not	one	self	in	one	body,	and	the	relationship	forged	here	extends	beyond	pregnancy	and	into	motherhood.		For	now,	this	paratextual	material	fills	a	blank	space	within	the	narration,	and	in	doing	so,	it	establishes	the	why	of	this	narration	in	Trickster’s	
Choice:			 ‘Your	aunt	is	having	a	baby	shape-shifter	within	the	month,’	replied	her	mother.	[…]	‘If	she	doesn’t	change	below	the	waist	whenever	the	child	does,	it	might	kick	its	way	out	of	her	womb.’	Alanna	shuddered.	‘[…]	it	made	me	queasy	to	see	her	go	from	bear	to	donkey	to	fish	every	now	and	then,	while	her	upper	half	remains	the	same.’	([2003]	2005,	17)	
                                                96	Examples	of	realistic	YAL	concerning	pregnancy	include,	but	are	not	limited	too,	Efaw	(2009),	Nolan	(2011),	and	Carter	(2013).	Overwhelmingly,	these	books—and	those	of	a	similar	vein—see	the	pregnant	girl	as	wayward,	as	fallen.	
Trouble	by	Non	Pratt	(2014)	stands	out	as	a	realistic	YAL	text	that	concerns	teen	pregnancy	without	the	didacticism	bound	up	in	the	above	texts.		Finally	Emgee	(2006)	offers	a	critical	look	at	pregnancy	in	realistic	YAL.		
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	Daine’s	having	to	shape-shift	each	time	her	unborn	child	does	establishes	a	tension	between	the	outside	appearance	(where	shape-shifting	is	available)	and	the	inside	womb	(where	the	unborn	child	is	shape-shifting).	While	pregnancies	typically	require	some	sort	of	“shape-change”—as	Aly’s	“slight	swell”	indicated	([2004]	2005,	441)—Daine’s	shape-shifting	to	match	the	baby	takes	that	change	to	an	entirely	different	level:	it	makes	explicit	the	shape(s)	of	the	child;	Daine’s	form	shifts	to	match	the	unborn	child.	It	is	about	“accomodat[ing]	the	baby’s	changes	(infant	to	horse	to	rabbit	to	bird	to	fawn	to	cub	to	[…]	you	name	it),”	as	Pierces	states	(Len	2007a).	In	this	way,	the	narration	of	Daine’s	pregnancy	makes	explicit	not	only	a	connection	between	mother	and	child	but	also	Battersby’s	(1998)	argument	that	the	mother	is	no	longer	one—the	mother	is	two	(or	more).	Finally,	the	appearance	of	Daine’s	child—that	is	to	say,	the	child’s	self—is	not	fixed,	the	continual	shape-shifting	indicates	as	much.	Moreover,	Daine,	and	readers,	do	not	know	what,	or	who,	this	child	is:			No	one	could	even	magically	tell	the	child’s	sex	while	it	was	in	the	womb.	It	had	shifted	both	sex	and	shape	constantly,	pummeling	poor	Daine	with	everything	from	elephant	feet	to	ostrich	claws.	([2003]	2005,	130)		Before	the	child	is	born,	the	child’s	self,	identity,	and	shape	are	not	fixed.	Moreover,	they	are	directly	tied	to	the	mother’s:	the	child	is	part	of	the	mother	and	the	mother	part	of	the	child,	again	expanding	a	sense	of	self,	as	where	does	one	begin	and	the	other	end?	While	this	is	the	case	for	any	pregnancy—the	relationship	between	mother	and	child	is	one	of	interdependency	and	relation,	as	opposed	to	opposition—this	fantastical	pregnancy	has	the	ability	to	demonstrate	that	relationship	in	ways	that	are	impossible	to	mundane	pregnancies	(that	is	‘normal’	or	non-fantastical	pregnancies).	In	this	way,	where	woman	confuses	boundaries—specifically,	the	boundary	of	self/other	underpinning	Western	philosophy,	as	Battersby	(1998)	argues	(see,	also,	Irigaray	[1974]	1985)—the	pregnant	woman	makes	this	confusion	explicit	and	the	pregnancies	in	these	fantasy	texts	offer	a	further,	heightened	example	of	that	confusion.		
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	 Pregnancy	has	the	capacity	to	both	make	internal	change	known	on	the	body’s	surface,	while,	at	the	same	time,	masking	the	detail	of	that	change,	in	part	because,	as	the	above	suggests,	that	detail	is	unfixed,	still	forming.	In	this	way,	pregnancy—even	“normal,”	as	in	occurring	within	Western	consensus	reality,	pregnancy—questions	representational	economies	by	complicating	the	assumed	singularity	of	self.	Both	revealing	and	concealing	the	multiplicity	within,	the	pregnant	body	is	a	liminal	body,	one	that	also	troubles—as	the	liminal	does—the	stability	of	the	categories	(self	and	other)	that	it	interrupts.	In	fact,	Gennep	([1909]	1960)	devotes	just	as	much	attention	to	“Pregnancy	and	Childbirth”	(41–49)	as	he	does	to	adolescence.	Regarding	pregnancy,	he	states,			 it	has	been	established	that	at	the	onset	of	pregnancy	a	woman	is	placed	in	a	state	of	isolation,	either	because	she	is	considered	impure	and	dangerous	or	because	her	very	pregnancy	places	her	physiologically	and	socially	in	an	abnormal	condition.	(41)		This	“abnormal”	condition	is	the	same	abnormality	associated	with	adolescence,	manifested	in	different	terms.	Both	the	adolescent	and	the	pregnant	woman	are	between,	the	adolescent	is	between	the	oppositional	pairs	adult/child	and	the	pregnancy	woman	between	the	pair	self/other.	She,	like	the	adolescent,	is	neither	one	(self)	nor	the	other	(Other);	she	is	both.	Pregnancy	positions	the	Other	as	existing	within,	but	this	unborn	child	is	not	quite	the	Other	of	the	Symbolic	order:	she	is	both	other	and	not	other,	a	part	of	the	mother	she	inhabits	(see,	also,	Irigaray	[1974]	1985).	It	is	about	conceiving	of	the	child	in	terms	of	her	bodily	encounter	with	the	mother,	while	also	taking	into	account	the	mother’s	bodily	encounter	with	the	child.	It	is	not	a	reading	that	is	altogether	different	from	the	relationship	between	brother	and	sister,	especially,	the	twin	status	that	made	Alanna’s	cross-dressing	possible.	Moreover,	these	narrations	introduce	a	third,	a	mediating	option	between	the	binaries:	Alanna’s	offers	it	through	a	self	that	is	somehow	both	girl	and	not	girl;	Aly	and	Daine’s	pregnancies	through	the	existence	of	two,	or	more,	selves/bodies	within	one	self/body.	Moreover,	this	reading	of	pregnancy	has	implications	for	subjectivity,	especially	when	the	child,	or	children,	are	born,	as	I	discuss	in	the	Conclusions.		Here,	it	serves	to	illustrate	that	the	representational	economy	of	popular	and	media	culture	is	flawed,	both	in	its	
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insistence	on	the	singularity	of	self/body	and	the	reliability	of	appearance,	a	reading	that	shape-shifting	develops	by	making	manifest,	on	the	body,	the	internal	multiplicity	that	pregnancy	introduces.		
Shapeshifters:	Animals	(or	humans?)	in	Disguise		As	the	shape-shifting	heroine	of	Pierce’s	Immortals	quartet,	Daine	is	not	entirely	human:	with	her	mother	a	mortal	and	Weiryn—god	of	the	hunt—her	father,	Daine	“may	look	like	a	human,”	but	she	is	not,	at	least	not	totally	(1992,	70).	She	is	also	“of	the	People:	the	folk	of	claw	and	fur,	wing	and	scale”	(70).	Daine	is	the	child	of	a	human	and	a	god,	and	as	such,	she	is	both	human	and	animal—because	her	god-father	is	affiliated	with	animals.	Yet,	Daine’s	perspective	initially	rejects	being	“of	the	People”	(animals	within	this	world):	“‘Impossible,’	the	girl	said	flatly.	‘Look	at	me.	I’m	pink,	my	fur’s	patchy,	I	walk	on	two	legs.	I’m	human,	human	all	over’”	(70).	Daine	rejects	being	of	the	People	because	she	does	not	look	the	part:	she	is	“pink,”	with	“patchy	fur”	(hair),	and	“two	legs.”	In	many	ways,	her	position	marks	the	expected	position	of	the	adolescent	girl	within	popular	culture:	you	are	who	you	appear	to	be.	However,	Daine	is	both	human	and	animal,	and	in	so	being,	the	narration	establishes	appearance	as	unreliable:	the	body’s	surface,	Daine’s	“look[ing]	human”	(70)—while	being	“of	the	People,”	of	the	animal	(70)—frustrates	the	assumed	one-to-one	relationship	between	self	(being)	and	body	(appearing),	at	least	until	she	shape-shifts.	The	shape-shifting,	while	making	an	internal	being	available	on	the	body,	does	not,	however,	invert	the	one-to-one	relationship	between	self	and	appearance.	Rather,	it	offers	“mutation,	variation,	and	becoming”	(Seaman	2007,	247).	Furthermore,	where	Alanna’s	cross-dressing	was	made	possible	by	a	shared	body	shape	(or	appearance)	and	where	pregnancy	alludes	to	multiplicity	within,	Daine’s	shape-shifting	unites	these	two	narratives,	while	also	extending	the	argument.	In	other	words,	Daine,	as	does	Alanna,	shares	a	bond	with	another,	and	as	with	“normal”	pregnancy,	this	bond	occurs	internally.	However,	unlike	Alanna’s	cross-dressing,	Daine’s	shape-shifting	makes	explicit	exactly	who	she	is	(this	internal	being),	even	if	that	being	is	quite	mutable.	Moreover,	
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Daine’s	“being	of	the	people”	does	not	remain,	as	is	the	case	with	pregnancy,97	internal,	Daine’s	shape-shifting	makes	the	internal	bond	explicit	on	the	body,	blurring	the	border	between	human	and	animal	in	the	process.	Thus,	this	section	is	concerned	with	how	Daine’s	being	“of	the	People”	is	manifest	on	her	body,	thus	disrupting	the	stability	of	body	required	by	both	popular	and	media	culture,	as	well	as	the	hero	paradigm	underscoring	this	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy.	The	question	is,	then,	how	is	she	both	human	and	People,	and	how	is	that	internal	“of	the	People”	made	available?		In	the	first	instance,	Daine’s	internal	being	is	made	available	through	the	narration	of	Cloud’s	(a	pony	whom	Daine	considers	family)	ability	to	see	inside	Daine,	because	they	are	both	“of	the	People.”	Through	this	bond,	Cloud	can	see	inside	Daine:	“On	the	outside,	the	pony	insisted.	Not	inside.	Inside	you’re	People”	(1992,	70).98	This	inside	that	he	is	narrated	as	seeing	is,	in	fact,	a	seeing	of	either	the	Gift	(the	“light”	that	“is	only	for	humans”)	or,	in	Daine’s	case,	wild	magic,	and	while	this	plays	into	a	difference	between	the	Gift	and	wild	magic,	it	also	introduces	a	notion	of	outside	and	inside.	Thus,	where	Alanna	and	Thom’s	shared	body	shape	made	that	reading	of	bodily	instability	possible,	it	is	Daine’s	wild	magic	that	serves	as	the	link—or	a	manifestation	of	the	link—between	Daine-the-human	and	Daine	“of	the	People.”	Furthermore,	it	is	this	magic	that	allows	her	to,	first,	join	her	mind	with	the	minds’	of	her	animal	friends,	becoming—as	Numair	terms	it—a	“magical	symbiote”	([1994]	1999,	22).		This	magical	symbiosis	is	here	useful	because	it	demonstrates—and	makes	possible—the	connectedness	of	two	conventionally	oppositional	categories:	human	and	animal,	but	it	is	also	this	symbiosis	that	directly	leads	to	Daine’s	shape-shifting.			
—Make	your	mind	like	that	of	the	animal	you	join	[…]	[t]hink	like	that	
animal	does,	until	you	become	one.	You	may	be	quite	surprised	by	what	
comes	of	it,	in	the	end.—	(20,	formatting	original)		
                                                97	Birth	is	different.	Yes,	the	internal	multiplicity	is	made	available	externally—the	child,	that	which	causes	the	multiplicity,	can	be	seen—but	this	making	available	produces	another	distinct	self,	and	as	such,	birth	is	discussed	in	the	Conclusions.		98	Daine	learns	to	“see	inside”	too,	see,	Pierce	(1992).		
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Full	body	shape-shifting	is	“what	comes	of	it,	in	the	end”;	although,	the	process	begins	with	partial	transformations,	as	Daine	becomes	accustomed	to	“think[ing]	like”	different	animals.		In	the	first	instance	of	sustained,	albeit	partial,	bodily	transformation,	Daine’s	ears	become	those	of	a	bat,	after	she	joins	with	the	mind	of	Wisewing,	a	member	of	the	“Song	Hollow	Colony	of	bats”	(144).		Her	ears	were	tired	and	sore,	the	muscles	round	them	cramped	from	use.	Reaching	up	to	rub	them,	Daine	touched	a	long	flap	of	leathery	skin	that	flicked	to	and	fro,	catching	each	quiver	of	sound	in	the	air.	(151)			Initially,	this	transformation	is	bound	up	in	issues	of	possession,	of	that	which	belongs	to	Daine	(“her	ears”)	and	that	which	does	not	(“the	long	flap	of	leathery	skin”).	In	so	being,	this	hers/not	hers	plays	into	the	economies	that	underpin	contemporary	Western	culture.	The	ears	are	hers,	but	they	are	also	her—through	belonging,	her	ears	identify	her.	Yet	the	simple	inclusion	of	these	other	ears	on	Daine’s	body	insists	that	they	too,	somehow,	belong	to	her—or,	at	least,	that	they	are	also	a	part	of	her—likely,	owing	to	her	internal	“being	of	the	people”	(1992,	70).	The	surface	of	the	body	is	here	a	place	of	amalgamation.	Its	liminality	is	made	explicit.	Furthermore,	while	the	change	itself	disrupts	the	visual	certainty	of	the	body,	the	narration	of	the	touch	also,	in	offering	an	alternative	way	of	perceiving	the	body,	disrupts	popular	and	media	culture’s	insistence	on	appearance.	Here,	a	later	transformation	makes	this	questioning	of	appearance	even	more	explicit:	“She	looked	at	her	hands	and	feet.	They	were	still	human	but	a	fine	grey	fuzz	covered	them	and	the	tips	of	her	nails	were	black	claws”	([1994]	1999,	213).	Daine’s	body	is	constructed	as	unstable—change	is	introduced	onto	its	surface.	Furthermore,	this	narration	establishes	what	that	change	is	by	defining	what	does	not	change:	the	“human”	that	somehow	exists	before,	and	yet	also	after,	change	has	occurred.	The	narration	of	bodily	transformation,	in	other	words,	establishes	an	opposition	between	changed	and	not	change,	while,	simultaneously,	questioning	it.	For,	by	remaining	“human,”	despite	being	“covered”	and	despite	“black	claws”—despite	change—the	“hands	and	feet”	in	
 159	
their	“not	changed”	states	appeal	to	a	stable	core,	a	core	of	“human”	that	has	somehow	not	changed	during	this	transformation.		Chappell	(2007)	engages	this	issue	through	the	example	of	how,	within	Pierce’s	Immortals	(1992–1996)	quartet,	“death	detaches	the	core	of	a	person	from	their	material	body	in	the	human	realm”	and	yet	“continuous	identity	is	manifested	in	the	afterlife	through	an	identical	replacement	of	the	body	left	behind”	(125).	Chappell	makes	this	point	through	the	death	of	Daine’s	mother	(prior	to	the	quartet’s	start)	and	the	narration	of	Daine	(and	Numair)	meeting	her	when	they	are	sent	to	the	Divine	Realms	in	Realms	of	the	Gods	(1996).	Daine’s	mother	died,	and	her	body	was	buried	in	the	human	realm,	but	here,	in	this	space	of	afterlife,	it	(still)	exists.	Chappell	(2007)	thus	suggests,	“bodies	[…]	clearly	form	and	express	a	large	portion	of	people’s	continuous	identities”	(125),	as	Daine’s	mother	has	maintained	her	body	through	life	and	death.	However,	Daine’s	ability	to	shape-shift	complicates	matters.	Her	ability	to	shape-shift—to	change	the	shape	of	her	body,	or	that	which	should	express	some	portion	of	her	identity,	in	Chappell’s	terminology—complicates	popular	and	media	culture’s	economy	of	representation	in	its	positing	of	a	single,	stable	self.	Specifically,	Daine’s	shape-shifting	literalises	the	liminality	of,	and	the	bodily	instability	associated	with,	the	adolescent	girl,	while	also	speaking	to	the	wider	issues	of	liminality	associated	with	the	period	of	adolescence.		This	shape-shifting	is,	thus,	quite	a	provocative	counter	to	the	conventional	positing	of	(continuous)	identity	requiring	bodily	stability.	In	fact,	Chappell	(2007)	argues,			Daine’s	ability	to	transform	her	body	into	non-human	shapes	yet	maintain	a	stable	identity	gives	the	impression	that	an	essential	self	[…]	is	a	core	somehow	attached	within	but	not	defined	by	one’s	spatio-temporal	form.	In	this	respect,	Pierce’s	series	emphasises	the	necessity	of	having	some	essential	part	of	oneself	separated	from	one's	body	so	that	identity	persists	despite	physical	changes.	(125)		I	agree	with	Chappell	that	some	sense	of	self—that	is	unrelated	to	the	body’s	appearance	is	necessary	for	Daine’s	shape-shifting	to	occur,	in	that,	it,	like	Alanna’s	cross-dressing,	would	not	be	shape-shifting	if	Daine	did	not	somehow	remain.	However,	I	feel	that	Chappell’s	positing	recapitulates	the	binary	
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oppositions	underpinning	popular	and	media	culture,	at	least	in	as	much	as	it	presupposes	the	“Kantian	I”	that	Battersby	(1998)	finds	troubling.	I	am	more	interested	in	how	this	produces	the	self	through	a	changing	body.		The	narration	of	Daine’s	shapeshifting	establishes	a	binary	opposition	between	changed	and	not	changed,	only	to	immediately	question	it;	in	so	being,	this	shape-shifting	is	explicitly	about	showing	how	an	unchanging	core	is	impossible	to	maintain.	The	notion	is	too	rigid;	change	influences	and	modifies	both	the	body	and	the	core,	as	“they	were	still	human	but”	demonstrates—“but”	calls	any	stability	of	the	body	or	otherwise	into	question	(213,	my	emphasis).	“But”	introduces	the	possibility	that	neither	complete	change	nor	complete	non-change	has	occurred	thus	calling	the	stability	of	both	into	question.	The	act	of	change	produces	the	results	of	that	act	as	existing	on,	or	as,	a	continuum,	effectively	uniting	the	oppositions.	In	other	words,	while	the	hands	and	feet	are	claimed	to	be	“still	human,”	“a	fine	grey	fuzz”	and	“black	claws”	are	not	human,	and	while	these	things	are	now	connected	to	the	hands	and	feet	(to	that	which	is	“human”),	they	are	not	human	and	potentially	jeopardise	the	humanness	of	what	they	touch.	The	stability	of	human	is	worried,	just	as	the	lingering	human	worries	the	completeness	of	change	because	this	is	not	about	change/not	changed,	for	all	that	the	narration	terms	it	as	such;	this	is	about	Daine’s	embodying	multiplicity,	change,	and	becoming.	For	me,	this	narration	of	fantastic	bodily	change	is	a	modelling	of	the	very	real	(as	in	physical)	changes	associated	with	the	adolescent	girl:	while	the	adolescent	girl	might	not	develop	“black	claws”	or	grow	“a	fine	grey	fuzz”	(Pierce	[1994]	1999,	213),	she	does	(typically)	begin	growing	underarm	and	pubic	hair	at	the	onset	of	puberty,	while	also	in	the	West	often	experimenting	with	nail	polish	and	other	body	modification	techniques.	Moreover,	while	Daine’s	“human”	appears	to	be	expressed	on	the	body—much	like	femininity—it	also	begins	implementing	a	deeper	sense	of	self,	a	depth	pregnancy	foreshadowed.	Here,	the	allusion	appears	in	how	the	change	only	covers	her	hands	and	feet.	The	“fuzz”	is	covering	a	body-cum-self	that	has	been,	perhaps,	obscured	rather	than	utterly	changed,	a	reading	that	the	specific	location	of	this	change—on	the	outer	extremities—reinforces.	It	is	about	layering	change	onto	the	(unchanged)	body,	thus	the	body	is	the	site	of	continuum,	of	continuous	
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possibility,	in	Chappell’s	terms.	In	other	words,	Daine’s	body	is	still	body,	whether	it	is	human-shaped	or	animal-shaped.	Akin	to	Meyer’s	changes	in	terms	of	her	futuristic	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy,	these	bodily	changes	are	changes	of	degree,	not	of	kind.		Yet,	the	body—her	human	body—holds	an	exalted	position.	Its	“truth,”	which	happens	to	be	female	and	human,	makes	this	multiplicity	possible,	a	reading	that	the	other	kinds	of	changes	Daine	makes	develops.	While	Daine	can	entirely	shift	into	the	form	of	a	single	animal:	a	wolf	([1994]	1999,	303),	starling	(1995,	111),	hyena	(266-267),	and	golden	eagle	(1996,	18),	for	example,	and	while	there	are	many	instances	of	her	transforming	parts	of	her	body	into	animal	parts:	“using	bats	eyes	to	see	in	the	dark”	(1995,	224)	or	“thickening	the	soles	of	her	feet	by	changing	them	to	elephant	hide”	(1996,	44),	it	is	an	attempt	to	shape	a	human	mouth	on	a	bird	that	best	reinforces	this	idea	of	“true	shape.”			It	was	harder	to	shape	a	human	mouth	and	voice	box	in	a	bird	that	it	was	to	give	her	two-legged	self	raptor’s	eyes,	or	bat’s	ears.	She	had	no	idea	why	that	was	true;	it	just	was.	(1996,	246)		While	Daine	may	have	no	idea,	the	narration	makes	it	quite	clear:	the	bird	is	not	her	“true	shape,”	thus	it	is	not	the	body	on	which	(or	from	which)	these	changes	take	place.	Her	human	shape	provides	the	base	from	which	these	transformations	occur.		However,	while	Daine’s	human	body	may	hold	a	privileged	position	in	narration,	the	construction	of	this	body	is	also	more	complicated:	this	is	not	a	simple	veneration	of	the	human	body.	This	is,	rather,	a	complex	offering	of	the	body’s	liminality—its	in-betweenness,	and	its	potential—a	point	evidenced	by	the	narration	of	Daine’s	relationship	to	“the	wolf-shape.”		Sitting	down,	she	began	to	recover	her	true	shape.	It	was	harder	than	she	had	expected.	Her	body	liked	the	wolf-shape.	Bruises	and	hot	feet	notwithstanding,	the	wolf-shape	felt	good,	even	natural.	The	girl	had	to	fight	a	sense	that	she	was	meant	to	stay	a	wolf	[…].	At	last	she	found	her	two-legger	self,	and	slid	into	it.	Opening	her	eyes,	she	made	an	unhappy	discovery.			Her	clothes	were	gone.	([1994]	1999,	309)			
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Daine	shares	a	particular	affinity	with	wolves,	“liked	the	wolf	shape”	and	“the	wolf-shape	felt	good,	even	natural.”	While	this	narration	develops	that	affinity	quite	thoroughly,	it	is	Daine’s	return	to	her	“true	shape,”	in	the	face	of	that	affinity,	that	is	here	interesting,	especially,	as	it	speaks	to	Levana’s	“true	skin”	(Meyer	2015b,	96).	Both	these	figurations—“two-legger	self”	and	“true	skin”—speak	to	the	physicality	of	the	body	and	appear	to	establish	it	as	site	of	“truth.”		In	one	sense,	Daine’s	transformations	(the	animal	shapes	that	she	puts	on)	function	similarly	to	Alanna’s	clothes	and	hair,	to	those	superficial	things	that	change	in	order	for	her	disguise	to	occur;	poignantly,	changes	that	occur,	for	both	girls,	in	order	to	match	their	external	appearing	with	their	internal	being:	Daine	is	“of	People”	and	Alanna	is	coded	as	masculine.	In	this	figuration,	the	body	is	the	site	of	change	and	any	“truth”	is	produced	not	through	unwavering	stability	but	through	that	change.	While	this	passage	also	possibly	questions	the	supplementarity	of	actual	clothes—in	that,	Daine’s	clothes	are	gone,	when	she	returns	to	her	human	form—the	narration	does	so	for	a	reason:	the	human	form	is	both	the	clothes	that	she	“slid[es]	into,”	and	the	manifestation	of,	what	the	narration	terms	elsewhere,	her	“inner-self”	(1992,	182),	a	self	that	is	aligned	with	the	human—despite	its	affinity	with	the	wolf	shape	and	its	ability	to	shape-shift.		However,	the	body	is	also	not	clothes—because	it	is	her	“true	shape,”	as	evidenced	by	the	fact	that	“her	clothes	were	gone,”	and	that	it	is	from	her	“true	shape,”	and	only	it,	that	multiple	bodies	can	be	formed.	The	body	is	both,	and	this	is	key.	It	is	more	than	one	or	the	other,	in	part,	because	it	is	the	very	place	of	all	these	changes	but	also	because	it	is	the	liminal	space	between	surface/depth,	and	outer/inner.	Sheryl	Vint	(2007)	discusses	this	notion	of	the	body	as	liminal	in	Bodies	of	Tomorrow:	Technology,	Subjectivity	and	Science	
Fiction.			The	body	is	a	type	of	threshold,	occupying	the	liminal	space	between	self	and	not	self,	nature	and	culture,	between	the	inner	‘authentic’	person	and	social	persona.	(16)		Vint’s	point	is	sound,	though	I	contend	that	the	body	is	not	just	“a	type	of	threshold”	but	that	it	is,	rather,	the	archetypal	threshold,	the	single	most	
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ubiquitous	limen.	There	is	a	body	associated	with	every	self,	no	matter	if	that	self	is	human,	animal,	or	cyborg.	Thus,	a	second	point	of	contention	with	Vint,	despite	a	desire	to	explore	the	post—as	in	expanded	sense	of,	human—Vint’s	reading	still	prioritises	the	human.	For	one,	self	and	culture	are	human	privileges.	Daine’s	shape-shifting	includes	the	animal	within	a	conceiving	of	the	body/self,	an	idea	that	Meyer’s	mutant	wolf	soldiers	initiated,	while	Cinder’s	cyborgian	state	does	the	same	for	the	machine.		This	blurring	of	the	human	and	animal	within	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	is	not	confined	to	Pierce’s	work.	Sarah	J.	Maas’s	Throne	of	Glass	series	(2012–on-going)	offers	a	particularly	poignant	supplement	to	my	reading.99	In	Maas’s	Erilea	(a	Secondary	World),	Aelin	Ashryver	Galathynius—otherwise	known	as	Celaena	Sardothien	and	Adarlan’s	finest	assassin—is	half	human,	half	Fae.	Within	this	world,	the	Fae	are	immortal	beings,	often	gifted	with	magical	powers.	Aelin	is,	for	example	a	fire	wielder,	as	Heir	of	Fire	describes	(2014a).	The	Fae	are	also	shapeshifters,	of	a	kind.		 All	Fae	possessed	a	secondary	animal	form.	Celaena	was	currently	in	hers,	her	mortal	human	body	as	animal	as	the	birds	wheeling	above.	But	what	was	his	[Rowan’s]?	He	could	have	been	a	wolf,	she	thought,	with	that	layered	surcoat	that	flowed	to	midthigh	like	a	pelt,	his	footfalls	so	silent.	Or	a	mountain	cat,	with	that	predatory	grace.	(14)		While	Rowan’s	animal	form	is,	despite	Celaena	/Aelin’s	fanciful	musing,	a	“white-tailed	hawk”	(4),	it	is	Aelin’s	that	is	the	most	interesting:	“her	mortal	human	body	as	animal	as	the	birds	wheeling	above.”	This	narration,	rather	than	thinking	the	relationship	of	humans	and	animals	as	binary	(human/animal),	offers	a	human-animal	relationship,	where	human	describes	the	kind	of	animal	one	is,	much	like	wolf-animal	or	bird-animal	would	also	work.100	Thus,	through	
                                                99	Not	least	owing	to	the	fact	that	this	is	another	reworking	of	the	Cinderella	narrative,	only	if	Cinderella	had	become	an	assassin	after	becoming	orphaned;	see	Maas	(2012)	and	(2014b).		100	There	are	full-body	shape-shifters	within	Maas’s	world,	and	Lysandra,	a	courtesan	and	friend	of	Aelin’s,	is	one	(2015,	310).		Of	this	ability,	Aelin	muses:			 Holy	gods.	What	was	fire	magic,	or	wind	and	ice,	compared	to	shape-shifting?	Shifters:	spies	and	thieves	and	assassins	able	to	demand	any	
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Daine	and	Aelin’s	very	selves,	these	texts	establish	a	tension	between	external	(appearance)	and	internal	(being).	Returning	to	Pierce’s	Tortall,	Daine	is	both	human	and	animal,	narration	makes	that	clear.	Thus,	her	transformation	into	the	animals	with	whom	she	shares	a	unique	bond	is	not	Daine	becoming	something	Other	(animal).	Rather,	it	is	about	demonstrating	how	she	is	already	both.	Daine	is	human	and	People	(animals	within	this	world).	Her	shape-shifting	is	simply	the	process	by	which	this	internal	being	is	made	available	on	the	body’s	surface,	questioning	the	assumed	shape	and	appearance	of	human	in	the	process.		In	this	way	Daine’s	magic	and	shape-shifting	are	about	making	visible	a	human	body	that	is	formed	in	multiplicity	and	about	narrating	between	poles	of	opposition	(Vint	2007),	an	‘inter-dict’	(a	functioning	between	states),	according	to	Irigaray	([1974]	1985,	22).	For	this	reason,	I	offer	Grosz’s	(1994)	use	of	the	Möbius	strip	as	a	way	of	conceiving	of	the	body	as	a	limen,	a	thing	between	binary	pairs.		 The	Möbius	strip	has	the	advantage	of	showing	the	inflection	of	mind	into	body	and	body	into	mind,	the	ways	in	which,	through	a	kind	of	twisting	or	inversion,	one	side	becomes	another.	(xii)		While	Grosz	is	concerned	with	the	specific	binary	of	mind/body,	this	inflection	modelled	by	the	Möbius	strip	also	describes	the	body’s	liminality,	while	refusing	to	privilege	one	side	over	another	and	also	demonstrating	interdependence.	Grosz	further	suggests,			 this	model	also	provides	a	way	of	problematizing	and	rethinking	the	relations	between	the	inside	and	the	outside	of	the	subject.	Its	psychical	interior	and	its	corporeal	exterior,	by	showing	not	their	fundamental	identity	or	reducibility	but	the	torsion	of	the	one	into	the	other.	(xii)		
                                                                                                                                     price	for	their	services;	the	bane	of	courts	across	the	world,	so	feared	that	they’d	been	hunted	nearly	to	extinction	even	before	Adarlan	had	banned	magic.	(310)		Like	Aelin,	Lysandra	is	stuck	in	a	form	that	is	not	her	own,	not	her	“true	skin”	to	borrow	a	phrase	from	Meyer.	Both	women	are	“beasts	wearing	human	skins,”	as	Lysandra	terms	it	(120	and	310).	
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In	its	liminality,	the	body	is	a	Möbius	strip.	It	is	both	this	and	that,	surface	and	depth,	self	and	other.	In	these	readings,	the	body	has	oscillated	between	serving	as	a	“truth”	of	one’s	self	and	as	that	which	does	not	matter	because	it	can	be	hidden,	disguised.	The	oscillation	is	key,	because	the	body	is	neither	one	nor	the	other,	it	moves	between	both	(or	all).		It	is	the	introduction	of	in-betweenness	that	has	implications	for	rethinking	the	structure	of	binary	oppositions,	while	also	speaking	to	the	“in-betweenness”	of	adolescence.	It	is	a	reading	that	one	final	narration	of	Daine’s	shape-shifting	makes	explicit.	At	the	end	of	her	quartet	and	when	she	is	at	the	height	of	her	powers,	Daine	is	able	to	transforms	into	multiple	birds,	at	once.			There	was	no	one	bird	that	she	drew	on,	but	many,	as	Daine	shaped	angled	wings	to	give	her	speed,	a	ripping	beak	and	talons	to	match	for	combat,	a	starling’s	talent	for	quick	midair	dodges.	She	stayed	as	large	as	she	dared.	(1996,	249)		Daine	is,	here,	quite	literally	“of	the	People”	(animals	within	this	world)—all	the	People,	or,	at	least,	all	the	birds	she	draws	upon.	Her	shape-shifting	is,	in	this	transformation,	very	much	about	expressing	multiplicity.	Not	only	does	it	further	blur	the	distinction	between	human	and	animal,	a	blurring	that	Daine	embodies,	but	it	also	blurs	the	differences	between	different	kinds	of	birds:	this	is	an	amalgamation	of	“no	one	bird”	as	well	as	of	no	particular	bird.	Apart	from	the	starling,	narration	does	not	name	the	birds	whose	appearance	Daine	takes	on,	and	even	with	the	one	it	does	name,	Daine	does	not	take	on	its	appearance	but,	rather,	an	attribute:	the	bird’s	“talent.”	In	terms	of	the	bodily	transformations,	the	birds	remain	un-named;	Daine	is	“no	one	bird.”	For	readers	in	the	United	Kingdom	this	is	particularly	poignant,	as	“bird”	is	commonly	used	to	indicate	a	girl—a	human	girl—evidencing	one	further	example	of	how	these	texts	might	hail	a	reader	outside	of	the	text.		Fantastical	transformation	aside,	the	adolescent	girl	is	a	shape-shifting	creature:	she	is	becoming-woman	through	the	bodily	changes	of	puberty.	In	offering	a	heightened	form	of	bodily	transformation,	Daine’s	shape-shifting	not	only	addresses	this	more	mundane	transformation,	but	it	also	serves	to	rationalise	it.	Through	the	hail,	this	kind	of	modelling	has	the	powerful	potential	to	offer	bodily	instability	and	change	as	a	“position	to	occupy;”	it	makes	the	
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liminal	available	as	a	“position	to	occupy”	(Parsons	2004,	136).	Moreover,	Daine’s	shape-shifting	offers	a	framework	for	conceiving	the	relationship	between	humans	and	animals	not	as	a	binary	but	as	continuum;	rather	than	human/animal,	Daine	models	human-animal,	wolf-animal,	bird-animal,	a	reading	that	Aelin’s	human-animal	form	supports	(Maas	2012–on-going).			
SEEING	THROUGH	THE	SUPERFICIAL			Mirrors	play	a	critical	role	in	constructing	subjectivity,	both	the	mirrors	in	which	we	check	our	appearances	as	well	as	those	offered	by	the	images	of	media	and	social	media.	Mirrors	can	also	be	problematic.	The	mirrors	offered	by	social	and	popular	media—filtered	selfies	and	“photoshopped”	celebrities—offer	a	very	particular	way	of	living	and	being	a	body,	one	that	actual	mirrors	(as	in	reflective	surfaces)	police	through	reflecting	back	achievement	or	failure.	These	mirrors,	images	and	reflective	surfaces,	perpetuate	a	superficiality	of	self	that	traps	girls	and	women	within,	not	just	their	bodies	but	in	their	bodies’	appearance.	However,	Meyer’s	Lunar	Chronicles	offer	a	reading	of	mirrors	that	contests	dominant	hegemonic	mirrors,	when	Cinder	sees	herself—her	whole,	cybernetic	parts	and	all,	self.		
	 A	mirror	filled	the	wall.	Her	own	face	stared	wild-eyed	back	at	her.	Her	ponytail	was	a	mess:	dull,	tangled,	in	need	of	a	wash.	Her	skin	was	too	pale,	almost	translucent,	as	if	the	voltage	had	drained	her	of	more	than	energy.		 	They’d	taken	her	gloves	and	her	boots	and	rolled	her	pant	legs	up.	She	was	not	looking	at	a	girl	in	the	mirror.	She	was	looking	at	a	machine.	(2012,	78)		This	image	in	the	mirror,	as	well	as	the	seeing	of	it,	is—like	Alanna’s	seeing	her	“twin	star[ing]	back”	after	she	cross-dresses	(1983,	9)—complicated.	Where	Alanna’s	seeing	her	twin	in	the	mirror	conceals	a	reality	of	the	body	(that	it	is	female),	Cinder’s	mirror	image	makes	a	body	of	difference	available.	Cinder	“sees”	both	“her	own	face,”	“her	ponytail”	and	“her	skin”	and	also	a	“machine.”	This	seeing	provocatively	offers	a	body	of	difference	but	it	also	offers	that	difference	in	binary	terms:	“girl”/“machine,”	because	this	is	still	(merely)	a	
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reflection.	But,	how	might	these	texts	reconfigure	this	mechanism	of	hegemonic	discourses	of	self?	Are	there	other	kinds	of	mirrors?		In	The	Lunar	Chronicles,	mirrors	are	posited	as	having	an	“uncanny	way	of	telling	the	truth,”	at	least	in	terms	of	the	mirror’s	capacity	to	expose	the	Lunar	glamour.	While	queen’s	glamour	is	called	an	“endless	lie”	because	she	continually	presents	it	(Meyer	2012,	351),	“just	as	she	cannot	trick	the	netscreens,	neither	can	she	trick	a	mirror”	(172).	While	this	is	technically	because	mirrors	and	netscreens	are	not	“living	creatures”	and	therefore	have	no	bioelectricity	for	manipulation	(Lunars	also	dislike	androids),	it	is	also	because,	within	this	world,	the	glamour	remains	a	superficial	alteration	of	the	perception	of	appearance.	The	glamour	is	just	a	trick.	It	is	not	real,	and	it	is	in	this	way	that	the	text	insists	that	we	look	below	the	surface,	and	is	this	seeing	below	the	surface	that	the	remainder	of	this	chapter	considers.			Thus,	while	Cinder’s	cyborgian	state	visually	disrupts	what	it	means	to	be	human—through	the	incorporation	of	mechanical,	inorganic	parts	onto	the	surface	of	the	body—the	text	makes	it	quite	clear	that	this	disruption	goes	much	deeper,	and	it	is	an	insistence	that	relies	on	futuristic	medical	technology—technology	that	operates	rather	like	magic.	For	example,				 Cinder	opened	her	eyes.	The	net	screen	on	the	wall	and	changed,	no	longer	showing	her	life	stats.	Her	ID	number	was	still	at	the	top,	headlining	a	holographic	diagram,			Of	a	girl.			 	A	girl	full	of	wires.	(2012,	82)				The	netscreen,	previously	devoid	of	anything	save	Cinder’s	“name	and	ID	number”	(78),	now	displays	an	image	of	Cinder,	but	it	is	an	image	with	a	difference.	Where	the	mirrored	reflection	showed	Cinder’s	surface,	this	image	exposes	her	insides—whilst	not	only	maintaining	the	external	form	through	the	holographic	diagram	but	also	offering	the	contours	of	that	external.	This	hologram	is	also	a	mirror,	but	it	is	a	three	dimensional	one.	The	hologram	has	the	potential	to	(re)create	life,	“it	was	a	girl,	life-size,	her	different	layers	flickering	and	folding	into	one	another	(2014,	302)—explicitly	this	is	it	not	a	flat	image	(“life-size”),	just	as	it	is	not	a	dispersion	of	parts	(Balsamo	1996),	or,	
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even,	a	separating	of	the	inside	and	outside	(“layers	flickering	and	folding”).	This	image	is	a	Möbius strip.		Moreover,	this	is	no	longer	an	instance	of	“looking	at	a	girl	in	the	mirror”	and	seeing,	instead,	“machine”	(2012,	78);	rather,	it	is	looking	and	seeing	both,	simultaneously.	In	so	being,	it	is	quite	like	the	three-dimensional	nature	of	scars	and	that	“magical”	map	of	Owlshollow.	This	is	about	a	topographical	approach	to	the	body	that	also	takes	depth	into	account.		The	visual,	multi-dimensional	appeal	of	this	image	is	not	the	only	way	in	which	it	contests	hegemonic	discourses.	There	is	also	a	layering	of	meaning,	a	history,	held	within	the	image,	one	that	speaks	to	my	concern	with	discourse	in	the	following	chapter.		 But	those	things	she	had	known.	Those	things	she	had	expected.			She	had	not	known	about	the	metal	vertebrae	along	her	spine,	or	the	four	metal	ribs,	or	the	synthetic	tissue	around	her	heart,	or	the	metal	splints	along	the	bones	in	her	right	leg.	(2012,	82)		This	is	not	the	making	known	of	the	body	to	others—at	least	initially—the	first	narration	of	the	hologram	is	Cinder’s	viewing	of	it,	and	in	this	way,	it	is	a	making	known	of	the	body	to	the	self.	Cinder	discovers	that	which	“she	had	not	known”	about	her	body,	and	this	reading	of	the	self,	in	all	its	depth	and	complexity,	is	pivotal.	This	is,	in	other	words,	not	the	medical	image	that,	as	Balsamo	argues,	aids	in	the	“assembly-line	beauty”	by	which	“‘difference’	is	made	over	into	sameness”	([1996,	58).	This	image	is	not	concerned	with	such	aesthetics.	It	is,	rather,	about	illustrating	the	whole	of	Cinder’s	body.	It	is	about	re-mapping	Cinder’s	body.		This	hologram	is	also	important	for	the	narrative	of	seeing	inside	that	it	offers.	Cinder’s	cybernetic	makeup	not	only	allows	her	to	“netlink,”	to	access	the	universe’s	Internet	system	from	within	her	head,	but	her	brain,	which	is	part	computer,	can	see	through	the	Lunar	glamour.		While	Cinder	is	not	the	only	being	who	is	able	to	see	through	these	illusions,101	Cinder’s	“seeing	through”	
                                                101	Lunars	have	an	intense	dislike	for	mirrors,	androids,	cyborgs	with	“brain-machine	interfaces”	(176)	and	shells	(Lunars,	like	Cress,	born	without	the	ability	to	manipulate	bioelectricity),	as	these	cannot	be	influenced	by	their	“ability	to	manipulate	bioelectricity”	(171).		
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first	her	own	glamour	and	then	Levana’s	is	particularly	provocative,	and	it	is	so	because	of	her	liminal	status:	as	a	Lunar-cyborg,	she	can	see	through	the	glamour	(like	shells)	and	create	one	(unlike	shells).			 Her	cyborg	hand	began	to	morph	in	her	vision.	Little	wrinkles	appeared	in	her	knuckles.	Tendons	stretched	beneath	her	skin.	The	edges	softened.	Warmed.	Turned	to	flesh.		She	was	looking	at	two	hands,	two	human	hands.	Small	and	dainty	with	perfectly	sculpted	fingers	and	delicate,	rounded	nails.	She	flexed	the	fingers	of	her	left	hand,	forming	a	fist,	then	stretched	them	out	again.			An	almost	giddy	laugh	fell	out	of	her.	She	was	doing	it.	She	was	using	her	glamour.	(2013,	196)		This	is	the	power	of	the	glamour,	and	of	the	makeover.	It	also	speaks	to	the	conflation	of	the	fleshy	body	with	its	digital	image,	especially	in	terms	of	the	editing	that	occurs	to	those	images.		For	Cinder,	the	glamour	gives	her	the	possibility	of	a	whole	fleshy	body	(at	least	appearing	as	such).	This	glamour	also	models	the	same	kind	of	manipulation	that	girls	outside	of	the	texts	do	through	photo	editing	software.		Yet,	Cinder’s	cybernetic	parts	will	not	let	her	fall	prey	to	the	deception;	they	see	through	the	glamour:			And	then—too	soon—an	orange	light	flickered	in	the	corner	of	her	vision,	her	brain	warning	her	that	what	she	was	seeing	was	a	lie.	That	this	was	not	real,	would	never	be	real.	(2013,	196)		The	glamour	is	an	illusion;	the	selfie	is	an	illusion,	and	with	this	netscreen	embedded	in	her	eye,	Cinder	has	the	ability	to	not	only	see	through	the	lie,	but	to	see	“lie”	and	“truth”	simultaneously.		 She	shut	her	eyes,	sure	she	was	imagining	things,	then	opened	them	again.	The	diagram	realigned.	Lines	pinpointing	the	exact	angles	of	Levana’s	face.	Coordinates	showing	the	placement	of	her	eyes,	the	length	of	her	nose,	the	width	of	her	brow.	A	perfect	illustration	overlaid	the	perfect	woman—and	they	were	not	the	same.	(2012,	361)		The	simultaneity	of	this	seeing	is	key	for	in	seeing	both	the	“illustration”	and	the	“illusion,”	the	text	calls	attention	their	disjointedness,	not	the	superiority	of	one	
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over	the	other.	Moreover,	these	“lines,”	“angles,”	and	“coordinates”	speak	to	the	mapping,	and	re-mapping,	with	which	this	thesis	is	concerned.	Cinder’s	cybernetic	parts	effectively	allow	for	the	re-mapping	of	the	contours	of	Levana’s	body	in	narration.			 Finally,	this	seeing	that	Cinder	models	also	narrates	the	complexity	of	seeing	faced	by	the	adolescent	girl	in	popular	and	media	culture,	as	a	narration	of	Cinder	seeing	through	Levana’s	glamour	in	the	Chronicles’	final	text	demonstrates.	Here,	rather	than	seeing	both	at	the	same	time,	Cinder	“let	the	cyborg	side	win”	(448),	and	the	process	of	letting	this	“cyborg	side	win”	begins	with	a	battle	between	Cinder’s	“cyborg	eyes”	and	“her	own	brain.”			 It	wasn’t	an	easy	task.	Her	cyborg	eyes	were	in	conflict	with	her	own	brain	and	the	queen’s	manipulation,	and	her	mind	couldn’t	figure	out	what	it	was	seeing.	The	result	was	a	stream	of	confused	data,	blurred	colors,	fragmented	lines	trying	to	piece	together	what	was	real	and	what	was	illusion.	(435)			This	“stream	of	confused	data,	blurred	colors,	fragmented	lines”	and	the	difficulty	“trying	to	piece	together	what	was	real	and	what	was	illusion”	perfectly	describes	the	position	of	the	adolescent	female	girl	in	popular	and	media	culture,	given	the	bombardment	of	images,	often	edited,	that	she	faces.			 Crucially,	the	text	demonstrates	a	way	out	of	this	confusion,	a	modelling	that	the	continued	“seeing	through”	Levana’s	glamour	makes	explicit.		 She	stopped	fighting	the	onslaught	of	data	being	pieced	together	by	her	brain-machine	interface.	The	glamour	was	a	biological	construct.	Using	a	person’s	natural	bioelectricty	to	create	tiny	electric	pulses	in	the	brain,	to	change	what	they	saw	and	thought	and	felt	and	did.	But	the	cyborg	part	of	Cinder’s	brain	couldn’t	be	influenced	by	bioelectricity.	It	was	all	machine,	all	data	and	programming	and	math	and	logic.	When	faced	with	a	Lunar	glamour	or	when	a	Lunar	tried	to	manipulate	her,	the	two	parts	of	her	brain	went	to	war,	trying	to	figure	out	which	side	should	be	dominant.		 This	time,	she	let	the	cyborg	side	win.	(2015b	447–448)		This	is	a	way	out	of	the	trap	of	appearance	engendered	by	the	visuality	of	popular	and	media	culture.	Cinder	demonstrates	the	possibility	of	seeing	through	the	superficial.	Thus,	while	Cinder’s	“brain-machine”	interface	is	not	
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(yet)	available,	media	literacy,	as	advocated	by	Kathleen	Sweeny	(2008)	in	
Maiden	USA:	Girl	Icons	Come	of	Age,	is	available,	and	it	is	a	literacy	that	Cinder’s	“seeing”	models.	For	Sweeny,	media	literacy	is	about	giving	girls	the	tools	to	decode	the	messages	presented	by	media	culture	through	placing	them	behind	the	camera	rather	than	in	front	of	it.	In	doing	so,	Sweeney	argues	that	girls	will	“see”	how	the	images	in	magazines	and	on	television	and	film	are	created;	what	is	this	kind	of	seeing,	if	not	a	kind	of	brain-machine	joining?		 *	*	*		This	chapter’s	case	studies	demonstrate	inflection:	they	offer	possibilities	of	living	and	being	a	body	when	appearance	is	not	the	only	means	of	identifying	a	self,	when	self	is	not	confined	to	a	single,	unified	appearance—or,	even,	body—and	when	the	very	nature	of	appearing	is	ambiguous.	In	this	way,	the	cross-dressing,	glamoured,	pregnant,	shape-shifting	and	cybernetic	bodies	available	in	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	become	bodies	in-between	oppositional	pairs	(male/female;	truth/illusion;	single/multiple;	human/animal),	while	also	demonstrating	a	possible	continuum	of	relation	that	refuses	the	binary	way	of	rationalising	this	world.	The	final	section,	thus,	serves	as	both	a	call	to	action—bodies	are	not	homogenous	and	so	the	inclusion	of	bodies	of	difference	within	discourse	is	imperative	if	the	limiting,	over-reliance	on	appearance	is	to	be	contested—and	as	a	method—being	a	body	is	not	limited	to	its	superficial	appearance	and,	thus,	seeing	through	the	superficial	is	imperative—for	loosening	the	dominance	of	visuality,	that	is,	the	paradigmatic	way	in	which	the	visual	(appearance	and	images	of	appearances)	has	become	not	only	the	dominant	means	of	perceiving	this	world	but	also	of	being	a	self	in	it.		Finally,	the	visuality—or	specularization,	as	Irigaray	([1974]	1985)	terms	it—that	construes	appearance	as	marking	the	self	is	the	very	mechanism	of	the	adolescent	girl’s	exclusion	from	discourse.	She	is	body,	and	this	body	is	posited	as	natural	and	more	real	(Batteresby	1998)	and	thus	pre-	or	extra-discursive.	In	this	move,	woman-who-is-body	is	excluded	from	signification.	In	popular	and	media	culture	she	is	trapped	within	an	appearance,	an	appearance	whose	ideal	is	the	digitally	edited	or	enhanced	image	because	this	image	is	flat	
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and	superficial.	As	such,	these	readings	also	have	implications	for	the	silencing,	within	and	between	binary	oppositions,	that	woman	faces.	The	following	chapter	speaks	this	silence.	
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CHAPTER	FOUR	SPEAKING	THE	UNSPEAKABLE	AND	BREAKING	CULTURES	OF	SILENCE	 	 “There	is	no	single	truth	[…]		But	all	these	truths,	woven	together,		
might	give	us	a	picture	of	what	is	true.		We	can	never	see	all	the	sky	at	once.”		(Croggon	2005,	46,	my	emphasis)		The	point	of	the	hero	story	is	to	transform	chaos	(darkness,	the	unknown,	the	profane)	into	cosmos	(light,	the	known,	the	sacred).	For	this	task	to	be	accomplished,	there	has	to	be	an	“I,”	a	will	that	exists	in	opposition	to	the	chaos.	This	“I”	is	the	hero	or,	quite	simply,	man,	and	because	she	is	not	hero,	woman	is	chaos.	She	is	a	part	of	that	which	the	hero	must	transform;	she	is	conquered	and	controlled	alongside	monsters,	the	land,	nature,	the	unknown,	in	short,	alongside	that	which	the	hero	directs	his	will	against.	Only,	transforming	chaos	(the	profane)	into	cosmos	(the	sacred)	is	actually	the	task	of	religious	man,	according	to	Mircea	Eliade	(1959)	in	the	Sacred	and	the	Profane:	The	Nature	of	
Religion.	Yet,	it	is	also	the	task	of	the	hero,	not	untenable	as	myths	were	once	sacred	texts—the	discourse,	the	truth—of	their	time.	In	his	world-creating	and	world-shaping,	the	hero	transforms	chaos	into	cosmos,	just	as	the	priest	does	in	his	role	of	bringer-of-light-and-truth,	as	the	philosopher	does	in	his	role	of	sharer-of-wisdom,	or	the	psychoanalyst	does	in	his	role	of	un-coverer-of-inner	secrets.	The	point:	while	the	priest,	hero,	philosopher,	or	psychoanalyst	are	different	descriptions	of	“I.”	They	are	also	merely	varying	labels	of	man,	and	the	“truth”	they	offer	is	a	discursive	view	of	the	world,	in	particular	languages	and	from	particular	points	of	view.	In	other	words,	this	“I”	of	the	light—taking	the	shape	of	religious	man,	hero,	philosopher,	psychoanalyst,	or,	simply,	man	(in	his	relation	to	the	mind)—is	set	against	the	chaos	of	the	darkness,	silencing	woman	in	the	process.			The	various	labels	of	woman’s	condemnation	as	darkness	(her	othering)—chaos,	temptress,	whore	and	even	goddess	as	Eliade	(1959)	suggests	that	marking	off	the	“sacred”	is,	merely,	another	form	of	exclusion,	exclusion	through	making-holy—all	serve	the	same	purpose.	They	exclude	
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woman	from	discourse,	from	language,	and	they	do	so	through—and	because	of—her	body.	Thus,	while	silence	happens	in	many	ways	and	while	the	silencing	of	whole	groups—based	on	race,	religion,	(dis)ability,	and/or	gender—has	occurred	and	is	still	occurring,	I	am,	in	this	chapter,	concerned	with	a	particular	silence;	one	that	is	practised	against	the	body	and	against	woman	because	she	is	body.	It	is	a	silencing	that	excludes	woman	from	discourse,	from	the	“coining	of	signifiers,”	as	Irigaray	argues	([1974]	1985,	71),	and	it	is	a	silence	that	occurs	in	the	everyday,	ordinary	space	of	consensus	reality	where	it	takes	the	shape	of	popular	and	media	culture’s	use	of	shame	as	the	dominant	means	of	controlling	the	body.	Moreover,	it	is	a	silence	and	exclusion	that	the	adolescent	girl	experiences	to	a	heightened	degree:	she	is	both	becoming-woman	who	is	chaos	as	well	as	adolescent,	a	structural	anomaly.		In	the	last	chapter,	I	argued	that	this	silencing	and	exclusion	occurs	in	popular	and	media	culture	through	representational	economies	that	equate	the	self	with	the	body’s	appearance,	trapping	woman	within	a	body	that	can	never	fully,	or	permanently,	meet	the	ideal	standards	of	appearance.	Here,	this	economy	of	representation	is	managed	through	the	mechanism	of	shame,	one	that	insists	adolescent	girls,	especially,	“get	[and	keep]	their	bodies	under	control”	(Brumberg	1998,	49).	This	control	also	means	not	speaking	about	the	body,	especially	when	it	bleeds,	breaks,	or	changes.	In	concluding	the	previous	chapter,	I	suggested	that	sight	is	not	enough,	while	also	offering	the	possibility	of	its	redemption	through	Sweeney’s	(2008)	call	for	media	literacy.	This	literacy	is	key.	Speaking	about	that	which	is	unspeakable—speaking	about	the	body,	as	it	is	the	primary	location	of	shame	as	well	as	the	mechanism	of	woman’s	exclusion—is	key.	I	am	not,	however,	calling	for	a	Cixousian	l’écriture	féminine,	though	I	do	focus	on	women	writers.	Cixous	(1976)	calls	for	a	cyclical	way	of	writing,	one	that	confuses	the	linear	logic	of	the	“phallocentric	system”	that	is	patriarchal,	hegemonic	discourse	(883).	Yet,	in	so	doing,	this	method	of	writing	sets	itself	up	in	antithesis	to	that	discourse;	it	recreates	a	binary,	by	writing	that	which	is	Other	to	the	hegemonic.				 As	a	further	means	of	escaping	that	phallocentric	system,	Cixious	also	offers	“white	ink,”	as	a	metaphorical	way	of	writing	with	and	through	the	body	in	order	to	counter	phallocentric	writing	that	refuses	the	body	(881).	Yet,	the	
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argument	reinforces	the	notion	that	woman	is	“more	biological,	more	corporeal,	and	more	natural	than	m[a]n”;	as,	women—not	men—are	able	to	produce	this	writing	(Grosz	1994,	154,	emphasis	original).	This	sort	of	(re)aligning	woman	with	the	body	also	speaks	to	the	aligning	of	woman	with	the	Lacanian	Real.	Naively,	this	Real	can	be	associated	with	the	“real”	properties	of	a	thing:	the	flesh,	blood	and	bone	of	a	body,	for	example.	Thus,	woman	who	is	body-that-is-natural	is	this	“real.”	In	this	sense,	woman	is	impossible—just	as	the	child	(of	children’s	literature)	is	impossible	for	Rose	([1984]	1992).	The	real,	woman,	and	child	are	impossible	because	they	are	that	which	cannot	be	expressed	in	language.	They	are	outside	of	language;	this	also	links	to	Walsh	(2013)	and	her	concern	with	the	“real”	of	realistic	literature.		This	conflation	with	the	body	(that	is	perceived	as	Real)	prevents	woman	(and	child)	from	entering	the	Symbolic,	the	Lacanian	order	of	language	and	discourse,	because	this	phallocentric	system	lacks	an	Imaginary—a	developmental	model—that	accounts	for	this	body	and	its	multiplicity.	Chapter	Three	was	concerned	with	countering	the	images	of	the	phallocentric	Imaginary;	this	chapter	takes	issue	with	discourse	(the	Symbolic)	itself.	Thus,	I	am	interested	in	how	narrations	of	bodily	instability	speak	from	the	silences,	from	the	spaces	between	oppositions.	Not	only	do	such	narrations	engage	the	body,	which	is	the	location	and	mechanism	of	woman’s	silencing	within	the	binary	pair	(man/woman),	but	in	being	about	instability,	they	also	engage	the	space	between	oppositions.	In	this	way,	I	agree	with	Irigaray’s	([1974]	1985)	project	of	speaking	from	the	silenced	position	of	woman.	This	position	is	about	speaking	and	thus	engaging	discourse	and	language	from	such	positions	in	order	to	break	the	cultures	of	silence	that	surround	the	fleshy,	physical	body.	In	order	to	do	so,	I	begin	by	establishing	the	particular	shape	of	the	silence—a	culture	of	shame	centred	on	the	body—in	the	discursive	space	of	popular	and	media	culture.		For	this	reason,	Lewis	Hyde’s	([1998]	2008)	chapter	on	shame	is	also	particularly	useful	to	my	argument.	Hyde	employs	“shameless	speech”	as	a	means	of	breaking	through	the	shame	that	is	associated	with	the	body.	In	fact,	Hyde	argues,	“the	first	stuttering	questioning	of	those	orders	[of	hegemony,	of	discourse]	must	always	begin	by	breaking	the	seal	and	speaking	about	the	
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body"	(172).	The	cross-dressing,	shape-shifting,	bleeding	and	cybernetic	bodies—and	the	narrations	of	those	bodies—break	the	seal.	They	speak	the	unspeakable,	questioning	the	artifice	of	language	in	the	process.	For	this	reason,	the	chapter	concludes	with	a	speaking	of	menstruation.	The	perennially	taboo	topic,	menstruation	is	conventionally	excluded	from	discourse,	and	for	Alanna,	disguised	as	a	boy	and	occupying	a	position	of	masculine	subjectivity,	her	first	menarche	is	a	horrifying	experience,	one	that	makes	the	silence-through-shame	of	this	bodily	occurrence	explicit.	Especially,	but	not	just,	for	Alanna,	menarche	requires	a	telling,	it	needs	a	situating	within	discourse	to	effectively	normalise	it,	to	bring	it	into	language	and	out	of	shame.		
SHAME	CULTURES:	THE	ABSENCE	OF	DISCOURSE	 		Popular	and	media	culture	is	one	policed	by	shame.	There	is	slut-shaming:	the	cultural	phenomenon	of	shaming	“a	woman	or	a	girl	for	being	sexual,	having	one	or	more	sexual	partners,”	or	even	simply	“acknowledging	sexual	feelings”	(Tekanji	2010).	There	is	also	skinny-shaming,	a	trend	prevalent	on	the	social	media	site	Instagram.	On	the	account	@youdidnoteatthat,	thin	females	(males	occasionally)	are	shamed	for	posing	with	(high	calorie)	food	that	they	“obviously”	did	not	eat	(Bahadur	2014).	There	are	“shame	suits”	that	exist	in	American	high	schools	for	students	who	break	dress	codes	(Sullivan	2014),	and	finally,	though	by	no	means	the	end	of	possible	manifestations,	there	is	the	catchall	body-shaming	(Tamarkin	2014).	This	umbrella	term	“body-shaming”	seeks	to	encompass	all	the	varieties	of	shame	that	exist—and	that	particularly	affect	adolescent	girls	(and	women)—within	this	discursive	space.	In	doing	so,	the	term	also	makes	the	body’s	centrality	to	this	shame	explicit:	the	body’s	capriciousness,	its	tendency	to	act	outside	of	desired	parameters,	engenders	a	silence,	as	we	do	not	speak	about	that	which	is	shameful.	Within	this	framework,	there	are	two	manifestations	of	silence	that	particularly	effect	adolescent	girls:	a	silence	by	way	of	refusing	to	speak	about	that	which	is	(perceived	as)	shameful	and	an	illusion	of	discourse,	an	illusion	of	having	won	
the	right	to	speak,	and	both	involve	the	body.			
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The	locating	of	shame	on	the	body	is	a	particularly	integral	aspect	to	Hyde’s	([1998]	2008)	argument,	and	it	is	one	especially	relevant	to	female	adolescents.	As	Hyde	suggests,		 the	body	happens	to	be	a	uniquely	apt	location	for	the	inscription	of	shame,	partly	because	the	body	itself	seems	to	be	the	sense	organ	of	shame	(the	feeling	swamps	us,	we	stutter	and	flush	against	our	will),	but	also	because	the	context	of	shame,	what	we	feel	ashamed	of,	typically	seems	indelible	and	fixed,	with	us	as	a	sort	of	natural	fact.	(168,	emphasis	original)			Hyde’s	description	speaks	to	the	capriciousness	of	the	body	that	I	mentioned	above.	The	“against	our	will”	is	key,	as	the	body,	in	its	relation	to	our	very	self,	is	construed	as	that	which	should	most	readily	fall	within	our	will,	the	control	of	her	mind.	And,	again,	the	“what”—the	things	that	are	posited	as	the	most	shameful:	periods,	urination,	defecation—are	all	very	“natural”	bodily	processes.	In	terms	of	my	specific	argument,	the	significance	of	this	positioning	of	shame	on	the	body	is	twofold:	first,	the	female	adolescent	is	also	tied	to	her	(developing)	body,	as	I	described	in	relation	to	biological	determinism	in	Chapter	One.	Second,	femininity,	of	specific	relevance	to	the	adolescent	girl	as	she	is	(shape)	changing	into	woman,	is	also	positioned	on	the	body	(Gill	2007).	Does	it,	then,	follow	that	being	(female)	adolescent	and	feminine	are	also	shame(ful)?	Silence,	and	the	kind	of	silence	that	I	am	concerned	with,	is	made	explicit	in	the	injunction	to	girls	that	they,	“get	[and	keep]	their	bodies	under	control”	(Brumberg	1998,	49)—“under	control”	means	silent,	not	speaking	out	as	different	from	other	bodies,	as	fleshy	or	as	fallible.	For	female	adolescents,	this	control	overwhelmingly	focuses	on	her	menstruating	body.	Brumberg	details	how	for	Victorian	girls	menarche	(the	first	menstruation)	was	a	“private	affair,	and	girls	handled	the	first	sign	of	menstrual	blood	with	enormous	reserve,”	a	claim	she	makes	owing	to	the	ways	in	which	girls	wrote—or,	more	accurately,	did	not	write—about	their	experience	of	menarche	(xxvii).	In	that	discursive	space,	there	was	a	lack	of	language	with	which	to	address	the	body	and	menstruation.	In	today’s	climate,	the	same	lack	of	language	seems	impossible—
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Cher	did,	after	all,	announce	in	Clueless	in	1995,	that	she	“was	surfing	the	crimson	wave”	and	“had	to	haul	ass	to	the	ladies.”			Yet,	while	Cher’s	proclamation	offers	a	kind	of	speaking,	a	kind	of	language	that	was	unavailable	to	girls	in	previous	generations	(see,	also,	McRobbie	1997),	it	also	masks	the	depth	and	potential	implications	of	this	change,	and	in	turn	becomes	another	kind	of	silencing.102	In	other	words,	naming	is	powerful,	but	it	is	not	always	enough.	There	is	a	certain	distancing,	even	disassociating,	that	can	occur	with	names:	menstruation	hides	behind	the	legitimate;	“surfing	the	crimson	wave”	hides	behind	the	euphemistic.	For	example,	Brumberg	(1988)	devotes	an	entire	chapter	to	“Sanitizing	Puberty”	(1998,	27–55),	the	mechanism	of	silence	in	both	the	twentieth	and	twenty-first	centuries.	Here,	she	suggests,			instead	of	seeing	menarche	as	a	marker	of	an	important	internal	change	in	a	girl—specifically	her	new	capacity	for	reproduction—modern	mothers	typically	stress	the	importance	of	outside	appearances	for	their	daughters:	keeping	clean,	avoiding	soiled	clothes,	and	purchasing	the	‘right’	equipment.	(30)			Cher’s	declaration	that	she	had	to	“haul	ass	to	the	ladies”	represents	this	modern	take	on	menstruation:	it	is	to	be	managed,	with	products	and	in	such	a	way	that	it	is	never	made	visible,	so	that	it	never	affects—disrupts—one’s	appearance.	Blood	must	never	show.103		Thus,	this	is	a	twofold	reading	of	silence:	the	first	is	a	comprehensive	refusal	to	speak	about,	most	often,	the	body,	and	the	other	an	offering	of	
                                                102	Newton	(2016)	suggests	that	menstruation	is	still	“shrouded	in	secrecy”	when	it	is	taught	in	schools	(107).		103	In	November	of	2015,	Charlie	Edge	and	Ruth	Howarth	protested	the	UK’s	“tampon	tax”	(a	value	added	tax	on	sanitary	products)	by	“free-bleeding”	(not	using	sanitary	products)	outside	the	Houses	of	Parliament.	This	protest	speaks	to	my	argument	on	a	number	of	levels:	first,	the	intense	focus	on	the	sanitization	of	menstruation.	Second,	the	shame	of	allowing	blood	to	show,	if	it	were	not	shameful,	this	would	not	be	protest.	Finally,	the	tax	the	women	were	protesting	is	part	of	a	long-running	campaign	led	by	Laura	Coryton.	#EndTamponTax,	Coryton’s	campaign,	has	become	a	world-wide	call	to	end	the	penalising	of	women,	through	a	tax	on	goods	specific	to	them,	by	patriarchal	governments.		For	Edge	and	Howarth’s	protest	see:	Guff	(2015)	and	(Lara	2015).	For	Coryton’s	campaign	see,	Coryton	(2015)	and	Sanghani	(2015).		
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discourse	with	one	hand,	only	to	take	away	its	potential	by	limiting	who	can	speak	and	how	that	speaking	can	occur,	with	the	other.	In	this	second	sense	of	silence,	Caitlin	Moran’s	“speaking”	offers	a	final	poignant,	and	highly	relevant,	example,	given	the	topics	she	often	speaks	on,	including:	How	to	Be	a	Woman	(2011)	and	How	to	Build	a	Girl	(2014).	As	a	self-professed	“working	girl,”	who	is	no	longer	quite	so	working	class,	Moran	speaks	loudly,	proudly,	and	frequently	on	issues	ranging	from	periods	to	politics,	and	while	this	speaking	offers	an	extraordinary	kind	of	visibility,	the	privileged	position	from	which	Moran	speaks	is	not	available	to	everyone.	Moreover,	the	recalcitrant	attitude	as	well	as	the	coarse	tone	and	language	she	employs	speaks	to	the	superficiality	of	pop	culture	feminism	(a	thread	of	feminism	outside	of—and	often	at	odds	with—the	more	traditional	academic	and	political	modes	of	feminism).	Superficiality	is	pop	culture	feminism’s	great	trick:	despite	feminist	languages	appearing	to	offer	choice	and	agency	existing	with	the	cultural	field	(see,	also,	Gill	2007),	this	pop	culture	feminism	suppresses	issues	with	catchy	euphemisms	and	apparent	“obviousness,”	through	methods	such	as	this	intense	focus	on	sanitisation.	Pop	culture	feminism	also	encapsulates	a	tension	around,	as	Gill	(2007)	argues,	“a	certain	kind	of	liberal	feminist	perspective	[that]	is	treated	as	common	sense”	and	feminists	themselves,	who	are	often	“constructed	as	[…]	not	articulating	women’s	desires”	(161–162).	There	is	a	disconnect	between	a	“liberal	feminist	perspective”	(men	and	women	are,	or	should	be,	equal)	that	is	expected	within	popular	and	media	culture,	and	feminists	themselves	(physical,	fleshy	women	claiming	the	title).	Feminist	languages	are	not	just	allowed;	they	are	expected,	but	the	woman—the	body—is	still	refused.		This	trick	of	pop	culture	feminism	is	perfectly	illustrated	by	how,	“in	millennial	advertising,	while	representation	has	come	to	include	the	once-unseen	‘sanitary	products,’	blood	itself	never	appears,”	as	Sweeney	notes	(2008,	37).	Rather,	an	amorphous	blue	liquid	stands	in	for	the	blood,	stands	in	for	the	thing	itself,	and	it	does	so	because	to	show	the	blood	is	to	be	unsanitary,	unclean—even	when	advertising	the	very	products	designed	to	protect	girls	from	such	stain.	This	discourse	of	cleanliness	and	hygiene	is	currently	the	dominant	discourse	of	menstruation,	and	of	how	to	menstruate,	in	which	
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adolescent	girls	have	been	becoming	women,	in	this	most	iconic	way,	since	the	twentieth	century.	In	so	being,	this	discursive	space	refuses	not	only	sexuality	and	reproduction,	as	hygiene	comes	first,	an	argument	that	Brumberg	(1998)	also	makes,	but	it	also	refuses	the	very	materiality,	the	very	bloodiness	of	the	body.	Furthermore,	it	engenders	a	climate	of	perfectionism	in	which	shame	polices	transgressions.	Thus,	while	naming	offers	a	kind	of	unlocking,	a	story—a	making	normal—that	includes	the	potential	of	this	bleeding	is	also	necessary.	Hyde	([1998]	2008)	does	point	out	the	discernment	between	“shame	cultures”—which	are	face-to-face	and	in	which	members	behave	because	they	are	being	watched—and	“guilt	cultures”—which	function	through	an	internalisation	of	norms	and	standards—that	is	widely	noted	within	anthropological	studies.	Given	the	neoliberal	choice	biography,	popular	and	media	culture	would	appear	to	be	a	guilt	culture,	not	a	shame	culture,	and	yet,	the	space	in	which	the	adolescent	girl	exists	is	a	complex	negotiation	of	both.	Yes,	guilt	is	experienced:	over	eating	a	cupcake	or	that	extra	slice	of	pizza,	over	not	spending	“enough”	time	on	homework,	over	liking	a	book	or	film	that	friends	have	deemed	“uncool.”		The	list	is	endless.	However,	Hyde	also	suggests	that	shame	cultures	can,	and	do,	exist	within	guilt	cultures,	for	example,	“all	American	high	schools	are	shame	cultures”	and	“advertising	promulgates	a	culture	of	shame,”	and	both	of	these	exist	within	the	guilt	culture	that	is	popular	and	media	culture	(155).	I	suggest:	social	networking	sites—especially	Instagram—are	also	shame	cultures.	Shame	and	feeling,	on	the	body,	ashamed	are	not	excluded	from	the	discursive	space	of	popular	and	media	culture.	In	fact,	guilt	(existing	through	the	internalisation	of	norms)	simply	serves	as	a	deeper,	more	personal,	manifestation	of	the	shame	felt	when	one’s	body	does	not	“measure	up.”		This,	a	complex	negotiation	of	guilt	and	shame,	is	what	the	adolescent	girl	faces	on	a	daily	basis	within	popular	and	media	culture.	Moreover,	this	guilt	and	shame	most	often	focuses	on	her	(developing)	body,	especially	on	the	bodily	occurrences—menstruation,	in	particular—that	mark	it	as	female.	In	shame	cultures—and	by	extension	guilt	cultures,	as	in	these	the	source	of	judgement	has	merely	shifted	from	an	external	to	an	internal	source—there	is	a	silence	concerning	that	which	is	shameful.	As	the	(female)	body	is	
 181	
overwhelmingly	the	source	and	cause	of	shame	and	guilt,	the	body	is	that	which	we	do	not	speak.	Thus,	the	aim	of	the	chapter	is	to	speak	the	unspeakable,	to	break	cultures	of	silence	that	are	engendered	by	shame	and	guilt.	In	order	to	do	this,	the	remainder	of	the	chapter	follows	a	journey,	of	sorts.	It	follows	Alanna’s	hero	journey,	as	she	becomes	first	Thom,	then	Alan,	and,	finally,	her	own	gendered	self.	I	do	this	in	order	to	show	not	only	Alanna’s	engagement	with	the	conventional	hero	journey—especially	where,	in	being	female,	her	journey	expands	the	possibilities	of	the	hero	journey—but	also	in	order	to	show	how	the	female	body	(that	which	is	“real”	and	thus	unrepresentable)	is	included	with	discourse.			
WHO’S	LOOKING	AT	WHOM?:	ON	THE	ROAD	TO	BEING-ALAN		Alanna’s	cross-dressing	in	Pierce’s	Song	of	the	Lioness	quartet	depends	on	a	relationship	between	Alanna	and	Thom,	between	a	brother	and	sister,	a	twin	sibling	pair.	This	twin-status	grants	Alanna	and	Thom—as	children—a	shared	physical	appearance:	“In	face	and	body	shape,	dressed	alike,	they	would	have	looked	alike”	(1983,	1),	and	it	is	this	physical	appearance,	this	physical	sameness,	that	makes	Alanna’s	cross-dressing	possible.	Yet,	while	they	share	a	physical	appearance,	Alanna	is	not	Thom	(nor	is	Thom	Alanna).	Rather,	this	twin	status	constructs	Alanna	as	Thom’s,	“living	mirror,”	a	term	Irigaray	([1974]	1985)	uses	to	describe	the	relationship	between	brother	and	sister	(Alanna	and	Thom,	as	twins,	merely	make	the	mirroring	explicit)	(221,	emphasis	original).	In	a	Lacanian	model	of	identity	formation,	Alanna	reflects	back	to	Thom	their	shared	appearance,	granting	him,	not	her,	entrance	to	the	Symbolic.	It	is,	after	all,	Alanna’s	similarity	to	Thom—never	Thom’s	to	Alanna—that	makes	this	cross-dressing	possible.	Thus,	in	this	pairing	of	Alanna	and	Thom,	Thom	is	initially	the	subjective	agent,	the	individual	to	whom	signification	is	available.	Yet,	through	the	process	of	cross-dressing,	Alanna	appears	to	develop	a	kind	of	agency,	at	least	in	the	form	of	Alan,	the	boy	she	becomes.	Thus	this	section	is	concerned	with	representation	and	signification	and	how	Alanna—through	her	cross-dressed	persona	Alan—gains	a	kind	of	access	to	signification.		
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Thom’s	maleness	opens	up	possibility:	he	may	train	to	become	a	knight	
or	“study	religion	or	sorcery”	(1982,	7,	my	emphasis).	Alanna—as	female—is	offered	no	such	choice:	her	fate	is	to	attend	the	convent	where	she	will	learn	“to	be	a	lady,”	to:	“walk	slowly,”	“sit	still,”	and	keep	her	“shoulders	back”	(1).	Yet,	it	is	not	just	Alanna	(the	individual	girl)	for	whom	choice	is	denied:	“all	girls	from	noble	families	studied	in	convents	until	they	were	fifteen	or	sixteen,	at	which	time	they	went	to	Court	to	find	a	husband”	(7,	my	emphasis).	Alanna,	as	representative	of	this	“all	girls”	(all	noble	ones	at	least),	not	only	lacks	choice,	but	this	lack	of	choice	is	manifested	in	terms	of	a	particular	control	over	the	body,	a	control	that	echoes	the	illusion	of	bodily	choice	available	to	girls	in	popular	and	media	culture;	Alanna	will	learn	bodily	comportment	and	control	(see,	also,	Young	2005),	and	it	is	control	that	popular	and	media	culture	demands	of	its	adolescent	girl.		Moreover,	because	Alanna	is	not	physically	male,	she	lacks	access	to	representation	and	subjective	agency.	She	also	lacks,	as	do	all	women,	access	to	a	signifying	economy	of	her	femaleness.	As	Irigaray	([1974]	1985)	suggests		it	is	not	that	she	lacks	some	‘master	signifier’	or	that	none	is	imposed	on	her,	but	rather	that	access	to	a	signifying	economy,	to	the	coining	of	signifiers,	is	difficult	or	even	impossible	for	her	because	she	remains	an	outsider,	herself	(a)	subject	to	their	norms.	She	borrows	signifiers	but	cannot	make	her	mark,	or	re-mark	upon	them.	(71)		Alanna’s	lack	of	access	to	a	signifying	economy	of	her	femaleness	is	a	lack	that	always	already	affects	women	because	signification	is	the	purview	of	man;	Alanna’s	“looking	like”	Thom	merely	makes	this	lack	explicit.	Moreover,	this	“borrow[ing]	signifiers”	is	crucial,	as	the	ability	to	deal	in	signification	positions	Alanna	as	reliant	on	her	brother,	further	securing	his	agency	(a	subjective	position)	while	denying	hers.	As	female,	Alanna	must	borrow	Thom’s	(as	male)	signification,	a	point	the	cross-dressing—in	that	she	becomes,	first,	Thom—demonstrates.		Thom	“can	imitate	his	[the	father’s]	writing”	(1983,	2),	and	in	being	so	able,	he	has	access	to	the	“coining	of	signifiers”	(Irigaray	[1974]	1985,	71).	He,	unlike	Alanna,	can	deal	in	signification,	and	thus	it	is	Thom	who	provides	
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Alanna	with	the	discursive	status	of	“twin	boy”	(1983,	2).	He	effectively	writes	Alan	into	existence.		Thom	was	expert	at	forging	his	father’s	handwriting.	He	wrote	two	new	letters,	one	for	‘Alan,’	one	for	himself.	Alanna	read	them	carefully,	relieved	to	see	that	there	was	no	way	to	tell	the	difference	between	Thom’s	work	and	the	real	thing.	(7)		This	letter	creates	Alan,	and	it	is	crucial	that	Alan-as-letter	is	equivalent	to	the	“real	thing”	for	this	discursive	construction	makes	everything	that	follows	possible.	In	fact,	it	takes	both	this	reading	of	discourse—Thom’s	having	access	to	discourse	and	Alanna,	prior	to	becoming	Alan,	not	having	it—coupled	with	the	appeal	to	a	physical	change	to	Alanna’s	appearance	for	Alanna	to	gain	subjectivity	as	Alan.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	it	is	crucial	that	Alanna’s	cross-dressing	begins,	in	Lacanian	fashion,	with	a	look	in	a	mirror.		Alanna	stared	at	herself	in	the	mirror.	Her	twin	stared	back,	violet	eyes	wide	in	his	pale	face.	Grinning,	she	wrapped	herself	in	her	cloak.	With	a	last	peek	at	the	boy	in	the	mirror,	she	followed	Maude	out	to	the	courtyard.	Coram	and	Thom	already	mounted	up,	waited	for	them.	Thom	rearranged	his	skirts	and	gave	his	sister	a	wink.	(1983,	9)		Thom’s	letter	writes	Alan	into	existence,	but	this	look	in	the	mirror	actualises—for	Alanna—the	discursive	shift,	and	in	so	doing,	the	narration	literalises	Irigaray’s	([1974]	1985)	suggestion	that	woman	“borrows	signifiers”	(71).	Alanna	borrows	Thom’s	appearance,	the	very	core	of	his	signification.	This	narration	also	demonstrates	what	Chappell	(2007)	argues	is	“the	symbolic	castration”—despite	Alanna’s	lack	of	a	penis—that	“all	subjects	must	suffer	to	enter	the	Symbolic”	(93)	(see,	also,	Lacan	2001).	This	castration	applies	to	Alanna	because,	as	Chappell	adds,	it	is	the	symbolic	“loss	of	corporeal	jouissance”	that	occurs	“with	entry	into	language	and	social	laws”	(2007,	93).	Alanna	is	dissociated	from	her	body	(a	kind	of	castration)	in	order	to,	first,	become	Thom	and	then	Alan.	In	other	words,	Alanna	is	the	maternal	body—or	at	least,	as	woman,	he	has	the	potential	to	be—thus	her	castration	under	the	Symbolic	is	a	kind	of	death	to	her	own	self,	at	least	her	female	one.		
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In	becoming	Alan,	this	narration	of	subject	formation	also	offers	an	interesting	possibility	for	Alanna’s	self.	Through	being	female	while	yet	appearing	as	her	brother,	Alanna	becomes	not	just	the	mirror	but	also	that	which	is	mirrored,	and	in	doing	so,	her	cross-dressing,	and	this	mirror	moment,	lays	a	foundation	for	a	metaphorical	reading	of	being	female	that	problematises	the	binary	opposition	between	brother/sister	and	male/female.	Alanna	has	become	the	man—her	brother—that	she	desires	to	be;	as	such,	the	mirror	moment	demonstrates	this	narcissistic	ideal.	It	is	a	kind	of	Lacanian	subject	formation;	though,	it	is,	perhaps,	a	somewhat	peculiar	Lacanian	moment:	for,	it	is	not	herself	that	she	sees—and	recognises—but	her	twin’s	self.	He	stares	back—his	pale	face.	Here,	Alanna	embodies	the	dialectical	relationship	that	she	and	Thom	shared	through	her	serving	as	his	mirror,	and	in	doing	so	she	becomes	both	the	mirror	and	that	which	is	mirrored,	but	in	becoming	the	man	in	mirror—which	effectively	construes	Alanna	as	being,	in	one	body,	both	self	and	mirror—does	she	subvert	the	phallic	specularisation	upon	which	this	narcissistic	ideal	and	its	concomitant	subject	position	depends?	Or,	does	she	merely	represent	that	which	this	phallic	narcissistic	ideal	would	see	of	all	women?		I	contend,	given	the	setting	(within	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy)	and	nature	(she	is	both	within	one	body)	of	this	seeing,	this	mirror	moment	construes	Alanna	as	liminal	and	as	thus	displaying	characteristics	of	both	mirror	and	that	which	is	mirrored,	a	point	the	“violet	eyes”	make	explicit.	She	and	Thom	share	these	eyes,	and	in	this	moment	of	transformation,	the	eyes—not	his,	not	hers—become	theirs.	They	are	the	link	between	the	girl	she	was	and	the	boy	she	is	becoming.	The	eyes	literalise	her	liminality.	Thus,	while	potentially	ambiguous,	this	seeing	her	brother	in	the	mirror	is	the	start	of	Alanna’s	subject	formation,	as	it	is	here	that	she	becomes	Thom,	which	makes	Alan	possible.	If	only	because	it	gives	a	certain	weight	to	Alanna’s	transformation,	Thom	shares	no	such	moment	of	self-identification,	and	for	this	reason,	“his	skirts”	signify	differently	than	do	Alanna’s	breeches.	Thom	is	temporarily	disguised.	Whereas,	Alanna	is	cross-dressed,	and	it	is	this	cross-dressing	that	has	implications	for	(her)	gendered,	subjective	self.	
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In	other	words,	while	becoming-Thom	has	implications	for	subjectivity,	this	particular	mode	of	being	her	brother	is	only	ever	temporary.	For	one,	it	is	immediately	replaced	by	being-Alan.	Thus,	the	being	brother	is	less	important	for	subjectivity	and	more	imperative—to	this	reading—for	the	access	to	the	Symbolic	that	it	grants	Alanna.	In	other	words,	where	my	previous	reading	showed	how	she	borrowed	his	signifiers,	this	reading	of	mirrors	and	the	mirror	moment	shows	how	she	embodies	them	and	begins	to	make	them	her	own.	Alanna	enters	the	symbolic:	through	her	cross-dressing,	her	body	becomes	a	construct,	a	sign,	rather	than	the	“real”	that	it	is	often	associated	with	and	that	is	this	case	of	woman’s	exclusion.		Thus,	Alanna	must	“die”	to	her	old	self	in	order	to	become	Alan,	and	this	death	is	the	conventional	“belly	of	the	whale”	stage	of	hero	patterns	(Campbell	[1949]	1973,	90).	Alanna,	effectively	dies,	so	that	she	may	be	(re)born	as	Alan.	As	Campbell	suggests:		 The	idea	that	the	passage	of	the	magical	threshold	is	a	transit	into	a	sphere	of	rebirth	is	symbolized	in	the	worldwide	womb	image	of	the	belly	of	the	whale.	The	hero	[…]	is	swallowed	into	the	unknown	and	would	appear	to	have	died.	(90)			This	is	an	integral	part	of	the	hero	and	his	journey,	for	it	is	this	death	that	sets	him	on	the	road	to	success,	to	becoming	hero.	It	is	also	the	patterning	of	adolescence:	the	child	dies	as	a	self	in	order	to	become	adult,	and	as	such,	it	is	also	one	that	speaks	to	Lacanian	signification.	The	mirror	stage	brings	the	“I”	into	being	through	dying	to	a	libidinal,	fragmented	existence	in	order	to	become,	through	the	image	in	the	mirror,	the	fiction	(the	symbolic	representation)	of	a	single	unified	(masculine/male)	self.	Moreover,	it	is	a	repetition	that	proposes,	within	three	diffuse	strands	of	discourse	(myth,	developmental	studies	and	psychoanalysis),	the	same	thing:	a	change,	at	least,	in	the	self’s	perception	of	himself.	Alongside	many	feminists	(including	Irigaray,	Battersby,	and	Grosz,	it	is	here	that	I	find	fault	with	what	are	hegemonic,	patriarchal	discourses	of	the	self	becoming	self,	in	that	all	three	strands	also	presuppose	a	male-child	undertaking	this	transition.	In	this	sense,	Alanna’s	death	in	order	to	become	first	Thom	and	then	Alan	follows	the	conventional	pattern.	She—representative	of	non-
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signification—becomes	Thom,	the	“boy	in	the	mirror”	(Pierce	1983,	9),	and	in	doing	so	she	is	on	the	road	to	becoming	an	“I,”	or	self,	capable	of	“coining	of	signifiers”	(Irigaray	[1974]	1985,	71).	Thus,	where	Alanna	cannot	deal	in	the	symbols	necessary	to	write,	Alan	can	write,	and	“he”	can	write	to	the	father:	“‘You	[Alan]	may	go.	Don’t	forget	to	write	to	your	father	yourself’”	(52).	Alan	can	write	to	the	father;	yet,	it	is	important	to	point	out	that	Alan	is	not	copying	the	father’s	writing	(that	is	Thom’s	ability).	Alan	has	not	become,	or	cannot	become,	the	father	(this	too	is	Thom’s	ability).	It	is	for	this	reason	that	the	mirror	moment	and	the	cross-dressing—the	wearing	of	masculine	clothes	and	taking	on,	or	borrowing,	a	masculine	subjectivity—are	also	not	enough.	While	the	mirror	moment	provides	the	possibility	of	subject	formation	and	the	collapsing	of	the	dialectical	distance	between	the	brother	and	sister	makes	subjectivity	possible,	they	do	not	guarantee	it.	This	reading	merely	lays	the	groundwork.	For	Alanna,	in	the	unique	position	of	occupying	a	male-space	whilst	being	a	female,	there	has	to	be	more.		Victoria	Flanagan	(2008),	in	Into	the	Closet:	Cross-Dressing	and	the	
Gendered	Body	in	Children’s	Literature	and	Film,	explores	this	becoming-subject-through-castration	at	length,	in	her	singular	focus	on	cross-dressing.	For	Flanagan,	Lacan’s	system	of	subjectification	(of	becoming	a	subject)	is	divided	into	two	parts,	“either	‘having’	or	‘being’	a	phallus”	(31)	(see,	also,	Butler	1990,	55–73).		Men	symbolically	always	already	have	the	phallus	in	the	form	of	the	penis,	but	women	can	be	the	phallus,	and	it	is	this	being	that	is	important	for	Alan.	Flanagan	further	explains,			 the	determining	factors	of	this	system	of	gender	difference	are	possession,	or	lack	and	absence,	of	a	phallus.	Lacan	envisions	femininity	as	a	subject	position	characterized	primarily	by	lack,	but	female	cross-dressing	heroines	victoriously	claim	the	cultural	signifier	of	masculinity	as	their	own	while	disguised	as	men.	(31)			Through	cross-dressing	Alanna	claims	“the	cultural	signifier	of	masculinity”.	In	this	way,	Alanna’s	becoming-Alan	is	an	articulation	of	the	(male)	subject	coming	into	being;	as	Butler	(1990)	suggests,	this	becoming	rests	“on	the	condition	of	a	primary	repression	of	the	pre-individuated	incestuoús	pleasures	associated	with	the	(now	repressed)	maternal	body”	(57).		The	female	body	is	“pre-
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individuated	incestuoús	pleasures,”	in	that	it	could	always	potentially	be	the	maternal	body,	and	the	subject	coming	into	being	must	repress	his	mother’s	body	in	order	to	become	subject,	to	become	man.	In	other	words,	under	this	hegemonic	scheme,	it	is	impossible	to	recognise	that	Alanna	is	actually	both:	the	narration	of	Alanna’s	subject	formation	collapses	the	dialectical	opposition	between	self	(becoming	subject)	and	maternal	body	(that	which	is	repressed	in	order	to	become	subject).	Alanna	is	both,	in	one	body,	but	under	this	scheme,	she	must	suppress	herself.	Her	liminality	is	refused.	While	girls	in	popular	and	media	culture	do	not	have	to	cross-dress	in	order	to	become	subjective	agents,	they	are	still	denied	access	to	a	signifying	economy	of	what	it	means	to	be	female	outside	of	the	patriarchal	authority	of	the	Symbolic.	Angela	McRobbie	(2008),	in	The	Aftermath	of	Feminism:	Gender,	
Culture	and	Social	Change,	offers	four	modes	of	being	woman:	a	“postfeminist	masquerade”	that	offers	heightened	femininity,	the	“working	girl,”	“phallic	girl,”	and	the	“global	girl”	(see,	2008,	54–94)	that	are	the	sanctioned	female	selves	“allowed”	by	the	Symbolic.	Of	most	relevance,	to	Alanna’s	cross-dressing	is	McRobbie’s	figuration	of	the	“phallic	girl,”	one	who	“gives	the	impression	of	having	won	equality	with	men	by	becoming	like	her	male	counterparts	(83,	my	emphasis).	While	in	becoming	Alan,	Alanna	does	more	than	simply	becoming	“like	her	male	counterparts,”	she	still	speaks	to	this	figuration	of	the	phallic	girl:	both	Alanna	and	the	phallic	girl	are	refused	true	equality	with	men,	as	they	merely	give	the	“impression	of	having	won	equality.”	This	is	the	euphemistic	and	“catchy”	phrases	of	pop	culture	feminism	and	how	those	phrases	give	the	appearance	of	“equality,	a	point	that	a	brief	look	at	the	“post-feminist	masquerade”	makes	exceedingly	well.		Drawing	on	Joan	Riviere’s	(1929)	“Womanliness	as	Masquerade,”	McRobbie’s	post-feminist	masquerade	is	the	contemporary	performance	of	femininity	that	girls	and	women	are	allowed	in	popular	and	media	culture.	This	is	Gill’s	(2007)	argument	that	“femininity	is	a	bodily	property”	(2007,	149).	For	Riviere,	womanliness	and	masquerade	are	indistinguishable:	“womanliness”	is	a	“mask”	one	may	“put	on	[…]	to	avert	anxiety	and	the	retribution	feared	from	men”	(35).	Womanliness	is	a	position,	prescribed	by	patriarchy,	women	are	allowed	to	adopt,	just	as	“hyper-femininity”	is	the	position	women	are	allowed	
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to	adopt,	through	the	auspice	of	“free	choice”	in	contemporary	culture.	For	McRobbie,	this	reflects	how			the	Symbolic	[is]	highly	adaptable	and	capable	of	operating	at	high	speed,	to	pull	back	into	the	field	of	constraint,	actions	which	have	sought	to	subvert	the	subordinate	status	of	femininity.	(2008,	64)		Here,	McRobbie	shows	how	the	post-feminist	masquerade—and	also,	I	argue,	Alanna’s	cross-dressing—is	merely	an	illusion	of	subjectivity.	Moreover,	both	these	positions—the	“phallic	girl”	and	the	“hyper-feminine	girl,”	operating	under	the	“post-feminist	masquerade”—refuse	the	female	body.	While	this	is	most	obvious	with	the	phallic	girl	who	becomes	“like	her	male	counterparts,”	it	can	also	be	seen	in	the	hyper-femininity	offered	by	the	post-feminist	masquerade,	in	as	much	as	a	masquerade	offers	the	performance	of	femininity,	not	a	bodily	being	female	or	even	feminine.		Finally,	Flanagan	(2008)	notes,			Clothing	is	a	potent	cultural	symbol	of	gender	and	sexual	difference,	and	the	wearing	of	the	clothes	deemed	socially	appropriate	for	the	opposite	sex	is	generally	considered	to	be	a	transgressive	and	provocative	act.	(xv)		This	is	Alanna’s	cross-dressing.	There	is	no	transvestism	involved	because	she	is,	here	at	the	cross-dressing’s	start,	child	and	not	yet	sexual,	in	the	ways	that	would	signify	sexuality	to	hegemonic	discourse.	Alanna’s	cross-dressing—in	order	to	gain	access	to	the	page’s	wing	at	the	palace,	a	traditionally	male	space	and	to	the	knighthood	that	her	time	spent	there	will	produce—aligns	with	what	Marjorie	Garber	(1992)	describes	as	“cross-dressing	for	success”	(49),104	a	mode	of	cross-dressing	specifically	undertaken	in	order	to	access	spaces	hitherto	unavailable	in	order	to	achieve	a	particular	employment	or	lifestyle.	The	whole	purpose	of	Alanna’s	cross-dressing	is	to	gain	access	to	becoming	a	knight.	In	order	to	do	this,	she	adopts,	first,	her	brother’s	signification—in	
                                                104	In	fact,	Chapter	Two	of	Garber	(1992)	is	entirely	focused	on	this	particularly	female-centric	form	of	cross-dressing	in	order	to	‘better’	oneself.	It,	again,	reiterates	that	the	male	or	masculine	identity	is	deemed	normal,	as	why	would	any	male	need	to	cross-dress	in	order	to	be	more	successful	(41–67).		
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terms	of	his	appearance—before	developing	her	own,	unique,	masculine	signification	through	the	persona	Alan	(see,	also,	Brugger-Dethmers	2012).	It	is,	as	Flanagan	suggests,	a	“provocative	act,”	in	that	Alanna’s	gaining	any	form	of	signification—while	still	being	female—questions	the	presupposed	maleness	of	signification,	that	is	discourse,	language.			 However,	it	is	a	limited	act:	Alanna	may	be	able	to	become	Alan—she	may	gain	a	subjective	position—but	she	does	so	at	the	expense	of	her	femaleness.	In	other	words,	while	Alanna’s	gendered	self	may	die	in	order	for	her	to	become	Alan,	her	sexed-self—her	female	body—remains,	a	point	the	quartet,	and	especially	Alanna:	the	First	Adventure	(1983),	is	quite	preoccupied	with	reinforcing:	“ye’ll	be	turning	into	a	woman”	(14);	“Ye’re	turnin’	into	a	woman,	aren’t	ye?”		(106);	“Alanna	explained	quickly	that	she	was	a	female,	not	a	male”	(136);	“You’re	a	female,	child,	no	matter	what	clothing	you	wear”	(137).	Thus,	in	order	to	become	Alan,	to	operate	in	a	mode	of	signification,	Alanna’s	“death”	includes—it	requires—the	refusal	of	this	female	body,	and	it	is	a	violent	refusal,	a	violence	that	is	reflected	in	the	linguistic	shift	from	Alanna	to	Alan.	The	elision	of	the	diminutive	ending	(na)	is	a	kind	of	linguistic	death,	offered	initially	by	Thom’s	writing	Alan	into	existence,	but	one	that	is	also	mirrored	outside	of	these	texts	when	Jamie	becomes	James;	Ollie	becomes	Oliver;	Katie	becomes	Catherine.	Here,	it	is	not	just	that	Alanna	puts	on	“boy’s	clothes”;	it	is,	rather,	she	performs	masculinity	to	such	an	extent	that	she	becomes	“he,”	on	a	number	of	levels.	Significantly,	she	must	also	refuse	her	female	body	in	order	to	maintain	this	disguise	and	to	achieve	the	access	to	signification	it	grants.		
SILENCING	THE	(UNRULY)	FEMALE	BODY		 “For	what	one	covers	one	also	consigns	to	silence.”	(Hyde[1998]	2008,	169)			In	order	to	become	Alan,	Alanna	must	sacrifice	her	female	body;	she	must	silence	it,	and	it	is	a	sacrifice—a	kind	of	death—that	the	text	makes	explicit	in	its	preoccupation	with	how	Alanna	maintains	her	cross-dressed	persona,	especially	once	she	becomes	a	“real	girl”	(2000,	125).	Once	this	occurs,	Alanna	must	suppress	her	female	body	in	order	to	remain	Alan	and	to	continue	in	this	
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mode	of	signification.	This	suppressing	of	her	female	body	begins	with	the	development	of	her	breasts.			 Suddenly	she	froze	before	her	long	mirror.	Watching	the	glass	closely,	she	bounced	up	and	down.	Her	chest	moved.	It	wasn’t	much,	but	she	had	definitely	jiggled.	Over	the	winter	her	breasts	had	gotten	larger.	(106)				Speaking	back	to	the	narration	in	which	Kel	became	a	“real	girl”	(2000,	125),	this	passage	develops	the	centrality	of	breast	development	to	becoming-woman;	becoming-woman	involves	a	shape-change.105		In	one	sense,	this	implies	that	the	breasts	were,	somehow,	always	already	present,	at	least	in	as	much	as,	“over	the	winter”	they	“had	gotten	larger,”	not	that	they	had	come	into	existence	from	nothing.	They	were	already	there,	just	not	“larger.”	However,	it	is	certainly	their	visible	manifestation	that	directly	impacts	Alanna’s	sense	of	self.	So	much	so	that	it	causes	her	to	“fr[eeze],”	to	pause	her	actions	and	re-engage	the	body	(“watching	closely”).	Yet,	alongside	this	controlled	action,	the	body	itself	“jiggled,”	not	to	mention	that	it	“had	gotten	larger,”	and	it	is	this	unplanned	and	uncontrolled	action	that	is	worrying.	Finally,	contrasting	this	mirror	moment	with	the	moment	in	which	Alanna	saw	not	herself	but	her	brother	is	also	quite	useful	(“Her	twin	stared	back,	violet	eyes	wide	in	his	pale	face”	(1983,	9)).	Where	that	moment	granted	Alanna	signification	(as	Thom),	this	moment	is	a	cause	of	“tears	of	fury”	(106)—because	the	female	body	threatens	to	break	through	the	disguise.			 This	“problem”	of	the	female	body	is	a	strong	narrative	thread	throughout	Alanna’s	time	as	Alan,	and	the	ways	in	which	her	female	body	must	be	bound—in	order	to	appear	male—are	of	the	most	relevance	to	my	current	concern	with	the	silencing	of	the	female	body	in	order	to	achieve	and	maintain	subjectivity.	For	example,		
                                                105	In	the	narration	of	Alanna	telling	Gary,	a	friend	and	once	fellow	trainee	knight,	of	her	disguise,	his	first	question	is	“Where	are	your	breasts?”	(1984,	189).	It	is	almost	as	if,	within	this	world,	breasts	have	the	magical	power	of	making	one	a	woman,	or	not.		
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It	wasn’t	easy	to	live	with	the	binding	on	her	chest.	For	one	thing,	her	growing	breasts	hurt,	though	luckily	they	remained	quite	small.	She	was	twice	as	careful	now	about	how	far	she	opened	her	shirt.	(1983,	107)		The	female	body	is	refused,	the	text	makes	this	clear	with	the	“binding”;	however,	it	also	reinforces	how	difficult	this	is	by	suggesting	“it	wasn’t	easy”	and	how	the	“growing	breasts	hurt.”	However,	this	is	not	entirely	about	refusing	the	female	body	through	its	suppression,	as	Alanna	is	also	“twice	as	careful	now	about	how	far	she	opened	her	shirt,”	this	refusal	is	also	about	not	revealing	her	female	body	or,	even,	the	binding	that	contains	it.	Finally,	Alanna	is	never	narrated	as	padding	anything;	it	is	always	about	“binding”	her	body	or,	later,	wearing	“bandage”	to	“stop	the	red	flow”	(132).	It	is	never	about	creating	the	male	body	underneath	her	clothes;	it	is	always	about	suppressing	the	female	one,	a	supressing	that,	as	I	have	discussed,	adolescent	girls	also	face	in	the	form	of	living	up	to	the	ideal	body.		While	the	disguising	of	her	femaleness	through	the	binding	of	her	breasts	is	the	central	means	by	which	Alanna	constructs	her	body	as	male,	the	text	does	offer	a	bodily	marker	of	maleness—a	changing	voice,	“his	[Prince	Jonathan’s]	voice	was	beginning	to	boom	and	crack”—that	Alanna	must	also	affect	through	her	body,	“soon	Alanna	would	have	to	start	faking	the	voice-change	herself”	(1983,	118).	Here,	the	narration	offers	a	bodily	property—in	as	much	as	the	voice	change	is	a	bodily	occurrence—that	Alanna	must	perform.	Yet,	this	is	also	not	the	same	as	constructing	a	bulge	in	one’s	trousers	or	binding	the	breasts,	as	these	alter	the	contours	of	the	body.	In	other	words,	I	have	been	concerned	with	the	ways	in	which	Alanna	bodily	constructs	herself	as	male,	a	construction	that	depends	on	the	suppression	of	her	female	body,	not	on	the	creating	of	a	male	body	underneath	her	clothes;	yet,	the	distinction	is	complex,	and	in	offering	this	example	of	a	male	bodily	change	that	Alanna	must	perform,	the	text	illustrates	the	complexity	to	the	relationship	between	the	performance	of	gender	and	the	physical,	fleshy	body	behind	and	within	those	performances.	In	the	main,	Alanna’s	body	must	be	suppressed	in	order	for	her	signification	as	Alan	to	be	achieved,	and	this	suppression	speaks	to	the	bodily	suppression	that	all	women	face.	In	other	words,	more	widely	than	this	cross-dressing,	Alanna’s	becoming	Alan	is	a	playing	out	of	Ideal	female	subject	
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formation	under	the	law	of	the	Symbolic.	The	maternal	body,	that	is	one’s	own,	must	be	suppressed:	Alanna	achieves	this	by	cross-dressing;	women	in	contemporary	Western	culture,	through	the	frames	of	selfies	and	through	continually	working	to	meet	hegemonic	ideals	of	appearance.	There	are	countless	examples	of	this	kind	of	refusal	of	the	female	body	within	popular	and	media	culture;	it	is	at	the	heart	of	recent	controversies	and	dialogues	regarding	public	breastfeeding	and	the	refusal	of	social	media	sites	(like	Facebook)	to	allow	photos	of	that,	and	of	childbirth,	to	be	posted.	It	is	also	in	the	Twitter	storm	over	Arial	Winter’s	2016	Screen	Actor	Guild	Awards	(SAGs)	gown,	as	it	revealed	her	breast	reduction	scars.	The	SAGs	are	a	high	fashion,	high	glamour,	event,	and	Winter’s	scars	questioned	the	superficial	femininity	required	of	women	in	that	space.	Winter’s	response	on	Twitter	(@arielwinter1)—the	scars	“are	a	part	of	me	and	I’m	not	ashamed	of	them	at	all”—not	only	speaks	back	to	my	concern	with	scars	in	Chapter	Three	but	it	also	reflects	the	suppression,	or	how	it	“should”	be	suppressed,	of	the	female	body	in	contemporary	Western	culture	(Winter	2016).106		Finally,	while	Alanna	cross-dresses	and	thus	silences	her	female	body	in	order	to	become	Alan,	the	silencing	of	her	body	is	but	a	silencing	of	the	female	body	that	occurs	throughout	hegemonic	discourse.	Alanna—as	Alan—embodies	the	Symbolic	order’s	ideal	female	self,	a	self	that	refuses	the	female	body,	a	reading	that	is	actualised	in	Alanna’s	symbolic	death	(to	self)	in	order	to	become,	fully,	Alan.	Given	this,	it	is	useful,	if	not	also	provocative,	to	consider	Alanna	as	Alan,	particularly	in	a	narration	in	which	Alan	asks	Mistress	Cooper	(an	older	woman)	for	assistance	in	learning	“to	dress	like	a	girl”	(1984,	137).			
MAKEOVER	OR	DRAG?	(IT’S	DRAG)		At	this	stage,	Alanna	is	Alan.	S/he	has	bested	the	bully	Ralon	who	was,	at	the	time,	a	page	and	older	as	well	as	bigger	(see,	1983,	73–79);	saved	Prince	Jonathan	from	a	sweating	sickness	sent	to	destroy	the	Royal	family	(see,	1983,	
                                                
106 Of	Winter’s	decision	to	undergo	breast	reduction	surgery,	see	Radloff	(2015).	Of	the	media	coverage,	see,	for	example,	(Couch	2016)	and	(Denton	2016).	
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99–103);	defeated—alongside	Jon—the	ancient	and	immortal	Ysandir	(see,	1983,	193–206);	been	made	the	Prince’s	own	Squire	and	has	seen	war	(see,	1984,	67–134).	She,	as	he,	has	performed	the	deeds	of	masculinity	so	well	that	her	maleness—despite	the	changes	her	body	has	undergone—is	not	questioned.	As	Jon	notes	after	they	have	defeated	the	Ysandir	and	he	learns	that	she	is	a	girl,	“Girl,	boy	or	dancing	bear,	you’re	the	finest	page—the	finest	squire-to-be—at	Court”	(1983,	215).	Alanna’s	sex	no	longer	matters,	at	least	to	Jon.	Her	deeds,	her	performances	of	masculinity,	have	earned	her	the	right	to	try	for	her	shield.	In	short,	she—as	he—has	become	a	hero,	and	she	now	wishes	to	learn	how	“to	dress	like	a	girl”	(1984,	137).	In	this	way,	while	the	mirror	moment	initiated	the	process	of	Alanna’s	subject	formation	(of	her	becoming	an	active	agent),	her	makeover—her	(re)transformation	into	a	girl—offers	another.		In	the	first	instance,	this	makeover—despite	Alanna’s	“being	Alan”—	has	little	to	do	with	announcing	her	true	sex,	or	even	her	‘true’	self.	Coram	and	Maud,	the	children’s	caretakers,	know	that	Alanna	is	a	girl,	as	they	both	assisted	in	the	deception,	both	Mistress	Cooper	and	George	(Cooper’s	son,	king	of	thieves	and	Alanna’s	friend)	have	known	that	Alan	is	‘really’	Alanna	since	her	first	menstruation.107	More,	Sir	Myles	has	suspected	since	witnessing	Alan(na)	healing	Jon	from	the	“Sweating	Fever”	in	Alanna’s	first	year	of	page	training	(1983,	82).	Calling	on	the	Great	Mother,	Alanna	heals	Jon	with	the	goddess’s	assistance,	and	as	this	healing	occurs,	“Myles	stared.	He	did	not	hear	a	boy-child	calling	the	Prince.	He	heard	a	woman’s	voice”	(1983,	102).	While	the	goddess’s	role	in	the	healing	allows	for	some	ambiguity	as	to	who	was	speaking,	it	is	noted	that	Myles	from	this	point	on	suspects,108			
                                                107	Here,	Alanna	seeks,	with	George’s	aid,	the	help	of	a	“healing	woman,”	I	discuss	this	in	detail	below	(1983,	133).		108	See,	also,		 Alanna	looked	up,	impatient.	‘The	masquerade	is	over.	Myles,	all	these	men	know,	you	should	too,	I’m	a	girl.’			‘But	I	do	know,’	Myles	said	quietly.	‘Thank	you	for	telling	me	at	least,	but	I	have	known	for	years.’	(1984,	220)	
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One	of	my	teachers,	Sir	Myles	of	Olau	guessed.	I	had	to	use	magic	to	save	Prince	Jonathan	when	he	had	the	Sweating	Sickness,	and	Myles	was	watching;	he	must	have	seen	something	that	gave	me	away.	(1986,	30)		There	is	a	particularly	close	relationship	between	Alanna	and	Myles.	Alanna	was	assigned	to	serve	him	at	court	dinners	when	she	was	a	page	and	the	assignment	has	developed	into	a	mentor/mentee,	father/son	(daughter)	relationship.	Myles	is	also	the	court	drunk,	a	flaw—but	also	a	performance	that	he	hides	behind.	In	other	words,	despite	appearances,	he	is	constructed	as	more	perceptive	than	most	and	is	thus	able	to	see	through	Alanna’s	disguise.		Finally,	Prince	Jonathan	also	knows	her	true	sex:	Ylon	and	Ylanda,	the	last	of	the	Ysandir	race,	revealed	Alanna’s	sex	to	him	by	magically	removing	her	clothes	during	their	battle.	Instructing	Jon	to	“‘see	your	companion	for	what	she	really	is!’”	(1983,	199),	their	interference—their	‘revealing’	of	her	sex—leaves	Alanna	wearing	just	“her	belt	and	scabbard”	(199).	She	is	left	with	the	most	masculine	piece	of	her	uniform:	her	(phallus)	sword.	Garber	(1992)	insists	that	men	do	not	unequivocally	possess	the	phallus;	in	that,	the	penis	is	not	necessarily	it:	“the	penis	is	an	organ;	the	phallus	is	a	structure”	(119).	The	phallus	is	a	way	of	conceiving	of	the	world	in	terms	of	binary	oppositions,	and	the	penis	is	its	symbolic	representation.	Alanna	is	man,	but	here,	when	her	true	sex	is	revealed—when	“what	she	really	is,”	a	female,	is	revealed—the	phallus-sword	remains	(1983,	199).	The	marker	of	her	maleness	remains	because	Alanna	has	become	Alan.		It	is	in	this	situation	that	Alanna	seeks	the	help	of	Mistress	Cooper:	“would	you	teach	me	how	to	dress	like	a	girl?”	(1984,	137).		In	other	words,	Alanna	is	very	much	Alan,	though	always	bearing	in	mind	that	this	cross-dressing	has	seen	her	become	both	her	bother	Thom	as	well	as	Alan,	a	character	in	his	own	right.	Thus,	Alanna’s	makeover—and	the	subsequent	girl	disguise	that	she	adopts	in	order	to	venture	“into	the	city,	getting	used	to	her	skirts	and	learning	about	things	most	girls	her	age	took	for	granted”	(1983,	144)—becomes	an	additional	instance	of	cross-dressing.	This	is	Alan	(a	boy)	dressing	as	Alanna	(a	girl),	a	reading	the	text	makes	explicit	at	Alan’s	first	dress	fitting:	not	only	does	Mistress	Cooper	suggest	that	s/he	is	“worse	than	a	city	lad	getting	fitted	with	his	first	pair	of	long	breeches,”	but	Alan/na	also	complains,	once	the	
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dress	has	been	fitted,	that	“‘it	[her	feminine	appearance]	doesn’t	look	right	[…]	It	looks	like	Squire	Alan	in	a	girl’s	dress”	(1984,	138).	Reinforcing	my	view	that	Alanna	has	become	Alan,	Alanna	not	only	fails	to	meet	expectations	of	feminine	performance—she	is	acting	“like	a	city	lad”—but	she	also	fails	to	meet	expectations	of	feminine	appearance—“it	doesn’t	look	right.”	Where	the	makeover	of	popular	and	media	culture	is	about	becoming	more,	or	better,	feminine	(Cinderella’s	“sparkle-mation”	is	the	ideal	example)	and	about	possessing	a	certain	self-determination	through	such	activity,	Alanna’s	makeover	does	something	else—because	it	is	really	Alan’s.	Rather	than	a	neoliberal	moment	of	self-actualisation	through	bodily	self-improvement,	this	makeover	offers	another	instance	of	cross-dressing:	of	male-to-female	cross-dressing.	This	makeover	offers	Alan-in-drag	as	its	result,	and	in	so	doing,	it	offers	a	rearticulation	of	the	makeover	narrative.	It	offers	a	mode	of	being	female	that,	rather	than	being	dependent	on	the	body’s	appearance,	is	open	to	interpretation.	However,	before	exploring	the	ramifications	of	this	makeover-as-drag,	it	is	useful	to	consider	what	it	does	take—a	change	to	her	hair—for	Alanna	to	appear	feminine,	not	merely	“like	Squire	Alan	in	a	girl’s	dress”	(183).	According	to	Mistress	Cooper,	Alan’s	makeover	is	not	complete	with	just	a	change	of	clothes;	it	is	not	complete	“because	we’ve	done	nothing	with	Squire	Alan’s	hair’”	(138).	Hair	is	pivotal.	Not	only	did	it	take	cutting	Alanna’s	hair	in	order	for	her	to	appear	as	Thom,	but	it	also	takes	another	change	to	her	hair	in	order	to	complete	the	makeover.	In	many	respects,	this	is	another	articulation	of	liminality.	The	hair	(part	of	the	body)	is	both	that	which	can	change	(length)	and	that	which	cannot	change	(colour).	Dyeing	her	hair	is	not	on	offer:	the	red	hair,	of	appropriate	length,	must	mark	her	as	Thom	in	order	to	initiate	the	cross-dressing,	and	once	this	learning	“to	dress	like	a	girl”	occurs,	she—as	Alan—is	known	to	have	red	hair	(1984,	137).	Still,	the	hair	began	this	transformation	into	Alan,	so	it	follows	that	the	hair	must	also	participate	in	
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Alan’s	transformation	into	Alan(na).109	For	this	reason,	Alan	dons	a	“black	wig”	to	go	out	“in	public”	(152).	Moreover,	hair	is	not	only	important	to	Alanna’s	narrative;	it	is	also	an	integral	marker	of	femininity	in	popular	and	media	culture:	long	flowing	locks	are	a	key	aspect	of	heightened	fantasy	femininity,	especially	youthful	fantasy	femininity.	A	walk	through	my	midlands’	town-centre	at	the	end	of	the	school	day	indicates	as	much:	the	overwhelming	ubiquity	of	not	just	long,	but	extremely	long,	hair	on	young	girls	is	astounding.	My	sister,	teaching	in	an	American	high	school,	notes	a	similar	situation.	Young	girls,	on	the	whole,	just	do	not	have	short	hair,	and	their	hair	is	a	marker	not	only	of	their	femininity	but	also	their	youth.		Returning	to	Alanna’s	cross-dressing	and	what	I	consider	to	be	her	subsequent	girl	disguise,	the	hair	remains	integral.	On	her	seventeenth	birthday,	Alan	goes	for	a	walk	in	the	palace	gardens	as	a	girl,	as	s/he	is	narrated	thinking	“there	was	no	law	that	said	she	had	to	be	a	boy	on	her	seventeenth	birthday”	(1984,	153).	In	order	to	do	this,	s/he	first	retrieves	her	“pretty	clothes—a	lace-trimmed	chemise,	delicate	silk	stockings,	tiny	leather	slippers,	a	purple	silk	dress”	from	“the	wooden	chest	she	kept	at	the	foot	of	her	bed,	locked	and	magically	protected”	(152).	While	it	is	interesting	enough	that	this	whole	endeavour	is	described	in	such	furtive	and	evocative/sumptuous	terms—lace-trimmed,	delicate,	tiny	and	silk—the	fact	that	it	is	“thinking	of	Delia”	that	sends	her	there	is	even	more	so,	as	this	thinking	offers	a	complicated	portrayal	of	desire.	In	one	sense,	it	offers	the	possibility	of	Alan	being	sexually	attracted	to	this	“beautiful”	woman,	but	it	also	simultaneously	posits	Delia	as	an	example	of	femininity	that	Alanna	should	emulate:	“she	[Alanna]	wasn’t	a	beauty	like	Delia,	but	she	wasn’t	a	hag	either”	(152).	Not	only	is	it	now	impossible	to	separate,	at	least,	this	cross-dressing	(Alan	as	a	girl)	from	issues	of	sex	and	sexuality,	but	it	
                                                109	I	use	the	figuration	Alan(na)	to	linguistically	mark	the	gendered	identity	that	Alanna	adopts	after	being	Alan.	There	is	no	straightforward	return	to	Alanna.	There	cannot	be;	she	has	become	Alan.	Alan(na)	represents	this	combination,	while	speaking	to	the	changes	that	have	occurred	in	order	to	produce	this	particular	subjectivity.		
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also	simultaneously	posits	Alan(na)	as	in	between.	She	is	neither	Alan	nor	Alanna,	just	as	she	is	neither	“beauty”	nor	“hag.”	Owing	to	this	liminality,	it	takes—even	with	these	clothes	that	are	heavily	coded	as	feminine—“the	black	wig	she	normally	wore	in	public”	because	“there	weren’t	enough	violet-eyed	redheads	around”	(152–153)	in	order	for	Alan	to	appear	as	a	girl.	The	clothes—again—are	not	quite	enough,	so	much	so	that	Alanna	wears	a	wig	as	“some	kind	of	disguise”	(153)	when	leaving	her	rooms	as	a	girl.	In	other	words,	Alanna,	crossed-dressed	as	Alan,	must	wear	a	disguise	in	order	to	be—to	appear	as—the	girl	that	she	already	is,	in	that,	even	if	she	was	“only	a	little	man”/her	brother	(Freud	[1933]	1973,	151).	Alanna	is,	having	experienced	menarche	and	breast	development,	a	“real	girl”	(2000,	125).	In	as	much,	this	is—rather	than	a	makeover	and	Alanna’s	coming	into	appropriate	femininity—Alan	in	drag.		Hair	is	complicated	and	it	plays	a	fundamental	role	in	Alanna’s	cross-dressing.	However,	in	all	this	preoccupation	with	Alanna/Alan’s	hair,	the	absence	of	a	narration	regarding	body	hair	is	striking.	In	fact,	only	once	in	the	entire	quartet	is	Alanna	referred	to	as	a	“beardless	youth”	(1988,	1).	Ironically,	this	is	after	she	has	revealed	her	“true	sex”	and	at	the	start	of	the	final	book	of	her	quartet.	In	The	Last	Taboo:	Women	and	Body	Hair,	Karin	Lesnik-Oberstein		(2007)	opens	by	calling	attention	to	how	“the	hair	on	the	top	of	women’s	heads	is	valued	and	admired,”	while	they	“remove	the	hair	on	their	bodies”	(1).	Lesnik-Oberstein	also	suggests	that	body	hair	is	never	seen,	even	“when	there	are	references	to	women	shaving,	such	as	in	some	American	sitcoms”	(1)—the	parallel	to	my	reading	of	menstruation	and	the	invisibility	of	its	blood	is	provocative.	Here,	in	a	narration	of	cross-dressing—in	which	hair	plays	such	a	pivotal	role—the	absence	of	(body)	hair	reinforces	Lesnik-Oberstein’s	view	that	female	body	hair	is	taboo.			Finally,	for	Garber	(1992)	female-to-male	cross-dressing	is	typically	not	regarded	as	transvestism,	which	involves	a	sexualised	fetish	for	wearing	the	clothes	coded	for	the	opposite	sex.	Garber	goes	as	far	as	to	suggest	that	that	as	“women	are	regarded	as	having	not	sexual	but	cultural	desires”	(i.e.	to	improve	their	cultural	standing	by	cross-dressing),	female-to-male	cross-dressing	cannot	be	transvestism.	Thus,	while	this	narration	of	Alanna	masquerading	as	a	black-
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haired	girl	on	her	seventeenth	birthday	plays	at	the	edges	of	such	a	fetish—if	only	in	an	initial	ambiguity	as	to	what	about	“the	sight	of	Jonathan	dancing	with	Lady	Delia”	makes	Alanna	“too	restless	to	socialize,	and	too	nervous	to	sleep”	(1983,	152),	the	object	of	Alanna’s	desire	is	Jonathan,	not	Delia:	“Alanna’s	lips	quivered.	She	wanted	Jonathan’s	love.	To	be	honest,	she	had	wanted	it	for	a	long	time”	(156).	In	this	way,	it	is	not	Alanna’s	(homosexual)	desire	for	Delia	that	is	at	play	here,	but,	rather,	some	mutual	desire	between	Jonathan	and	Alan(na)-in-drag.		 For	this	reason,	Alanna	only	gains	her	a	sort	of	pseudo-signification.	One	that,	while	valuable	for	problematising	woman’s	exclusion	from	discourse	or	signification—that	occurs	because	of,	and	through,	her	body—the	female	body,	has	not	been	engaged	as	female	in	this	cross-dressing,	an	issue	that	I	address	in	the	final	section	of	this	chapter.	In	many	ways,	it	is	a	problem	of	mirror(s),	the	mirrors	that	pervade	this	thesis	in	terms	of	how	the	adolescent	girl	constructs	herself	in	a	digital,	temporary	world	in	which	femininity,	what	it	means	to	be	female,	exists	on	the	body	as	well	as	the	mirror	moment	that	Alanna	experiences	in	order	to	become	Alan.	According	to	Irigaray,	“really	successful	femininity	cannot	lay	claim	to	being	ideal	or	confer	an	ideal	upon	itself.	It	lacks	a	mirror	appropriate	for	doing	so”	([1974]	1985,	105,	emphasis	original).	This	is	why	Alanna’s	subject	formation,	as	a	metaphor	for	the	subject	formation	all	women	experience	under	hegemonic	regimes,	includes	her	seeing	Thom	in	the	mirror.	There	is	no	Imaginary	for	the	female-subject,	for	an	embodied	female	subject,	and	it	is	a	reading	demonstrated	through	the	horror	of	the	blood,	of	menstrual	blood.			
THE	HORROR	OF	THE	BLOOD		 	“Blood	is	burned	to	cinders	in	the	writing	of	the	text	of	the	law”		(Irigaray	[1974]	1985,	221).		For	Alanna,	disguised	as	boy	whilst	training	to	become	a	knight	and—crucially—without	a	mother,	menarche	is	a	horrifying	occurrence:			She	got	out	of	bed—and	gasped	in	horror	to	find	her	thighs	and	sheets	smeared	with	blood.	She	washed	herself	in	a	panic	and	bundled	the	
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sheets	down	the	privy.	What	was	going	on?	She	was	bleeding	and	she	had	to	see	a	healer;	but	who?”	(1983,	132)		Thus,	the	narration	of	Alanna’s	transition	into	womanhood	begins	with	her	seeking	the	help	of	a	“healing	woman,”	as	“she	was	bleeding	[…]	from	the	secret	place	between	her	legs”	(132-3).	Masquerading	as	boy,	Alanna	seeks	the	help	of	this	healing	woman	because,	in	this	moment	of,	arguably	heightened,	femaleness,	she	does	not	know	her	body;	the	“bleeding”	has	no	meaning.	Occupying	a	position	of	masculine	subjectivity	but	having	experienced	this	bleeding,	Alanna’s	menarche	quite	literally	demonstrates	Irigaray’s	([1974]	1985)	reading	of	woman’s	position	within	patriarchal,	hegemonic	discourse.	Taking	issue	with	the	economy	of	representation	underscoring	the	discursive	space	of	Western	philosophy,	Irigaray	claims	that	the	female	body	is	rendered	unavailable	as	a	means	of	signification	because	the	“blood”—menstrual	blood—“is	burned	to	cinders	in	the	writing	of	the	text	of	the	law”	(221).110	Alanna’s	disguise,	and	her	subject	formation	as	Alan,	illustrates	the	unavailability	of	the	female	body	within	hegemonic	discourse,	it	appeals	to	a	visual	representation	of	the	lack,	a	lack	of	“access	to	the	signifying	economy”	of	femininity	that	all	women	face	(Irigaray	[1974]	1985,	71).	Alanna	“remains	an	outsider,”	the	epitome	of	being	“subject[ed]	to	their	[masculine]	norms,”	and	in	this	time	of	crisis,	the	physicality	of	the	body	is	not	enough:	she	lacks	the	ability	to	read,	to	understand,	its	signification	(71).	Without	that	ability,	“the	horror	of	the	blood,”	as	it	is	construed	in	hegemonic	discourse,	is	reiterated,	and	in	order	to	neutralize	that	horror,	a	rearticulation	of	the	body	must	occur	(228).	For	this	reason,	this	section	is	concerned	with	establishing	the	horror	of	the	blood,	both	in	terms	of	Alanna’s	“gasp[ing]	in	horror	and,	more	widely,	the	silence	and	horror	with	which	the	blood	is	approached	in	popular	and	media	culture	(as	representative	of	a	hegemonic	space).	Thus,	at	the	sight	of	the	blood,	Alanna	seeks	the	help	of	a	“healing	woman”	(1983,	133),	and	it	is	this	woman	who	gives	the	bleeding	signification:	
                                                110	While	there	is	not	space	to	fully	develop	the	issue	here,	Cinder—her	very	name—and	that	the	burning	of	her	body	precipitated	her	transformation	into	cyborg	is	highly	relevant	and	poignant.		
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“you	poor	child,’	she	chuckled.	‘Did	no	one	ever	tell	you	of	a	woman’s	monthly	cycle?	The	fertility	cycle?’”	(136).	Initially,	this	confirms	my	earlier	reading	of	Alanna	as	somehow	simultaneously	a	child	who	is	not	yet	a	woman	and	a	woman,	or,	at	least,	female.	It	is	an	issue	that	the	text	addresses	through	the	distinction	of	being	female:	the	telling	of	this	bleeding	begins	with	Alanna	confessing,	“that	she	was	a	female,	not	a	male”	(136).	It	is	this	being	female	that	not	only	makes	both	the	telling	and	the	bleeding	possible,	but	it	is	also	the	female	that,	here,	bridges	the	space	between	child	and	woman.	Child	and	woman	are	thus	constructed,	like	gender	or	clothes,	as	superficial	to	the	body,	to	the	core	that	is,	here,	female.		Yet,	it	is	not	just	for	Alanna—who	at	this	point	is	Alan—that	this	telling	is	imperative.	Her	disguise,	as	well	as	her	masculine	subjectivity,	makes	the	need	for	a	conversation	around	the	bleeding	imperative,	but	Kel	also	receives,	and	needs,	a	telling	of	the	bleeding,	despite	remembering	“several	talks	she	had	with	her	mother”	(2000,	97).	Crucially,	“Keladry	of	Mindelan	would	not	have	to	hide	her	sex	for	eight	years	as	Alanna	had	done”	([1999]	2004,	1).	Kel—who	is	not	disguised	as	a	boy	and	who	has	a	mother—does	possess	the	ability	to	understand	the	signification	of	the	bleeding,	though	it	must	be	remembered,	“blood	was	on	her	loincloth	and	inner	thighs.	She	stared	at	it,	thinking	something	dreadful	was	happening.	Then	she	remembered	several	talks	she	had	with	her	mother”	(2000,	97).	For	both	girls,	the	materiality	of	the	blood	is	the	same;	it	is	blood	from,	as	Alanna’s	narration	terms	it,	“the	secret	place	between	[their]	legs”	(1983,	132).	Yet,	while	this	bodily	phenomenon—the	blood—is	the	same,	their	understanding—or	lack	thereof—is	not,	and	it	is	a	difference	wrapped	up	in	conversation,	or	language:	Kel	“remembered	several	talks	she	had	with	her	mother”	(2000,	97).	The	figure	of	the	mother,	as	is	becoming	apparent,	is	key,	a	concept	that	I	return	to	in	the	Conclusions.	Here,	it	is	important	that	Kel	“remember[s]”	the	meaning	of	the	bleeding	because	of	her	conversation	with	her	mother,	whereas	Alanna	shares	no	such	remembering.		Within	popular	culture	(hegemonic	spaces),	menstruation,	when	it	is	discussed	at	all,	is	frequently	associated	with	horror.	Moreover,	menarche	and	more	generally	female	adolescence	itself	has	been	historically	been	likened	to	monstrosity,	as	Carrie,	both	the	novel	(King	1974)	and	the	film	(De	Palma	1976)	
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exemplifies.111	Both	have	also	been	linked	to	a	kind	of	animality,	as	is	also	the	case	with	the	horror	film	Ginger	Snaps	and	its	two	teenaged	protagonists	(Fawcett	2000).112	While	the	references	to	the	“horror	of	the	blood”	as	Irigaray	so	aptly	describes	it	abound,	YAL	also	offers	its	own	pertinent	examples,	one	of	which	is	Only	Ever	Yours	(O’Neil	2015a),	a	satirical	rendering	of	popular	and	media	culture	set	in	a	dystopic	future	where	women	are	created	for	the	pleasure	of	men.		Genetically	engineered	for	perfection	and	existing	on	medications	that	control	their	bodies:	SleepSound	to	ensure	a	good	night’s	sleep,	Kcal	to	prevent	weight	gain,	and	antiwomenstruation	medications	to	stop	them	menstruating,	the	eves,	as	they	are	called,	are	more	robot	than	human.	Yet,	human	they	are,	as	the	many	medications	to	control	their	human	bodies	and	emotions	attest.	Frieda,	the	heroine,	is	the	first	of	the	eves	to	experience	menarche,	and	it	is	a	horrifying	experience.		I	[Frieda]	woke	in	the	middle	of	the	night.	I	could	feel	something	seeping	away	from	the	very	centre	of	me.	I	blinked	in	the	dim	light	of	the	night-time	lamps,	blinking	again	and	again,	but	it	was	still	there,	a	shadowy	puddle	oozing	through	my	new	sheets.	I	shrank	away,	pulling	myself	into	the	corner,	away	from	it,	but	it	was	on	my	hands	and	it	was	sticky	on	the	backs	of	my	legs	and	it	was	spreading	everywhere.	I	couldn’t	stop	it.				 I	screamed	and	screamed	and	screamed.	(195)			This,	quite	dramatically,	demonstrates	the	horror	(“screamed”)	of	the	blood,	but	it	also	explains	why—for	Frieda,	and	by	extension,	adolescent	girls	more	widely—the	blood	is	horrific:	it	puddles	and	oozes,	and	it	is	sticky	and	impossible	to	stop.	The	repetition	of	“it”	intensifies	the	feeling	of	horror	created	
                                                111	Carrie	has	been	much	analysed	for	its	navigation	of	the	feminine	and	feminist	and	its	handling	of	menstruation.	See,	Moseley	(2002),	Clover	(1993)	and	Creed	(1993).		112	While	I	address	issues	of	shape-shifting	(often	termed	metamorphosis,	in	for	example,	the	work	of	Lassén-Seger	(2006)	and	Chappell	(2007)	throughout	this	thesis,	Ginger	Snaps	alludes	to	a	were-wolf	motif	that	is	strongly	present	in	terms	of	both	animal	studies,	which	my	reading	of	shape-shifting	will	touch	upon,	as	well	as	the	perceived	horror	of	a	girl’s	transition	into	woman.		Regarding	werewolves	in	Western	culture	see:	Otten	(1986),	Douglas	(1994),	Bourgault	(2006),	and	McMahon-Coleman	and	Weaver	(2012).	
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by	this	narration,	especially	in	the	passage’s	refusal	to	identify,	to	speak,	the	blood.	The	passage	also	gets	to	the	core	of	the	“problem”	of	menstruation:	“I	couldn’t	stop	it”	(195).	While	this	is	particularly	relevant	to	Frieda—in	the	novel’s	world	of	uber-heightened	body	surveillance—it	also	describes	the	plight	of	the	adolescent	girl	in	popular	and	media	culture.	Furthermore,	Frieda	is	mocked	for	allowing	her	body	to	express	itself	in	such	a	way,	and	through	the	Eves’	tie	to	Adam	and	Eve,	it	is	a	suppression	of	the	body	that	includes	biblical	allusions.	The	red	blood	is	a	curse:	“chastity-ruth	hung	the	tainted	sheets	outside	my	cubicle	for	the	five	days	that	I	bled	as	a	sign	that	I	was	unclean.	We	knew	then.	We	knew	this	was	our	curse.	We	knew	it	had	to	be	hidden”	(196).	The	“curse”	that	is	this	bleeding	is	weighty,	and	it	is	useful	returning	to	Hyde	([1998]	2010)	for	an	explanation	as	to	why.		The	organized	body	is	a	sign	that	we	are	organized	psychologically	and	that	we	understand	and	accept	the	organization	of	the	world	around	us.	When	Adam	and	Eve	cover	their	genitals,	they	simultaneously	begin	to	structure	consciousness	and	to	structure	their	primordial	community.	(169)			
Only	Ever	Yours	(2014)	and	the	bleeding	that	is	a	“curse”	stems	from	this	very	biblical	structuring.	In	bleeding	on	her	sheets,	they	become	“tainted”	and	a	marker	of	how	Frieda’s	body	has	failed	because	it	has	bled.	Moreover,	because	the	“organized	body	is	a	sign	that	we	are	organized	psychologically,”	it	also	speaks	to	how	Frieda	has,	as	an	Eve,	failed.	So	much	so	that	one	of	the	other	eves	muses	over	a	red	velvet	cupcake	that,	“‘It’s	so	red.’	She	giggles.	‘It	reminds	me	of	when	you	got	your	first	womenstruation.	Your	bed	looked	like	a	crime	scene”	(193).	In	bleeding,	Frieda	breaks	the	rules,	and	it	is	a	“crime.”	Yet,	while	the	harsh	reality	often	found	in	dystopian	fiction	is	useful,	in	that	it	is	another	kind	of	engagement	with	the	unspeakable,	it	is	not	about	providing	the	same	kinds	of	narratives	of	acceptance	and	agency	around	that	unspeakable	that	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	can,	and	does,	offer,	and	such	conversations	are	crucial—a	point	Lucy	Powrie	(LucytheReader	2015),	a	hugely	successful	teenage	blogger	and	“booktuber”	(someone	who	posts	videos	about	books	on,	typically,	youtube)	who	works	under	the	moniker	Lucy	the	Reader,	discusses	in	a	vlog	on	“Periods	in	YA.”	Here,	Powrie	is	concerned	with	how	
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“we’re	taught	from	a	very	young	age	not	to	talk	about	menstruation	and	that	its	embarrassing,	weird	and	kind	of	gross”	(n.p.).	She	further	mentions,	it	would’ve	been	such	a	great	comfort	to	me	to	read	about	girls	who	were	menstruating	as	well,”	also	noting	that	she	experienced	menarche	quite	early	and	before	all	of	her	friends.	Powrie,	in	this	way,	makes	a	case—“such	a	great	comfort”—for	the	inclusion	of	narrations	of	menstruation	within	YAL.	Yet,	YAL	does	not	frequently	include	such	narrations,	suggesting	through	its	interpellative	role	that	the	ideal	(female)	adolescent	should	not	be	seen	as	menstruating.113			In	other	words,	the	literature,	by	neglecting	the	topic,	both	reinforces	and	constructs	the	shame	around	menstruation.	Moreover,	Powrie	quite	poignantly	asks	how	might	The	Hunger	Games	(2008–2010)	or	Twilight	(2005–2008),	examples	of	hegemonic	YA	fantasy,	have	been	different	had	Katniss	or	Bella	had	their	periods	within	the	stories,	while	also	musing	on	how	inconvenient	that	might	have	been	for	Edward,	Bella’s	love	interest	and	a	vampire.	Musing	aside,	Powrie	has	a	valid	point:	both	of	these	texts	have	been,	and	still	are,	hugely	successful,	not	least	owing	to	their	adaptations	as	film.	Yet,	this	very	ordinary	bodily	function	is	never	mentioned.	As	Powrie	suggests	and	exemplifies	in	the	vlog	post,	we	have	to	“break	the	stigma	surrounding	menstruation”	by	talking	about	it	(n.p.),114	and	while	this	is	beginning	to	happen—and	is	at	the	heart	of	Are	You	There	God?	It’s	Me,	Margaret	(Blume	1970)—I	am	concerned	with	the	conversations—shared	between	adolescent	girls	and	older	women—about	menarche,	as	I	believe	these	are	essential	to	“break[ing]	the	stigma.”			The	telling	of	this	bleeding,	the	conversation	around	it,	is	integral	because	the	telling	gives	the	bleeding	(the	physical	thing)	meaning	within	discourse,	within	language	(that	is	to	say	the	Symbolic).	The	telling	provides	
                                                113	For	other	discussions	of	the	absence	of	menstruation	in	YAL,	see,	for	example,	Cummins	(2008),	Sayantani	(2010),	Burns	(2013),	and	Jensen	(2014).		114	For	realistic	YAL	that	includes	menstruation	within	its	narrative	frame,	see:	though	by	no	means	exhaustively,	Mayhew	(2013),	O’Porter	(2013),	Pratt	(2014)	Bannan	(2015)	Bourne	(2015)	Heathfield	(2015)	Williamson	(2015).	In	terms	of	speculative	fiction,	including	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy,	see,	again	not	exhaustively	and	not	including	texts	that	I	discuss	in	detail,	Cashore	(2009)	and	(2010),	Maas	(2012),	Rossi	(2013),	and	Marchetta	(2014).				
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signification,	and	in	doing	so,	“the	horror	of	the	blood,”	as	Irigaray	terms	it	([1974]	1985,	228)—and	as	echoed	so	beautifully	by	Alanna	“gasp[ing]	in	horror	to	find	her	thighs	and	sheets	smeared	with	blood”	(1983,	132)—is	neutralised.	It	is,	as	Alanna	suggested,	made	“normal.”	This	thesis	is	about	making	normal,	about	making	normal	that	which	is	considered	abnormal.	Chapter	Three	focused	on	appearance	and	the	strict,	limited	appearance	that	is	expected	of	girls	and	women,	and	this	chapter	is	concerned	with	discourse	itself,	with	how	the	female	body,	through	its	bleeding,	may	be	made	normal.	The	simple	fact	that	these	stories	exist	is	crucial	to	this	aim.	Thus,	the	rest	of	this	chapter	is	concerned,	first,	with	undoing	the	dominance	of	hegemonic	discourse	by	questioning,	through	Daine’s	shape-shifting	ability,	the	truth	of	discourse’s	rendering	of	the	world.	From	the	unlocked	potential	of	discourse,	I	move	to	a	speaking	of	the	female	body	in	order	to	include	it	within	language,	within	discourse	to	make	the	bleeding,	and	the	blood,	normal.	The	hero	story	tames	the	other	by	speaking	it,	by	narrating	the	story	of	the	hero	conquering	his	foe,	so	why	not	do	the	same	for	the	horror	of	the	blood?			
DAINE’S	MAGIC:	QUESTIONING	THE	NAMES	OF	THINGS			There	is	a	consensus	within	critical	theory	that	engages	the	animal	that,	as	Kari	Weil	(2012)	suggests,	animals	are	“being[s]	that	resist	our	flawed	system	of	language”	(12).	Animals	are	posited	as	outside	of	representation	(the	Symbolic),	much	like	woman	(who	is	body).	For	this	reason,	metamorphosis,	or	fantastic	change,	is	often	seen	as	an	escape	from	language	and	a	return	to	the	real	(Clarke	1998;	Weil	2012),	especially	when	that	fantastic	change	involves	a	human	changing	into	an	animal.	While	metamorphosis	is	the	most	commonly	employed	term	for	describing	such	transformations	(see,	also,	Lassén-Seger	2006;	Chappell	2007;	Waller	2009),	I	use	the	term	shape-shifting,	initially	because	it	is	the	term	used	within	Pierce’s	Tortall	universe,	but	also	for	other,	more	specific	reasons	that	this	section	develops.	Thus,	this	section	is	concerned	with	the	implications	of	perceiving	fantastic	change,	particularly	fantastic	change	that	sees	a	human	change	into	an	animal,	when	“animal”	is	posited	by	many	critics	as	outside	of	signification	because	it	is	more	“real,”	a	positing	that	has	to	do	
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with	a	lack	of	language.		Moreover,	this	section	also	engages	a	series	of	oppositions:	the	human/animal	and	self/other,	as	well	as	an	opposition	established	in	terms	of	Gift/wild	magic,	a	distinction	between	the	sanctioned	or	legitimate	magic	of	Tortall	and	the	“wild	magic”	Daine	possesses.	I	do	this	in	order	to	show	how	these	texts	are,	more	widely	than	in	terms	of	menstruation,	concerned	with	speaking	the	unspeakable.		This	reading	is	about,	in	many	ways,	questioning	the	names	of	things—or,	our	consensus	agreement	on	the	names	of	things,	as	that	is	what	gives	them	power.	Being	both	human	and	“of	the	People”	(animals	within	this	world),	Daine	is	an	embodiment	of	this	questioning	because	being	animal	posits	her	as	outside	representation	(1992,	70).	It	is	a	point	made	even	more	soundly	by	her	parentage:	“I	don’t	know	who	he	[her	father]	is.	It’s	in	my	name:	Sarrasri—Sarra’s	daughter.	Only	bastards	are	named	for	their	mothers”	(113).	Daine’s	narrative	is	doubly	preoccupied	with	this	notion	illegitimacy:	she	is	outside	of	signification	because	she	is	able	to	shape-shift	(become	animal)	and	because,	as	a	bastard,	she	lacks	a	father’s	name.	This	kind	of	illegitimacy	is	another	kind	of	exclusion,	another	silencing.	In	her	home	village	of	Snowsdale	in	Galla	(a	country	north	of	Tortall),	Daine	lacks	a	proper	place	within	society—because	of	her	magic	and	her	lack	of	a	father—yet	in	Tortall,	the	capital	of	the	country	Tortall,	it	does	not	matter.	She	is	valued	for	herself.	In	many	respects,	this	complicating	of	discourse	is	a	process	of	undoing	that	begins	with	an	unpicking	of	magic,	one	of	the	components	of	fantasy	that	I	established	in	Chapter	Two.	It	is	about	the	difference	between	the	“Gift”—the	all-purpose	magical	ability	that	is	trained	within	institutions—and	“wild	magic”—a	sort	of	elemental	magic	that	bonds	those	who	have	it	to	particular	things	or,	as	is	the	case	with	Daine,	animals.		As	I	have	noted,	Daine	suggests,	“I	can’t	even	start	fire,	and	Gifted	babies	manage	that”	(1992,	15).	Having	the	Gift	is	bound	up	in	particular	expectations,	starting	fire,	in	this	case.	From	the	very	beginning,	Daine’s	ability	refuses	the	Gift’s	expectations.	So	much	so,	that	it	appears	to	be—and	is	perceived	as—nothing	more	than	a	knack,	“‘I	just	do.	I’ve—’	‘A	knack	with	animals,’	Onua	chorused	along	with	her”	(45).	In	this	way,	Daine’s	magic,	that	is	not	the	Gift,	expands	the	boundaries	of	that	which	is	classed	as	magic	within	this	world,	and	it	does	so	from	the	position	of	Other.		
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	‘If	I’ve	learned	anything	as	king,	it’s	been	I	never	know	when	someone	will	be	able	to	help	me.	I	have	a	feeling	you’ll	be	most	welcome	in	this	realm,	Veralidaine	Sarrasri.’	(69)			The	whole	purpose	of	Daine’s	quartet	is	a	kind	of	making	normal:	through	including	Daine	with	the	realm	of	Tortall,	through	giving	a	name	to	the	magic	that	she	possesses	as	well	as	through	a	kind	of	animal	speech	that	appeals	to	an	existence	outside	of	narration.	In	other	words,	through	self-consciously	questioning—for	example,	the	names	of	things,	what	names	mean	and	if	names	have	any	impact	on	power—the	text	speaks	from	a	certain	kind	of	silence.		Miri,	a	friend	of	Daine’s,	points	out	that	having	or	not	having	magic	“depends	on	what	you	mean	[…]	the	sea’s	full	of	magic,	but	we	can’t	use	it	like	the	Gift.	It	isn’t	the	same’”	(96).	While	the	two	are	not	the	same,	they	are	united	under	this	notion	of	magic.	Daine	might	not	have	the	Gift,	but	she	has	something.	It	is	a	point	that	Cloud’s	“horse	sense”	([1994]	1999,	107)	demonstrates	quite	well.	Having	just	been	told	she	possesses	wild	magic,	after	a	lifetime	of	being	tested—by	her	mother,	a	hedgewitch—for	signs	of	the	Gift,	Daine	asks	Cloud,	“‘You	ever	hear	of	‘wild	magic’?	They	say	I	have	it’”	(1992,	69).	Cloud	responds:	“You	have	something,	and	you	know	it.	Who	cares	what	name	it	has?	Or	did	you	really	think	the	wild	creatures	visit	because	they	like	humans?”	(69).	Here,	Cloud	offers	a	kind	of	practicality	that	is	in	opposition	to	Daine’s	worry	over	the	name	of	this	wild	magic,	and	it	is	a	practicality	that	speaks	to	something	outside	of	language;	it	defies	the	“naming”	that	is	always	associated	with	institutions	and	the	legitimate,	as	such	it	also	relates	to	that	moment	of	writing	that	initiated	Alanna’s	cross-dressing.	While	this	is	not	quite	Alanna’s	engagement	of	the	Symbolic,	the	negotiations	of	Daine’s	wild	magic	encompass	similar	issues:	the	legitimacy	and	power	of	the	names	of	things.		Walsh	(2013)	suggests,	“the	‘Wild’	then	is	both	the	locus	of	ultimate	knowledge,	and	indefinite,	interminable	and	unfathomable”	(71).	Yet,	the	wild	is	also,	she	suggests,	“written	as	not	needing	to	be	interpreted	because	its	meaning	is	transparent	and	immediate”	(71,	emphasis	original).	It	is	a	reading	that	speaks	to	my	earlier	discussion	of	both	realistic	YAL	and	to	woman’s	alignment	with	the	body;	Daine’s	wild	magic	aligns	with	all	these	readings.	Her	wild	magic	
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is	both	unknown	and	already	known,	as	“it’s	in	everything,”	according	to	Numair	(1992,	246).	Yet,	many	within	the	world	dismiss	it—the	Carthakis,	as	I	have	mentioned,	“think	it	old	wives’	tales”	(272).	It	is	perceived	as	both	wild,	“thus	the	name”	and	uncontrollable,	“unpredictable”	(207).	Furthermore,	Daine	“can’t	help	animals	knowing	her	feelings	any	more	than	she	can	help	breathing.	[Numair	has]	tested	her	control.	It’s	as	good	as	she	can	make	it”	(207).	Moreover,	Daine,	according	to	Numair,	“‘has	real	power.	Not	the	Gift,	though	[…]	It’s	wild	magic,	pure	and	simple.	She’s	brimming	with	it.	I’ve	never	seen	a	human	with	so	much’”	(65).	Daine’s	magic	is	constituted	not	only	as	power,	which	can	also	be	read	as	natural,	but	it	is	also	“real	power,”	further	suggesting	both	a	difference	from	the	Gift—in	that,	this	wild	magic	is	potentially	more	“real”	or	natural—while	also	appealing	to	the	obviousness	of	it.	In	this	way,	Daine’s	magic	is	perceived	as	both	Walsh’s	“indefinite,	interminable	and	unfathomable”	as	well	as—and	at	the	same	time—simple,	natural	and	thus	obvious.		Chappell	(2007)	suggests	that	the	animal—the	particular	manifestation	of	Daine’s	“wild	magic,”	in	that,	she	is	“of	the	People”—is	in	many	Lacanian	readings	conceptualised	as	the	Real,	what	Chappell	further	describes	as	the	“sensory	world,”	world	of	the	fleshy	body,	“and	thus	the	realm	of	unmediated	and	unordered	material	experience”	(190).	In	being	a	human	(girl)	and	also	“of	the	People,”	Daine	is	a	liminal	figure	between	human	(figured	as	the	Symbolic)	and	animal	(figured	as	the	Real).	Thus,	her	shape-shifting	could	be	read	as	a	return	to	this	world,	an	escape	from	the	world	of	signification,	a	point	that	Bruce	Clark	(1998)	and	Waller	(2009)	also	make.	Moreover,	Waller	goes	as	far	as	stating,	“metamorphosis	is	figured	[in	Psychoanalytic	theory]	as	a	return	to	a	world	of	non-signification”	(47).	Thus,	Daine—as	both	woman	(body)	and	“People”	(animal)—doubly	exists	within	this	“non-signification,”	especially	as	these	texts	seem	to	posit	the	human	form	as	merely	one	particular	kind	of	animal.115	She	is	excluded	from	discourse,	which	is	a	form	of	the	legitimate.	
                                                115	See	my	above	reading	of	Aelin,	the	heroine	of	Maas’s	Throne	of	Glass	series.	(2012–2015).		
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Moreover,	Waller	also	suggests	metamorphosis	that	does	not	see	a	return	to	a	human	state—as	is	the	case	with	Lady:	My	Life	as	a	Bitch	(Burgess	2001)	in	which	Sandra	is	transformed	into	a	dog	and	remains	forever	dog—“functions	as	an	endless	liminal	state	where	norms	are	upended	and	then	not	returned	to”	(49).	While	Daine	always	returns	to	her	“true-shape,”	thus	never	remaining	wholly	shape-shifted,	as	I	discussed	in	Chapter	Three,	she	is	always	already	liminal.	She	is	always	already	“of	the	People,”	even	when	not	wearing	an	(conventionally-perceived-as)	animal	form.	In	this	way	shape-shifting—and	this	is	one	of	the	reasons	I	refer	to	it	as	shape-shifting	and	not	metamorphosis—potentially	grants	access	to	this	space	of	non-signification,	but	it	does	not	stay	there;	it	bridges	the	space	between	the	two.	In	this	way	Daine’s	shape-shifting	is	also	about	bringing	the	Other	into	discourse.		For	Daine,	shape-shifting	is	not	quite	a	return	to	non-signification.	Throughout	the	Immortals	quartet,	Daine’s	communication	with	the	animals	is	rendered	in	language,	despite	an	absence	of	speech	marks.	With	Cloud	and	other	mortal	animals,	there	are	no	speech	marks	surrounding	the	animal’s	dialogue,	though	when	Daine	speaks	aloud	to	them,	her	speaking	receives	speech	marks.			Strong	teeth	gripped	her	elbow	hard,	Daine	looked	around	into	the	bright	eyes	of	her	pony,	Cloud.	If	I	have	to	bite	you	to	stop	you	feeling	sorry	for	yourself,	I	will,	the	mare	informed	her.	You	are	being	silly.			Numair,	used	to	these	silent	exchanges,	asked,	“What	does	she	say?”		‘She	says	I’m	feeling	sorry	for	myself.	I	don’t	think	she	understands.’	([1994]	1999,	3–4)		While	this	is	again	an	example	of	Cloud’s	“horse	sense”	([1994]	1999,	107),	it	also	demonstrates	how	Daine’s	“mind	speech”	with	animals	is	rendered	in	narration:	there	are	no	speech	marks.	This	speaking	employs	a	refusal	of	the	linguistic	marker	of	speech	(speech	marks),	but	it	is	still	the	narration	of	speech.	In	other	words,	it	is	a	liminal	speaking:	this	“mind	speech”	is	at	once	outside	of	hegemonic	discourse	(which	requires	speech	marks,	the	symbol	indicating	speech)	and,	yet,	within	a	discourse	(the	narrative	of	the	text).	It	both	is,	and	is	not,	speaking.	Moreover,	the	text	is	particularly	concerned	with	establishing	the	
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normalcy,	or	at	least	regularity,	of	such	“mind	speech;”	Numair	is	“used	to	these	silent	exchanges,”	and	so	should	be	the	reader,	by	extension	(my	emphasis).		In	this	way,	the	narration	offers	an	expanded	sense	of	“speaking.”	Not	only	does	Daine’s	wild	magic,	and	thus	her	shape-shifting,	grant	her	access	to	an	additional	language,	a	language	that	in	conventional	terms	ought	not	exist	for	its	alignment	with	“non-signification”	(Waller	2009,	47),	but	it	is	rendered	as	speech	within	the	text,	crucially	without	the	linguistic	marker	of	speech.	This	is,	in	other	words,	one	more	way	in	which	these	texts	are	preoccupied	with	making	visible	that	which	is	invisible	and	with	speaking	that	which	is	unspeakable.		
Wolf-Speaker	(1994),	book	two	of	Pierce’s	Immortals	quartet,	clearly	demonstrates	this	speaking	the	unspeakable	as	well	as	the	mutual	cooperation	it	engenders.	In	this	text,	Daine	is	called	to	the	aid	of	the	Long	Lake	Pack	of	wolves.	Led	by	Brokefang	and	his	mate	Frostfur,	these	wolves	helped	Daine	take	revenge	on	the	bandits	who	burned	her	home,	killing	her	mother	and	grandfather.	Forced	from	Snowsdale	in	Galla	for	their	part	in	helping	Daine,	as	well	as	because	of	the	lack	of	game,	the	wolves	now	occupy	the	Long	Lake	valley	area	that	surrounds	Fief	Dunlath.	This	place	is	posited	as	“just	about	perfect,”	not	just	for	the	wolves	or	“‘the	People,	but	two	leggers’”	([1994]	1999,	199)	and	“‘Maybe	even	immortals,	too’”	(200).	As	Brokefang	describes,			This	valley	is	so	big	we	could	go	for	days	without	seeing	humans.	There	is	plenty	of	game,	no	rival	pack	to	claim	it,	and	caves	in	the	mountains	for	dens	in	the	snows.	(13)		The	problem:	Yolan	of	Dunlath	is	wrecking	the	land	in	a	bid	to	take	over	the	Tortallan	Crown.	With	the	aid	of	Tristan	Staghorn	and	Gissa	of	Rachne	(Carthaki	mages),	his	plan	is	to	destroy	the	land	with	“bloodrain,”	a	highly	toxic	magic	brew	that	will	“kill	anything	that	uses	moisture	from	the	river”	for	a	span	of	“ten	miles”	(240).	Acting	through	Brokefang,	Old	White—the	Wolf	god—brings	Daine	to	the	Longlake	region	in	order	to	“set	this	whole	valley	to	rights”	(201,	
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italics	original),116	and	it	is	Daine	that	must	do	so,	because	of	her	particular	liminality:	“Fish,	Fowl,	four-leggers,	two-leggers,	no-leggers,	[Daine	is]	to	set	this	
valley	to	rights”	by	“shap[ing]	a	bridge	between	kindreds”	(ibid.).	Daine	is	the	“only	one	for	the	task”	(201)	because	she	“alone	speak[s]	to	all	three	kindreds:	
human,	immortals	and	beasts”	(199).	From	the	liminal	position	of	human-animal	(being	“of	the	People”)	Daine	is	link	between	them	all.	In	this	way,	these	narrations	of	Daine’s	magic	are	about	overcoming	the	assumption	that	the	animal	(woman,	child,	adolescent—anyone/thing	not	the	positive,	that	is,	white	human	male—of	hegemonic	binary	oppositions)	is	somehow	lesser.	Moreover,	it	is	the	inclusion	of	wild	magic—including	the	speech	between	species	that	this	magic	makes	possible—within	discourse	that,	in	offering	multiple	perspectives,	questions	the	names	of	things,	that	is	to	say,	the	truth	of	things.		There	is	a	certain	kind	of	naming	that	is	always	associated	with	institutions	and	the	legitimate	(the	Symbolic),	and	the	defining	of	things	as	legitimate	(the	Gift)	or	illegitimate	(wild	magic,	raka	magic)	as	a	part	of	this	naming	is	questionable,	as	it	is	the	source	of	so	many	exclusions.	Yet,	these	narrations	show	both	Diane	and	the	raka	(in	Chapter	Two)	using	their	Othered	magic	to	great	success:	“raka	magic	was	shaped	by	subtlety,	crafted	by	mages	who	spent	their	lives	hiding	things	from	other	mages	([2004]	2005,	74).	In	this	way,	this	section	relates	to	the	moment	of	writing	that	initiated	Alanna’s	cross-dressing,	while	also	speaking	to	issues	regarding	access	to	the	Symbolic.	In	other	words	Daine’s	magic	is	constituted,	within	Pierce’s	Immortal	quartet,	not	only	as	power—something	that	can	be	read	as	natural—but	it	is	also	“real”	power,	suggesting	a	difference	from	the	Gift,	the	sanctioned	and	institutionalised	magic	of	this	world.	In	that,	this	wild	magic	is	potentially	more	“real”	or	natural,	and	in	being	included	within	narration,	this	Other	is	made	available	in	discourse,	thus	engaging	those	silences.	Consequently,	this	section	not	only	demonstrates	how	Pierce’s	Tortall	universe	is	concerned	with	questioning	the	authority	(truth)	of	hegemonic	discourse,	more	widely	than	just	
                                                116	While	conversations	with	immortals	are	given	speech	marks—because	immortal	animals	can	both	mind-speak	with	Daine	and	speak	in	the	human	sense—such	conversations	are	also	denoted	by	italics,	to	indicate	the	divine	nature	of	the	speaking.		
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in	terms	of	gender,	while	also	making	that	which	is	unspeakable	(the	animal,	the	Real)	available	in	narration	(a	kind	of	discourse).	Pivotally,	these	texts	do	this	through	the	figure	of	Daine,	a	liminal	persona	between	the	poles—human/animal,	Gift/wild	magic—of	opposition.			
UN-HORROR-ING	THE	BLOOD:	THE	BODY	IN	LANGUAGE		Alanna’s	unique	position	makes	a	telling	of	the	bleeding	of	menarche—provided	by	an	older	woman,	who	is	also	a	healer—imperative.	This	telling	gives	the	bleeding—this	physical,	female	thing—meaning	within	discourse,	within	language,	that	is	to	say,	the	Symbolic.	Yet	it	is	not	just	for	Alanna,	the	girl	operating	with	a	masculine	subjectivity,	for	whom	such	a	telling	is	imperative.	While	Alanna’s	disguise	and	its	(temporary)	exclusion	from	the	feminine	makes	it	particularly	important,	Kel—who	is	also	training	to	become	a	knight,	though	not	disguised	as	a	boy—also	offers	a	telling	of	the	bleeding,	one	that	extends	to	the	conversations	around	menarche	and	menstruation	that	girls,	like	Lucy	Powrie,	are	asking	for	both	inside,	and	out,	of	YAL.		For	Alanna,	Kel	and	also	Maerad	(the	shero	of	Croggon’s	The	Books	of	Pellinor),	the	telling	provides	signification,	and	in	doing	so,	“the	horror	of	the	blood,”	as	Irigaray	terms	it,	is	neutralised	([1974]	1985,	228).	This	neutralisation	is	essential	because,	as	Hyde	suggests,	the	first	questioning	of	discourse	(law	or	hegemony)	must	start	with	the	body,	for	the	body	is	the	site	upon	which	discourse,	or	power	in	Foucault’s	terms,	manifest.	Irigaray	([1974]	1985)	takes	up	the	red	blood	as	a	metaphor	for	the	mother	and	maternal	lineage,	for	a	reading	of	relationships	outside	of	the	law	of	the	father,	or	the	white	blood,	or	sperm	(see,	116	and	221–222).	Battersby	(1998)	argues	that	Irigaray’s	reading	of	the	bond	between	Antigone	and	her	brother,	“opens	up	a	division	between	‘sang	rouge’	(red	blood,	which	is	linked	to	matrilinetal	descent)	and	‘sang	blanc’	(white	blood/anemic	blood,	which	links	with	sperm	and	patrilineality)”	(113).	Sang	blanc	is	the	order	of	Western	philosophy,	of	subjectivity.	As	females	are	excluded	from	the	Lacanian	Symbolic,	they	not	only	lack	access	to	(masculine)	discourse,	but	they	also	lack	“access	to	the	signifying	economy”	of	their	femaleness,	as	Irigaray	([1974]	
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1985)	terms	it	(71).		As	all	subjectivity	is	masculine,	there	is	no	space	for	a	subjectivity	that	includes	‘red	blood’	and	birth.	It	is	this	positioning	that	gives	rise	to	“the	horror	of	the	blood”	(228).	Furthermore,	the	horror	is	merely	reiterated	unless	rearticulation	of	the	body	occurs,	unless	discourse	is	transformed.	The	telling	of	Alanna’s	bleeding	not	only	situates	the	body	within	language	(the	Symbolic),	but	it	also	makes	it	known	through	that	language,	while	also	facilitating	Alanna’s	transition	from	child	to	woman.	Importantly,	this	telling	comes	through	a	conversation	between	Alanna	and	an	older	women,	Mistress	Cooper.			‘You	poor	child,’	she	chuckled.	‘Did	no	one	ever	tell	you	of	a	woman’s	monthly	cycle?	The	fertility	cycle?			Alanna	stared.	Maude	had	mentioned	something,	once—		‘That’s	what	this	is?	It’s	normal?’		The	woman	nodded.	‘It	happens	to	us	all.	We	can’t	bear	children	until	it	begins.’			‘How	long	do	I	have	to	put	up	with	this?’	Alanna	gritted.			‘Until	you	are	too	old	to	be	bear	children.	It’s	as	normal	as	the	full	moon	is,	and	it	happens	just	as	often.	You	may	as	well	get	used	to	it.	(136–137,	emphasis	original)			Alanna	is	a	“poor	child”	because	of	the	absence	of	this	telling,	though	as	the	narration	makes	clear,	Alanna	had	heard	something	“once”	regarding	“the	woman’s	monthly	cycle.”	Here,	the	difference	lies	in	how	she	has	now	experienced	this	bleeding	for	herself	thus	calling	for	a	more	practical	need	for	the	conversation.	Thus,	someone	must	tell	the	child	about	this	“woman’s	monthly	cycle”	(1983,	136)	for	until	told,	the	child	does	not	know	the	body.	The	bleeding	has	given	new	meaning	to	that	which	“Maude	had	mentioned,”	and	in	this	way,	the	narration	makes	explicit	the	link	between	the	bleeding	(the	physical,	bodily	occurrence)	and	the	telling	of	it	(the	discursive	production).		In	other	words,	there	is	a	difference	between	the	bleeding	(as	a	physical	occurrence)	and	the	meaning	of	it.	The	meaning	is	that	which	Alanna	lacks	
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access	to,	as	the	child	and	as	Alan.	“Tell	you	of	the	woman’s	monthly	cycle”	serves	as	both	the	naming	of	this	thing,	this	physical	occurrence,	as	well	as	its	making	normal	(136).	Without	the	telling,	Alanna	does	not	understand	the	bleeding.	Thus,	prior	to	this	telling	the	bleeding	at	once	exists	and	yet	does	not,	and	it	is	the	telling	that	allows,	makes	possible,	the	transition	into	knowledge:	“‘That’s	what	this	is?		It’s	normal?’”	(136,	emphasis	original).	Crucially,	in	this	making	normal,	the	telling	links	this	“woman’s	monthly	cycle”	(what	Alanna	refers	to	as	“it”)	to	the	“full	moon,”	not	only	is	this	an	instance	of	relationality	(“woman’s	cycle”),	but	it	is	also	repetition.	Moreover,	the	making	normal	depends	on	a	link	to	nature;	there	is	a	suggestion	that	both	these	things	are	natural,	and	thus	normal,	because	they	occur	in	nature.117	This	fully	takes	advantage	of	the	space	opened	through	my	reading	of	Daine’s	magic	and	shape-shifting	in	the	previous	section.						 However,	as	Alanna	is	cross-dressed	and	as	she	has	taken	on	the	subject	position	of	Alan,	this	telling	is	complicated:	“again	Mistress	Cooper	raised	her	eyebrows,	‘you’re	female,	child,	no	matter	what	clothing	you	wear.	You	must	become	accustomed	to	that’”	(136).	This	is	about	the	“obviousness”	of	the	body,	as	discussed	in	relation	to	Alanna’s	own	cross-dressing,	Daine’s	shape-shifting	and	Cinder’s	cybernetic	state	in	Chapter	Three	and,	in	this	chapter,	in	relation	to	the	“real,”	which	is	both	outside	of	language	and	impossible	to	represent	and	also	not	in	need	of	representation	because	of	its	obviousness.	The	“you’re	female”	is	this	bodily	obviousness.	Yet,	the	language	of	clothes	(a	discourse)	has	worked	to	obscure	that	obviousness,	while	also	questioning	how	obvious	or	“real”	(as	in	natural)	it	actually	is.	Despite	the	heightened	physicality	of	the	
                                                117	As	a	point	of	expansion—and	of	defining	“in	nature,”	which	I	do	not	here	have	space	to	cover—a	passage	from	Fire	(Cashore	2009).		 ‘There	is	nothing	unnatural	in	this	world,’	he	said.	‘An	unnatural	thing	is	a	thing	that	could	never	happen	in	nature.	I	happened.	I	am	natural,	and	the	things	I	want	are	natural.	The	power	of	your	mind,	and	your	beauty,	even	when	you’ve	been	drugged	in	the	bottom	of	a	boat	for	two	weeks,	covered	in	grime	and	your	face	purple	and	green—your	unnatural	beauty	is	natural.	Nature	is	horrifying.	(318)		This	musing	on	nature,	and	on	what	is	natural,	speaks	to	this	chapter’s	concern,	from	the	point	of	few	of	another	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	text.			
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femaleness	through	this	“bleeding”—despite	the	body’s	insistence	upon	its	own	obviousness—“clothing”	has	worked	to	obscure	it.	This	is	why	discourse	is	so	important;	discourse	has	the	power	to	change	our	perceptions	of	things,	and	while	our	perceptions	of	things	cannot	offer	absolute	truth,	they	do	shape	our	world.			This	worrying	of	the	body’s	obviousness	is	furthered	with	the	instruction	that	Alanna	“must	become	accustomed”	to	being	female,	in	that	not	only	does	“become	accustomed”	set	up	the	chance	of	not	becoming	accustomed,	but	it	also	sets	the	“female”	up	as	depending	on	this	“tell[ing].”	The	stability	of	the	“female”	is	dependent	on	the	thing	it	creates;	each	side	of	the	various	oppositional	pairs	(bleeding/tell[ing],	woman/child,	I/us	all,	female/male)	requires	the	other,	and	through	narration,	each	becomes	that	other;	thus	transition	from	“child”	to	“woman”	exists	as	a	continuum	of	change,	at	once	requiring	the	stable	oppositions,	while	at	the	same	time	collapsing	their	opposition.	In	other	words,	the	apparent	obviousness	of	the	body	is	obscured,	and	it	is	the	“tell[ing]”	that	allows	the	disguised	body	to	be	known:	the	“tell[ing]”	constructs	the	“female.”	For	Alanna,	then,	the	body	is	at	once	known	and	unknown,	and	knowing	depends	on	telling	(“explained”).		However,	while	“female”	(the	physical	body)	does	not	change,	at	least	for	this	“you,”	it	is	the	“female”	that	allows	change	to	occur—that	allows	this	“clothing”	to	be	worn.	Without	the	being	“female,”	the	telling	(in	all	its	forms)	would	not	be.	This	is	why	the	fleshy,	physical	body	(that	bleeds)	is	also	crucial;	the	body	influences	the	discourses	of	it;	without	the	body	there	would	be	nothing	to	have	perceptions	of,	and	while	the	body	does	not	in	a	straight	forward	and	one-to-one	way	dictate	the	shape	of	its	discursive	construction,	it	must	still	be	taken	into	account.	For	this	reason,	a	conversation	is	just	as	integral	to	Kel’s	transition	into	womanhood—“‘You’ve	become	a	woman.	It’s	the	Goddess’s	mark	on	us,	that	we	bleed	every	month”	(2000,	98)—as	it	is	for	Alanna.	While	Alanna’s	conversation	was	required	because	of	her	particular	masculine	subjectivity,	the	text	insists	that	Kel,	even	as	a	girl	(in	that	she	appears	girl	through	her	clothing),	requires	the	conversation.	First,	in	the	“remember[ing]	of	several	talks	she’d	had	with	her	mother”	and	second	with	the	conversation	that	occurs	alongside	the	first	bleeding.	
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	Lalasa	opened	the	dressing	room	door.	Looking	at	Kel,	she	saw	the	problem	immediately.	‘Do	you	know	what	this	means?’	she	asked	opening	a	dry-goods	chest	and	drawing	out	linen	and	a	fresh	loincloth.								Kel	nodded,	still	scrubbing.			‘Congratulations,’	Lalasa	said.	You	started	early,	didn’t	you?	Not	even	twelve.	I	was	thirteen	[…]	Have	you	cramps?”			‘An	ache,	like.’	Lalasa	patted	her	abdomen.			Kel	nodded.		 	‘Willow	tea	will	help.	Here.’	She	showed	Kel	how	to	fix	a	linen	pad	inside	her	loincloth,	to	catch	the	blood.	‘We	can	change	that	at	lunchtime.’	(2000,	98)		Kel,	thanks	to	her	mother,	already	knows	what	this	bleeding	is,	as	the	“nodded”	suggests	and	as	I	discussed	above.	Yet,	as	this	is	the	first	bleeding,	a	conversation	still	occurs,	a	conversation	that	insists	on	the	practical:	scrubbing	hose,	resolving	cramps	and	how	to	use	the	linen	pad.			 This	conversation	is,	again,	about	making	the	bleeding	normal.	While	there	is	a	temptation	to	read	Kel’s	first	bleeding	in	opposition	to	Alanna’s	and	as	the	more	“normal”	menarche—in	that	most	girls	have	not	become,	through	cross-dressing,	boys—the	text	refuses	that	distinction.	Despite	knowing	what	this	bleeding	is,	the	above	conversation	between	Lalasa	and	Kel	is	prefaced,	in	narration,	by	“She	had	a	dull	ache	in	her	abdomen.	Was	that	normal?”	(2000,	97),	contrasted	with	Alanna’s	earlier	exclamation	of	“‘That’s	what	this	is?	It’s	
normal?’,”	and	this	use	of	“normal”	in	both	situations	suggests	that	these	texts	are	very	much	concerned	with	a	making	normal	of	this	bleeding.	Critically,	it	is	a	making	normal	through	language—through	narrations	of	conversations,	which	are,	in	fact,	a	double	layering	of	language:	the	narration	itself	and	the	conversation,	shared	between	two	women,	to	which	that	narration	appeals.		Moreover,	this	making	normal	does	not	just	end	at	the	conversation	surrounding	menarche.	Rather,	the	text	also	writes	it	into	the	girl’s	everyday	existence.		
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As	Kel	washed	her	face,	cleaned	her	teeth,	and	combed	her	hair,	Lalasa	put	out	her	clothes,	including	a	fresh	breastband	and	loincloth,	and	one	of	the	cloth	pads	Kel	wore	during	her	monthly	bleeding.	It	had	begun	the	day	before.	(2001,	39)		The	repetition	of	the	stories	within	Pierce’s	work,	alongside	the	inclusion	of	menstruation	into	the	girl’s	daily	life,	as	Kel’s	handmaiden	indicates,	speaks	to	a	wider	concern	with	speaking	the	unspeakable	that	is	appearing	in	popular	and	media	culture.	Reaching	a	particular	apex	in	the	summer	of	2015,	there	has	been	a	particular	emphasis	on	the	lack	of	narrations	and	speaking	about	menstruation	(see,	for	example,	O’Neil	2015;	see,	also,	Rojas	2015	and	tyrannosauruslexx	2015),	as	I	discussed	above	in	relation	to	Powrie’s	vlog	on	the	topic	(2015).		Finally,	The	Gift	(Croggon	2002)	is	an	excellent	example	of	this	speaking	from	the	mythopoeic	point	of	view	and	outside	of	Pierce’s	work,	demonstrating	that	this	speaking	is	occurring,	though	still	in	a	limited	fashion.	Maerad,	having	been	raised	a	slave	after	the	sack	of	her	home,	does	not	know	(like	Alanna)	the	meaning	of	the	menstrual	blood,	and,	again,	there	is	a	conversation	between	Maerad,	the-girl-becoming-woman	and	Silva,	an	older	woman,	in	order	to	explain	the	bleeding,	and,	in	this	instance,	the	“agonizing	cramps”	that	accompany	it	(100).	Where	Kel’s	narration	introduced	a	“dull	ache”	in	the	abdomen,	Maerad’s	offers	a	similar,	but	also	different,	accompanying	trait.	In	this	way,	these	texts	also	demonstrate	that	while	menstruation	generally	affects	most	women,	the	individual	experience	may	differ.	Finally,	Silva	also	gets	to	the	heart	of	this	chapter,	by	suggesting	“‘it	is	dreadful	that	any	girl	should	be	kept	in	such	ignorance	of	her	own	body.	But	still,	you	have	no	mother’”	([2002]	2004,	102).		This	ignorance	of	the	body	is	what	is	at	stake,	without	a	discourse	of	bodily	instability—including	menarche—adolescent	girls	are	trapped	within	a	body	that	has	limited	meaning.	This	is	why	the	body	(fleshy,	physical)	and	the	discourses	of	it	are	so	important:	understanding	takes	both.	These	narrations	of	menstruation,	and	narrations—throughout	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy—like	them,	are	that	rearticulation.	They	are	the	bringing	of	blood,	of	red	blood,	into	discourse,	into	language.	Furthermore,	in	being	so	preoccupied	with	constructing	the	bleeding	of	menstruation	as	
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“normal,”	these	texts	insist	upon	its	signification,	and	in	doing	so	they	open	spaces	in	which	not	only	might	Battersby’s	project	of	conceiving	of	the	female	self	as	not	one	but	always	potentially	two	might	logically	occur	but	also	relationships	between	mothers	and	daughters	as	well	as	sexual	relationships	between	individuals.	In	other	words,	relationships	are	key,	and	it	is	these	concomitant	issues—as	their	articulations	are	made	possible	through	this	rearticulation	of	bleeding—that	I	address	in	Conclusions.	Here,	I	want	to	conclude	this	chapter	with	a	brief	look	at	the	uniquely	gendered	persona	Alan/Alanna	develops,	as	I	feel	this	being	Alan(na)	is	made	possible	by	the	very	speaking	of	the	unspeakable	with	which	I	have	been	concerned.			
ALANNA/ALAN	BECOMES	ALAN(NA)			Owing	to	Alanna’s	cross-dressing,	the	text	appears	to	insist	that	the	self	is	the	body	seen:	Alanna	is	Alan	because	she	appears	to	be	(and	performs)	Alan,	as	I	have	discussed.	Yet,	because	this	is	an	instance	of	cross-dressing,	the	text	also	questions	the	very	visuality	that	it	has	established	as	essential.	Alanna	is	not	Alan	nor	is	she	simply	Alanna.	She	is	a	unique	combination	of	both,	and	it	is	through	her	gendered	performances—that	are	always	in	tension	with	her	physical,	fleshy	body—that	this	combination	is,	through	narration,	made	available.	In	one	sense,	it	is	about	how,	as	Flanagan	(2008)	suggests			female	cross-dressing	texts	emphasize	the	fallibility	of	visual	cues,	particularly	as	they	relate	to	the	assessment	of	gender.	They	achieve	this	through	the	endless	portrayal	of	characters	that	are	not	conventionally	masculine	or	feminine,	and	by	ultimately	suggesting	that	it	is	not	all-important	to	be	considered	as	such.	(128–129)			The	“fallibility	of	visual	cues”	and	the	“ultimately	suggesting	that	it	is	not	all-important”	to	be	considered	“conventionally	masculine	or	feminine”	is	a	reading	that	Alanna’s	text	makes	explicit.	In	a	narration	of	squeamishness	over	a	large	spider	that	drops	onto	her	head,	Alanna	is	narrated	as	reflexively	musing	upon	how	“her	fellow	squires	[…]	would	laugh	if	they	knew	she	feared	spiders.	They’d	say	she	was	behaving	like	a	girl,	not	knowing	she	was	a	girl”	(1984,	5).	The	squires	are	narrated	as	not	only	associating	a	fear	of	spiders	with	girls	but	
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also	of	not	knowing	that	Alanna	is,	in	fact,	a	girl.	Not	only	is	a	difference	established	between	behaving	(surface)	like	a	girl	and	being	(depth)	a	girl	(thus	establishing	an	opposition	between	gender	and	sex),	but	the	squires—save	Alanna—are	also	aligned	with	only	knowing	the	behaviour.		During	Alanna’s	cross-dressing	it	is	the	surface	(gender)	that	is	made	available	for	determining	identity	and	that	surface	assumes	a	sex.	Alanna,	however,	problematises	this	assumption	by	being,	despite	the	clothes	she	wears,	female—and	sometimes,	even,	what	is	described	as—feminine.			‘And	the	Duke	wears	a	red-gold	brocade	dressing-gown.	Can	you	imagine?’	she	[Alanna]	asked.’		Coram	chuckled.	‘It’s	things	like	that	that	remind	me	who	ye	are.	Sometimes	even	I	forget	ye’re	not	a	lad.’	(1984,	145)		Commenting	on	the	Duke’s	dressing-gown	is	coded	as,	if	not	feminine,	at	least	not	being	“a	lad,”	and	it	reminds	not	only	Coram	but	also	the	reader	that	Alanna	is	not	quite	one	or	the	other.	In	many	ways,	this	is	Marjorie	Garber’s	(2009)	point	about	how	“the	transvestite	marks	the	entrance	into	the	symbolic”	(36).	While	Alanna	is	not	the	transvestite	as	her	cross-dressing	generally	follows	Garber’s	cross-dressing	for	success	patterning,	her	cross-dressing	still	marks	an	entrance	into	the	Symbolic	as	it	demonstrates	her	body	to	be	a	construct,	a	sign	upon	which	other	signs	may	be	superimposed.			 Garber	argues	that	the	cross-dressing	figure	“inhabits,	indeed	incarnates,	the	margin”	(17).	In	this	way,	the	cross-dresser	is	a	liminal	figure,	and,	as	such,	s/he,	through	problematising	of	gender	difference	“indicates	a	category	crisis	[…]	an	irresolvable	conflict	or	epistemological	crux	that	destabilises	comfortable	binaries,”	as	Garber	further	suggests	(17).	For	this	reason,	it	is	important	that	Alanna	is	narrated	as	being	aware,	through	her	position	between	the	binary,	of	both	the	surface	and	the	depth.	She	notes,			 In	the	three	years	she	had	been	disguised	as	a	boy,	she	had	learned	that	boys	know	girls	as	little	as	girls	know	boys.	It	didn’t	make	sense—people	
are	people,	after	all,	she	thought—but	that	was	how	things	were.	(5,	emphasis	original)		Not	only	is	Alanna	granted	access—owing	to	her	cross-dressing—to	
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traditionally	masculine	spaces,	but	she	is	also	granted	access	to	a	position	of	knowledge	unavailable	to	either	side	of	the	binary.	In	this	way,	she	becomes	what	Garber	argues	is	the	“third,”	or	“a	mode	of	articulation,	a	way	of	describing	a	space	of	possibility.	Three	puts	in	question	the	idea	of	one:	of	identity,	self-sufficiency,	self-knowledge”	(1992,	11).	Three	places	one	(the	individual)	into	question	because	in	Western	society	one	is	always	defined	in	opposition	to	the	Other,	a	third	disrupts	that	opposition.	Alanna,	as	Alan,	disrupts	that	opposition,	as	the	text	metaphorically	demonstrates	this	position	through	clothing.		In	Lioness	Rampant	(1988),	Alanna	is	nearing	the	end	of	her	hero’s	journey.	She	has	ventured	forth	and	conquered	demons	and	has	even	returned	home,	to	Tortall,	with	a	boon,	the	“Dominion	Jewel”	to	present	to	Jonathan	(just	before	his	coronation).	Owing	to	her	long	absence	and	to	Jon’s	impending	coronation,	Alanna	is	to	be	(re)presented	at	court.	The	seamstresses	hired	to	dress	Alanna	for	the	occasion	believe	that	she	must	appear	as	a	lady,	despite	being	a	knight:	“‘Ye	can’t	show	your	legs	to	the	whole	court	and	his	Majesty	that’s	to	be’”	(213).	The	seamstress’s	position	represents	the	hegemonic	discourse	of	this	space.	However,	as	Alanna	declares,	‘I’m	not	a	lady—I’m	a	knight	[…]	and	I’m	making	my	bow	to	court	as	one.	Dresses	are	fine	sometimes,	but	not	tonight”	(214).	The	seamstress	speaks	from	the	side	of	propriety,	the	sumptuary	rules	that	dictated	women’s	dress	at	court	at	this	time.	She	speaks	from	the	hegemonic.	However,	Alanna—who	has	rightfully	earned	her	shield	(and	who	has	proved	that	earning	over	and	over)—is	not,	strictly,	a	lady.	Thayet—the	exiled	princess	of	Sarain	and	stunningly	beautiful—suggests	an	alternative.			 It	was	a	shirt	and	tunic,	with	soft,	full	breeches	instead	of	hose.	The	tunic	was	longer	than	usual,	coming	to	the	knee,	yet	splits	in	the	sides	to	the	waist	ensured	the	wearer’s	freedom	of	movement.	(214)		Thus	the	shirt	and	tunic	that	are	suggested	as	a	mediating	option	between	the	two	poles	of	masculine	dress	(breeches	and	hose	for	men	and	gowns	for	ladies)	come	to	represent	Alanna’s	subject	position—between	the	poles	of	opposition—at	the	series	conclusion,	at	the	end	of	her	journey,	as	it	were.				
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*	*	*			While	Hyde	([1998]	2010)	suggests	that	“the	first	stuttering	questioning	of	those	orders	[of	hegemony,	of	discourse]	must	always	begin	by	breaking	the	seal	and	speaking	about	the	body"	(172),	I	began	concluding	this	chapter	with	the	most	pivotal	speaking	of	the	body:	the	speaking	of	menstruation,	the	including—within	discourse—“the	bleeding	of	women”	(Croggon	[2002]	2004,	102).	I	did	so	because,	in	this	case,	speaking	required	all	that	came	before:	Alanna’s	cross-dressing,	while	also	of	the	body,	offers	the	possibility	of	signification	through	the	acquiring	of	a	masculine	subjectivity.	Thus,	while	it	works	for	a	time	to	empower	her	and	to	offer	agency,	it	is	not	until	Alanna	fully	accepts	her	status	as	both	“woman	and	warrior”	that	she	is	able	to	take	on	a	subjectivity	that	is	uniquely	hers.	Daine’s	existence	as	both	human	and	animal	explores,	through	her	liminal	position,	how	the	binary	opposition	human/animals	conceives	the	animal	(and	also	woman)	as	aligned	with	“non-signification”	(Waller	2009,	47).	Daine	unravels	that	assumption.	Within	this	world,	animals	are	not	“non-signification.”	It	is,	rather,	that	humans	cannot	understand	them	(and	vice	versa).	There	is	a	difference	in	signification,	not	an	absence.	Daine,	as	both	human	and	animal	(perhaps	human-animal),	bridges	the	gap	between	the	oppositions,	speaking	from	a	silenced	position.	From	this	unlocked	potential	of	discourse,	woman,	“can	sing	a	shapely	cosmos	if”	she,	not	just	“he,	wants	to”	(Hyde	[1998]	2008,	218).	From	this	position,	woman	can	speak,	engaging	the	power	of	discourse.	
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CONCLUSIONS	ALTERNATIVE	WAYS	THROUGH	EMBODIED	SUBJECTIVITIES			Through	the	texts	of	Tamora	Pierce	and	Marissa	Meyer,	this	thesis	has	argued	that	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	contests	the	dominant,	hegemonic	framework	of	adolescence,	as	well	as	the	concomitant	image	of	being	an	adolescent	female	girl	in	popular	and	media	culture,	issues	that	Chapter	One	and	Two	specifically	established	and	engaged.	It	has	argued	that	the	liminality	of	adolescence	(in	general)	and	of	the	adolescent	girl	(in	particular)	is	destabilising	to	the	structure	of	binary	oppositions	dominating	this	space,	to	such	an	extent	that	the	adolescent’s	very	“in-betweenness”	renders	her	“structurally	[…]	‘invisible,’”	that	is,	outside	of—and	unaccounted	for	within—binary	structures	(Turner’s	[1967]	1979,	235).	Owing	to	this,	the	hegemonic	map	of	adolescence	is	linear	and	flat,	and	it	refuses	the	adolescent	girl,	who	is	perceived	to	be	a	shape-shifting,	non-linear,	and	embodied	creature	in	ways	that	her	male	counterparts	are	not.	As	established	in	Chapter	Two,	maps,	and	a	notion	of	(re)mapping,	has	been	central	throughout:	through	a	focus	on	the	body,	this	thesis	is	fundamentally	a	re-mapping	of	female	adolescence	through	the	images	(Chapter	Three)	and	narratives	(Chapter	Four)	available	in	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy.	Specifically,	I	have	been	concerned	with	how	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	offers	an	alternative	Imaginary—a	language	of	female	adolescence,	of	being	an	adolescent	female	body—that	challenges	the	dominant	hegemonic	Imaginary	of	popular	and	media	culture.	In	order	to	draw	together	the	key	threads	of	this	thesis,	this	conclusion	focuses	on	images	of	relation,	as	relation	frustrates	the	economy	of	opposition,	and	its	attendant	insistence	on	linear	development,	that	dominates	Western	discourses	of	adolescence.	Relation	refuses	binary	structures	and	contesting	binaries	is	the	very	core	of	this	thesis.	Thus,	this	focus	offers	a	twofold	opportunity.	First,	a	relational	model	of	self—made	possible	through	repetition	and	connection—engages	each	of	this	thesis’s	key	issues:	the	body’s	liminality,	as	evidenced	by	the	case	studies	in	Chapter	Three	and	the	subject	position	Alan(na)	adopts	at	the	end	of	her	hero	journey	in	Chapter	Four;	the	importance	
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of	scars,	not	just	as	markers	of	a	body’s	history	but	as	also	refusing	the	flatness	of	hegemonic	discourse’s	ideal	appearance;	the	multiplicity	of	self	that	becomes	possible	when	the	body	is	conceived	as	liminal;	while	also	engaging	the	space	between	opposing	sides	of	binary	pairs	(mind/body,	human/animal,	man/woman,	appearance/self).		Second,	it	offers	a	new	model	of	being	adolescent,	a	model	made	possible	by	the	alternative	images	of	living	and	being	an	adolescent	girl	that	are	available	in	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy.	Through	an	economy	of	repetition,	this	relational	model	of	self	frustrates	opposition;	the	very	nature	of	repetition	refuses	opposition,	as	it	requires	an	affiliation	between	occurrences.	Narrations	of	connection	develop	this	relation,	especially	through	images	of	touch,	as	touch	insists	upon	a	connection	between	the	toucher	and	the	touched,	while	also	accounting	for	raised	and	irregular	surfaces.	Finally	both	repetition	and	connection	serve	as	a	map	of	how	a	self	might	be	conceived	in	relation	to,	and	as	interdependent	with,	other	selves—while	also	always	demonstrating	how	relationality	can	produce	the	uniqueness	so	central	to	hegemonic	narratives	of	self,	only	without	the	exclusionary	practices	of	that	discourse.	Thus,	it	is	to	this	model	of	relation	that	I	now	turn,	through	first	a	focus	on	two	kinds	relation—repetition	and	connection—that	are	available	in	Pierce’s	Song	of	the	Lioness	and	Immortals	quartets	as	well	as	Meyer’s	Lunar	Chronicles	before	concluding	with	a	metaphorical	notion	of	“the	Pack,”	as	an	example	of	this	relational	model	of	self.118			
                                                
118	This	reading	of	a	relational	model	of	self	is	underscored	by	a	feminist	ethics	of	care	that	is	outside	the	scope	of	this	thesis.	Still,	Gilligan	(1979),	(1982),	(1986),	(1987),	and	(1990);	Kittay	and	Feder	(2003),	Kittay,	Jennings	and	Wasunna	(2005),	Kittay	(2011)	are	integral	within	this	field.	Gilligan’s	work,	in	particular,	helped	to	establish	the	field,	and	throughout	her	long	career,	adolescence	has	been	of	concern.	Within	Battersby	(1998),	there	is	a	strong	engagement,	within	her	overall	project	of	a	feminist	metaphysics	of	identity,	with	a	feminist	ethics	of	care,	and	also,	more	recently,	Holdsworth	and	Lury	(forthcoming,	2016)	look	at	the	possibilities	for	an	ethics	of	care	in	relation	to	children’s	television,	of	specific	relevance	in	its	concern	with	how	practices	of	caring	are	made	available	in	children’s	programming,	a	focus	similar	to	my	concern	with	how	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	makes	such	available	to	adolescents.		
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COUNTERING	LINEARITY:	REPETITION	 	“She	will	be	her	mother	and	yet	not	her	mother,	nor	her	daughter	as	mother,	with	no	closure	of	the	circle	or	the	spiral	of	identity.”		(Irigaray	[1974]	1985,	76)		Within	these	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	texts,	repetition	occurs	in	a	number	of	ways,	but	I	am	here	interested	with	a	particular	iteration	of	repetition,	specifically	repetitions	that	are	related	to	menstruation’s	role	in	transforming	a	female-child	into	a	woman	and	the	bearing	of	children	it	makes	possible.	I	am	interested	in	these	repetitions	because	in	developmental	theories	of	adolescence	cyclicality	is	what	makes	the	girl	unsuitable	for	hegemonic	models	of	development,	because	cyclicality	is	posited	as	the	antithesis	to	linear	development.	It	is	where,	in	Waller’s	(2009)	reading,	the	adolescent	girl	“slips	back	into	[…]	‘woman’s	time’”	(35),	and	in	my	larger	concern,	it	is	where	one	of	the	most	profound	silences	occurs:	we	do	not	talk	about	that	which	makes	us	uncomfortable,	and	in	not	talking	about,	for	example,	menstruation,	isolation	and	exclusion	occur.		In	Chapter	Four,	this	was	particularly	evident	in	the	narration	of	Alanna’s	menarche.	Disguised	as	a	boy	whilst	training	to	become	a	knight—and,	crucially,	without	a	mother—menarche,	for	Alanna,	is	a	horrifying	occurrence,	because	she	is	both	alone	in	its	occurrence	and	unknowing	of	its	meaning;	as	I	demonstrated,	it	is	this	combination	of	isolation	and	ignorance	that	contrived	to	produce	the	horror	of	the	blood.	While	in	Chapter	Four,	I	discussed	how	the	conversation	shared	between	Mistress	Cooper	and	Alanna	aided	in	making	the	bleeding	“normal”	(‘That’s	what	this	is?	It’s	normal?’),	I	want	to	here	focus	on	the	repetition	offered	by,	and	within,	that	conversation:	the	one	implied	by	cycle	(“woman’s	monthly	cycle”),	the	one	offered	by	Maude’s	having	“mentioned	something,	once”	(the	telling	a	repetition	of	that	original	mentioning),	the	repetition	in	how	“it	happens	to	us	all”	as	well	as	in	that	it	repeats	the	pattern	of	the	“full	moon,”	and	the	connection	to	“bearing	children”	(1983,	136–137).119			
                                                119	The	passage	concerning	the	“telling”	of	this	bleeding	is	given	in	full	on	214	of	this	thesis.				
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Significantly,	this	bleeding	is	constructed	in	terms	of	plurality.	Not	only	does	the	conversation	itself	insist	upon	a	notion	of	community	(at	least	two	beings	are	required	in	order	to	converse),	but	it	also	reiterates	the	importance	of	relation	through	insisting	that	this	bleeding	happens	to	“us	all,”	the	women	of	the	“women’s	monthly	cycle.”	This	is	not	to	say	that	all	women	experience	this	bleeding	in	the	same	way;	it	is,	rather,	that	this	blood,	the	physical	material	thing,	offers	connection,	if	discursive	constructions	will	only	take	it	up.	Typically,	they	do	not,	as	Alan	illustrates.	Faced	with	this	bodily	function—this	aspect	of	being-female—Alan	cannot	apprehend	the	meaning	of	the	bleeding.	Alan	is	the	ideal	of	hegemonic	models	of	self:	the	individual,	the	hero.	Yet,	for	him,	the	bleeding	has	no	meaning.	Thus,	in	order	for	Alanna	to	come	into	her	full-self,	to	become	Alan(na),	menstruation	has	to	be	acknowledged.	The	being-female—and	being	so	with	another	woman—has	to	be	acknowledged.		Moreover,	this	monthly	cycle—itself	a	repetition—has	the	potential	to	produce	(other)	children,	at	least	until	it	ends.	In	relating	the	“it”	to	“bear[ing]	children,”	narration	not	only	relates	the	cycle	to	something	outside	of	itself—another	kind	of	making	normal	through	linking—but	it	also	produces	a	repetition	that	problematises	the	linearity	of	dominant	conceptions	of	development.	In	other	words,	Alanna	is	narrated	as	being	a	“child,”	though	one	transitioning	into	“womanhood,”	and	this	cycle	constructs	her	as	now	being	able	to	bear	other	children,	to	perpetuate	the	cycle	and	to	produce	multiplicity	of	self.	This	perpetuation	of	the	“child”	through	the	“bear[ing]”	of	other	“children”	constructs	the	cycle	as	at	once	ending	and	never	ending.	While	Alanna	may	one	day	be	“too	old,”	the	narration	of	the	cycle—in	terms	of	“tell,”	of	story—constructs	that	cycle	as	never	ceasing.	In	so	doing,	the	narration	offers	cycles	(repeats	monthly)	within	cycles	(the	bearing	of	children),	modelling	a	kind	of	spiral	of	identity	in	the	process.	This	is	about,	as	Irigaray	([1974]	1985)	suggests,	“frustrate[ing]	the	opposition	through	the	economy	of	repetition”	(77).	Repetition	is	not	linear,	which	problematises	traditional	developmental	models	that	are	based	on	linear	development	through	time,	and	it	is	speaks	to	a	kind	of	interdependency	that	contributes	to	the	relational	model	of	existence	with	which	I	am	concerned.	Repetition	refuses	autonomy,	since	without	links	between	occurrences	there	would	be	no	repetition.		
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Alanna	and	Thom,	as	twins,	offer	a	heightened	example	of	repetition.	Hunt	(1986)	suggests	that	twins	offer	unique	possibilities	for	identity	formation	through	the	mechanism	of	“identity	exchange”	(109).	One	way	this	kind	of	exchange	may	occur	is	through	the	notion	of	a	“counterpart,”	and	of	this	Hunt	suggests		 here	we	may	point	out	that	the	idea	of	counterparts	calls	up	not	only	facile	masquerades	but	deeper	ambiguities—for	example,	the	notion	that	both	counterparts	really	have	their	existence	within	a	single	individual.	In	this	essentially	Jungian	interpretation,	the	counterparts	become	the	self	and	the	shadow.	(112)			As	I	have	demonstrated,	this	is	the	relationship	between	the	twins	Alanna	and	Thom.	From	the	outset,	they	are	constructed	as	not	merely	two	distinct	parts	of	one	whole	but	as	a	whole	in	two	parts.	After	the	cross-dressing,	Alanna	“looks	enough	like	Thom	to	fool	anyone	but	Coram”	(1983,	9)	and	she—not	Thom—possesses	the	skills	coded	as	masculine	within	this	world:	“quicker	[…]	rarely	tired	[…]	[and	has]	a	feel	for	the	fighting	arts”	(15).	While	I	discussed	above	how	this	allows	Alanna	to	not	only	construct	her	“own	gender	niche”	(Flanagan	2008,	104)	and	to	serve	as	a	“third”	(Garber	1992,	11),	it	also	posits	her	self	in	relation	to,	or	in	dialogue	with,	Thom’s.	They,	in	other	words,	complement	one	another,	while	in	appearance,	they	repeat	one	another:	despite	being	brother	and	sister,	Alanna	and	Thom	are	identical,	once	Alanna	cross-dresses.		Of	this	doubleness,	McCallum	(1999)	notes,	“a	primary	effect	of	the	double	is	to	destabilize	notions	of	the	subject	as	unified,	or	coherent,	or	as	existing	outside	of	a	relation	to	an	other”	(75)	(see,	also,	Hunt	1986	and	Waller	2009).	This	is	the	aim	of	these	Conclusions:	to	demonstrate	how	the	self—that	is	multiple	and	fragmented—might	exist	in	relation	to	other	selves,	in	this	case,	through	repetitions	of,	or	related	to,	that	body.	However,	as	I	have	demonstrated,	the	goal	of	hegemonic	YAL	is	to	enact	the	unification	of	the	fragmented	self.	Hegemonic	YAL	hails	the	adolescent	outside	of	the	text	through	the	adolescent	inside	the	text	in	order	to	assist	the	“real”	adolescent	in	their	journey	towards	a	unique	and	individual	self,	foreclosing	relationship	or	interdependency	in	the	process.	Thus,	the	double	must	be	“resolved;”	the	liberal	humanist	ethic	underscoring	these	texts	requires	resolution.	McCallum	
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specifically	notes	that	in	“gothic	novels	closure	is	usually	achieved	through	the	death	of	the	double”	(76).	On	the	surface,	this	would	appear	to	be	the	case	with	Alanna	and	Thom,	as	Thom	does	die	at	the	end	of	The	Song	of	the	Lioness	quartet,	concomitant	to	Alan(na)	finally	coming	fully	into	her	powers	and	her	sense	of	self.	However,	these	are	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	texts,	and	as	such,	they	complicate	matters.		In	this	case,	Alanna’s	three	children	thwart	any	easy	resolution	of	Alanna’s	self	as	singular	or	individual—refigured	as	her	eldest	son	(Thom),	Alanna	not	only	gives	birth	to	her	dead	brother/other	half	(Thom),	but	she	also	gives	birth	to	Alan,	her	cross-dressed	self,	refigured	as	a	twin	to	her	daughter	Aly.	Through	having	children,	these	“other”	parts	of	Alanna’s	identity	are	actualised.	The	multiple	aspects	of	Alanna	are	offered	through	her	children,	another	kind	of	repetition.	Crucially,	this	offering	of	repetition	through	children	focuses,	in	the	Daughter	of	the	Lioness	duology,	on	Aly,	crucial	as	Aly	most	closely	replicates	Alan(na)—the	subject	position	of	multiplicity	that	Alanna	achieves	at	the	end	of	her	hero	journey.	This	figuring	gives	even	more	weight	to	“the	whole	point	to	doing	as	I	did	[becoming	a	knight]	was	so	you	could	do	something	else,	if	you	wanted	to”	([2003]	2005,	18)	with	which	I	opened	this	reading	of	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy.	It	is	not	just	that	Alanna	opened	the	door	for	Aly	to	“do	something	else,”	which	she	did;	it	is,	rather,	that	Alanna	made	it	possible	for	Aly	not	to	be	beholden	to	gendered	expectations.			‘I	could	make	myself	up	as	a	raka	man,	if	that	will	appease	you,	my	lady,	Aly	offered.	I	think	it	would	be	a	waste	of	my	time,	but	I	live	to	serve	in	any	small	way	that	I	can.’	(380)			Benefiting	from	the	pluralities	her	mother	made	possible,	Aly	is	a	trickster.	She	is	the	liminal	figure	between	oppositions,	or	as	Hyde	([1998]	2008)	suggests,	“a	boundary-crosser”	(7).	Aly	can	be	whomever—man	or	woman,	raka	(black)	or	lurian	(white)—she	needs,	or	wishes,	to	be,	and	in	this	way,	she	is	not	beholden	to	a	sexed,	or	even	raced,	body,	a	notion	that	a	reading	of	Daine’s	firstborn,	a	daughter,	makes	explicit.		Thus,	where	the	narration	of	Alanna’s	menstruation	and	the	children	it	makes	possible	expands,	through	the	embodied	repetition	of	her	children,	
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Alanna’s	sense	of	self,	the	narration	concerning	Daine’s	first	child	pushes	the	boundaries	of	this	expanded	sense	of	self	even	further,	questioning	both	what	it	means	to	be	gendered	as	well	as	what	it	means	to	be	human.			Sarra	[Daine’s	now	goddess	mother]	walked	over	and	reached	into	the	hammock	blanket,	pulling	out	a	wolf	puppy.	It	turned	instantly	into	a	young	giraffe,	then	a	gosling.	Whatever	shape	it	took,	Sarra	held	it	firmly.	‘Now	see	here,	youngster,’	she	informed	her	grandchild	[…]	Enough.	Choose	a	shape	and	a	sex	and	stick	to	it,	right	now.’	She	listened	for	a	moment,	then	shook	her	head.	‘Five	years	at	least.	Learn	the	limits	of	one	body.	Then,	if	you’re	good,	you	may	try	others.	Now	choose.’			A	moment	later	she	held	a	human	baby	girl	in	her	hands.	([2003]	2005,	246)			This	choice—that	the	child	gets	to	choose	“shape	and	sex”—is	provocative,	while	also	offering	an	alternative	to	the	illusions	of	choice	offered	to	adolescent	girls	in	popular	and	media	culture.	Importantly,	this	choice—and	choosing	“human	baby	girl”—does	not	limit	the	potentialities	of	self.		Yes,	the	child	chooses	this	shape	and,	presumably,	“stick[s]	to	it,”	but	the	possibility	of	“whatever	shape”	remains.			 While	I	discussed	the	relationship	between	Daine	and	her	unborn	child	in	Chapter	Three	in	terms	of	how	Daine	had	to	“change	below	the	waist	whenever	the	child”	did	in	order	to	prevent	it	from	“kick[ing]	its	way	out	of	her	womb’	([2003]	2005,	17),	this	pregnancy	reiterates	the	relationship	between	mother	and	(unborn)	child:	“‘in	the	future,	don’t	shape-shift	while	you’re	pregnant.	It	gives	them	the	wrong	idea’”	([2003]	2005,	246).	Daine’s	daughter	transforms	so	frequently	because,	the	narration	suggests,	Daine	shape-shifted	whilst	pregnant.	The	actions	of	the	mother	directly	influence	the	child	through	the	shapes	the	child	adopts.	The	child	repeats	the	shape-shifting	her	of	her	mother.	I	do	not	make	this	point	in	order	to	suggest	the	“rightness”	or	“wrongness”	of	Daine’s	shape-shifting	whilst	pregnant,	I	discuss	it,	rather,	to	illustrate	the	relationship	between	mother	and	child,	a	relationship	dependent	on	the	blood	(of	life)	that	hegemonic	discourse	refuses.		
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COUNTERING	VISUALITY:	CONNECTION	 	“She	is	beyond	all	pairs	of	opposites,		all	distinctions	between	active	and	passive	or	past	and	future.”		(Irigaray	[1974]	1985,	230)		The	economy	of	opposition	dominating	hegemonic	discourse	relies	on	visuality—or	the	paradigmatic	way	in	which	the	visual	has	become	not	only	the	dominant	means	of	perceiving	this	world	but	of	also	being	a	self	in	it.	As	the	Introduction	established	and	Chapter	Three	contested,	this	is	a	problem	this	thesis	has	addressed.	This	visuality	has	led	to	a	representational	economy	of	self-through-appearance	that	produces	not	only	a	pervasive	superficiality—you	are	who	you	appear	to	be—but	it	does	so	through	furthering	opposition	itself:	viewing	may	occur	at	a	distance,	leaving	a	space,	a	potential	opposition,	between	the	viewer	and	the	viewed.	Touch	refuses	this	distance.	Directly	drawing	on	my	reading	of	topographical	maps	in	Chapter	Two	as	well	as	the	hologram	in	Chapter	Three,	this	call	for	touch—as	an	additional	means	of	perceiving	the	body—utilises	Grosz’s	(1998).	Specifically,	her	argument	that	the	touch’s	“contiguous	access	to	an	abiding	object;	the	surface	of	the	toucher	and	the	touched	must	partially	coincide,”	while	also	“grant[ing]	the	subject	access	to	the	texture”	and	also,	potentially,	“to	the	depth—of	objects,	depending	on	their	composition”	(1998,	98–99).	In	this	way,	touch	offers	more	access	to	the	contours	of	the	body	than	does	vision,	and	it	does	so	through	connections	between	individuals	or	between	individuals	and	other	things	(be	they	animal	or	mechanical),	a	reading	that	Daine	and	Cinder’s	relationships	with	animals	and	machines	(respectively)	narrates	particularly	well.		In	Daine’s	shape-shifting,	touch	is	explicitly	engaged	in	order	to	make	the	changed	body	available:	“Daine	explored	with	her	hands	[…]	Her	top	and	bottom	incisors	were	long	and	extremely	sharp,	sharp	enough	to	cut	her	skin	([1994]	1999,	177).	Touch	allows	her	to	grasp,	as	it	were,	just	how	sharp	her	teeth	are	and	it	allows	for	the	texture	of	her	furred	nose	to	be	made	known,	to	both	her	and	to	the	reader.	Within	the	narration,	Daine	discovers	the	body’s	changed	shape	through	this	touch,	but	it	is	also	through	the	narration	of	the	touch	that	this	change	is	conveyed	to	the	reader.	A	narration	of	seeing	the	changes	to	Daine’s	body	would	not	offer	the	same	kinds	of	details	(textures,	
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changed	contours)	to	which	even	a	narrated	touch	can	appeal.	Yet,	even	here,	there	is	a	tension	between	touch	(Daine’s	“explor[ing]	with	her	hands”)	and	sight,	as	Daine	immediately	asks	her	companions	if	they	“can	all	see	this?”	(177),	thus	reiterating	conventional	reliance	on	the	visual.	Yet,	while	acknowledging	that	tension,	the	passage	does	offer	touch	as	an	alternative.	After	all,	the	narration	only	confirms	that	what	was	touched	can	be	seen:	“‘Of	course,’	Maura	replied	scornfully”	(178).	The	touch	made	the	change	known;	the	seeing	merely	confirmed	it.	Moreover,	the	touch	grants	access	to	the	characteristics	of	these	changes,	characteristics	that	sight	would	only	be	able	to	approximate.	Furthermore,	because	of	that	tension	between	seeing	and	touching,	this	narration	of	touch	does	not	aim	to	replace	sight;	it	works	to	supplement	sight,	often	through	the	garnering	of	additional	information	about,	for	example,	a	body.	It	is	a	powerful	narrative	of	perceiving	the	changes	to	one’s	own	body,	but	touch	can	also	be	employed	in	relation	to	other	bodies:	“Daine	felt	the	dragon’s	hide	ripple.	It	was	like	a	convulsion—or	a	contraction!	Ma’s	daughter	realized”	(1992,	262).	Here,	the	touch	not	only	grants	knowledge,	but	it	also	begins	to	offer	an	access	to	depth,	to	the	internal,	while	also	foreshadowing	a	kind	of	touch	that	(much	like	a	medical	scan)	makes	the	internal	available.	For	this	reason,	I	now	turn	to	Cinder	and	how,	through	the	iteration	of	a	touch,	the	extent	of	Cinder’s	“cybernetic	makeup”	is	made	known	(2012,	81).	This	development	of	touch,	and	this	turn	to	the	mechanical,	is	important	for	two	reasons:	first,	in	popular	in	media	culture,	adolescent	girls	are	no	longer	strictly	fleshy	(as	in	animal)	creatures;	they	are	integrated	with	and	reliant	on	technology—how	often	does	an	adolescent	girl	appear	without	a	mobile	phone	in	her	hand?—and	second,	the	re-envisioning	of	the	medical	scan,	through	this	frame	of	touch,	speaks	back	to	the	hologram	as	an	alternative,	to	the	flat	and	superficial	image	of	popular	and	media	culture.		Having	been	volunteered	for	“plague	research”	(2012,	66)	by	her	legal	guardian,	Lingh	Adri,	Cinder’s	body	undergoes,	ostensibly,	a	medical	scan;	however,	given	her	cyborg	state,	it	involved	“the	click	of	prongs”	(80)	as	an	android	connected	to	“the	panel	in	the	back	of	her	head”	(81)	as	opposed	to	the	external	scan	typical	of	such	imaging.	This	connection,	or	“plugging	in”	(195)	is	
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a	kind	of	touch.	In	fact,	I	consider	it	a	development	of	the	touch	that	I	read	in	relation	to	Daine,	one	that	is	made	specifically	possible	because	of	Cinder’s	cybernetic	body	(fleshy	bodies	do	not	have	control	panels	or	sockets).	It	is	a	development	that	grants	not	just	access	to	the	surface	of	the	touched	and	toucher,	but	also	to	the	internal:	from	this	connection,	Cinder’s	cybernetic	makeup	is	made	known—something	as	internal	as	the	composition	of	her	heart,	“primarily	silicon,	mixed	with	bio	tissue,”	is	made	known	(117).	For	both	Daine	and	Cinder,	the	touch	not	only	reveals	multiplicity,	but	it	also	holds	the	internal	in	simultaneity	with	the	external	(Daine’s	shape-shifting	occurs	because	of	that	internal	being	“of	the	People”	(1992,	70)),	and	in	so	doing	it	becomes	a	powerful	way	of	perceiving	the	body	(and	its	changes).		Yet,	prior	to	the	scan’s	(forced)	connection,	Cinder	uses	this	kind	of	connection	to	join	with	an	android	in	need	of	repair,	and	the	narration	of	that	connection	is	quite	telling	in	relation	to	the	potential	risk	of	this	kind	of	touch.		The	only	way	to	determine	what	was	wrong	and	if	a	reboot	was	necessary	was	to	check	the	android’s	internal	diagnostics,	and	that	required	plugging	in.	Cinder	hated	plugging	in.	Connecting	her	own	wiring	with	a	foreign	object	had	always	felt	hazardous,	like	if	she	wasn’t	careful,	her	own	software	could	be	overridden.	(2012,	195)		While	lending	a	certain	weight	to	the	previous	reading	and,	perhaps,	also	speaking	to	what	Balsamo	(1996)	refers	to	as	the	invasiveness	of	medical	imaging—“plugging	in”	reads	as	a	euphemism	for	rape—this	narration	suggests	a	possibility,	or	at	least	fear,	of	losing	the	self	through	this	kind	of	touch,	and	it	is	an	uneasiness	that	Daine’s	narration	also	discusses,	though	in	a	slightly	different	way.	The	early	manifestations	of	Daine’s	“wild	magic”	(114)—prior	to	her	even	knowing	she	has	magic—result	in	a	loss	of	self	that	causes	her	to	“start	thinking	like	the	closest	group	of	animals—like	a	herd	of	horses,	or	a	pack	[of	wolves].	I	forget	I’m	human.	I	forget	I’m	me”	(1992,	177–178).	It	is	an	issue	that	Shelley	Chappell	(2007)	discusses	at	length	in	her	exploration	of	how	(a	continuous)	identity	is	maintained	when	one’s	body	undergoes	such	changes.	Exploring	this	in	relation	to	Daine’s	shape-shifting,	Chappell	uses	a	narration	in	Pierce’s	Wild	Magic	in	which	Daine’s	mentor,	the	great	mage	Numair,	erects	a	magical	“glass	wall”	between	Daine’s	self,	envisioned	as	a	“white	core”	and	her	
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“wild	magic,”	depicted	as	“copper	fire”	(1992,	181).	Chappell	(2007)	argues	that	this	image	establishes	a	core	or	“essential	self”	(125)	that	must	somehow	remain	through	such	bodily	changes.	While	this	essential	self	is	not	quite	my	concern—as	I	am	more	interested	in	the	blurring	of	the	inner	and	outer	and	its	implications	for	bodily	appearance	as	a	marker	of	self—it	does	raise	an	interesting	premise	regarding	how	such	possible	loss	of	self	may	be	negotiated.		Both	Daine’s	shape-shifting	and	Cinder’s	cybernetic	bodies	continue	engaging	this	issue	of	loss	of	self	through	several	passages	that	narrate	just	how	such	other	things	become	incorporated	into	the	body	image—the	body,	according	to	Grosz	(1994),	“insofar	as	it	is	imagined	and	represented	for	the	subject	by	the	image	of	others	[including	its	own	reflection	in	a	mirror]”	(39).	While	returning	to	an	image	is	questionable	(inasmuch	as	doing	so	revisits	the	images	that	bombard	social	and	media	culture),	the	body	image	offered	by	these	texts	is	an	image	with	a	difference:	it	is	an	imagined	image,	a	fiction.	In	popular	and	media	culture,	body	image	is	problematic	not	only	because	of	the	particular	fiction—perfection—required	by	the	images	(mirrors)	of	that	space:	airbrushed	models	and	digitally-edited	selfies,	for	example,	but	also	because	of	the	sheer	preponderance	of	those	images.	However,	images	are	not	always	contentious,	and	Grosz’s	understanding	of	body	image	is	useful	here	because	of	how	it	allows	“the	peculiar,	nonorganic	connections	formed	in	hysteria	and	in	such	phenomena	as	the	phantom	limb”	(40)	to	be	included	within	one’s	conception	of	oneself.	It	is	relevant	to	both	Daine	and	Cinder,	but	it	is	the	narration	of	Cinder’s	removing	a	“too-small	foot”	(2012,	3)	from	her	body	that	I	find	most	provocative.	This	narration	of	Cinder’s	removing	and	replacing	her	cybernetic	foot	establishes	a	difference	between	the	(inorganic)	“too-small	foot”	that	has	not	grown	and	her	(organic)	body	that	has	grown.			The	screw	through	Cinder’s	ankle	had	rusted,	the	engraved	cross	marks	worn	to	a	mangled	circle.	[…]	By	the	time	it	was	extracted	far	enough	for	her	to	wrench	free	with	her	prosthetic	steel	hand,	the	hairline	threads	had	been	stripped	clean.	(3)		The	foot	has	become	useless	because	it	is	too	small;	as	an	inorganic	thing,	it	has	not	grown	with	the	body,	and	has	thus	become	unfit	for	its	purpose.	Yet,	it	has	
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not	deteriorated	in	the	same	way	as	the	screw.	The	screw	is	failing.	It	is	“rusted”	and	“stripped	clean.”			However,	despite	this	tension,	the	foot	is	still	a	part	of	her,	and	as	such,	it	is	constructed	as	different	from	other	inorganic	things.	It	is	this	difference	that	makes	the	inclusion	of	some	things	into	the	body	image	(that	is	to	say,	one’s	sense	of	self)	possible.			Tossing	the	screwdriver	onto	the	table,	Cinder	gripped	her	heel	and	yanked	the	foot	from	its	socket.	A	spark	singed	her	fingertips	and	she	jerked	away,	leaving	the	foot	to	dangle	from	a	tangle	of	red	and	yellow	wires.	(3)			The	foot,	as	well	as	Cinder’s	cybernetic	hand,	is	quite	different	from	the	(rusted)	screw	and	the	screwdriver	that	is	tossed	onto	the	table,	and	this	difference	hinges	upon	how	one	group	of	things	has	become	incorporated	into	her	body	image,	while	the	other	has	not.	It	is	a	reading	evidenced	by	the	change	from	the	possessive	pronoun	in	“her	heel”	to	the	definite	article	in	“the	foot.”	While	attached	to	the	body—via	those	red	and	yellow	wires—the	cybernetic	foot	is	hers,	but	once	removal	begins,	the	possession	diminishes.	Thus,	it	is	a	connection	that	depends	on	those	wires;	it	depends	on	another	kind	of	touch,	in	that	the	wires	link.		While	it	could	be	argued	that	the	foot	becomes	part	of	the	body	because	it	is	human	in	shape	(although—since	it	is	plate	metal—it	is,	for	me,	humanoid,	not	human)	and	the	screw	does	not	become	part	of	the	body	because	it	does	not	appear	human,	the	connective	function,	the	touch,	of	those	wires	that	makes	incorporation	possible.	Cinder’s	removal	of	the	“too-small	foot”	(3)	precipitates	the	connection	of	a	“replacement	foot”	(12).	This	connection	begins,	“She	propped	her	ankle	on	the	opposite	knee	and	began	connecting	the	color-coordinated	wires”	(15)	and	is	followed	by			She	tightened	the	last	screw	and	stretched	out	her	leg,	rolling	her	ankle	forward,	back,	wiggling	the	toes.	It	was	a	little	stiff,	and	the	nerve	sensors	would	need	a	few	days	to	harmonize	with	the	updated	wiring.	(15)		
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The	screws	merely	hold	the	foot	in	place,	whereas	the	wires—through	“harmoniz[ing]”	with	“the	nerve	sensors”	(15)—make	connection	possible.		Thus,	where	this	process	of	removing	the	“too-small	foot”	(3)	(and	replacing	it	with	a	“brand-new	steel-plated	foot”	(11))	not	only	insists	upon	the	juxtaposition	between	the	human,	fleshy	body	and	this	body’s	mechanical	body	parts,	it	also	illustrates	different	kinds	of	connection	made	possible	by	Cinder’s	being	cyborg:	that	which	is	only	connected;	that	which	is	incorporated	into	the	body	image	(the	hand	and	foot);	and	that	which	threatens	(“plugging	in”	(195)).	This	acknowledgement	of	what	I	consider	to	be	a	fear	of	the	loss	of	self	is	integral	to	this	reading:	by	acknowledging	a	potential	flaw,	these	narrations	do	not	seek	to	replace	sight	with	touch	as	the	means	for	perceiving	the	body;	doing	so	would	risk	merely	replacing	one	dominant	means	with	another.	Rather,	they	show	touch	and	sight	working	together	in	order	to	develop,	most	particularly,	Daine’s	and	Cinder’s	perception	of	their	own	(changed)	bodies.	Thus,	touch	becomes	a	provocative	means	of	expanding	the	self’s	perception	of	itself,	that	is	to	say,	its	body,	and	in	so	doing,	it—alongside	repetition—offers	a	framework	for	a	relational	model	of	self	that	counters	dominant	hegemonic	models.			
“THE	PACK:”	A	RELATIONAL	MODEL	OF	SELF			Against	a	backdrop	of	“girl	power,”	neoliberal	narratives	of	self,	and	a	sort	of	“common	sense”	feminism,	Katniss	Everdeen—a	YA	heroine	brought	to	“life”	by	Jennifer	Lawrence	in	the	apocalyptically	popular	Hunger	Games	film	series	and	franchise	(see,	Ross	2012	and	Lawrence	2013,	2014,	2015)—appears	to	be	an	ideal	female	self	for	contemporary	culture.	She	hunts,	with	considerable	skill,	becomes	the	face	of	a	rebellion—and,	thus,	the	embodiment	of	hope—and	she	has	two	young	men	vying	for	her	affection.	Yet,	despite	appearing	to	be	empowered,	Katniss	also	bears	the	weight	of	her	world	on	her	slim	shoulders.	Ironically,	she	is	not	alone	in	this	figuring:	Bella,	Tris,	Clary	(and	many	other	hegemonic	YA	heroines)	are	right	there,	alongside	Katniss,	saving	the	respective	day.	This	is	the	dominant	image	of	acceptable	girlhood	in	contemporary	Western	culture:	young,	fit	(in	both	senses	of	the	word),	active	and	empowered,	but	while	these	girls	appear	to	be	active	and	empowered	subjective	selves,	the	
 234	
model	of	empowerment	they	offer	is	not	without	cost.	Katniss,	as	well	as	the	others,	are	empowered	at	the	expense	of	relationships	not	only	with	others	but	also	with	themselves.			 However,	this	popular,	hegemonic	offering	of	female	adolescence	is	not	the	only	model	available	to	adolescent	girls.	As	I	have	demonstrated	throughout	this	thesis,	Mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	is	challenging	this	dominant	ideal	by	offering	alternative	images	of	living	and	being	an	adolescent	girl.	In	short,	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	is	a	sub,	or	counter,	cultural	fantasy	literature	that	is	rooted	in	a	mythic,	world-building	mind	set,	and	it	does	not	merely	recapitulate	the	discourses	of	popular	and	media	culture	but,	while	always	in	relation	to	those	discourses,	it	offers	alternative	images	of	girlhood.	The	model	of	“the	Pack”	that	follows	offers	a	metaphorical	model	of	self	that	includes	interdependency	and	relation,	both	of	which	are	refused	by	hegemonic	developmental	narratives	and	liberal	humanist	narratives	of	self.	Moreover,	it	does	not	refuse	the	body	in	this	figuring	rather	the	body	makes	it	possible.			According	to	the	opening	pages	of	Wild	Magic	(1992),	Daine	has	always	had	a	“knack	with	animals,	but	no	gift”	(15),	at	least	not	in	the	traditional,	Tortallan	sense.	This	“knack”	not	only	sets	her	apart	from	other	humans,	but	it	also	lays	a	foundation	upon	which	her	ability	to	shape-shift,	that	is,	to	transform	into	the	shapes	of	animals,	eventually	evolves.	As	I	have	argued,	it	is	a	foundation	that	establishes	oppositions	(Gift/wild	magic,	outside/inside	and	human/animal)	in	order	to	question	them.	In	other	words,	where	the	text	establishes	a	(binary)	difference	between	humans	and	animals,	Daine’s	shape-shifting—through	an	expanding	of	what	it	means	to	be	Gifted,	a	blurring	of	inside/outside	and	a	countering	of	individuality—holds	together	those	opposing	identities.	Daine	is	“of	the	People”	(1992,	70),	and	this	is	imperative	because	it	is	through	the	relationships	that	Daine	develops	with	animals	that	her	shape-shifting	offers	a	relational	model	of	being	that	counters	the	individuality	of	popular	and	media	culture.120	
                                                120	Daine’s	shape-shifting—especially,	the	narrations	of	her	pregnancies—also	has	the	distinct	advantage	of	offering	a	model	of	self	that	is	“impregnated	with	otherness”	and	that	demonstrates	how	“other	selves	are	generated	from	within	the	embodied	self”	(18),	a	model	that	Battersby	(1998)	argues	is	lacking.		
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In	a	provocative	narration,	Onau,	Daine’s	friend	and	employer,	makes	this	relationship	clear.		The	older	woman	sighed.	‘We	share	this	world,	Diane.	We	can’t	hold	apart	from	each	other—humans	and	animals	are	meant	to	be	partners.	Aren’t	we,	Tahoi?’	The	dog	wagged	his	tail.	He	knows.	He	saved	my	life,	when	my	husband	left	me	to	die.	I’ve	saved	his	life	since.	He	can’t	cook	or	sing,	and	I	can’t	chase	rabbits,	but	we’re	partners	all	the	same.	(266–267)		When	she	shape-shifts,	Daine	literally	embodies	this	bond	humans	and	animals	already	share	because	“we	share	this	world.”	Modelling	a	relationship	of	self	that	takes	into	account	the	interdependency	between	not	just	generations—this	is	a	conversation	between	Daine	and	“the	older	woman,”	also	an	issue	at	play	in	the	conversations	between	Alanna	and	Mistress	Cooper	as	well	as	Kel	and	her	maid—but	also	humans	and	animals,	this	narration	is	striking	in	its	espousing	not	just	relationship	but	a	relationship	between	a	woman	and	her	dog	(see,	also,	Haraway	2003).121		This	notion	of	companionship	is	one	that	Daine’s	quartet	offers	in	many	forms:	Daine	is	“Hoof-sister,”	or	“hoof-kin,”	with	horses	([1994]	1999,	308);	she	is	“night-sister”	to	an	owl	(1992,	134),	as	she	is	“wing-sister”	to	a	dragon	(260).	These	relationships	suggest	kinship,	an	important	web	of	relations,	often	between	blood	relatives	but	also	including	those	who	have	entered	a	family	group	through	marriage.122	In	Daine’s	case,	her	wild	magic	links	her	to	these	animals,	producing	a	relationship	of	kin.	Metaphorically,	her	magic	is	the	blood	of	a	“blood	relation,”	speaking	back	to	my	concern	with	menstruation	as	the	blood	of	life	in	Chapter	Four	as	well	as	to	my	concern	with	connection	in	these	Conclusions.		Poignantly,	Daine	is	also	“Pack-sister”	(28),	and	this	“Pack”	is	linked	to	a	
                                                121	The	interdependency	between	generations	is	one	issue	of	concern	in	Holdsworth	and	Lury	(forthcoming,	2016).		122	For	a	cultural	materialist	approach	to	kinship	patterns,	Cultural	Anthropology	(Harris	and	Johnson	2006)	offers	a	useful	starting	point.	While	not	specifically	addressed	in	this	thesis,	cultural	materialism	in	its	concern	with	material,	physical	aspects	of	culture	speaks	quite	strongly	to	my	concern	with	the	body.			
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sense	of	community	and	collectivity	that	not	only	problematises	the	binary	opposition	between	human	and	animal,	but	it	also	demonstrates	a	sense	of	cooperation	and	camaraderie	that	is	absent	in	the	individualism	required	by	neoliberal	narratives	of	choice—and	it	does	so	without	a	loss	of	self.	Moreover,	this	metaphor	of	“the	Pack”	is	not	restricted	to	Pierce’s	Immortals	quartet,	as	The	Books	of	Pellinor	(Croggon	2003–2008)	also	include	a	notion	of	“the	Pack,”	and	both	these	quartets	use	this	image	of	“the	Pack”	to	establish	a	metaphorical	framework	for	a	relational	model	of	self.	In	other	words,	while	adolescent	girls	may	not	be	able	to	experience	“the	Pack,”	in	the	same	way	Daine	and	Maerad	(Croggon’s	shero)	do	through	their	literal	transformations	into	wolves,	“the	Pack”	does	have	the	potential	to	serve	as	a	powerful	metaphor	of	interdependency	and	community	that	is	absent	from	the	discourses	of,	especially,	adolescent	development	in	contemporary	Western	culture.	In	this	space,	Taylor	Swift’s	“squad,”	alongside	the	impetus	behind	the	popular	#squadgoals,	speaks	to	this	kind	of	relationship,	while	also	demonstrating	the	power	of	the	dominant	for	recuperating	that	which	might	disrupt	its	norms.		While	Daine	ultimately	learns	to	transform	into	any	animal	(including	multiple	animals	at	once)	and	to	incorporate	animal	parts	within	and	on	her	human	self	as	well	as	human	parts	into	her	animal	self,	she	shares	a	particular	bond	with	wolves;	Brokefang,	the	Pack	leader	of	the	Longlake	wolves,	regards	her	as	Pack,	despite	her	looking	quite	human	([1994]	1999,	3).	Daine’s	inclusion	within	the	Pack,	despite	a	visible	difference	between	her	and	a	typical	Pack	member	is	crucial.	It	is	a	key	difference	between	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	figurings	of	the	Pack	and	hegemonic	offerings.	For	Daine,	appearance	does	not	matter,	but	for	members	of	Taylor	Swift’s	“squad,”	appearance—and	the	appearance	of	the	squad	as	a	whole—is	paramount.	As	Petersen	(2015)	suggests,			It’s	simply	that	the	friends	Swift	chooses	to	present	to	the	world	serve	to	support	crucial,	carefully	crafted	components	of	Swift’s	image.	She	isn’t	coldhearted	or	utilitarian	in	her	friendship	so	much	as	savvy	to	the	ways	in	which	the	production	of	celebrity	is,	at	its	heart,	utilitarian.	(n.p.)			Illustrating	a	keen	sense	of	neoliberal	self-awareness,	Swift’s	squad	is	modelled	on	hegemonic	ideals.	The	image	available	through	the	squad	is	beauty,	wealth	
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and	privilege,	as	the	friends	include	celebrities,	musicians	and—recently—(popculture)	feminists,	who	serve	to	craft	a	particular	aspect	of	Swift’s	image	(Fillipovic	2015).	In	other	words,	Taylor’s	squad	gives	the	impression	of	a	relational	model	of	self	that	eschews	dominate	narrative	threads	of	individuality,	but	as	it	exists	within	popular	culture,	this	squad	is	recuperated	by	the	hegemonic,	reinforcing	my	argument	that	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	occupies,	and	that	it	must,	an	alternative	discursive	space.			 To	this	end,	Pierce	offers	a	human	model	of	the	“pack”	in	her	Circle	Universe	books,	in	the	partnership	wrought	between	the	four	ambient	mages	Sandry	(thread	mage),	Tris	(weather	mage),	Briar	(plant	mage)	and	Daja	(smith	mage).	Ambient	magic	is	somewhat	akin	to	Daine’s	wildmagic	and	many	parallels	between	the	two	can	be	drawn.	While	all	the	texts	of	this	universe	are	preoccupied,	in	some	way,	with	the	children’s	relationship,	The	Magic	in	the	
Weaving	(1998)	is	crucial	for	it	sets	them	upon	a	particularly	bonded	path,	one	that	runs	counter	to	hegemonic	narratives	of	individualism.123	Trapped	underground	by	an	earthquake	and	at	risk	from	subsequent	tremors,	Sandry	weaves	the	children’s	magics	together	in	order	to	make	them	stronger,	“Fibres	
by	themselves	are	weak—so	are	we.	Spin	them	together,	and	they	become	strong.	I	
think	the	spindle	will	bring	our	powers	together	and	strengthen	us”	(203,	formatting	original).	The	metaphor	of	spinning	and	weaving	is	beautiful,	as	it	speaks	to	how	we	are	“stronger	together,”	not	when	in	competition.			 Competition	is	symptom	of	binary	systems,	and	competititon	plagues	both	Swift’s	squad	and	#squadgoals.	When	competition	enters	the	Pack	or	squad,	interdependency,	community,	and	relation	fall	apart,	as	competition	promotes	antagonism,	individuality,	and	distinctiveness.	With	Swift,	the	squad	is	part	of	a	general	strategy	that	was	concerned	with	redeveloping	her	public	persona,	after	a	series	of	missteps	saw	her	“labelled	[as]	a	serial	dater,	a	‘maneater’	who	was	crazy	and	desperate	for	a	boyfriend”	(Woodward	2015,	
                                                123	Outside	of	present	scope,	this	series	also	speaks	to	the	diversity	that	is	often	missing	in	YA	and	children’s	literature.	The	children	are	a	“pack,”	but	they	are	different:	in	terms	of	class	(Sandry	is	a	noble,	Tris	a	merchant,	Briar	an	orphan	and	pickpocket,	and	Daja	a	Trader),	race	(Daja	is	black),	sex	(Sandry,	Tris	and	Daja	are	female	and	Briar	is	male)	and	even	sexual	orientation	(Daja	is	gay).	Here,	their	differences	make	them	stronger.		
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n.p).	The	squad,	in	this	light,	becomes	a	means	of	refocusing	public	opinion	and	increasing	Swift’s	stardom;	her	individuality,	despite	the	squad.		On	a	more	ordinary	level,	#squadgoals	are	competition	incarnate:	the	ambitions	of	a	particular	group	of	friends	to	dress	in	a	certain	style	(often	that	of	a	particular	celebrity),	to	take	fantastic	group	selfies,	or	to	reach	some	shared	fitness	target.	The	hegemonic	nature	of	the	goals	and	their	overwhelming	tendency	to	focus	on	appearance	illustrates	the	problem	with	mainstream,	hegemonic	renderings	of	the	Pack.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	the	American	high	school	student	Laurie	Lopez	(2016)	calls	for	the	ending	of	the	squad	in	a	recent	article	for	Clover,	Lena	Dunham’s	newsletter	aimed	at	adolescent	and	teenage	girls.	Lopez’s	reasons	for	disliking	squads	is	because	the	squad,	as	figured	in	American	high	schools,	often	becomes	a	clique—the	hegemonic	model	of	the	relation	that	focuses	on	exclusivity,	individuality	and	competition.	Pierce’s	Tortall	books,	however,	offer	alternatives,	and	they	do	so	because	they	are	outside	of	the	mainstream	of	popular	and	media	culture.	For	these	texts,	“the	Pack”	means	kinship,	support	and	relation:	“‘You’re	my	pack,	aren’t	you?	I’ll	do	my	best.	I	can’t	promise	they’ll	listen	to	me,	but	I’ll	try’	([1994]	1999,	14),”	and	“It’s	so	lonely	outside	the	pack”	(1992,	161,	ellipses	original).	While	Maerad’s	ability	differs	from	Daine’s,	the	idea	of	“Pack”	offered	by	her	“being	wolf”	is	similar	to	that	constructed	by	Daine’s	texts:	Maerad	“can	
share	our	kill	and	drink	our	water,	he	said.	We	will	give	her	the	protection	of	the	
pack”	(Croggon	[2004]	2005,	435	emphasis	original).	Here,	the	pack	is	about	“shar[ing]”	and	“protection.”	For	Daine,	this	community	is	demonstrated	in	a	need	for	companionship:	“he’s	a	good	pack	leader	for	you.	Brokefang	went	on.	Humans	are	like	wolves.	We	all	need	a	pack”	([1994]	1999,	93).	Brokefang’s	statement	not	only	demonstrates	an	importance	of	the	Pack,	but	it	also	establishes	a	further	similarity	between	humans	and	wolves,	at	least	concerning	this	need	for	a	Pack—humans	are	like	wolves	in	this	need.		Daine	and	Maerad	find	care,	companionship,	and	unity	in	“the	Pack,”	just	as	Alanna	and	Kel	find	support	and	understanding	in	their	conversations	with	other	women.	These	are	relational	models	of	self,	and	they	are	crucial	for	undoing	the	dominance	of	binary	oppositions.	As	repetition	and	connection	demonstrate,	relationship	frustrates	economies	of	opposition	by	occupying	the	
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space	between	oppositions,	and	as	this	final	reading	of	“the	Pack”	demonstrates,	the	relational	model	of	self	available	in	these	texts	also	refuses	the	competition	and	isolating	individuality	implicit	in	hegemonic	narratives	of	self	(narratives	underscored	by	the	system	of	binary	oppositions).	Moreover,	as	mainstream	offerings	of	“the	Pack”	demonstrate,	the	power	of	the	dominant	to	recuperate,	to	stabilise,	that	which	threatens	its	systems	is	strong.	Thus,	these	texts	also	demonstrate	how	challenges	to	this	narrative	must	come	from	the	periphery,	from,	for	example,	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy,	as	this	fantasy	is	both	outside	of	mainstream,	popular	culture	and	in-between	the	binary	opposition	children/adult	literature.		 	*	*	*		These	mythopoeic	YA	fantasy	texts	do	insist	upon	a	certain	“truth”	of	the	body;	there	are	certain	immutable	facts:	Alanna	is	female	and	her	body	will	physically	develop	into	a	woman;	Levana’s	body	is	scarred;	Daine’s	body	is	human;	Cinder’s	body	is	part-human	and	part-machine.	Yet,	these	texts	also	complicate	that	truth:	cross-dressing	disguises	Alanna’s	body,	as	the	Lunar	glamour	does	for	Levana	and	Cinder;	pregnancy	both	reveals	and	conceals	a	multiplicity	of	body,	while	Daine’s	body	can	also	become	wolf	or	bird	or	a	myriad	of	People	(animals	within	this	world).	In	other	words,	these	texts	demonstrate,	exceedingly	well,	the	body’s	liminality,	and	in	so	doing,	they	refuse	the	flatness	and	superficiality	of	body,	and	bodily	appearance,	demanded	by	popular	and	media	culture.	Becoming	bodily	a	girl,	animal,	human-machine	hybrid	or	being	scarred	or	pregnant	does	not	foreclose	opportunity	or	the	“positions	available	for	occupation,”	to	return	to	Parsons	(2004).	Rather,	this	“becoming”	or	“being”	offers	a	topography	of	the	body	that	does	not	refuse	lumps,	bumps	and	difference	and	a	concomitant	model	of	self	founded	in	relation,	not	opposition.				
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